Plotting the Course to Xi’s Fourth Term: Preparations, Predictions, and Possibilities
- Jonathan Czin
- 2 days ago
- 36 min read
The defining question at the next Party Congress in 2027 more likely will be whether Xi identifies an heir-apparent rather than whether he will step down. His fourth term in office is likely to be characterized by a dichotomy between increasingly tumultuous internal politicking and relative policy continuity. In his fourth term, Xi’s age will make the succession issue an increasingly unavoidable aspect of politics in Zhongnanhai, and the possibility that most of Xi’s cronies might retire at the next Party Congress will intensify the jockeying to succeed him. By contrast, Xi is likely to stay the course on the policies he set during his first two terms. Policy dynamics in Beijing could become more volatile if succession politicking and policymaking become intertwined. Otherwise, the Taiwan issue is likely where we would see policy discontinuity during Xi’s fourth term. If the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) wins another presidential term, Xi could become more willing to pursue measures he so far has forgone, such as seizing Taiwan’s offshore islands or conducting military overflights of Taiwan, among other possibilities.
The defining question at the next Party Congress in 2027 more likely will be whether Xi identifies an heir-apparent rather than whether he will step down. His fourth term in office is likely to be characterized by a dichotomy between increasingly tumultuous internal politicking and relative policy continuity. In his fourth term, Xi’s age will make the succession issue an increasingly unavoidable aspect of politics in Zhongnanhai, and the possibility that most of Xi’s cronies might retire at the next Party Congress will intensify the jockeying to succeed him. By contrast, Xi is likely to stay the course on the policies he set during his first two terms. Policy dynamics in Beijing could become more volatile if succession politicking and policymaking become intertwined. Otherwise, the Taiwan issue is likely where we would see policy discontinuity during Xi’s fourth term. If the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) wins another presidential term, Xi could become more willing to pursue measures he so far has forgone, such as seizing Taiwan’s offshore islands or conducting military overflights of Taiwan, among other possibilities.
Now that Xi has rounded the corner into the latter half of his third term, it is a propitious time to consider whether Xi will pursue a fourth term in office, and if so, what his priorities might be during a fourth term. Xi’s lack of an obvious heir-apparent—and decimation of the norms for identifying one—suggest Xi will in fact serve a fourth term, though it remains possible that he will start grooming a potential heir during his next term.[1] In his third term, for the most part Xi has been content to tweak the policies he laid out in his first two terms, suggesting broad continuity in a fourth term as well—in large part because Xi sees China to be on course for entrenching itself as a great power and a techno-industrial powerhouse.[2] The main potential area for policy discontinuity is Taiwan, where a presidential election in 2028—and the possibility of a fourth consecutive president from the Democratic People’s Party (DPP)—could prompt a deeper rethink of China’s Taiwan policy, an area in which Xi has lost ground since meeting with Taiwan President Ma Ying-Jeou in Singapore a decade ago.[3] Xi’s failure to replicate that symbolic success, never mind build on it, may increasingly gnaw at him, especially as he will be just around the corner from turning age 80 when he will conclude his fourth term in office. In contrast to the likelihood of policy stability on issues aside from Taiwan, Chinese politics is poised to become even more tumultuous during Xi’s fourth term—as the reality of Xi’s mortality and the concomitant need to identify a successor become increasingly salient features of political life in Beijing.
Setting the Stage for the Next Party Congress
Personnel issues have occupied a surprising amount of time during Xi’s third term in office, with Xi purging a number of high-profile officials whom he seemed to have personally promoted.[4] This is especially remarkable when one considers that he evicted any figure who possibly might have impinged on his authority at the most recent Party Congress in 2022.[5] Simultaneously, Xi stacked the leadership with either his long-time associates or figures whom he had plucked from obscurity through rapid “helicopter promotions.”[6] The extent of leadership turnover has taken many observers by surprise during his third term because Xi is no longer going after his rivals, but rather seems to be going after his putative friends. The personnel churn has been the most furious in the ranks of the PLA high command, where Xi has removed not one, but three members of the Party’s supreme military body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), including Vice Chairman He Weidong.[7] This number is even more astounding when appropriately contextualized: The number of CMC members Xi has removed could surpass the number that Mao purged over the course of his entire tenure from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 until his death in 1976.[8] Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that this is the period of greatest turnover in the high command in the post-Mao era since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.[9] In 2023 Xi also disposed of his foreign minister, Qin Gang, just months after elevating him—making Qin the shortest serving foreign minister in PRC history, a remarkable feat given the vicissitudes of Chinese politics in the Mao era.[10]
Although Xi has purged a number of officials who seemed to benefit from his patronage, the officials with whom Xi has enjoyed the closest and longest relationships have remained unscathed. This coterie includes all of the current members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) (except Wang Huning) and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, whose father served alongside Xi’s father in China’s Northwest during the Civil War.[11] Indeed, at the last Party Congress, Xi retained Zhang on the CMC even though Zhang had already exceeded the Party’s informal retirement age.[12] Perhaps more remarkably, Zhang so far seems to be unsullied by corruption allegations even though the anti-corruption campaign in the military has ravaged the leadership of the PLA’s Equipment Development Department that Zhang ran during Xi’s first term.[13]
This outcome suggests that Xi’s court has at least two layers, with Xi at the center of this political solar system. The innermost orbit consists of officials whom Xi has known and worked with for decades, extending back to his time in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces.[14] Beyond the metaphorical asteroid belt is a second cluster of officials whom Xi has elevated since coming into office but who in Xi’s eyes are largely disposable. This distinction is intuitive: in a paranoid polity like the PRC, trust is an especially precious commodity—and it makes sense that accumulating such trust takes decades, not years. Many observers have contended that the downfall of these disposable protégés is a sign of Xi’s weakness, but their ousters instead suggest Xi’s ability to move personnel around on the chessboard with impunity; in this game, even Xi’s bishops seem to be as disposable as his pawns.[15] He has demonstrated sangfroid rather than weakness. The corollary of this line of thinking is that a better indicator of Xi’s standing being in jeopardy would be if members of Xi’s innermost circle were to start to lose their positions.
Moreover, these purges—as dramatic and consequential as they have been—are only half of the story of Xi’s third term. At the same time that Xi has discarded officials with whom he has lost confidence for one reason or another, in his third term Xi has delegated meaningful authority to those officials who have remained in his good graces—even if they are not part of his innermost circle. The most conspicuous example of this phenomenon is Premier Li Qiang, who as scholar Neil Thomas documents, enjoys greater authority over economic policy than did his predecessor Li Keqiang.[16] Li Keqiang had been Xi’s rival for the top position, but he lost out in the succession sweepstakes, and then he was marginalized by Xi early during his first term.[17] By contrast, Xi has not only given Li Qiang more latitude to manage the economy—which is the traditional remit of the premier—but he has also been increasingly comfortable delegating high-profile foreign travel to Li Qiang, sending Li to the G-20 in his stead in 2023 and, more recently, tapping Li to represent China at the BRICS summit in July.[18] In each instance, Xi’s decision to stay home sparked speculation about Xi’s political and physical health, but in this instance the simplest explanation seems to be the most likely one.[19] Xi demonstrably trusts Li and, moreover, Xi—like many people in their 70s—has demonstrated less interest in traveling abroad, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic.[20] Insisting that foreign leaders instead visit him in Beijing—as Xi did during the recent China-EU summit in July 2025—is also more consistent with traditional Chinese statecraft, lending Xi an air of imperial remoteness.[21]
Similarly, Wang Yi has become the most powerful foreign policy official in China in a generation. This is yet another reflection of Xi’s comfort with delegating authority and allowing trusted officials to enjoy the full authority to do their jobs. Indeed, Wang seems to have been the chief beneficiary of the sudden dismissal of erstwhile Foreign Minister Qin Gang in 2023, whose mere presence as a possible successor to Wang over time would have chipped away at Wang’s power since Wang would have become more of a lame duck with each passing year.[22] Instead, Qin’s removal allowed Wang to serve concurrently as both director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission and as minister of Foreign Affairs, with no obvious successor in sight.[23] The last foreign policy official to enjoy such power was Qian Qichen, who from 1997 to 2002 served concurrently as a Politburo member, vice premier, and foreign minister.[24] The rumors in the wake of Qin’s removal that some other figure, like director of the International Liaison Department, Liu Jianchao, might become foreign minister never materialized, probably a reflection of Xi’s willingness to allow power to be concentrated in Wang’s hands for now.[25] Liu’s reported detention in August has likely taken the most viable contender to succeed Wang out of the picture, further cementing Wang’s preeminence in the foreign policy bureaucracy.[26]
Will Xi Serve a Fourth Term?
The defining question at the next Party Congress in 2027 is more likely to be whether Xi will identify an heir-apparent than whether he will step down. After methodically concentrating power in his own hands for more than a decade, Xi thus far has demonstrated scant inclination to begin unwinding that process by designating a successor—and he has very little time to do so before the next Party Congress.[27] Xi has undone many of the norms of succession that steadily accumulated beginning in the Deng era, most notably jettisoning both the formal term limits for the presidency and concurrently breaking the incipient norm of holding the top job in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for only two terms.[28] Meanwhile, none of the last three vice presidents—have even held a concurrent seat on the PBSC, turning a traditional a stepping stone to the top leadership position into a professional cul-de-sac.[29] Most importantly, no civilian has served on the CMC since Xi became commander-in-chief in 2012.[30] No heir-apparent will last long in the top job without first establishing his bona fides with the military—as the sad cases of Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang amply demonstrate.[31]
Although the norms for identifying a successor may be moribund, they are not yet quite dead. If Xi installs a younger civilian member of the PBSC—someone born in the 1960s or later—as vice chairman of the CMC, some of the former markers might once again be useful for identifying who among them may be a plausible candidate for heir-apparent. But the absence of any younger figure holding both those positions strongly suggests that Xi intends to serve yet another term in office.
In the meantime, Xi has already begun laying the groundwork for the next Party Congress, most notably by kicking off the mid-cycle game of musical chairs among ministerial-level officials who might be eligible for promotion to the Politburo. The most telling sign that such jockeying for the next Party Congress is already underway was obscured by the long shadow cast by the onset of the second trade war between the United States and China in early April. Just as the trade war was escalating, Xi was making moves at home to prepare for the next Party Congress, taking the highly unusual step in April of replacing Li Ganjie with Shi Taifeng as director of the Central Organization Department—an extremely powerful position that oversees Party personnel and has no real analogue in Western polities.[32] It is exceedingly rare to change the head of the Organization Department in between Party Congresses—and every Organization Department chief who has lost their position in between Party Congresses has ultimately ended up being purged.[33] Li Ganjie’s ouster was especially remarkable since he was one of only ten Politburo members born in the 1960s, and therefore eligible to serve on the Politburo during Xi’s fourth term.[34] Moreover, running the Organization Department has historically been a springboard to a position on the PBSC.[35]
We do not know what prompted Li’s ouster, but we can safely infer that Xi is already focusing in earnest on the sundry personnel decisions he will have to make at the upcoming 21st Party Congress in 2027. Such a focus on personnel makes sense given the scope of the turnover that is likely to occur at the next Party Congress. At this next Party Congress, the leadership will likely experience a generational turnover to figures born in the 1960s. Indeed, if Xi continues to abide by the informal “7 up, 8 down” (i.e., Politburo members must be 67 or younger at the time of the Party Congress), then only ten members of the current Politburo will be eligible to remain, and the entire PBSC except for Ding Xuexiang would have to step down (see chart).[36] If precedent is at all predictive, at the next Party Congress Xi will likely violate but not altogether abandon this norm by letting some of his cronies stay in office past the unofficial retirement age, much as he did at the last Party Congress by letting General Zhang Youxia remain in place.[37]
Table 1: Politburo Standing Committee members and birth year. (Boldface signifies members who should step down under the “7 up, 8 down” rule)
Name | Current Position | Birthyear |
Xi Jinping | General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the CCP CMC, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Chairman of the PRC CMC. | 1953 |
Li Qiang | Premier of the State Council | 1956 |
Zhao Leji | Chairman of the 14th National People's Congress Standing Committee | 1957 |
Wang Huning | Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. | 1955 |
Cai Qi | Secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat, Director of the CCP General Office | 1955 |
Ding Xuexiang | Executive Vice Premier of the State Council | 1962 |
Li Xi | Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission | 1956 |
Table 2: Other Politburo members and birth year (Boldface signifies members who should step down under the “7 up, 8 down” rule)
Name | Current Position | Birthyear |
Ma Xingrui | (Currently being reassigned) | 1959 |
Wang Yi | State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. | 1953 |
Yin Li | Secretary of the Beijing Municipal CCP Committee. | 1962 |
Shi Taifeng | Vice Chairman of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Director of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee. | 1956 |
Liu Guozhong | Vice Premier of the State Council | 1962 |
Li Ganjie | Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee. | 1964 |
Li Shulei | Member of the Politburo of the 20th CCP Central Committee, Secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat, Minister of the CCP Central Propaganda Department. | 1964 |
Li Hongzhong | Member of the Politburo of the 20th CCP Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress. | 1956 |
He Weidong* | Vice Chairman of the CMC* | 1957 |
He Lifeng | Vice Premier and Director of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Office. | 1955 |
Zhang Youxia | Vice Chairman of the CMC | 1950 |
Zhang Guoqing | Vice Premier of the State Council and member of the Party Leadership Group. | 1964 |
Chen Wenqing | Secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, President of the Chinese Law Society. | 1960 |
Chen Jining | Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee | 1964 |
Chen Min’er | Secretary of the Tianjin Municipal CCP Committee | 1960 |
Yuan Jiajun | Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal CCPCommittee | 1962 |
Huang Kunming | Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee | 1956 |
*He Weidong has been removed from his post but he has not been officially ousted from the Politburo.
What Are Xi’s Priorities for his Fourth Term?
Xi’s fourth term in office is likely to be characterized by a dichotomy between increasingly tumultuous internal politicking and relative policy continuity. The new crop of senior officials will likely have weaker ties to Xi than the current cohort, many of whom have worked with Xi for decades. This younger generation is likely to jockey to ingratiate themselves, undermine their potential rivals, and possibly even position themselves as Xi’s eventual heir. Indeed, the actuarial table and the questions it will raise about the eventual succession are likely to increasingly dominate the behind-the-scenes politics in Beijing. Meanwhile, Xi is likely to stay the course on the policies he set during his first two terms. As scholar Carl Minzer argues, Xi has definitively ended the age of reform—leaving precious little space for the policy experimentation or oscillations that marked previous eras of Chinese politics.[38] Indeed, Xi has largely tinkered with his existing policies at the margins, adjusting them as needed to cope with exogenous challenges such as the second trade war with the United States.[39] Perhaps the most likely and notable exception could be on Taiwan—where Xi has very little to show for the policy of patient coercion he has pursued during the decade since the DPP came to power. If the DPP returns to power again for a fourth term in 2028, an aging Xi may be inclined to take qualitatively more coercive actions against Taiwan to pressure it to engage in political talks with the mainland. Xi, however, will likely remain unwilling to gamble with his legacy by following a more reckless course of action, such as a full-blown invasion.
1. Most Likely to Succeed?
Assuming that Xi does serve a fourth term, personnel issues are likely to remain his central preoccupation even after the next Party Congress—especially because Xi will be 79 by the end of his fourth term. Xi’s age will make the succession question an increasingly unavoidable aspect of Zhongnanhai politics. The possibility that most, if not all, of Xi’s cronies may retire at the next Party Congress will intensify the jockeying to succeed Xi. Even if Xi does designate an heir-apparent at the next Party Congress, that would likely be the first rather than the last stop in resolving the succession issue. Indeed, aside from Xi and his predecessor, every other heir- apparent in PRC politics has wound up dead, purged, arrested, or marginalized.[40] During his first term Xi purchased his own power at the expense of the system by demolishing the norms that allowed China to pull off two peaceful transfers of power. The politics surrounding the succession are to be bumpy and messy—and will likely result in political casualties among the leadership ranks of the Party.[41]
Meanwhile, if, for the most part, Xi does enforce the “7 up, 8 down” rule, only he and at most a few of his closest allies on the PBSC will remain in power. This raises real questions about what role Xi’s other stalwart allies will play after retiring, given how close and enduring his relationships with each of them are. Xi devoted much of his first term eviscerating the power of the Party elders, such as Jiang Zemin and other former PBSC members who historically played significant behind-the-scenes roles in Chinese politics.[42] Yet if Xi continues to look to his old friends for counsel and advice, it is entirely possible that Chinese politics will go “back to the future” and in some ways resemble the politics of the 1980s when retired Party heavyweights played outsized roles, often nominally overshadowing the younger officials in charge of the Party and the state.[43] The crucial difference between that time and now is that this new crop of Party elders will lack the heft and desire to be counterweights to Xi in the way that Party elders like Chen Yun were to Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.[44]
Nonetheless, this group could prove fissiparous, especially once they are unburdened by public office and as the succession issue becomes increasingly salient. After all, it is not at all clear that Xi’s allies on the PBSC are a cohesive group, especially since Xi forged bonds with them at different stages of his career and that before joining the PBSC, they had not previously worked together as a group.[45] Moreover, from Xi’s perspective as an authoritarian leader, it behooves him to sow some division among his allies in order to keep any of them from amassing too much power on their own and to ensure they are all closer to Xi than they are to one another.
If Xi’s peers do retire, in his fourth term Xi will find himself surrounded by officials who are a generation younger than he is, with whom he may have little familiarity, and who in all likelihood will be his protégés’ protégés. These younger men in turn will likely be vying with one another to ingratiate themselves with an aging Xi—and looking to position themselves not only for promotion but potentially to become his heir-apparent. The rivalry will likely prove especially intense because during his third term Xi has already demonstrated an ample willingness to eject officials who are in his outer orbit.
2. Keeping Policy on Track
Although Xi’s fourth term will have all the ingredients for a tumultuous period of politicking, the policy picture is poised to be much more stable—all things being equal. During his first term. Xi largely laid down the parameters of his policies, and he has stuck with those policies through his second and third terms. On the home front, Xi has demonstrated little interest in the policy experimentation and pilots that characterized the Deng and post-Deng eras.[46] While a number of economists argue that many of the structural changes long countenanced by Chinese leaders will help ameliorate the economic slowdown that has characterized Xi’s third term—such as boosting domestic consumption, establishing a property tax, or reforming the antiquated hukou system—from Xi’s vantage, China’s economic slowdown makes the timing much less propitious for experimenting with any of these reforms.[47] During COVID-19, the existing hukou system allowed migrant workers in China’s big cities to return to the countryside and allowed them to provide for themselves after losing their jobs.[48] The cratering of China’s property sector means that instating any property tax now would only compound the malaise in that sector, while adding far less to the public coffers than it would have five years ago.[49] Even though since the September 2024 Politburo meeting the leadership has pledged to make boosting domestic consumption the Party’s top priority, the lack of follow-through suggests that this rhetoric is primarily designed to assuage public angst rather than to renovate China’s growth model in any meaningful way.[50] Indeed, during his inspection tours Xi has continued to hammer home the pre-eminence of his techno-industrial policies for China.[51] He likely judges that China is making significant headway on the suite of policy objectives that has emerged as the centerpiece of his tenure—positioning China as the world’s techno-industrial powerhouse.[52] The Party is already gearing up to put in place the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will dictate economic policy for much of Xi’s fourth term.[53]
One dynamic that has changed during Xi’s third term is that Xi seems to have become more fiscally conservative as he has gotten older, or at least more restrained—and this dynamic is likely to carry over into his fourth term.[54] We see this proclivity for frugality driving Xi’s approach to the domestic economy. Even as the real estate sector collapsed and pushed the Chinese economy to the brink of deflation, Xi has only been willing to expend the absolute bare minimum of resources to sustain economic growth and stave off the worst knock-on effects.[55] Indeed, if one reads the Party’s authoritative statements on economic policy during the past year, the overwhelming emphasis is on “stabilizing” rather than on “stimulating” the economy.[56]
The story of broad continuity is largely the same on the foreign policy front, where Xi’s strategy has largely been a mirror image of the Biden administration’s China strategy, which was summed up by the phrase “invest, align, compete.”[57] Competition with the United States remains at the forefront of Xi’s foreign policy, and his entente with Vladimir Putin’s Russia remains the core of his strategy for dealing with what he likely sees an increasingly hostile United States.[58] Xi has been personally invested in the relationship with Russia since early in his first term, making his first state visit to Moscow in 2013 shortly after taking over the top position.[59] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only deepened and hardened that alignment, despite speculation among some observers during the early days of the war that Xi might try to distance himself from Putin.[60] The reduction in U.S. hostility toward Russia gives him even less reason to change course. Xi’s other top priority is China’s own periphery—as evidenced by his convocation in April of a central work conference devoted to this issue, the first of its kind since Xi’s first term.[61] Xi may shift from coercing to wooing U.S. allies in the region if he judges that the Trump administration’s tariff policy is alienating them and creating opportunities for China, but so far Xi has preferred to deepen the conundrum for U.S. allies in the region by intensifying pressure on them.[62] Xi’s likely objective is to persuade these U.S. partners of the shallowness of the U.S. commitment to them, especially under the Trump administration. Likewise, Xi’s overtures to the Global South have already become a well-entrenched feature of China’s foreign policy, with little sign of change.[63]
What Could Cause Policy Discontinuity?
1. Self-assurance Becomes Overconfidence
Xi’s confidence in his overall foreign and domestic policies does raise the question of what will happens if Xi judges that China is starting to overtake a United States driven by internal dysfunction and debt and is increasingly isolated internationally by the Trump administration’s impulsive and inconsistent foreign policy. Xi’s second term saw the rise of precisely such premature triumphalism as China initially seemed to manage the COVID-19 pandemic better than the United States.[64] The confluence with the CCP’s centenary celebrations in 2021, toward the end of Xi’s second term, amplified this triumphal spirit.[65] This line of thinking was encapsulated in the phrase “the East is rising, the West is declining”—which remains intact, but has become less pronounced in PRC rhetoric as the United States briskly recovered from the pandemic while China encountered its own economic doldrums.[66]
Some scholars have argued that when China is confident, its foreign policy tends to be more restrained, while others have argued the converse—namely, that when China feels insecure, its foreign policy becomes more aggressive.[67] In fact, there is little evidence for either of these suppositions. China actually tends to be more restrained when it is insecure. The paradigmatic example is Deng Xiaoping’s promulgation of his dictum that China “should hide its capabilities and bide its time” in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, when China was at its weakest and most isolated ebb in the post-Mao era.[68] By contrast, two decades later, China shifted toward a more assertive foreign policy in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, when many in the Chinese system argued that it was time to move on from “hide and bide” because China was clearly the ascendant power while the United States was in decline.[69] In retrospect, this clearly was the most consequential policy debate in China of this century. While Xi’s predecessor tamped down the percolating forces calling for change, Xi harnessed this political energy in dramatic fashion during his first term, making a series of dramatic foreign policy moves—most notably, or at least most conspicuously, by reclaiming more than 3,000 acres in the South China Sea.[70] By contrast, in his second term Xi was more restrained as the first trade war and the wholesale shift to a competitive China policy by the first Trump administration seemed to catch him off guard.[71] This time around, though, Xi was well prepared for Trump’s return—and for the second trade war—as reflected in the greater alacrity and efficacy with which he has responded to Trump’s trade measures.[72] This all suggests the very real possibility that we might see Xi pursue a more dramatic and assertive foreign policy during his fourth term if he judges that the United States is retrenching and malfunctioning, much as it was in the wake of the Vietnam War.
2. Politicking Takes Command
The policy dynamic in Beijing may become more volatile if these two otherwise parallel trends intersect—and the politicking and policymaking become intertwined, which was a crucial feature of the Mao and Deng eras.[73] The emergence of this dynamic always remains a possibility in Chinese politics, where differences over policy or even ideology have so often been post hoc justifications for undermining one’s rivals—the symptom rather than the cause of political infighting.[74] However, a major facet of Xi’s tenure is that for the most part he has flattened the oscillations in Chinese policymaking, making them distinctly more linear. The main way this could change would be if Xi were to opt to move to the “second line” as Mao and then Deng did. Xi would have to become content with operating more by remote control and with Delphic orations that leave his subordinates with much room for interpretation—or even misinterpretation, willful or otherwise. As noted above, in his third term Xi has already demonstrated, in some instances, a greater willingness to delegate authority to those whom he trusts. Notably, however, both Li Qiang and Wang Yi are technocrats operating within the Chinese state, and as consequential as the premiership and Foreign Ministry are, neither is a locus of power in China’s Leninist system that would allow either official to pose any challenge to Xi.[75]
Another variant on this scenario is that Xi experiences meaningful cognitive decline in his fourth term and moves to the “second line” in fact if not formally. We have few insights into Xi’s health, but some basic facts and common sense suggest this is a plausible scenario. After all, Xi is a visibly overweight man in his 70s who is in his second decade of holding an unimaginably stressful—if not virtually impossible—job of governing the world’s largest country. In some ways, it would be more remarkable if the job did not start to exact some toll on his mental acuity during his fourth term.
Taiwan is the Wild Card and 2028—Not 2027—Is the Crucial Year
Taiwan is the one issue where we are most likely to see policy discontinuity during Xi’s fourth term, regardless of the political dynamic in Zhongnanhai. For much of Xi’s third term, the policy community in Washington and elsewhere has focused on the year 2027—the deadline Xi set for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to take Taiwan by force, if need be.[76] Although, as Brookings scholar John Culver points out, the PLA in fact will bring significant military capabilities for a Taiwan mission online in the next 18 months, Xi’s rolling purges of the high command suggest that Xi has little confidence in his high command.[77] Moreover, it is worth noting that Xi likely chose the 2027 timeline for symbolic as much as for substantive reasons. 2027 is not only when Xi might begin his fourth term, but, more importantly, it will also be the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the PLA.[78] Xi seems to have a numerological fixation, and throughout his tenure he has demonstrated a fondness for centenary goals.
However, 2027 is not the key year that will determine the trajectory of cross-Strait relations during Xi’s fourth term. The more consequential date will come the following year, 2028, when Taiwan has its next presidential election. If Taiwan President Lai Ching-te and the DPP win another term, it could finally drive home to Xi the intellectual bankruptcy at the heart of his Taiwan policy—namely, that he and the Party writ large do not have a viable political strategy for Taiwan, regardless of the shifting military balance in the Western Pacific and in the Taiwan Strait. Since the DPP first took office in 2016, the PRC has had no known channels of communication with the government in Taiwan.[79] The Guomindang (KMT) victory in the Legislative Yuan in the 2024 election afforded Beijing enough of a fig leaf to sincerely believe that its current approach is in fact still viable.[80] Yet if the DPP wins a fourth consecutive term—and also secures a majority in the Legislative Yuan—it could and should raise profound questions for Xi about whether he is on track to merely hand the Taiwan problem down “from generation to generation”—which he has vowed not to do.[81]
Analysts have a wide range of views as to what Xi needs to do to preclude this outcome, but at a minimum, Xi needs at least some kind of political dialogue to be underway with Taiwan by the end of his tenure in order to claim that he has made progress on this core issue.[82] It is worth recalling that in his first term Xi became the first head of the CCP to shake hands with his KMT counterpart since Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek met during the Marshall Mission of 1946.[83] That meeting likely established the minimum threshold that Xi needs to clear by the end of his tenure. For Xi, having less than that to show for his efforts by the end of his fourth term will likely become increasingly untenable personally, if not politically, as he approaches the age of 80 and starts to think in earnest about his legacy.
This then raises the question of how Xi will respond if he starts to judge that time is not on his side—both because Taiwan is continuing to drift away from the mainland politically, and because of the simple fact of Xi’s own mortality. Xi can be quite patient when he thinks time is on his side, as he demonstrated during the long years of masking his ambitions and ruthlessness as he climbed the Party hierarchy. Moreover, Xi, unlike Russian President Vladimir Putin, is not a gambler, and he is not prone to acts of violence that might paint him into a corner politically—suggesting that Xi will be unwilling to gamble with his legacy by doing something recklessly dramatic, such as launching a full invasion of Taiwan. However, when it comes to advancing China’s sovereignty claims, Xi is quite comfortable with employing coercion, as he demonstrated in Hong Kong.[84] Ironically, Xi’s actions in Hong Kong in 2019 helped precipitate the very outcome he sought to avoid in 2020 in Taiwan—namely the return of the DPP.[85] On balance, this set of data points suggests that Xi could very well become more willing to pursue the more coercive and provocative measures he so far has forgone, such as seizing Taiwan’s offshore islands or conducting military overflights of Taiwan, among other possibilities.
The United States of course will be a crucial variable in this equation. We do not know how U.S. policy toward Taiwan will shift during the Trump administration, but it is difficult to imagine that the United States will be more invested in Taiwan’s security in the next four years than it is today, or that in the meantime the U.S. will play a hands-on role in managing the subtleties and nuances endemic to the cross-Strait dynamic. The Trump administration has barely responded to major PRC military exercises around Taiwan, such as Strait Thunder-A, [86] and it has reportedly cancelled defense talks with Taiwan.[87] If this dynamic continues, Xi may judge that he can enhance his coercion against Taiwan without provoking Washington.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis and scenarios are all grounded in the assumption of ceteris paribus—all other conditions remain the same. As the tumult of the last ten years—or even the last ten weeks—shows, all other conditions are not likely to remain equal during Xi’s fourth term. As Xi is fond of saying, “the world is seeing changes unseen in a century.”[88] There is always the unexpected. This is especially true for a man in his 70s. Although this essay does not focus on who might succeed Xi or on how the succession process might play out, such questions will increasingly define the political landscape during Xi’s fourth term. Xi sometimes may seem larger than life, but he is not, and the perturbations of age and his mortality will increasingly intrude on his thinking, his decision-making, and the calculations of those around him, whether he likes it or not.
About the Contributor
Jonathan A. Czin is the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center. He is a former member of the Senior Analytic Service at the CIA and was Director for China in the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023.
Notes
[1] Unlike previous successors, Xi has not designated an heir-apparent, and he has dismantled the informal system of succession to establish these norms; Jonathan Czin, “Burying Deng: Xi Jinping and the Abnormalization of Chinese Politics,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 83 (February 2025), https://www.prcleader.org/post/burying-deng-xi-jinping-and-the-abnormalization-of-chinese-politics;
[2] Li Qiang discussed the steady progress of the Chinese economy and modernization at the Third Session of the 14th National People’s Congress, and Xi Jinping has been leading inspection tours to ensure high-quality development. For more, see “政府工作报告,” 中国政府网, March 12, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202503/content_7013163.htm; “习近平在河南考察时强调：坚定信心推动高质量发展高效能治理 奋力谱写中原大地推进中国式现代化新篇章,” 中国政府网, May 20, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202505/content_7024510.htm. For foreign policy, see Ryan Hass, “From Strategic Reassurance to Running Over Roadblocks: A Review of Xi’s Foreign Policy Record,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 73 (September 2022), https://www.prcleader.org/post/from-strategic-reassurance-to-running-over-roadblocks-a-review-of-xi-jinping-s-foreign-policy-recor.
[3] Jane Perlez and Austin Ramzy, “China, Taiwan and a Meeting After 66 Years,” The New York Times, November 3, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/leaders-of-china-and-taiwan-to-meet-for-first-time-since-1949.html.
[4] High-ranking officials who have been purged include Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe. For more information, see Guoguang Wu, “Xi Jinping’s Purges Have Escalated. Here’s Why They Are Unlikely to Stop,” Asia Society Policy Institute, February 26, 2025, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/xi-jinpings-purges-have-escalated-heres-why-they-are-unlikely-stop.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Guoguang Wu, “Killing the Dreams, Keeping the Same Regime: Xi’s Ten-Year Struggle to Remake CCP Elite Politics,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 73 (September 2022), https://www.prcleader.org/post/killing-the-dreams-keeping-the-same-regime-xi-s-ten-year-struggle-to-remake-ccp-elite-politics.
[7] Demetri Sevastopulo, “Top Chinese General Removed in Xi Jinping’s Latest Purge,” Financial Times, April 10, 2025, https://www.ft.com/conte “中央军委委员、军委政治工作部上将主任苗华被停职检查,” 中华人民共和国国防部, November 28, 2024, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16354907.html. nt/8226e1d9-2e4a-4079-8f3c-2ae877ba5ba9 nt/8226e1d9-2e4a-4079-8f3c-2ae877ba5ba9; “中央軍委原委員、原國務委員兼國防部長李尚福受到開除黨籍處分,” 人民网, June 27, 2024, .http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2024/0627/c1001-40265853.html.
[8] Mao purged Peng Dehuai, He Long, and Lin Biao. Others, like Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Nie Rongzhen were not purged, but they were gradually sidelined. For more information, see Fox Butterfield, “China Reveals Far of Purged Leaders,” The New York Times, April 1, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/01/archives/china-reveals-fate-of-purged-leaders-breaks-secrecy-tradition.html; “薛明谈贺龙被迫害致死--党史频道,” 人民网, July 23, 2014, http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/0723/c85037-25324849.html; 资料中心, “林 彪,” 中国共产党新闻网, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/126778/126780/7490123.html, accessed July 30, 2025; Michael Sheng, “Mao and Chinese Elite Politics in the 1950s: The Gao Gang Affair Revisited,” Twentieth-Century China 36, no. 1 (2011): 67–96.
[9] Jonathan Czin, “Thoughts on the Political Demise of Miao Hua,” Brookings Institution, February 18, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thoughts-on-the-political-demise-of-miao-hua/; Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “Tales of Army Discord Show Tiananmen Square in a New Light,” The New York Times, June 2, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/world/asia/tiananmen-square-25-years-later-details-emerge-of-armys-chaos.html.
[10] Qin Gang served as foreign minister only from December 2022 to July 2023, a total of seven months, while Chinese foreign ministers have typically served for five to ten years. For more information, see Lingling Wei, “China’s Former Foreign Minister Ousted After Alleged Affair, Senior Officials Told,” The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-ex-foreign-minister-ousted-after-alleged-affair-senior-officials-told-fdff4672.
[11] Chris Buckley, “China’s Communist Party Congress: For His 3rd Term, Xi Jinping Surrounds Himself With Loyalists,” The New York Times, October 23, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/22/world/china-xi-jinping-congress; 任贵祥, “习仲勋对中共中央转战陕北的重要贡献,” 中共中央党史和文献研究院, September 29, 2020, https://www.dswxyjy.org.cn/n1/2020/0929/c219021-31879824.html; Cheng Li, “Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 1: The Shaanxi Gang),” China Leadership Monitor, no. 43 (January 2014), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM43CL.pdf.
[12] Joel Wuthnow, “Xi’s New Central Military Commission: A War Council for Taiwan?” China Leadership Monitor, no. 74 (December 2022), https://www.prcleader.org/post/xi-s-new-central-military-commission-a-war-council-for-taiwan.
[13] 林韵诗, “均‘涉嫌严重违纪违法’ 九将领已被罢免全国人大代表,” 财新, February 3, 2024, https://china.caixin.com/2024-02-04/102163591.html?originReferrer=caixinsearch_pc; “张又侠同志简历,” 人民网, March 2018, http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2017/1025/c414940-29608822.html,
[14] “习近平同志简历,” 人民网, March 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64192/105996/6463136.html；Guoguang Wu, “New Faces, New Factional Dynamics: CCP Leadership Politics Following the 20th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 74 (December 2022), https://www.prcleader.org/post/new-faces-new-factional-dynamics-ccp-leadership-politics-following-the-20th-party-congress.
[15] Keith B. Richburg, “Is Xi Jinping All-Powerful or Weak? Depends on Whom You Ask,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/02/xi-strong-weak-purges-china/; Lily Kuo et al., “China’s Military Shake-up May Hint at Corruption – or Xi Jinping’s Weakness,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/02/china-military-rocket-force-xi-jinping/; Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Xi Can’t Trust His Own Military,” The New York Times, May 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/opinion/china-taiwan-xi-jinping.html; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The China Brief: Xi’s Personnel Mismanagement,” The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/xis-personnel-mismanagement/, accessed July 30, 2025,
[16] Neil Thomas, “China’s Overlooked Premier Is Slowly Building up Power,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/05/li-qiang-china-premier-economy/.
[17] Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, “Li Keqiang, Chinese Premier Eclipsed by Xi Jinping, Dies at 68,” The New York Times, October 27, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/26/world/asia/li-keqiang-china-dead.html.
[18] “Li Qiang Attends the Third Session of the 18th G20 Summit,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 10, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202405/t20240530_11332239.html; “李强出席金砖国家领导人第十七次会晤第二第三阶段会议,” 中国政府网, July 8, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202507/content_7030962.htm; Neil Thomas, “Li Qiang’s Quiet Rise,” ChinaFile, June 4, 2025, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/li-qiangs-quiet-rise.
[19] Morgan Phillips, “Xi’s Absence from BRICS Summit Sparks Speculation about China’s Influence,” Fox News, July 5, 2025, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/xi-jinpings-surprise-no-show-brics-summit-fuels-speculation-about-chinas-global-standing; Matthias von Hein, “Speculation Grows over Xi Jinping’s G20 Absence,” DW, September 8, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/speculation-grows-over-xi-jinpings-g20-absence/a-66759689.
[20] Chun Han Wong, “China’s Xi Gives Up Air Miles for More Time at Home,” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-gives-up-air-miles-for-more-time-at-home-42e6876f.
[21] Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Leaders Plan Trip to Beijing in July for Summit with Xi,” South China Morning Post, April 11, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3306066/eu-leaders-plan-trip-beijing-july-summit-xi-jinping.
[22] Emily Feng, “China Has Replaced Its Foreign Minister, Absent from Public for a Month,” Asia, NPR, July 25, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/07/25/1189915255/china-foreign-minister-replace-qin-gang-wang-yi.
[23] “部长简历_中华人民共和国外交部,” 中华人民共和国外交部, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbz_673089/grjl_673095/, accessed July 30, 2025.
[24] Chris Buckley, “Qian Qichen, Pragmatic Chinese Envoy, Dies at 89,” The New York Times, May 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/world/asia/qian-qichen-dead-china-foreign-minister.html; “钱其琛,” 中华人民共和国外交部, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ziliao_674904/wjrw_674925/2166_674931/200805/t20080503_9880960.shtml, accessed July 25, 2025.
[25] Shi Jiangtao, “US Visit Firms Speculation Liu Jianchao Will Be China’s Next Foreign Minister,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3249873/us-visit-firms-speculation-liu-jianchao-will-be-chinas-next-foreign-minister.
[26] Chun Han Wong, “China Detains Senior Diplomat Who Aided U.S. Relations,” Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-detains-senior-diplomat-who-aided-u-s-relations-ca110bfc?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgkmBXqlV9MxxF6Tl77sZ0Kht8CoeTEQ8WsHCo9BrLun_td-KKuDmwzsjaFCBQ%3D&gaa_ts=68a92612&gaa_sig=U7ONrdUZMq7Selx1QlyCt63IGAosPm1SWWDCCLNgQTUvjHKUkWpxLatrcvjfJ_czTat-UBUY7s7A0_xkVQNcRA%3D%3D
[27] Czin, “Burying Deng: Xi Jinping and the Abnormalization of Chinese Politics.”
[28] Ibid.
[29] The last three vice presidents include Han Zheng (2023 to present), Wang Qishan (2018 to 2023), and Li Yuanchao (2013 to 2018). Czin, “Burying Deng: Xi Jinping and the Abnormalization of Chinese Politics”; “韩正同志简历_人物资料,” 中国政府网, March 19, 2018, https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2018-03/19/content_5275614.htm; “王岐山简历,” 中国政府网, March 17, 2018, https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2018-03/17/content_5275066.htm； “李源潮_人物资料,” 中国政府网, https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2013-03/14/content_2583111.htm, accessed July 25, 2025.
[30] Wuthnow, “Xi’s New Central Military Commission: A War Council for Taiwan?”; James Mulvenon, “The Best Laid Plans: Xi Jinping and the CMC Vice-Chairmanship That Didn’t Happen,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 30 (November 19, 2009), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/CLM30JM.pdf.
[31] Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping - Updated Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 45, 59–60, 187–188, 217, 258; June Teufel Dreyer, “Deng Xiaoping: The Soldier,” The China Quarterly, no. 135 (1993): 549.
[32] Shi Taifeng was first mentioned as director of the Central Organization Department on April 2. See “石泰峰听取部机关深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育开展情况,” 共产党员网, April 2, 2025, https://www.12371.cn/2025/04/02/ARTI1743580658838276.shtml. “In a First for China’s Communist Party, 2 Politburo Members Swap Jobs,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3304844/first-chinas-communist-party-politburo-members-li-ganjie-and-shi-taifeng-swap-jobs. Li Ganjie’s resume was updated on April 3, 2025. See “李干杰同志简历,” 新华网, April 3, 2025, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250403/b873d9ada1c6450cbc505d4230a85c17/c.html.
[33] Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking Chinese Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 19.
[34] “李干杰同志简历-新华网,” 新华网, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250403/b873d9ada1c6450cbc505d4230a85c17/c.html, accessed July 28, 2025.
[35] Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 46; Alice Miller, “Projecting the Next PBSC,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 49 (March 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/projecting-next-politburo-standing-committee.
[36] For current positions and birth years, see China Central Government, “中共二十届中央领导机构成员简历,”中国政府网 [Gov.cn], October 23, 2022, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/23/content_5721019.htm.
[37] Wuthnow, “Xi’s New Central Military Commission: A War Council for Taiwan?”
[38] Carl Minzner, “China’s Age of Counterreform,” Journal of Democracy 35, no. 4 (2024): 5–19.
[39] Many of Xi’s largest policy proposals occurred during his first two terms, including the Belt and Road Initiative, Made in China 2025, dual-circulation, overhaul of the PLA, establishment of the AIIB, entry into the RCEP, among others. Policy change has most been focused on “unleashing new quality productive forces.” For more information, see Arthur Krober, “Unleashing ‘New Quality Productive Forces’: China’s Strategy for Technology-Led Growth,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unleashing-new-quality-productive-forces-chinas-strategy-for-technology-led-growth/, accessed July 31, 2025.
[40] Czin, “Burying Deng: Xi Jinping and the Abnormalization of Chinese Politics.”
[41] Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 18.
[42] Czin, “Burying Deng: Xi Jinping and the Abnormalization of Chinese Politics”; Chris Buckley, “Former Chinese Leader Steps Back, Fueling Speculation,” The New York Times, January 23, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/world/asia/jiang-zemin-ex-china-leader-steps-back-fueling-speculation.html; Joseph Fewsmith, “The 19th Party Congress: Ringing in Xi Jinping’s New Age,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 55 (January 23, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/19th-party-congress-ringing-xi-jinpings-new-age.
[43] Baum, Burying Mao, 144–145, 368; Czin, “Burying Deng: Xi Jinping and the Abnormalization of Chinese Politics.”
[44] Baum, Burying Mao, 144–147.
[45] Wu, “New Faces, New Factional Dynamics: CCP Leadership Politics Following the 20th Party Congress.”
[46] Diana Choyleva, “The End of Experimentation and Aspiration in Xi Jinping’s China,” Asia Society Policy Institute, September 27, 2023, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/end-experimentation-and-aspiration-xi-jinpings-china; Abbey S. Heffer and Gunter Schubert, “Policy Experimentation under Pressure in Contemporary China,” The China Quarterly, no. 253 (March 2023): 35–56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741022001801; “China Is Conducting Fewer Local Policy Experiments under Xi Jinping,” The Economist, August 18, 2018, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/08/18/china-is-conducting-fewer-local-policy-experiments-under-xi-jinping.
[47] For information on domestic consumption, reforming the hukou system, and China’s property tax, see Eswar Prasad, “A Resurgent China Should Do the Hard Work Now,” Financial Times, July 1, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/358557b2-c493-4d8e-8d77-d81193156cdf; Jonathan Czin, “What Are the Key Drivers of Xi’s Economic Policy in 2025?” Brookings Institution, March 28, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-are-the-key-drivers-of-xis-economic-policy-in-2025/; Camille Boullenois et al., “How Can China Boost Consumption?,” Rhodium Group, February 10, 2025, https://rhg.com/research/how-can-china-boost-consumption/; Keith Bradsher, “Why China Doesn’t Have a Property Tax,” The New York Times, May 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/10/business/china-property-tax.html; “Xi Jinping’s Misguided Plan to Escape Economic Stagnation,” The Economist, April 4, 2024, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/04/04/xi-jinpings-misguided-plan-to-escape-economic-stagnation.
[48] Li Ma et al., “Rural Return Migration in the Post COVID-19 China: Incentives and Barriers,” Journal of Rural Studies 107 (April 2024): 103258, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2024.103258.
[49] Bradsher, “Why China Doesn’t Have a Property Tax.”
[50] “中共中央政治局召开会议 分析研究当前经济形势和经济工作 中共中央总书记习近平主持会议,” 中国政府网, September 26, 2024, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202409/content_6976686.htm; Hannah Miao, “China Turns to Consumers to Boost Growth, but Households Are Wary,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-turns-to-consumers-to-boost-growth-but-households-are-wary-e94be62a; Xiaofei Xu and Sylvia Ma, “‘Actionable Results’ Needed to Get Chinese Spending Again, No. 4 Official Says,” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3318450/actionable-results-new-ideas-needed-boost-chinas-consumption-no-4-official-says.
[51] “习近平在山西考察时强调 努力在推动资源型经济转型发展上迈出新步伐 奋力谱写三晋大地推进中国式现代化新篇章--时政,” 人民网, July 8, 2025, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0708/c1024-40517342.html; “习近平在河南考察时强调：坚定信心推动高质量发展高效能治理 奋力谱写中原大地推进中国式现代化新篇章,” 中国政府网, May 20, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202505/content_7024510.htm; “习近平在贵州考察时强调：坚持以高质量发展统揽全局 在中国式现代化进程中展现贵州新风采,” 中国政府网, March 18, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202503/content_7014297.htm.
[52] “政府工作报告,” 中国政府网, March 12, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202503/content_7013163.htm; “习近平在河南考察时强调：坚定信心推动高质量发展高效能治理 奋力谱写中原大地推进中国式现代化新篇章,” 中国政府网, May 20, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202505/content_7024510.htm.
[53] “把顶层设计和问计于民统一起来 – 习近平总书记重要指示为‘十五五’规划编制工作指明方向,” 中国政府网, May 20, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202505/content_7024402.htm.
[54] Keith Bradsher, “China Invested $1 Trillion to Gain Global Influence. Can That Go On?” The New York Times, October 17, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/16/business/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri.html.
[55] Czin, “What Are the Key Drivers of Xi’s Economic Policy in 2025?”
[56] “中国经济半年报‘出炉’ – 宏观政策发力显效 经济运行稳中向好_部门动态,” 中国政府网, July 16, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202507/content_7032390.htm; “2024年经济运行稳中有进 主要发展目标顺利实现,” 国家统计局, January 17, 2025, https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/xwfbh/fbhwd/202501/t20250117_1958332.html； “关于2024年国民经济和社会发展计划执行情况与2025年国民经济和社会发展计划草案的报告,” 中国政府网, March 13, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202503/content_7013429.htm.
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