China Projects Confidence in the Face of Trump’s Tariff Storm

Ryan Hass CLM Issue 85 September 2025.pdf

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More than perhaps any other country or bloc in the world, for the past five-plus years China has been methodically fortifying its capacity to withstand trade and strategic pressures from the United States. Beijing has assumed that Washington will grow more aggressive in seeking to suppress China’s rise as the gap in relative power between the two countries narrows. President Donald Trump’s return to power and his launch of a new trade war with China was not a surprise. It was a validation of President Xi Jinping’s campaigns of self-reliance and self-strengthening. Beijing has taken satisfaction that its swift and sharp retaliation and countermeasures to Trump’s trade war have caused Washington to retreat. Even so, Beijing remains aware of its continuing vulnerabilities with the United States, particularly in relation to Taiwan and its access to technological products. Ultimately, the lesson for the United States from Trump’s ill-fated attempt to escalate the trade war is that America will struggle to isolate China or to limit its growth. Washington’s best bet for strengthening its competitive edge is to concentrate on elevating its own performance in the technological fields that will matter most for measuring power in the 21st century.

A mere two years ago, amidst American efforts to strengthen alliances in Asia and tighten export restrictions on technology exports to China, President Xi Jinping sounded the alarm. On the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in March 2023, he warned: “Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-round containment and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to the country’s development” (italics added).[1] By contrast, earlier this year, after the Trump administration launched a barrage of tariffs on China, Xi showed defiance. Instead of warning of the challenges to China, Xi emphasized that China is “not afraid of any unjust suppression.” He presented China’s development path as rooted in “self-reliance and hard work” and not as a gift that any external country can offer or take away.[2]

Xi was not caught off guard or surprised by Trump or his trade war. He knows how Trump operates. Additionally, Xi is neither a new leader needing to prove his toughness nor an endangered politician angling for reelection. He is a deeply entrenched statesman who dominates his political system. He has used his influence to prepare China for the type of external confrontation that Trump’s trade war represents. Far from being a shock or a scare, Xi has used Trump’s trade war as validation of his political campaign to harden the country against external challenges.

China’s leaders and official media responded matter-of-factly to America’s imposition of 145 percent tariffs on Chinese exports. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian flatly stated: “China does not want to fight these wars but is not scared of them.”[3] This comment followed from Premier Li Qiang’s declaration at the “Two Sessions” in March that the “giant ship of China’s economy” will “sail steadily toward the future” and will not be derailed by any external forces.[4]

China was one of only two countries in the world to impose counter-tariffs on U.S. goods, the other being Canada. China also used Trump’s tariff war as a pretext to launch a new export control regime for rare earths, a move that exposed Washington’s unpreparedness for this form of retaliation.

Overall, China’s response to Trump’s first months in office reveals a country that is confident in its capacity to manage stresses from the United States. It also reveals a country that believes it is closer to parity with the United States than it was during the first trade war. With its new suite of economic cost imposition tools at the ready, China is better positioned to fight a trade war with the United States than it was during Trump’s first term.

Organizing Principles of China’s Policy Response to American Pressure 

Drawing from a series of closed-door meetings with Chinese officials, policy experts, and academics in China in April and June, as well as a review of China’s official media commentaries and analyses by Chinese experts, Beijing’s response to Trump’s launch of a second trade war with China in April 2025 appears to be guided by five organizing principles:

(1)       Stand firm. Maintain strategic composure (战略定力). Continue amassing national strength while avoiding a direct collision with the United States. Persuade the Chinese public that long-term trends are working in China’s favor. 

(2)       Avoid international isolation. Prevent America from striking trade deals with other major economies that will disadvantage China’s economic growth prospects. Work to warm up relations with key peripheral countries, such as Australia, India, Vietnam, Japan, and Korea; stabilize relations with the European Union; and pull developing countries closer to China. 

(3)       Hit the United States where it hurts. Take fast and decisive counter-measures to disabuse Washington of any expectations that Beijing will buckle under pressure. Remind Washington that Beijing controls the chokepoints (e.g., rare earths) and, if necessary, it is willing to endure economic pain to outlast the United States in a trade war.

(4)       Trust that time is on China’s side. Have confidence that, compared to the United States, China’s society and political system are better able to “eat bitterness” (吃苦). The longer negotiations prolong, the more eager Trump may become to strike a deal.

(5)        Leave the door open. Do not personalize the trade war with Trump and do not signal implacable hostility toward the United States. Chinese officials up to and including President Xi have signaled a willingness to engage their U.S. counterparts. Xi invited Trump to visit China during their June phone call and Trump reciprocated.  

Tools and Tactics for Responding to American Pressure

China’s approaches for withstanding strategic pressure from the United States were not drawn up hastily or emotionally. They have been developed methodically over recent years around the objectives of greater self-reliance and self-strengthening.

China’s main line of preparatory effort has been domestic. Dating as far back as 2018, Xi has been sounding the alarm about the national security risks of depending on technological inputs from abroad for China’s economic advancement.[5] Xi used American export controls on semiconductors, investment restrictions, and visa limits on Chinese researchers as proof of the national security risks of depending on foreign suppliers for critical inputs for the development of semiconductor, artificial intelligence, and other advanced technological sectors. Beginning in 2020, Xi and his deputies began promoting a dual circulation strategy, which aims to spur domestic innovation and consumption with the goal of making the world more dependent on China and China less dependent on the rest of the world.[6] 

This trend toward promoting greater self-reliance became institutionalized in 2023. The Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee adopted the concept of self-reliance as a core organizing principle for building a resilient, innovation-driven economy capable of withstanding external shocks from technological competition with the United States.[7] The goal was to build enough indigenous production capacity to mitigate overdependence on external suppliers. 

Over time, China’s response to Western restrictions on high technology exports has become systematized into a comprehensive national innovation strategy.[8] China’s reforms and strategic investments have paid dividends in terms of spurring key emerging industries, and it now is the dominant supplier of electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage systems.[9] The country accounts for over 30 percent of global manufacturing value added and has become a central and indispensable link in global value chains.[10] The launch of DeepSeek’s advanced AI reasoning model in early 2025 and its performance comparability with leading U.S. models from OpenAI and Meta have become a point of national pride. At the same time, this sprawling national strategy also generated significant waste and deflationary pressures.[11] 

Beijing has also invested considerable resources over the past seven years to build a suite of policy tools to deter and, if necessary, to respond to external challenges. As Evan Medeiros and Andrew Polk examine in detail, China’s new suite of policy tools goes beyond its traditional economic countermeasures, such as halting purchases of goods and services, withholding investments, or spurring consumer boycotts of products from countries that challenge Chinese interests. China now has new legal and regulatory instruments for export control rules, sanctions, and investment restrictions that are comparable to rules in place in the United States and Europe.[12] 

These novel economic tools were not in place during the first U.S.–China trade war. They were built and codified into law and regulation during the previous five years in anticipation of the present moment. In aggregate, these tools apply narrow and specific pain on symbolic American companies and industries.

For example, Beijing responded in December 2024 to new U.S. export control restrictions on the sale of advanced microchips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment by banning the export of gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the United States under its export control regime.[13] Beijing’s decision to employ its new export control regulations in the waning weeks of the Biden administration was intended as much as a response to Biden’s policy decision as a warning to the incoming Trump team. The warning was not heeded.

After President Trump announced 54 percent tariffs on China on April 2, Beijing responded in kind with its own retaliatory tariffs on the United States. In addition, Beijing announced that it would begin controlling the export of rare earth magnets, a small but critical component upon which the U.S. auto industry, technology sector, and defense sector depend.[14] This step echoed Beijing’s December 2024 ban on exports of superhard materials.

The Trump administration wrongly assumed that rapidly escalating economic pressures would compel China to back off and bend to American demands for trade and economic concessions.[15] Instead, Beijing held firm, partly out of confidence that the United States had not stockpiled rare earth magnets prior to Trump’s announcement. Thus, America’s factory floors would soon shutter without access to critical Chinese products, and this dynamic would place pressure on Trump to back off from his escalation. Beijing’s expectations were borne out. Within weeks, the Trump administration proposed a meeting in Geneva with Chinese trade negotiators to pursue a trade truce.[16] 

Chinese experts broadly interpreted Beijing’s countermeasures as having succeeded in causing Trump to retreat from his escalatory threats against China. For example, Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong described China’s countermeasures as having “exerted decisive pressure on the U.S. and prompted the Trump administration to proactively lower tariffs.”[17]

Beijing also fortified itself for this trade war by deepening its importance to the global economy. According to analysis by the St. Louis Federal Reserve, more than 70 percent of countries in the world now trade more with China than with the United States.[18] China has become arguably the central hub of global value chains. As a result, China knows there will be hard limits on any American attempts to isolate it from the global economy.

Additionally, Beijing has been prosecuting a disciplined global messaging campaign. In authoritative op-eds in China’s official newspaper of record, Renmin ribao, “Zhong Sheng” (a pseudonym for a definitive viewpoint of the Chinese Communist Party that literally translates as “Voice of China”) have sought to present Beijing as a defender of the global economic order and protector of the multilateral trading system based on the World Trade Organization.[19] Xi and others have presented China as a principled actor working to uphold international trade rules and norms in the face of Trump’s capricious attacks on the global economy.[20] Beijing’s message to the rest of the world is clear: China is willing to take blows from the United States to protect others and to block Trump’s destruction of the global trading system.

China has pared its coordinated messaging campaign with an upsurge in activity through its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Investments by Chinese companies in BRI member states hit a record high this year, reaching $124 billion in the first six months.[21] This upsurge has resulted both from a need for Chinese firms to diversify markets and a demand by recipient countries for inbound investments to counterbalance negative pressures from Trump’s tariffs.[22]  

Beijing also has prioritized efforts to shore up relations with countries along its periphery.[23] It views strengthening relations with its Southeast Asian periphery as critical for counterbalancing American pressure on its economic model. From Beijing’s perspective, deeper economic integration with Southeast Asia expands the number of avenues for Chinese economic outputs to enter global value chains and to get around America’s protectionist walls.[24] Beijing increasingly is also providing internal security assistance to countries in the region to gain goodwill with its leaders.[25] 

How is Beijing’s Response Working?

Beijing has reason to judge positively the early returns from its comprehensive strategy for counteracting Trump’s trade pressures. For the first half of 2025, China reported strong economic performance, with GDP growing 5.3 percent.[26] China’s overall exports grew roughly 3 percent year on year, despite an 11 percent drop in volume to the United States.[27] Beijing was able to increase exports to Southeast Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa to more than offset its drop in exports to the United States.[28] China also burnished its global image. According to Pew polling, confidence in Xi to “do the right thing in world affairs” increased in 16 of the 25 countries surveyed, and positive views of China rose in 15 of the 25 countries surveyed. Meanwhile, global perceptions of the United States and Trump plummeted during this period.[29]

Two other events in July shed light on Beijing’s sense of confidence in its current approach. First, Chinese leaders played hardball with their European Union counterparts during a China–EU summit.[30] This likely reflected their expectation that trans-Atlantic ties are unlikely to meaningfully improve during Trump’s presidency, thus lowering the risk of a united front emerging in opposition to China. Second, the Politburo’s traditionally economics-focused meeting ended with no significant policy changes.[31] China’s leaders largely kept in place existing fiscal and monetary policies.

Even so, there are important caveats to all these findings. For example, the U.S.–China trade war generated pain for the Chinese economy. Export-dependent regions and sectors suffered.[32] China’s official gauge of factory activity contracted for four consecutive months in H1 2025.[33] Profits at industrial and state-owned firms shrunk in the first half of the year.[34] On top of this, China’s re-routing of exports to get around America’s tariff walls could be sowing the seeds of future anti-China sentiment if it leads to negative economic effects in those countries.[35] Looking ahead, China’s economic performance likely will decline in H2 2025.[36] 

For Xi and China’s other top leaders, though, these costs likely are viewed as the price of waging a trade war with the United States. The key point is that there is solid evidence to support Beijing’s sense of confidence in its capacity to withstand American pressure under Trump, at least for the time being.

China’s Expectations and Anxieties about U.S.–China Rivalry Going Forward

There are no observable indicators that Beijing expects U.S.–China rivalry to abate in the coming years.[37] Rather, China’s leaders appear to be seeking ways to mellow the rivalrous nature of the U.S.–China relationship as Beijing advances its strategy for building strength at home and influence abroad. China’s goal is not to confront and overtake the United States but rather to amass strength of its own to a point that America must accommodate and accept China as a central global power.

The Chinese policy community seems to forecast global trends as working in their favor over the coming decade. Since Xi Jinping popularized the phrase “the world is experiencing changes unseen in a century,” a cottage industry has emerged in China to describe factors leading to the diminishing relative weight of the West and the expanding opportunities for China to exercise greater global influence.[38]

Some Chinese experts still warn against underestimating the United States.[39] On balance, though, there appears to be more public commentators in China who are arguing that the United States is experiencing relative decline. One of them is Xie Tao, dean of the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University, a top training program with a reputation for being a “cradle of Chinese diplomats.”[40] Xie and others have argued publicly that China is in a strengthening position to withstand American pressure because of “America’s decreasing importance in China’s global strategy, the decreased impact of America’s containment, and the decline of America’s capability to mobilize domestic and international resources.”[41]

Behind such confidence, though, there remain latent anxieties about America’s ability to impede China’s rise. Chinese officials and experts harbor concerns that a fairly manageable U.S.–China trade war from their perspective could metastasize into an unmanageable great power confrontation. The most likely trigger for such a confrontation would likely be Taiwan. Some analysts, such as Chen Wenling, former chief economist of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, warn that the Trump administration might use Taiwan as its “last card when all its containment policies toward China fail.”[42] In other words, she warns that Trump could provide greater American support for Taiwan in ways that might compel China to divert its focus and national resources to respond.

China’s leaders also worry that the United States could intensify its efforts to obstruct China’s technological progress by blocking the flow of advanced components to China. Losing access to AI models, cutting edge semiconductor chips and equipment, aerospace technologies, etc., could threaten China’s development goals for the next decade and beyond. To limit this risk, China’s leaders have made science and technology self-reliance a paramount national goal.[43] Xi has repeatedly urged scientists to achieve breakthroughs in “choke-point” technologies so that “the lifeline is in our own hands.”[44] He and others believe that innovation capacity will determine the U.S.–China rivalry. China aims to be a technology superpower by 2030,[45] but it needs time, space, training opportunities for Chinese students and scientists in the United States, and continuing access to Western technology to reach that goal.

Importantly, Chinese leaders also worry that if U.S.–China rivalry broadens beyond trade and enters a phase of uncontrolled escalation, Washington could attempt to delegitimize the Chinese Communist Party leadership in the eyes of the Chinese people. Former Chinese officials and experts have warned during closed-door U.S.–China Track-2 dialogues in which this author has participated over the past six months that Beijing has no tolerance for public criticisms of individual leaders. In their telling, this includes any efforts to publicize the corruption or wealth of Chinese officials or any efforts to pin blame on the Party leadership for the origin or spread of COVID-19.

Lessons for the United States

The main takeaway of this review is that the Trump administration did not do its homework in advance of launching its trade war on China. Instead, it launched a war without a plan. During the past five years, it did not take stock of China’s preparations for this trade war, Xi’s own political imperatives, or America’s own dependencies and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China. In so doing, the Trump administration secured a place in history alongside Napolean’s winter invasion of Russia. In both cases, a dangerous blend of under-preparedness, hubris, and ignorance of the other side’s capabilities generated an unwise opening move followed by a costly and embarrassing retreat.

Historically, though, America’s strength has not been its avoidance of mistakes but rather its capacity for correcting them. To do so effectively with China now, Washington should devote less energy to trying to influence Beijing and focus more on itself and its partners. At its heart, the U.S.–China rivalry is a race to the frontier of innovation. Whichever country does better in building capacity in 21st century industries, like AI, robotics, nuclear fusion, quantum computing, and biotechnology, will benefit from the shadow of the future.

To compete effectively, the United States will need to harness its strengths. These include its longstanding relationships with allies and partners around the world and its historical tolerance for industrial experimentation. America is at its strongest when it can pool capabilities with other advanced democracies, and when it has the self-confidence at home to try and occasionally fail in incubating future industries.

American leaders have proven adept at times in spurring new industries into existence. During World War II, public–private partnerships brought about jet propulsion and advances in radar technologies. Kennedy’s challenge to land a man on the moon spurred a generation of scientific breakthroughs. And Trump’s launch of Operation Warp Speed during the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated development of a vaccine that saved millions of lives.[46] 

In the near-term, the Trump administration is unlikely to act on these recommendations. Instead, the Trump team is placing a bet that greater protectionism, deregulation, and energy abundance will attract global capital and unleash economic growth. If Trump’s policy experiment underperforms, however, there will be political space for fresh thinking about ways to strengthen the sources of American power.

As Washington charts America’s course for self-strengthening, it must do so with an evidentiary understanding of the limits of its ability to influence China’s national trajectory. China is deeply embedded in global value chains. It is at or near the leading edge of innovation across most technological sectors. China has abundant talent and access to capital. The country is not going to be contained or deprived of inputs for its continued development. The only country that can impede China’s rise is China itself. If Washington is truly determined to maintain its edge in its competition with Beijing, it will need to focus less on trying to change China and focus more on improving its own performance.

About the Contributor

Ryan Hass is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, where he is also the Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He also is a Nonresident Affiliated Fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School. Prior to joining Brookings, Hass served as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) from 2013 to 2017. In that role, he advised President Obama and senior White House officials on all aspects of U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and coordinated among U.S. government departments and agencies on implementation of U.S. policy toward the region. Prior to the White House, Hass was a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State. He is the author of Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence (Yale University Press, 2021) and co-author of US–Taiwan Relations: Will China’s Challenge Lead to a Crisis? (Brookings, 2023).

Notes

[1] Teddy Ng, “China’s ‘Two Sessions’ 2023: Xi Jinping Directly Accuses US of Leading Western Suppression of China,” South China Morning Post, March 7, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3212627/chinas-two-sessions-2023-xi-jinping-directly-accuses-us-leading-western-suppression-china.

[2] Kate Plummer, “Xi Jinping Breaks Silence on US Tariff War,” Newsweek, April 11, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/xi-jinping-breaks-silence-us-tariff-war-2058435.

[3]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on April 11, 2025,” updated April 11, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202504/t20250411_11593654.html.

[4] Simone McCarty, “China Has a Message for Trump: The US Won’t Stop its Rise,” CNN, March 8, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/08/china/china-two-sessions-xi-jinping-trump-trade-war-intl-hnk/index.html.

[5] Adam Segal, “China’s Move to Greater Self Reliance,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 70 (December 1, 2021), https://www.prcleader.org/post/china-s-move-to-greater-self-reliance.

[6] Liu Hongzhong, “超越脱钩：中国的双循环战略与全球经济秩序的重塑” [Beyond Decoupling: China's Dual Circulation Strategy and the Reshaping of the Global Economic Order], available at CNKI, https://doi.org/10.13851/j.cnki.gjzw.202503001.

[7] Marina Yue Zhang, “Self-reliance and Openness Central Pillars of China’s Third Plenum,” East Asia Forum, August 15, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/15/self-reliance-and-openness-central-pillars-of-chinas-third-plenum/.

[8]Xu Zheng and Zhan Zhiyong, “特朗普 2.0 时期中国经济发展环境挑战与应对策略” [China’s Economic Development Environment in the Trump 2.0 Era: Challenges and Coping Strategies], United Front Research Yuan, no. 3 (2025): 135–47, available at CNKI,  https://doi.org/10.13946/j.cnki.jcqis.2025.03.011.

[9] Editorial Board, “China Is Winning the Race for Green Supremacy,” Financial Times, January 12, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/d3650b44-0313-44c9-a7aa-495549b158b5.

[10] Arendse Huld and Qian Zhou, “China Manufacturing Tracker 2025,” China Briefing, Dezan Shira and Associates, July 21, 2025, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-manufacturing-industry-tracker-2024-25/.

[11]Editorial Board, “China’s Battle with Deflation Isn’t Just a Demand Problem,” Financial Times, July 27, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/d5ab6bdb-689f-466c-94ea-0d4e5bbaa8f1. 

[12] The tools Beijing has developed are comprehensive and sharp. They include the development of an unreliable entity list, blocking rules, an anti-foreign sanctions law, cybersecurity reviews, antitrust and mergers and acquisitions reviews, and export control laws and control lists; Evan S. Medeiros and Andrew Polk, “China’s New Economic Weapons,” The Washington Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2025): 99–123, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2480513.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Lucy Zhang, Wendy Yan, Cloris Mao, and Claire Zhao, “China’s Retaliatory Actions to Trump 2.0 Actions,” Faegre Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP, April 30, 2025, https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2025/4/china-retaliatory-actions-to-trump-2-0-tariffs. 

[15] Ana Swanson and Tripp Mickle, “As Trump Courts a More Assertive Beijing, China Hawks Are Losing Out,” New York Times, July 20, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/20/us/politics/trump-china-technology.html.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Xintian Li and Yuxuan Jia, “Yan Xuetong on China–U.S. Talks, Ukraine, and International Order Without Global Leadership,” Pekingnology, June 24, 2025, https://www.pekingnology.com/p/yan-xuetong-on-chinaus-talks-ukraine.

[18] B. Ravikumar and Dawn Chinagorom-Abiakalam, “Who Trades More with China than with the U.S.?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, June 2, 2025, https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2025/jun/who-trades-more-china-us.

[19] Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, “Behind the Zhong Sheng Pseudonym: Understanding China’s Official Diplomatic Voice,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, July 23, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/behind-zhong-sheng-pseudonym-understanding-china-s-official-diplomatic-voice.

[20] Victoria Kim and David Pierson, “Australian Leader’s Bonhomie in China Belies Delicate Balancing Act,” New York Times, July 15, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/world/asia/china-australia-trade-security.html.

[21] Christoph Nedopil, “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2025 H1,” Griffith Asia Insights, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, July 17, 2025, https://blogs.griffith.edu.au/asiainsights/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2025/.

[22] Joe Leahy, “China’s Belt and Road Investment and Construction Activity Hits Record,” Financial Times, July 15, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/a2635ba1-198e-4014-8030-7e420edf34be .

[23] Xie Huanchi, “中央周邊工作會議在北京舉行” [Central Peripheral Work Conference Held in Beijing], People’s Daily Online, April 10, 2025, http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2025/0410/c1024-40456600.html.

[24] Xu Zheng and Zhan Zhiyong, “特朗普 2.0 时期中国经济发展环境挑战与应对策略.”

[25] Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac B. Kardon, “Does China’s Growing Security Outreach Matter? Tracing Implications for Irregular Warfare and U.S. Security Cooperation,” Irregular Warfare, June 4, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/does-chinas-growing-security-outreach-matter-tracing-implications-for-irregular-warfare-and-u-s-security-cooperation/.

[26] “China’s Foreign Trade Up 2.9 % in H1,” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July 14, 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/statistics/202507/14/content_WS68746e34c6d0868f4e8f421b.html.

[27] Xinhua News Agency, “China’s Foreign Trade Up 2.9% in H1,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (pressroom article), July 14, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250514_11622464.html.

[28] Anna Fleck, “China Fills U.S. Exports Gap with ASEAN, EU, and Africa,” Statista, July 14, 2025, https://www.statista.com/chart/34803/chinese-exports-to-selected-countries-groups-of-nations/. 

[29]Laura Silver, Laura Clancy, Jonathan Schulman, William Miner, and Christine Huang, “Views of China and Xi Jinping,” Pew Research Center, July 15, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/07/15/views-of-china-and-xi-jinping-2025/.  

[30] Laurie Chen, Liz Lee, and Xiuhao Chen, “EU-China Ties at 'Inflection Point', Von der Leyen Says After Tense Beijing Summit,” Reuters, July 24, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-china-ties-inflection-point-von-der-leyen-says-after-tense-beijing-summit-2025-07-24/. 

[31] “China Politburo Holds Off on Further Stimulus,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-politburo-holds-off-on-further-stimulus-bfeeccbe.  

[32]Francesco Paolo Conteduca, Michele Mancini, and Alessandro Borin, “Roaring Tariffs: The Global Impact of the 2025 US Trade War,” VoxEU, Centre for Economic Policy Research, May 6, 2025, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/roaring-tariffs-global-impact-2025-us-trade-war.

[33] “China Official PMIs Signal Impending Slowdown,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/economy/china-manufacturing-activity-contracts-for-fourth-straight-month-dbbe41b4.

[34] “China's Industrial Profits Fall Further in June,” Reuters, July 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-industrial-profits-fall-further-june-2025-07-27/.

[35] Ellen Francis and Kelly Kasulis Cho, “Bound for Beijing, E.U. leaders Face Two-front Trade Fight with Trump and Xi,” Washington Post, July 23, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/23/eu-china-tensions-beijing-summit/.

[36] Christian Shepherd and Pei-Lin Wu, “China’s Economy Grows by 5.3% in First Half Despite Trump’s Trade War,” Washington Post, July 15, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/14/china-economy-growth-united-states-trade-war/. 

[37] Phoenix News, “美国‘重返亚太’说了无数次，这次能回来吗?” [The United States Has Said Countless Times That It Will ‘Return to the Asia-Pacific.’ Can It Come Back This Time?], interview with Da Wei, reposted by the Peking University Sino-Foreign Cultural Exchange Research Base (Weixin/WeChat official account), June 3, 2025, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wxKPhqGCUtEbzrz922C-dg. 

[38] Chen Wenling, “特朗普第二任期对华战略与政策走向” [Trump's China Strategy and Policy Direction in His Second Term], People’s Forum - Academic Frontiers, no. 9 (2025), available at CNKI, https://doi.org/10.16619/j.cnki.rmltxsqy.2025.07.014.

[39] Yiyang Xu, Yuxuan Jia, and Zichen Wang, “Wang Jisi on U.S. Society, Foreign Policy, and China-U.S. Relations,” Pekingnology, May 22, 2025, https://www.pekingnology.com/p/wang-jisi-on-us-society-foreign-policy. 

[40] “School of International Relations and Diplomacy,” Beijing Foreign Studies University website (English version), https://en.bfsu.edu.cn/sird.html.

[41] Xie Tao, “What Do Chinese Analysts Expect for China–U.S. Relations Under Trump,” Brookings Institution, January 23, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-do-chinese-analysts-expect-for-china-us-relations-under-trump-2-0/#:~:text=Trump%20and%20Biden%E2%80%99s%20idiosyncratic%20leadership,four%20or%20eight%20years%2C%20China.

[42] Chen Wenling, “特朗普第二任期对华战略与政策走向.”  

[43] Lizzi C. Lee, “Beijing Has Already Prepared for Trump’s Return,” Foreign Policy, November 13, 2024,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/china-trump-xi-jinping-tariffs/.

[44] Xinhua News Agency commentator, “新华社评论员：把科技的命脉牢牢掌握在自己手” [Keep the Lifeline of Science and Technology Firmly in our Own Hands], State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July 2, 2022, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-07/02/content_5698911.htm.

[45] National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China, The Outline of the 14th Five‑Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2021–2025) and Long‑Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, March 13, 2021, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202203/P020220315511326748336.pdf.

[46] David Autor and Gordon Hanson, “We Warned About the First China Shock. The Next One Will Be Worse.” New York Times, July 14, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/14/opinion/china-shock-economy-manufacturing.html. 

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