China’s View of Lai Ching-te and the Pending Crisis in the Taiwan Strait
As the Democratic Progressive Party embarks on an unprecedented third term in Taiwan’s electoral history in 2024, cross-strait relations are entering unchartered territory. Beijing regards Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te as beyond redemption, with his inaugural speech and National Day speech as two examples of his “deception” and his “manipulation” of the historical facts to support his “Taiwan independence” agenda. Regardless of any goodwill Lai attempted to message, Beijing has only fixated on what it sees as unacceptable and provocative in his statements. As anxiety drives up China’s military responses to any perceived “transgressions” by Taiwan and the U.S., Beijing’s punitive measures increasingly aim at building a “new normal” to increase the costs of such activities. Consequently, the “Joint Sword” military exercises that China staged after Lai’s two 2024 speeches represent a new chapter in the long struggle over the future of Taiwan and a series of impending crises across the Taiwan Strait.
The year 2024 will leave its mark on history for its distinct impact on cross-strait relations in many ways. It is in 2024 that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a third term for the first time in Taiwan’s electoral history. This not only demonstrates the unparalleled upper hand of the DPP and its policy platforms in Taiwanese politics but also alludes to an exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, future for mainland China’s unification agenda, as the DPP’s policy platforms will have an uninterrupted twelve years to expand and deepen their roots and influence. It is also in 2024 that former President Donald Trump struck a historic victory with his re-election to the U.S. presidency. Given the significant turbulence related to Taiwan that took place during Trump’s first term, Beijing cannot help but wonder what Trump’s second term will mean for the future of cross-strait relations and for U.S.-China interactions over Taiwan.
Despite Beijing’s loud complaints about U.S. interactions with Taiwan throughout the year, China was in fact relatively satisfied with how the United States managed its response to Taiwan’s 2024 election and to Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te. For China, Lai’s inaugural speech and National Day speech are two examples of his being beyond redemption. Regardless of any goodwill Lai attempted to message, Beijing has only fixated on what it sees as unacceptable and provocative in his statements. As anxiety drives up China’s military responses to any perceived “transgressions” by Taiwan and the U.S., Beijing’s punitive measures are increasingly aiming to build a “new normal” to increase the costs of such activities. Consequently, the “Joint Sword” military exercises China staged after Lai’s two speeches in 2024 represent a new chapter in the long struggle over the future of Taiwan and foretell a series of pending crises across the Taiwan strait.
Lai Ching-te: Beyond Redemption
Before the January election, there were few questions about the prospects of a victory for the DPP candidate, then–vice president Lai Ching-te, even in China. Such an assessment was not only based on Tsai Ing-wen’s largely neutral-to-positive governance record but also based on the internal divisions within the opposition party—the KMT—and its inability to appeal to younger voters.[1] Although Beijing predicted a third DPP term, it by no means failed to put up a fight. Cyber disinformation campaigns and cognitive warfare were heavily deployed to sway public opinion in Taiwan.[2] There was a view among mainland Chinese Taiwan experts that this election might be the last chance for the KMT to prove that it is still a viable political party and that if the KMT were to fail, the election would transition politics in Taiwan toward a next stage, with new opposition arising, for example, from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) led by Ko Wen-je. (However, in light of Ko’s political scandal and criminal case,[3] it appears that the DPP will face no peer competitor in Taiwan for a long time to come.)
Despite Lai’s victory, China saw two silver linings from the election. The first was that the DPP, and Lai, only won 40 percent of the popular vote.[4] For mainland China, the small margin of the DPP’s victory meant that the DPP could only form a minority government. Combined with the KMT’s victory in the Legislative Yuan,[5] this meant that China could interpret the election results as the majority of the people on Taiwan oppose Taiwan independence and also as a victory for the mainland’s cross-strait policy.[6] More than one Chinese interlocutor has commented that the results of the election were face-saving for mainland China’s leaders.[7]
The second silver lining that China saw from Taiwan’s elections was the perception of Washington’s active efforts to manage Lai before and after the elections. Some Chinese experts privately observed that U.S. treatment of the KMT candidate, Hou You-yi, during his U.S. visit in the summer of 2023 was “visibly more favorable” than the treatment Lai received during his U.S. “transits.”[8] The Chinese also sensed that the Biden administration was more concerned about Lai and his potential to overstep Washington’s comfort level, which later was even more clearly manifested through how Lai’s inauguration speech was managed.
But neither factor had anything to do with Lai himself or his political convictions. For China, Lai is beyond redemption in every possible way. In Beijing’s view, Lai represents the New Tide faction within the DPP, which is the far-left deep green element of the DPP’s political spectrum, despite his announced exit from it after winning the January election. China sees Lai as owing his political ascension completely to support from key figures among “Taiwan independence forces,” thus earning him the nickname of “Golden Grandson of Taiwan Independence (Forces).”[9] In the Chinese narrative, he is famous for publicly vowing to be a “practical worker for Taiwan independence.”[10] In the eyes of mainland Chinese, there is nothing in Lai’s résumé or his past political record that can reassure Beijing that he will be less ambitious or provocative than was his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, in pursuing what mainland China sees as moves toward Taiwan independence.
In mainland China’s view, Lai will pursue policies that materialize Taiwan’s de facto independence, because de jure independence based on a constitutional revision is deemed to be impossible due to the DPP’s inability to achieve the required super-majority in the Legislative Yuan. The Chinese government foresees that Lai will take measures to state Taiwan’s independence in Taiwan domestically and to seek recognition of Taiwan’s de facto independent status and statehood internationally. It also sees Lai as a follower of Tsai’s declared position that Taiwan is “already an independent country,” called the Republic of China, and thus it does not need to declare its independence.[11] This, indeed, is the position Lai himself stated in a Bloomberg interview during his summer 2023 election campaign. Interestingly, the Chinese government chose not to react strongly when he made the statement publicly, despite its strong political message, based on the rationale that Tsai had earlier already made the same statement.[12]
Although China had nothing positive to say about President Tsai during the eight years of her tenure as president, she suddenly became much more acceptable in comparison to her successor. Unprecedently, in private conversations Chinese interlocutors have acknowledged that in fact Tsai had been “quite conservative and moderate in her policies during her terms.”[13] According to these interlocutors, as a lawyer it is in Tsai’s nature to be careful and precise about her choice of words. Lai, however, is seen as almost the opposite: as a local politician who rose to power through “inflammatory campaign rhetoric,” he is seen as being much bolder and more provocative in his public statements.[14] In addition, the mainland Chinese have also observed that by nature Tsai is not a radical person; therefore, China had no problem “bullying” her or “pushing her around,” knowing that she would be prudent and careful in her response. But in the eyes of mainland Chinese, the same cannot be said about Lai. [15]
The Chinese do not believe that Lai will pursue actual measures, such as a constitutional revision or a referendum on independence, for the simple reason that the DPP does not hold a majority in the Legislative Yuan, so any such moves will never be passed. However, the Chinese hardly see this as reassuring because it means Lai might also become emboldened to ramp up the rhetoric about such moves since there will be no risk of such measures ever being passed. Also, the Chinese do not believe that Lai has truly left the New Tide faction. He is already thinking about his reelection in 2028, and he will need to rally more deep-green supporters within the DPP by revealing his commitment to Taiwan’s independence in order to win that campaign. Interestingly, this interpretation is the exact opposite of predictions by prominent U.S. experts that Lai will have to “tack to the center of Taiwan’s political spectrum rather than cater to the wishes of a small minority of Taiwan voters who favor throwing caution to the wind in service of Taiwan independence or unification.”[16]
There is no expectation that Lai will ever move closer to mainland China on the issue of the 1992 Consensus, a stated precondition for China’s engagement with Tsai Ing-wen during her two terms in office.[17] China did not concede on this issue during the eight years from 2016 to 2024, and it certainly does not plan to do so now or to sacrifice this principle without any significant return from Lai Ching-te. Among Chinese policymakers, there is a complete lack of trust in Lai as well as in any prospect that he and Beijing will be able work out anything positive in the context of cross-strait relations. What is worse, given the sensitive nature of the Taiwan issue, it is unlikely that anyone in the Chinese system would even propose to try.
The fundamental problem is that the two sides’ bottom lines and goals are beyond reconciliation. China will not give up unification, and all roads will have to lead to that Rome. At the same time, Taiwan does not accept unification, unless and until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopts democratic reforms, or, in an even more extreme case, no longer holds power.[18] But the CCP sees any democratic reforms as threats to regime security. Under these circumstances, as long as Taiwan does not embrace unification, the goals of all of its policies will be seen as pursuing independence, even if it is simply aiming to preserve the status quo. This leads China to interpret Lai’s policy in the least constructive and worst possible light, and this was particularly the case with respect to his inaugural and National Day speeches.
How China Views Lai’s Two Speeches
There are vast differences between how China and the outside world evaluate Lai’s inaugural and National Day speeches. Western observers have regarded Lai’s inaugural speech as generally moderate and unprovocative. For example, according to Rush Doshi, a former Biden National Security Council deputy director for China and Taiwan, “Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges.”[19] The U.S. State Department also noted “Lai’s promise to ensure the cross-strait peace, stability and the status quo,” stating that “the State Department welcomes the message.”[20] As the United States has regarded Tsai’s cross-strait policy as balanced and moderate, the hope expressed before the inauguration had been that Lai would maintain continuity with Tsai’s policy instead of resorting to any significant change in the framing of cross-strait relations and the status quo.
Perhaps as part of the manifestation of such a continuity, Lai referred to the Republic of China (ROC) nine times in his speech, but he also referred to Taiwan seventy-two times and to ROC Taiwan three times. He mentioned the ROC constitution only once and the ROC constitutional government system only once. For mainland China, direct mentions of the Republic of China and the ROC constitution are seen as key criteria in determining whether he is viewed as signaling goodwill or as signaling hostility. Before the inaugural speech, one prominent Chinese Taiwan expert commented that he expected that Lai would mention the ROC no more than once. [21]
Although Lai mentioned the ROC nine times, China is no less enraged by what else he did or did not include in his inaugural speech. To begin with, the absence of the 1992 Consensus did not come as a surprise to Beijing. With Tsai gradually distancing herself from the Consensus during her presidency, few in China expected that Lai would go so far as to mention it, thus implicitly agreeing that “there is one China.”
It was only downhill from there. Lai’s speech did not include the previous president’s references to China as “the other side of the strait” (对岸) or as “mainland China” (大陆). Instead, referring to it as “China” Lai presented Taiwan as China’s equal counterpart in an oppositional framing, such as when he said, “I call upon China to stop the rhetorical attacks and military coercion of Taiwan.”[22] For China, “mainland China” and “the other side of the strait” imply that the two sides of the Taiwan strait still belong to the same political entity as “China,” regardless of how that China is defined. But when “China” and “Taiwan” are directly framed as two sides of the equation, it suggests that Taiwan has the same sovereign and independent status as China. Because Lai also referred to Taiwan directly as a “country” (国家), the mainland Chinese were quick to conclude that Lai’s inaugural speech was a new reincarnation of the “two-state theory” (两国论).[23]
The other offense the Chinese perceived in Lai’s inaugural speech was the statement that “the two sides of the strait are not subordinate to each other.” This statement is neither new nor untrue, as China does not exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan and it has not done so since 1949. But for Beijing, the issue of jurisdiction and administrative governance (治权) is inevitably entangled with the issue of sovereignty (主权), as the lack of jurisdiction implies that Taiwan’s sovereignty is being exercised by a government other than that of Beijing. For Beijing, it not only suggests that Taiwan is a renegade that is defiant of Chinese authority, it also lays the foundation for Taiwan to reject any future attempt by Beijing to assert its authority since such authority has never before been exercised by Beijing.
According to Beijing, Lai skillfully selected the facts and the truths that are most supportive of his political beliefs about Taiwan, and the speech cleverly exposed the inconsistencies and weaknesses of China’s assertions about Taiwan. China has not been able to exercise control over Taiwan nor has it been able persuade the people on Taiwan to aspire for unification. The results of the Taiwan presidential election are the most explicit answer by the people on Taiwan about their future.
What is more irritating for China is that Lai’s speech did not visibly tread any explicit U.S. red lines on changing the status quo. He did not call for revising the ROC constitution, which is politically impossible anyway given the 52 seats held by the opposition party (the KMT) in the Legislative Yuan, compared to the DPP’s 51 seats.[24] Unlike former president Chen Shui-bian, Lai also did not call for a referendum on Taiwan’s political status or membership in the UN. Lai treaded his position so carefully that the message largely reflects continuity with Tsai Ing-wen’s policy. However, the Chinese heard a very different message in the speeches, all in the worst possible light that China could imagine. Even worse, because superficially the speech appeared to be harmless, to the international audience Chinese anger appeared extremely irrational.
In the view of mainland Chinese, Lai’s deception was exacerbated in his National Day speech. Mainland Chinese could not dispute the historical facts he presented; instead, they accused him of “packaging and sneaking in “the theory of Taiwan independence,” and painstakingly piecing together “evidence for dividing the country.” Lai’s “the ROC has taken root in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and Taiwan is not subordinate to the PRC” are interpreted as “severing the origins and connections between the two sides of the Strait.”[25] His use of “the ROC as a symbol” emphasizes the political differences between the two sides and strengthens the perception that “the Taiwanese people are not Chinese people” and that “the Taiwan issue is not China’s internal affairs.”[26] His focus on democracy and freedom was also downgraded to being “a cover to promote Taiwan independence and separatism.”[27] What the outside world perceived to be true statements were seen as selective evidence by China to support one agenda: “Taiwan independence.” China maximized a hostile interpretation of Lai’s speeches. With the overarching political description of Lai as a “Taiwan separatist,” the result could only lead to a more coercive response from China.
The Political Calculus Behind China’s Military Responses
China launched two major military exercises to respond to Lai’s two 2024 speeches, respectively: Joint Sword-2024A and Joint Sword-2024B. Both were full-scale military exercises that included the PLA army, navy, air force, and rocket force. It is debatable as to whether these exercises represented an unprecedented level of threat to Taiwan’s security, but one thing is clear: China’s military response to the DPP and President Lai’s policies will escalate from here to establish a “new normal” to punish any perceived transgressions.
Part of the reason that Beijing decided on this path is due to the aftermath of the visit by former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan in 2022. Pelosi’s high-profile visit on August 2, 2022, was followed by protracted and aggressive Chinese military exercises after her departure. There are differing views about whether the visit was beneficial to Taiwan’s security given China’s harsh response. At least some of Taiwan public opinion believes that the visit was unnecessarily destabilizing for the Taiwan strait,[28] a message that was later echoed by David Ignatius at the Washington Post in an assessment that the visit had “done considerable damage to the island’s security” and that President Biden should have blocked the visit.[29]
The Chinese takeaway is that when actions by Taiwan or America provide China with justification for escalation, China should seize the opportunity and push the envelope to undermine Taiwan’s defense posture as well as to erode public confidence in the island’s security and, more importantly, in its future. Major Chinese military exercises, including the one in 2022 and the two in 2024, not only increased uncertainties about Taiwan’s future among global businesses and investors, they also had a tremendous psychological impact on the people on Taiwan themselves. As long as Beijing believes that they can get away without significant pushback from the United States, Beijing will proceed to push the envelope while justifying its actions as a reaction to the DPP and Lai Ching-te’s “Taiwan independence” narrative and actions.
The other logic behind this Chinese conviction appears to be a lesson from the U.S. and Taiwan playbook that if anything has a precedent, it can be done again without “changing the status quo.” China has complained that the United States justifies the transits by presidents of Taiwan through the United States as well as visits by U.S. officials to Taiwan on the grounds that there is a “historical precedent.”[30] Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, for example, was justified on the grounds that then-U.S. Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, had visited Taiwan in 1997. The lesson Chinese have learned is that if China is willing to take the risk and push the envelope, salami-slicing will enable it to create a new normal while imposing a new reality on the ground as part of the status quo.
Such is the logic behind China’s naval and air force patrols encircling Taiwan since DPP president Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in 2016. The same is also true of China’s military violations, and eventually political denial, of the median line in the Taiwan strait. There is a positive correlation between events that China perceives as provocative by Taiwan and the United States and China’s own aggressive military behavior because China sees the latter as opportunities. For example, when U.S. Undersecretary of State Keith Krach visited Taiwan in September 2020, PLA warplanes continuously crossed the median line in the Taiwan strait for days.[31] After Lai Ching-te’s inaugural speech, Beijing dispatched 62 warplanes and 27 warships around the island for the Joint Sword-2024A military exercises. Once the Chinese achieve a new normal, the country is unlikely to back down from it. Thus, the United States and Taiwan will have to prepare for further escalation of Chinese actions and reactions. One can argue that Chinese deterrence is also imposing increasing costs on the activities of the United States and Taiwan, so the challenge for Taiwan and the U.S. is to determine how to effectively respond to Chinese aggressiveness without triggering an actual conflict.
Finally, in 2024 mainland China also increased involvement by the Chinese paramilitary maritime law enforcement agency: the Chinese Coast Guard. After the 2/14 Kinmen Incident, when two Chinese fishermen died following a chase by the Taiwanese Coast Guard in the waters near Kinmen, the Chinese imposed a new “regularization of law enforcement patrols by the Chinese Coast Guard in the waters near Xiamen and Kinmen” (厦门金门海域常态化执法巡查).[32] The Chinese Coast Guard also participated in both military exercises around Taiwan in 2024. While its military capabilities may not be a critical determinant in the event of a Taiwan contingency, it is said that it is included in the exercises to strengthen the narrative that Taiwan constitutes the internal affairs of China and that China is prepared to expand regular law enforcement patrols by the Chinese Coast Guard near Taiwan.[33]
A Gloomy Future of a Pending Crisis
Given the escalation of action-reaction cycles between China on the one side and Taiwan and the United States on the other, the inevitability of a future military conflict over Taiwan is worrisome. For the time being, China is clearly not ready to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, but with the long-term dominance of the DPP in Taiwan’s domestic politics and its conviction about Taiwan’s political status, there is a growing recognition both inside and outside of China that China is unlikely to achieve its desired unification peacefully. Chinese interlocutors and officials increasingly observe war preparations and mobilization internally in China. Their view is that if nothing else, the Chinese top leader must prepare for a military contingency over Taiwan in the event that the DPP and Lai resort to the risk of crossing China’s red line.
China’s economic slowdown has put China in a position of weakness .[34] The reelection of President Trump is exacerbating the unpredictability and volatility of U.S.-China relations, including on the Taiwan issue. The Chinese still have a vivid memory of the freefall in bilateral relations in 2020 during the last year of President Trump’s first term. But China’s weakness and memory of that earlier trauma are unlikely to translate into more tolerance of Taiwan and President Lai Ching-te. If anything, China will be less tolerant and more aggressive in its reactions to any perceived transgressions by Taiwan or to any American support for Taiwan that might further the ambitions of the DPP and President Lai.
The challenge is that China does not leave any option either for Taiwan or for the United States. Lai Ching-te will pay a significant political cost domestically if he is to dial down his current position on Taiwan’s status. But such a concession will almost certainly see no returns in improving cross-strait relations. This is because of China’s lack of trust in either the DPP or in Lai, which irreversibly inflates the costs of any reconciliation to an unrealistically high level. Lai will have to deliver significant compromises to even start such a process. But China will pocket any concessions he is willing to make without reciprocating. Therefore, there is no incentive or reason for Lai to change his position, just as China sees no incentive to reward Lai for his “treacherous” behavior. Neither side is willing or able to make concessions that will not elicit any returns. That is why it is expected that cross-strait relations will deteriorate in the foreseeable future, and the world will face what is bound to be four years of turbulence.
About the Contributor
Yun Sun is Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and China’s relations with its neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes. From 2011 to early 2014, she was Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, jointly appointed by the Foreign Policy Program and the Global Development Program, where she focused on Chinese national security decision-making processes and China-Africa relations. From 2008 to 2011, Yun was the China Analyst for the International Crisis Group (ICG) based in Beijing, specializing on China’s foreign policy toward conflict countries and the developing world. Prior to ICG, she worked on U.S.-Asia relations in Washington, DC for five years. Yun earned her master’s degree in international policy and practice from George Washington University as well as a master’s degree in Asia Pacific studies and a BA in international relations from Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.
Notes
[1] Zhekai Li, “Can the Kuomintang Rise Again?” Global Taiwan Institute, October 2, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/can-the-kuomintang-rise-again/.
[2] Eric Cheung, “Taiwan Faces a Flood of Disinformation from China Ahead of Crucial Election. Here’s How It’s Fighting Back,” CNN, December 16, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/15/asia/taiwan-election-disinformation-china-technology-intl-hnk/index.html.
[3] “Ko Wen-je Arrested in Corruption Case,” Taipei Times, September 1, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/09/01/2003823078.
[4] Clement Tan, “China Skeptic Lai Ching-te Wins Taiwan’s Presidential Election,” CNBC, January 13, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/13/taiwan-2024-election-dpps-lai-ching-te-wins.html.
[5] “No Party Gets Majority in Legislature; KMT Wins Most Seats,” Focus Taiwan, January 13, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202401130014.
[6] For example, following the election, a spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said that the election fully demonstrated that the DPP did not represent mainstream public opinion on the island and highlighted the contributions of mainland policy to the improvement of cross-strait relations. 国务院台办新闻发布会辑录 (Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee), January 17, 2024, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202401/t20240117_12594356.htm.
[7] Conversations with Chinese interlocutors, Washington DC, March 2024.
[8] Ibid.
[9] For example, see “赖清德：孤芳自赏的 ‘台独金孙,’” China Daily, July 24, 2024, https://tw.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202407/24/WS66a0b230a3107cd55d26c693.html.
[10] “赖清德自诩‘务实台独工作者’ 实为 ‘务实战争引爆者,’”环球时报, October 10, 2024, https://hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/4Jmt86StMOT.
[11] Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Tsai Interviewed by BBC,” January 18, 2020, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5962.
[12] Conversations with Chinese interlocutors, Washington, DC, December 2023.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ryan Hass, “Beware of Forecasts of Doom for Taiwan under Lai,” Brookings, May 14, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/beware-forecasts-of-doom-for-taiwan-under-lai/.
[17] For example, in a 2022 white paper issued by China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, upholding the 1992 Consensus is described as a major measure adopted by the CCP to chart the course for cross-strait relations, noting that China is “ready to engage with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan in a broad exchange of views aimed at resolving the political differences between the two sides based on the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus.” Government of the People’s Republic of China, “White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office, August 10, 2022, http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm.
[18] David J. Lorenzo, “Why Do Many Taiwanese Resist Unification with the People’s Republic of China?” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (May–June 2024): 43, https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/07/2003458328/-1/-1/1/FEATURE%20-%20LORENZO%20-%20JIPA.PDF.
[19] Rush Doshi and David Sacks, “Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 21, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference.
[20] 張柏源, “美國務院歡迎賴清德｢維持兩岸現狀承諾｣籲中國克制勿挑釁威嚇台灣,” NewTalk News, May 21, 2024, https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2024-05-21/920627.
[21] Conversations with Chinese interlocutors, Washington DC, December 2023.
[22] Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “總統發表就職演說 宣示打造民主和平繁榮的新臺灣,” May 20, 2024, https://www.president.gov.tw/News/28428.
[23] 王英津, “赖清德 ‘就职演说’充斥着赤裸裸的‘台独’挑衅,” 光明网, May 23, 2024, https://news.gmw.cn/2024-05/23/content_37337954.htm.
[24] “No Party Gets Majority in Legislature; KMT Wins Most Seats.” Focus Taiwan, January 13, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202401130014.
[25] “专家：赖清德‘双十’讲话极具欺骗性、挑衅性、危害性,” 新华网, October 13, 2024, http://www.news.cn/tw/20241013/c3daec007b374e309adacf4620b6ecf1/c.html.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Paul Mozur, Chris Horton, and Amy Chang Chien, “As Pelosi Arrives, Quiet Defiance in Taiwan,” New York Times, August 2, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/pelosi-trip-taiwan.html.
[29] David Ignatius, “President Biden Should Not Run Again in 2024,” Washington Post, September 12, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/12/biden-trump-election-step-aside/.
[30] For example, see Government of the People’s Republic of China, “Chinese FM Makes Remarks on U.S. Violation of China's Sovereignty,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 3, 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202208/t20220803_10732743.html as well as a piece in state media on Tsai’s transit through the United States in:
“Experts' Take on Taiwan Question,” China Military Online, April 3, 2023, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/OPINIONS_209196/Opinions_209197/16214067.html.
[31] “两岸关系：解放军战机‘越过海峡中线’背后的中美台局势,” BBC, October 21, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-54189623.
[32] “福建海警局将加强海上执法力量，在厦金海域开展常态化执法巡查行动” http://www.news.cn/tw/20240218/ccdeb923ecd947a5a0e3dc511f18e7ef/c.html; Government of the People’s Republic of China, “中国海警在厦金海域开展执法巡查行动,” Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, February 18, 2024, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bmst/202402/t20240218_12600423.htm..
[33] “毫无预兆围住台岛，解放军启动联合利剑2024B，3项演练变化不寻常,” Ifeng News, October 14, 2024, https://news.ifeng.com/c/8dfvvmFNDcJ.
[34] For example, see Kevin Yao, Ethan Wang, and Joe Cash, “China's Oct Data Shows Soft Economic Underbelly, Trump Threat Looms Large,” Reuters, November 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-oct-industrial-output-misses-expectations-retail-sales-top-forecast-2024-11-15/.
Photo credit: 中华民国总统府, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
