Local Fiscal Constraints and Grassroots Stability: Enhancing Party Control and Supervising Law Enforcement

Sheena Chestnut Greitens CLM Issue 84 June 2025.pdf

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Local fiscal constraints have the potential to challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s continued drive for grassroots-level social stability and party control, both core features of Xi Jinping’s governance. Campaigns that deploy work teams and “first secretaries” to the village level add to local financial burdens, and these visitors are under pressure to quickly deliver material benefits after their arrival. Amid these pressures, China’s leaders have expressed mounting concern about the use of coercive and predatory law enforcement tactics to make up for revenue shortfalls via exaggerated or falsified impositions of fines and other charges—and they have launched a nationwide supervision campaign intended to identify and eradicate “illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement.” The results of the campaign, which has picked up steam over the course of 2024 and early 2025, remain to be seen. 

How have strains on local government finances in China affected social stability and party control at the grassroots? Problems in the real estate sector and declining land revenues have placed severe strains on local government budgets, especially against the backdrop of sluggish economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, rising social security and welfare expenditures, and mounting concern about local government debt, especially after repayments peaked in 2024.[1] Experts assess that current efforts to create a unified management system for local debt and to reduce the debt load over time to achieve a fiscally sustainable trajectory at the local level are likely to be inadequate.[2] The gap has resulted, in some areas, in reductions in the provision of government services and delayed salary payments to civil servants.

These developments have the potential to challenge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s continuing drive for internal security and social stability that has become a core feature of governance under Xi Jinping. Campaigns that deploy work teams and “first secretaries” to the village level add to local financial burdens, and, after their arrival, these visitors are under pressure to quickly deliver material benefits. Amid these pressures, China’s leaders have expressed mounting concern about the use of coercive and predatory law enforcement tactics to make up for revenue shortfalls via exaggerated or falsified imposition of fines and other charges—and they have launched a nationwide campaign to eradicate “illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement.” Results of the campaign, which has picked up steam over the course of 2024 and early 2025, remain to be seen.

Strengthening Local Party Control 

Over the course of the past decade, the CCP has pursued a number of different measures by which it has endeavored to strengthen party penetration at the grassroots level and in village governance.[3] The first of these efforts under Xi’s tenure was the campaign to eliminate rural poverty (launched in 2014), followed by the rural revitalization campaign (in 2021), both of which dispatched work teams, mobilized local cadres, and empowered village-level party organizations.[4] Rural development and local party-building efforts therefore proceeded hand in hand.[5]

As of 2022, Xi Jinping set a target for over half of China’s villages to follow the policy of “two burdens on one shoulder” (liangge danzi yijiantiao., 两个担子一肩挑), under which the village party secretary also serves as village leader; this has created some complications as the 2018 Revised Organic Law on Village Elections specifies that the latter is supposed to be directly elected every five years.[6] Some scholars and local officials report that this policy can lend legitimacy to the local party secretary; others say that it requires political and procedural contortions to assure that the “correct” candidate wins every time.[7] In this sense, village elections serve multiple purposes. They are ostensibly intended to enhance local autonomy, but to the extent that they become public displays of citizen loyalty, they actually communicate the opposite: the party’s ability to control granular outcomes at the grassroots level, similar to the strength-signaling function of elections in some other authoritarian regimes.[8]

Beyond the “one-shoulder pole” policy, another tool used to project party-state power throughout the grassroots is mobilization of two sets of actors: work teams and “first secretaries.” In 2023, the party deployed approximately 563,000 work team personnel and planned to dispatch more than 400,000 “first secretaries,” typically appointed from outside the community to advise the local party secretary, and to assist in over one-half of China’s 600,000 villages—statistics that give some sense of the scale of the project.[9] Along with enhanced responsibility, however, there is enhanced vertical accountability: the stronger ability of township and county officials to evaluate, discipline, and compensate village-level cadres under the 2020 Law on Administrative Discipline for Public Officials reduces the theoretically autonomous/self-governing nature of villages in the Chinese political system.[10] As characterized by Australian scholar Ben Hillman, such a “massive importation of work teams and first secretaries is an unprecedented penetration by the party-state into village life in the post-Mao period.”[11] 

This drive to strengthen the party at the grassroots level, however, may falter as fiscal constraints continue to mount. As Hillman notes, one of the things that can trip up a “first secretary” arriving from outside is the inability to quickly deliver visible and material benefits, and the costs of large-scale redeployment of party personnel to engage in grassroots party-building add to the already-unsustainable financial strain on local governments.[12] Some of these “first secretaries” are veterans or retired law enforcement officers, a measure that can both defuse potential collective mobilization by these actors[13] and may introduce other potential issues, as detailed below.

The Problem of “Profit-Seeking Law Enforcement”

One of the major symptoms of fiscal constraints on local law enforcement has been the rise of “profit-seeking law enforcement and case handling” (zhu/qulixing zhifa ban’an, 逐/趋利性执法办案): over-extraction by law enforcement and local agents to fill the strained coffers of cash-strapped local governments. Tackling this problem has become a major area of focus and activity by the party-state in 2024 and (thus far) in 2025. The new campaign’s results are as yet unclear, but reducing fine revenue from law enforcement is unlikely to improve the tensions that fiscal constraints place on the drive to maintain social stability.[14]

As The Economist notes, a fall in other revenues in 2024 (3.4 percent decline in tax collection and 16 percent decline in land revenues) took place alongside an increase in money raised from fines and collections (a 14.8 percent increase).[15] Some articles and social media posts attribute the recent increase in non-tax revenue mainly to fines and profit-seeking law enforcement,[16] while other Chinese media sources counter that fines are a (variable) share of non-tax revenue, and the public security bureau is not the only bureaucratic actor generating fine revenue.[17] Data from the PRC National Bureau of Statistics (shown in Figure 1, below) demonstrate that over the course of the past decade, the share of fine revenue as a percentage of overall non-tax revenue has risen from approximately 8 percent to approximately 12 percent, suggesting that profit-seeking law enforcement may be a contributing factor to the rise of revenue obtained in this category.[18] 

Figure 1: Fine Revenue as a Share of Non-Tax Revenue (2015–2023)

The phenomenon of profit-seeking law enforcement has attracted increased attention from Chinese media and social media as well as from party and government officials. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has defined profit-seeking law enforcement as “behavior that violates the principles of law and justice by law enforcement agencies … due to the pursuit of personal or departmental interests.”[19] Chinese sources note that the root cause of this phenomenon lies in the funding of local law enforcement: property involved in each case is linked to the “case-handling funds,” which are restricted by local finances. [20] In particular, the MPS has become concerned about cross-jurisdictional activity by local law enforcement; police going outside their jurisdictions to arrest entrepreneurs in search of revenue has become known in Chinese media and social media discourse as “distant sea fishing” (yang bulao, 洋捕捞, or “deep-sea fishing”): police targeting or raiding companies outside their jurisdictions to extract funds, often on fabricated or exaggerated charges.[21] 

To attempt to address this problem, in June 2020 the MPS issued guidelines—known as the “Six Prohibitions” (liuge yanjin, 六个严禁)—on the cross-regional handling of cases by public security organs, noting that these guidelines were intended to standardize cooperation and “enforce work discipline.”[22] The measures prohibit public security officials from acting outside their county of jurisdiction (to arrest or to confiscate documents/property) without obtaining approval, and they contain explicit warnings against competition between public security organs in different administrative jurisdictions. In 2021, the MPS added the “Seven Provisions” (qige guiding, 七项规定) on profit-seeking law enforcement, building on the 2020 “Six Prohibitions.” Among other measures, these provisions prohibit the use of fines or the confiscation of assets to generate income as well as the threat or use of detention to force parties to agree to surrender property or reach a settlement. The measures seek to cut off the local law enforcement’s financial interests in confiscating or otherwise obtaining case property and funds for its own use, and to thereby ensure fairer, more standard behavior by the public security apparatus.[23] Additional measures, such as the 2021 Measures on Managing Confiscated/Seized Property (famo caiwu guanli banfa, 罚没财物管理办法), provide guidelines on how to manage property seized or confiscated during law enforcement investigations and operations.[24]

One case, which circulated widely on Chinese social media, was profiled in the Chinese-language edition of the New York Times. In April 2023, officials from the Shunde Public Security Bureau (PSB) in southern Guangdong province traveled almost 1,000 kilometers north to Wuhan, where they detained 25 employees at a social media company named Changxiangban (Wuhan) Technology Co. Ltd. (常相伴（武汉）科技有限公司) and coerced them into transferring 300 million yuan to an account affiliated with the Shunde PSB. The PSB officials and the Shunde procuratorate accused the company of operating an illegal online casino in their jurisdiction, and the Shunde procuratorate filed suit, but the company denied the allegation. A year later, the company posted a statement on WeChat announcing the cessation of operations of their 36-million user voice-streaming platform, Banban (伴伴), saying that the incident had caused too much damage and asking, “Were the Shunde police investigating a case, or committing robbery?!” (Shunde gongan daodi shi ban’an haishi dajie?! 顺德公安这到底是办案还是打劫?!)[25] (The post noted a number of laudatory awards the company had received, and stated that, in the three years prior to the investigation, it had paid 160 million yuan in taxes to the Wuhan authorities.) Other companies have been forced to pay 20 years of back taxes or were fined for other offenses; one video that circulated widely showed a Shandong official who had threatened to fine a Hebei company 25 million yuan, bragging that “it is easy to destroy a company” (gan kua yige qiye dai jiandan, 干垮一个企业太简单了).[26]

In another case, in June 2023, a PSB officer (minjing, 民警) and auxiliary police (xiejing, 协警) went to Jiangsu and arrested a local entrepreneur.[27] The entrepreneur escaped (supposedly jumping out of the car) and the two officers were convicted in Zhejiang and sentenced to seven and eight months in prison for abuse of power.

A number of commentaries over the course of 2024 drew attention to the problem and called for measures to address it. A March 2024 article in China Youth Daily, for example, notes that protection and development of private enterprises have emerged as central topics, with a number of officials speaking about the need to prevent excessive and profit-driven enforcement from harming companies.[28] It also notes the importance of the rule of law for China’s business environment, and it points out that the ability of private enterprises to protect their interests is critical for growth. It further notes that Pi Jianlong, a lawyer and delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, intended to submit a proposal for legislation to curb profit-seeking law enforcement and protect private enterprises, noting that the MPS departmental regulations do not have sufficient legal force and there are no regulations governing other parts of China’s political-legal apparatus and law enforcement. Zhou Tianyong, an official at the Central Party School, in September 2024 posted that if local officials continued to detain entrepreneurs as a method of boosting their revenues, this will lead to a “local economic disaster”; the post, according to The Economist, was removed from Chinese social media.[29]

Another analysis, in May 2024, begins with an account of the Banban case.[30] It calls profit-seeking law enforcement a “chronic disease” (guji, 痼疾), describing it as an abuse of power related to the PSB’s powers of criminal prosecution and administrative law enforcement as well as a practice that induces chaos. It discusses several ways in which this activity is “legal in form, but illegal in substance” (xingshishang hefa, dan shizhishang weifa, 形式上合法但实质上违法), including the practice of forced case divisions and the use of coercion to reach formally “voluntary” settlements that generate benefits for the PSB in question. Profit-seeking law enforcement, it argues, harms both the state and individuals, and it is a “cancer on the judiciary” (sifa zhi duliu, 司法之毒瘤). The analysis goes on to assert that the fact that the financial benefits of profit-seeking law enforcement accrue to local authorities beyond the PSB has created a “kind of judicial local protectionism” (yizhong sifa difang baohuzhuyi, 一种司法地方保护主义) that local supervisory mechanisms have been unable to resolve. The only solution, this analysis suggests, is centralization of the flow of non-tax (fine) revenue. This proposal has been echoed in other publications as a way to eliminate “judicial local protectionism” and to eliminate the incentive structure that encourages local PSBs to engage in cross-jurisdictional revenue generation.[31]

In addition to the proposal for revenue centralization, other analyses have drawn attention to the need to clarify in Chinese law the jurisdictional standard that assigns jurisdiction to public security organs “at the place of the crime,” which can be complex and open to multiple locations when cyber-crime is involved.[32] Others argue that further reforms to the Criminal Procedure Law are necessary complements, as these will address the now-common issues of property freezing and asset seizure. Still other experts have highlighted the need for “top-down” or external supervision of law enforcement actors.

The Campaign Against “Illegal Cross-Jurisdictional and Profit-Seeking Law Enforcement”

As noted above, attempts to address this problem at senior levels of the party-state have accelerated in 2024 and 2025. In February 2024, the State Council issued an opinion on standardizing and setting fines, representing the first time the PRC issued such standards in its administrative regulations and rules, and it appeared to be intended to reduce the fine-for-profit and fine-for-revenue practices that were being widely reported.[33] In September 2024, the Politburo held a meeting on standardizing enterprise-related law enforcement; in October, National Development Reform Commission head Zheng Zhajie and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) head Ying Yong emphasized the need to prevent profit-seeking law enforcement.[34] Later that month, the MPS issued new guidance limiting the scope of when funds can be frozen by law enforcement.[35] The draft “Private Economy Promotion Law” (Minying Jingji Cujin Fa, 民营经济促进法), which contains two references to cross-jurisdictional law enforcement, was posted for comment in October 2024, approved by the National People's Congress on April 30, 2025, and enters into force in May 2025. 

In December 2024, the Central Economic Work Conference discussed the need to "take special actions to standardize law enforcement involving enterprises,” which it called “not only an important task for deepening reform in a comprehensive manner but also a major measure to promote steady and healthy economic development.”[36] The Central Economic Work Conference particularly highlighted the “Six Prohibitions” and “Seven Provisions” as well as efforts by the SPP. In January 2025, the Central Political-Legal Work Conference also addressed the need to reduce cross-jurisdictional and profit seeking law enforcement.[37] Echoing earlier commentary, Supreme Court President Zhang Jun cited the need to overcome local protectionism (difang baohu zhuyi, 地方保护主义) in order to get rid of profit-seeking law enforcement.[38] 

Premier Li Qiang’s work report in March 2025 similarly highlighted the need to “take special action to standardize law enforcement involving enterprises, concentrate on regulating arbitrary charges and fines, inspections, and seizures, and resolutely prevent illegal cross-jurisdictional law enforcement and profit-seeking law enforcement” (weigui yidi zhifa he qulixing zhifa, 违规异地执法和趋利性执法).[39] On March 25, following the work report and on the day prior to the launch of the SPP’s special supervision (discussed below), the MPS held a “mobilization and deployment meeting” about the standardization of enterprise-related law enforcement; Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong emphasized the importance of eradicating problems in enterprise-related law enforcement, using the phrase “turn the knife inward” (daoren xiangnei, 刀刃向内), a phrase used by Xi Jinping in a 2024 speech calling for the eradication of corruption and improvement of discipline within the party-state.[40]

Indeed, the SPP and the procuratorial system have been a major institutional locus of the party-state response to the problem of profit-seeking law enforcement. In June 2024, the SPP met to discuss the importance of a “law-based business environment” and “cross-regional procuratorial cooperation,” including a “campaign to protect enterprises” that “addresses problems such as law enforcement and judicial activities for the purpose of profit-seeking.”[41] According to The Economist, in 2024 the SPP reviewed 1,500 cases and blocked improper attempts to seize 570 million RMB in assets. [42]

In February 2025, the SPP once again discussed the problem . An article in Beijing News quotes several experts who called for stricter accountability for law enforcement and better protection of citizens’ rights.[43] One expert quoted in the article, Wang Xixin (a Peking University law professor and vice president of the Chinese Law Society’s Administrative Law Research Section) noted that such behavior by law enforcement alienated law enforcement from citizens and distorted the purpose of public power—indicating an understanding that the costs of such behavior impact not only rule of law and China’s business environment but also broader social stability.[44] The SPP’s annual work report in March 2025 followed the work report of the Premier in calling for resolute/determined rectification of illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement and judicial administration.[45] 

A March 10 interview with Ge Xiaoyan, deputy prosecutor-general and member of the SPP party leadership group, published on the SPP website, previews the “special supervision” that the SPP planned to carry out to address the problem of cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement and judicial administration.[46] The interview discusses the need to address both the “symptoms and root causes”—common language in discussions of social stability—to implement the directives laid out by the Central Economic Work Conference and the 2025 Work Report. Ge further discusses applying administrative penalties to those who levy excessive fines commensurate with the social harm they cause, noting that in 2024 the SPP made 519 procuratorial recommendations to law enforcement on these issues and citing the damage disproportionate fines do to both the business environment and “fairness and justice in society.” In 2005, in a video posted on its website for the launch of the campaign, the SPP would repeat the 519 recommendations, adding that in 2024 it had supervised the “handling of 31 major cases involving profit-driven law enforcement and judicial practices” and that 137,000 individuals had been prosecuted “for crimes that disrupted socialist market economic order.”[47]

In March and April 2025, the SPP followed up its work report with action. On March 26, the SPP convened a video-conference meeting to roll out a campaign and a related work plan “to conduct special supervision over illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-driven law enforcement and administration of justice” (jiancha jiguan kaizhan weigui yidi zhifa he qulixing zhifa sifa zhuanxiang, 检查机关开展 违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督).[48] The campaign outlined requirements for using the “four major procuratorial functions”—criminal, civil, administrative, and public interest litigation—and highlighted “Eleven Key Tasks.” Ying Yong’s remarks at the launch again used the phrase “turn the knife inwards,” echoing Xi’s December phrasing and Wang Xiaohong’s phrasing a few days earlier. On April 1, the day that the campaign’s leading group held its first meeting, People’s Daily ran an article on the campaign, highlighting, as a feature of the campaign, the enhanced cooperation between the procuratorate and other parts of the political-legal apparatus, including public security, administrative law enforcement, courts, and discipline and supervision organs.[49]

On April 11, 2025, People’s Daily reported that the SPP had set up a website (www.12309.gov.cn), a WeChat “12309 Procuratorate Service Center” account, and a 12309 mobile client where citizens could report instances of ten different categories of illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement.[50] The reporting channels, which are similar to those used to solicit reports of espionage by the Ministry of State Security,[51] were explained as efforts to “smooth the channels for expressing demands and protecting the rights and interests of various business entities in accordance with the law.”

Other steps forward had to do with education and training. Among these were the convening, on April 27, 2025, of the 7th annual training course for senior members of the procuracy; this included training on special judicial supervision of illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement.[52] Finally, in April 2025 the SPP began publishing examples—three at the time of writing—each illustrating a different feature of the campaign and the underlying problems it aims to redress. These have focused on 1) measures to rectify the freezing of hospital assets in Jiangsu,[53] 2) Guizhou’s “Special Action Plan,”[54] and 3.) addressing problems in Anhui.[55]  

Although the launch of this campaign indicates some elevated level of concern on the part of the party-state leadership, it is, of course, too early to tell what the results of the newly-launched campaign will be. Absent a shift in the local fiscal environment, however, the resourcing and funding problems in local law enforcement that this campaign spotlights seem likely to persist.

About the Contributor

Sheena Chestnut Greitens is Associate Professor at the University of Texas-Austin, where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is the author of Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions & State Violence under Authoritarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and Politics of the North Korean Diaspora (Cambridge University Press, 2023). She is currently also a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Visiting Faculty at the U.S. Army War College’s China Landpower Studies Center. Views expressed herein are solely her own.

The author thanks Jessie Jiexi Lin and Michael Donmoyer for research assistance for this article.

Notes

[1] These concerns were especially acute in 2024, as repayments were peaking. Although there is no officially sanctioned total figure for local government debt, some estimates have placed it as high as five times local government capacity, or 80–90 percent of GDP. The risk of default led Moody’s to downgrade China’s economic outlook to negative in December 2023; “Moody’s Puts China on Downgrade Warning as Growth, Property Pressures Mount,” Reuters, December 6, 2025; Christine Wong, “Local Government Debt in China: The 2023 Bailout and Future Prospects,” The China Journal, no. 93 (January 2025), p. 112.

[2] Wong, “Local Government Debt in China,” pp. 132–135; see also Cheng Siwei and Denise Jia, “China Plans Overhaul to Fix Crisis in Local Government Finance,” Caixin Global, March 10, 2025, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2025-03-10/cover-story-china-plans-fiscal-overhaul-to-fix-crisis-in-local-government-finance-102296388.html, accessed May 8, 2025.

[3] Ben Hillman, “Shouldering the Burden: The Communist Party’s Deepening Penetration into Village China,” The China Quarterly (2025), pp. 1–15, doi:10.1017/S0305741025000232; see also John Fitzgerald, Cadre Nation: How China Became the Chinese Communist Party (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2022).

[4] “How China Lifts 100 Million People Out of Poverty: A Mission of a Century,” Xinhua, February 25, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qor1hZaiZY0; originally cited in Ben Hillman, “From Poverty Elimination to Rural Revitalization: The Party Takes Charge,” in Annie Luman Ren and Ben Hillman (eds.), China’s New Era (Canberra: ANU Press, 2024), pp. 73–80.

[5] Haoyue Zhou, and Jing Vivian Zhang, “Repenetrating the Rural Periphery: Party-Building under the anti-Poverty Campaign,” Journal of Contemporary China, no. 150 (2023), pp. 1–16; see also Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, “Rebuilding Authority: The Party’s Relationship With its Grassroots Organizations,” in Patricia M. Thornton (ed.), The China Quarterly, Special Issue: The CCP at 100: The Party’s New Long March, no. 248/S1 (2021), pp. 244–264.

[6] “中共中央 国务院 印发 ‘乡村振兴战略规划 (2018–2022)’” [The CCP Central Committee and State Council Issue the “Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalization (2018– 2022)”], Xinhua, September 26,  2018, www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-09/26/c_1123487123.htm, accessed May 8, 2025.

See also Hillman, “Shouldering the Burden”; Ji Ruan and Peng Wang, “Elite Capture and Corruption: The Influence of Elite Collusion on Village Elections and Rural Land Development in China,” The China Quarterly, no. 253 (2023), pp. 107–122.

[7] See quotes from local officials. in Hillman, “Shouldering the Burden,” pp. 10–11; Tan Zhao, “‘First Democracy, Then Centralism’: The New Shape of Village Elections Under the ‘One-Shoulder Pole’ Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, no. 153 (2024), pp. 489–503.

[8] Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political Science, 12 (2009), pp. 403–422.

[9] 吴云霞, “今年全国26个省份40多万名驻村干部将要到期轮换” [This Year, Over 400,000 Village Cadres Will Rotate to 26 Provinces Across the Country], 农民日报 [Peasant Daily], July 7, 2023, https://www.87424.cc/article_show/chid=11-id=41582.html, accessed May 10, 2025. 

[10] 桂 华 , “当前驻村干部的功能定位及考核要点” [Current Functional Positions and Evaluation Criteria of Village Cadres],” 人民论坛 [People’s Forum], January 1, 2023, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2023-01/01/content_25966109.htm, accessed May 10, 2025; Juan Wang and Yu Mou, “The Paradigm Shift in the Disciplining of Village Cadres in China: From Mao to Xi,” in Patricia Thornton (ed.), China Quarterly, Special Issue: The CCP at 100: The Party’s New Long March, no. 248/S1 (2021), pp. 181–199.

[11] Hillman, “Shouldering the Burden,” p. 7.

[12]  Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[13] Kai Yang, “Mobilizing Without Solidarity: Sustained Activism Among Chinese Veterans,” The China Journal, no. 87 (2022), pp. 1–19.

[14] For a critical assessment of the Private Economy Promotion Law (民营经济促进法), see Jamie Horsley, “China’s New Private Economy Promotion Law: Good Intentions Meet Weak Government,” NPC Observer, 15 May 2025, https://npcobserver.com/2025/05/china-private-economy-law-government-accountability/

[15] “Shakedown: The Chinese Government is Cracking Down on Predatory Law Enforcement,” The Economist, March 27, 2025.

[16] “中国地方政府不择手段捞钱，非税收入去年暴涨25%” [China's Local Governments Use All Means to Make Money, Non-tax Revenue Increased Dramatically by 25% Last Year], 美国之音 [Voice of America], January 25,  2025, https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-2024-fiscal-revenue-growth-shrinks-non-tax-income-jumps-20250124/7948819.html, accessed May 8, 2025; 蒋小天 ,

“法律界人士呼吁杜绝逐利执法，改革罚没返还制度” [Deep-sea Fishing-type Profit-seeking Law Enforcement Has Attracted a Lot of Attention. How Should It Be Governed? Legal Professionals Call for End to Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Reform of the Fine and Confiscation Return System], 南方都市报 [Southern Metropolis Daily], November 9, 2024, https://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2024-11/09/content_19490.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[17] “非税收入逾万亿等于“全国人均罚款700多元？严重误导” [Non-tax Revenue of More Than One Trillion Yuan Is Equivalent to "the National Average Fine of More Than 700 Yuan? Seriously Misleading], 澎湃新闻 [The Paper], April 27, 2024, https://jingji.cctv.com/2024/04/27/ARTICEXZeZZUPWUqrM0RNyio240427.shtml, accessed May 8, 2025.

[18] Data can be accessed online at https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01, accessed May 8, 2025.

[19] “公安部：禁止趋利性执法办案 ‘七项规定’ ‘六个严禁’汇总” [MPS: Summary of the “7 Provisions” and the “6 Strict Prohibitions” to Prohibit Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Case Handling], September 15,  2024, https://www.wenxiaobai.com/api/expends/detail?article=77c478f5-596b-4741-a423-6af5f36b184a, accessed May 9, 2025.

[20] Ibid; see also 蒋小天 , “法律界人士呼吁杜绝逐利执法，改革罚没返还制度” [Deep-sea Fishing-type Profit-seeking Law Enforcement Has Attracted a Lot of Attention. How Should It Be Governed? Legal Professionals Call for End to Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Reform of the Fine and Confiscation Return System], 南方都市报 [Southern Metropolis Daily], November 9, 2024, https://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2024-11/09/content_19490.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[21] 袁莉, “远洋捕捞”式执法猖獗凸显中国地方财政困境” [Rampant “Deep-sea fishing” Highlights China’s Local Fiscal Dilemmas], New York Times, Chinese Edition, November 26,  2024, https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20241126/china-economy-police-business/, accessed May 9, 2025.  

[22] “公安部关于印发《公安机关异地办案协作’六个严禁’》的通知“ [Notice of the Ministry of Public Security on Issuing “Six Strict Prohibitions” on Cooperation in Handling Cross-Regional Cases by Public Security Organs], Ministry of Public Security, Public Notice No. 6 (published January 20, 2021, but elsewhere dated  June 3, 2020), https://www.criminallaw.com.cn/article/?id=18255, accessed May 9, 2025.

[23] A list of both appears at “<公安机关禁止逐利执法’七项规定’> 具体是哪七项规定？” [What Are the Seven Provisions in the “Seven Provisions” on Prohibiting Profit-Seeking Law Enforcement by Public Security Organs?], 知乎, May 6, 2022, https://www.zhihu.com/question/456497802, accessed May 9, 2025. 

[24]  赵利新, “最高检再谈解决趋利性执法司法问题，专家：要保障好公民权益” [Supreme People’s Procuratorate Again Discusses Solving the Problem of Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Practices; Experts: We Must Protect Citizens’ Rights and Interests], 新京报 [Beijing News], February 18, 2025, https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1739879360129221.html, accessed May 9, 2025.

[25] “失去’伴伴’的365天 – 武汉常相伴公司告全体员工、主播及合作伙伴停业书” [365 Days Losing “Banban” – Wuhan Changxiangban Company Issues a Closure Letter to All Staff, Anchors, and Partners], Weixin, April 20, 2024, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIyMDM0NzY1OA==&mid=2247518889&idx=1&sn=f5ed2dcba14327ff923370e48b64e6aa&scene=21#wechat_redirect, accessed May 9, 2025.

[26] Cited in 袁莉, “远洋捕捞”式执法猖獗凸显中国地方财政困境” [Rampant “Deep-sea fishing” Highlights China’s Local Fiscal Dilemmas], New York Times, Chinese Edition, November 26,  2024, https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20241126/china-economy-police-business/, accessed May 9, 2025;  安然然, “如何有效遏制“远洋捕捞式趋利性执法？专家建言治本之策” [How to Effectively Curb the “Deep-Sea Fishing” of Profit-seeking Law Enforcement? Experts Advise a Fundamental Solution],  第一财经, August 29, 2024, https://www.yicai.com/news/102252600.html, accessed May 10, 2025;  The video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbkElYB9ARg.

[27] 行海洋, “整治趋利性执法有新部署，专家称关键是切断执法与获利的联系” [New Arrangements for Cracking Down on Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Experts Say the Key is to Sever the Connection Between Law Enforcement and Profits], 新京报 [Beijing News], March 27, 2025, https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1743072075129346.html, accessed May 9, 2025.

[28] 赵丽梅 , 张均斌, “坚决遏制逐利性执法 打造更好的营商环境” [Resolutely Constrain Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Create an Even Better Business Environment], 中青报 [China Youth Daily], March 6, 2024, https://zqb.cyol.com/html/2024-03/06/nw.D110000zgqnb_20240306_3-07.htm, accessed May 9, 2025. 

[29] “Shakedown: The Chinese Government is Cracking Down on Predatory Law Enforcement,” The Economist, March 27, 2025.

[30] “万毅：祛除逐利性执法痼疾唯有釜底抽薪” [Wan Yi: The Only Way to Eliminate the Chronic Disease of Profit-seeking Law Enforcement is to Eradicate the Root of the Problem], 上海法治报 [Shanghai Legal Daily], May 18,  2024, https://fzzfyjy.cupl.edu.cn/info/1713/16374.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[31] 安然然, “如何有效遏制“远洋捕捞式趋利性执法？专家建言治本之策” [How to Effectively Curb the “Deep-Sea Fishing” of Profit-seeking Law Enforcement? Experts Advise a Fundamental Solution],  第一财经, August 29, 2024, https://www.yicai.com/news/102252600.html, accessed May 10, 2025

[32] All proposals in this paragraph are mentioned in 蒋小天 , “法律界人士呼吁杜绝逐利执法，改革罚没返还制度” [Deep-sea Fishing-type Profit-seeking Law Enforcement Has Attracted A Lot of Attention. How Should It Be Governed? Legal Professionals Call for End to Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Reform of the Fine and Confiscation Return System], 南方都市报 [Southern Metropolis Daily], November 9, 2024, https://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2024-11/09/content_19490.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[33] 赵利新, “最高检再谈解决趋利性执法司法问题，专家：要保障好公民权益” [Supreme People’s Procuratorate Again Discusses Solving the Problem of Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Practices; Experts: We Must Protect Citizens’ Rights and Interests],  新京报 [Beijing News], February 18, 2025, https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1739879360129221.html, accessed May 9, 2025.

[34] 蒋小天 , “法律界人士呼吁杜绝逐利执法，改革罚没返还制度” [Deep-sea Fishing-type Profit-seeking Law Enforcement Has Attracted A Lot of Attention. How Should It Be Governed? Legal Professionals Call for End to Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Reform of the Fine and Confiscation Return System], 南方都市报 [Southern Metropolis Daily], November 9, 2024, https://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2024-11/09/content_19490.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[35] Ibid.

[36] “紧抓关键环节完成好明年经济工作重点任务—论学习贯彻中央经济工作会议精神” [Grasp the Key Links and Complete the Key Tasks of Economic Work Next Year—On Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Central Economic Work Conference], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], December 18, 2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202412/18/content_30046813.html, accessed May 11, 2025.

[37] “2025年法院工作这样干！[This is how courts will do their work in 2025!]” 人民法院新闻传媒总社责任 [People’s Court News & Media Agency], January 13, 2025, https://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100007/2025-01/13/content_12764066.shtml, accessed 16 May 2025. 

[38] 行海洋, “整治趋利性执法有新部署，专家称关键是切断执法与获利的联系” [New Arrangements for Cracking Down on Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Experts Say the Key is to Sever the Connection Between Law Enforcement and Profits], 新京报 [Beijing News], March 27, 2025, https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1743072075129346.html, accessed May 9, 2025.

[39] In Chinese, the statement referenced, “开展规范涉企执法专项行动，集中整治乱收费、乱罚款、乱检查、乱查封，坚决防止违规异地执法和趋利性执法.” 李强, “政府工作报告” [Government Work Report], 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [Central Government of the People’s Republic of China], March 12, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202503/content_7013163.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[40]  行海洋, “整治趋利性执法有新部署，专家称关键是切断执法与获利的联系” [New Arrangements for Cracking Down on Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Experts Say the Key is to Sever the Connection Between Law Enforcement and Profits], 新京报 [Beijing News], March 27, 2025, https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1743072075129346.html, accessed May 9, 2025.

For Xi’s speech, see Reuters, December 15,  2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-calls-party-turn-knife-inward-end-corruption-2024-12-16/, accessed May 9, 2025. or https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/16/xi-jinping-communist-party-corruption-crackdown, accessed May 9, 2025.

[41] “SPP Holds Meeting to Promote Campaigns to Protect Enterprises and People’s Livelihoods,” Supreme People’s Procuratorate, June 17, 2024, https://en.spp.gov.cn/2024-06/17/c_997774.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[42] “Shakedown: The Chinese Government is Cracking Down on Predatory Law Enforcement,” The Economist, March 27, 2025.

[43] 赵利新, “最高检再谈解决趋利性执法司法问题，专家：要保障好公民权益” [Supreme People’s Procuratorate Again Discusses Solving the Problem of Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Practices; Experts: We Must Protect Citizens’ Rights and Interests], 新京报 [Beijing News], February 18, 2025, https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1739879360129221.html, accessed May 9, 2025.

[44] Ibid.

[45] “最高检工作报告：坚决纠正违规异地执法趋利性执法司法” [Supreme People’s Procuratorate, “SPP Work Report: Resolutely Correct Illegal Cross-jurisdictional and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration],  March 9, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202503/t20250309_688944.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[46] 余蕊均,  淡忠奎, “专访葛晓燕：今年将开展违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督” [Exclusive Interview with Ge Xiaoyan: This Year, We Will Conduct a Special Supervision of Illegal Cross-regional and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration], Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 每日经济新闻 [Daily Economic News], March 10,  2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202503/t20250310_689388.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.  On Ge Xiaoyan, see https://en.spp.gov.cn/2023-12/04/c_944438.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[47]  Supreme People’s Procuratorate, “SPP Supervises Handling of 31 Major Cases Involving Profit-driven Law Enforcement and Judicial Practices,” March 27, 2025, https://en.spp.gov.cn/2025-03/27/c_1081054.htm, accessed May 9, 2025.

[48] “SPP Launches Special Campaign on Supervision over Illegal Cross-jurisdictional and Profit-driven Law Enforcement,” SPP, March 26,  2025, https://en.spp.gov.cn/2025-03/26/c_1082714.htm.

See also 刘硕, “最高检部署开展违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督” [SPP Deploys Special Supervision of Illegal Cross-jurisdictional Law Enforcement and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement], Xinhua,  March 27, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/202503/t20250327_691609.shtml, accessed May 11, 2025; 巩宸宇，孙风娟, “最高检部署开展违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督” [SPP Deploys Special Judicial Supervision on Illegal Cross-Jurisdictional and Profit-Seeking Law Enforcement], SPP, March 26, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn/tt/202503/t20250326_691422.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[49] “着力解决涉企执法司法突出问题” [Focus on Solving Outstanding Problems in Enterprise-related Law Enforcement and Judicial Work], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 1, 2025, http://yn.people.com.cn/n2/2025/0401/c361322-41182234.html, accessed May 9, 2025; also posted at https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/202504/t20250401_692017.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[50] 倪弋, “最高检设立涉企违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督专区 [The SPP Has Set Up a Special Supervision Zone for Illegal Cross-regional and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 11, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202504/t20250411_692815.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

See also刘硕, “发现涉企违规异地执法等线索，可以这样向检察机关反映” [If You Find Clues About Illegal Cross-border Enterprise-related Law Enforcement, You Can Report Them This Way to the Procuratorate], Xinhua, April 9, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/202504/t20250409_692587.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025; 孙莹, “ “’涉企违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督专区’设立 [“Special Supervision Zone for Illegal Cross-Border Law Enforcement and Profit-Seeking Law Enforcement” Established],” 央广·中国之声 [China National Radio/Voice of China], April 9, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/202504/t20250409_692585.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025; 董凡超, “12309中国检察网设立涉企违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督专区 [12309 China Procuratorate Network Sets Up Special Supervision Zone for Illegal Cross-jurisdictional Law Enforcement and Enterprise-related Profit-seeking Law Enforcement],” 法治日报 [Legal Daily], April 9, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/202504/t20250409_692583.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[51] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Counter-Espionage and State Security: the Changing Role of China’s Ministry of State Security,” China Leadership Monitor, issue 83 (March 2025), https://www.prcleader.org/post/counter-espionage-and-state-security-the-changing-role-of-china-s-ministry-of-state-security, accessed May 16, 2025.

[52] 刘亭亭, “全国检察机关第七届做实行政检察级研修班举办 [7th National Procuratorial Organs Senior Training Course on Administrative Procuratorial Practice Is Held],” 检察日报-要闻版 [Procuratorial Daily - News Edition], April 27, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202504/t20250427_694256.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[53] 王栋 葛东升 薛飞 “聚焦违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督｜江苏靖江：依法监督纠正不当扣押、冻结措施 [Focus on Special Supervision of Illegal Cross-jurisdictional Law Enforcement and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration. Jingjiang, Jiangsu: Supervise and Correct Improper Detention and Freezing Measures in Accordance with the Law],” 检察日报 [Procuratorate Daily], April 13, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202504/t20250413_692893.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[54] 丁艳红 范嗣刚 刘有书, “聚焦违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督. 贵州：务实举措优化法治化营商环境  [Focus on Special Supervision of Illegal Cross-jurisdictional Law Enforcement and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration| Guizhou: Practical Measures to Optimize a Rule of Law Business Environment],” 检察日报[Procuratorate Daily], April 21, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202504/t20250421_693597.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[55] 王福兵, “聚焦违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督 [Focus on Special Supervision of Illegal Cross-jurisdictional and Profit-seeking Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration],” 检察日报 [Procuratorate Daily],  April 25,  2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn//zdgz/202504/t20250425_694078.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025. 

Photo credit: Mussi Katz, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons