Same Strategy, But Different Emphasis: Main Takeaways from the Central Committee’s Proposals for the 15th Five-Year Plan

Minxin Pei CLM Issue 86 December 2025 .pdf

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The proposal for the 15^th Five-Year Plan (FYP), approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at its 4^th plenum in late October 2025, is substantively similar to the proposal for the 14^th FYP. The most important message conveyed in this document is that the party will continue to pursue the security-centered development strategy unveiled in October 2020. Based on the more pessimistic assessments of China’s external environment, the proposal for the next FYP underscores the party’s determination to mitigate China’s strategic vulnerabilities with new investments in a wide range of industrial, technological, and military capabilities. Although many specific measures listed in the proposal are part of existing policy, their prominence in this authoritative party document signals that the Chinese leadership will stay the course in spite of difficulties and risks. Regardless of its upbeat tone, the proposal reveals the significant challenges China will face in implementing its strategy. Contrary to the perception that the West’s technological chokeholds constitute China’s greatest vulnerability, what is holding back China is the party’s lack of success in reinvigorating the broad economy. The proposal contains few credible measures to suggest the party will do any better in this respect during the next five years.

The most important outcome of the recently concluded 4^th plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the committee’s proposal for the 15^th Five-Year Plan (FYP). Strictly speaking, the proposal provides the framework of the plan by setting objectives and prescribing policies in broad terms. The actual plan, expected to be released at the end of March 2026 following the conclusion of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, will be much longer and more detailed. The last (14^th) FYP, for example, contained more than 63,000 Chinese characters, three times the Central Committee’s proposal (20,000 characters) that was approved by the 5^th plenum of the CC in October 2020.[1]  Although China no longer has a command economy, FYPs continue to play an important role in conveying the CCP’s assessment of its challenges and in signaling the party’s policy priorities and objectives to its rank and file and the Chinese public.  In the case of the CC’s proposal for the 14^th FYP, issued in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2020 freefall in Sino-American relations, the party’s top leadership unveiled a new development strategy to cope with a radically different external environment. Centered on so-called “dual circulation” and technological self-sufficiency, the proposal for the 14^th FYP elevated economic security to the party’s most important medium-term priority, marking a decisive break with Deng Xiaoping’s policy priority of “opening” (mainly to the West).[2]

As five years have passed since General Secretary Xi Jinping began to implement his security-centered development strategy, the CC’s proposal for the 15^th FYP serves several important purposes. At the most basic level, it assesses the overall economic and security environments and identifies the new challenges facing the country. Additionally, it takes stock of fulfillment of the last (14^th) FYP and sets new objectives and tasks. In terms of providing strategic guidance to party officials administering the vast state apparatus, the proposal contains critical and specific policy signals.

The importance the party attaches to the proposal for the 15^th FYP, like similar proposals for previous FYPs, can be seen in its status as a CC “resolution,” the most authoritative declaration of policy or a decision by the party. Not surprisingly, according to Xi’s speech at the 4^th plenum the party’s top leadership invested a considerable amount of time in drafting the proposal. Xi personally chaired the drafting committee, with four other members of the Politburo Standing Committee (Li Qiang, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and Ding Xuexiang) serving as vice-chairs. Between late February 2025, when the process of drafting the proposal began, and late October, when the CC approved the proposal, the Politburo Standing Committee convened three meetings to discuss and review the drafts-in-progress.[3]  Even though it is a procedural formality for the party chief to chair such drafting committees, the stakes are likely higher for Xi than they were for his two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who did not have to deviate from Deng Xiaoping’s overall development strategy based on market-oriented domestic reform and economic integration with the West.  The breakdown of relations with the West, triggered by China’s assertive foreign policy under Xi, and the U.S.-China trade war in the first Trump administration, rendered this strategy unviable. The new geopolitical reality left Xi and his colleagues with no option but to search for a new development strategy that would reduce Chinese dependence on the West and mitigate its strategic vulnerabilities. The broad framework of this strategy emerged in October 2020 when the CC endorsed the proposal for the 14^th FYP, articulating a two-pronged strategy of “dual circulation” and technological self-sufficiency. As the leader under whose watch China had to make a fundamental shift in its national strategy (国策), Xi bears direct responsibility for its success. Given Xi’s apparent intention of seeking a fourth term, it is critical for him to reassure the party that his new national strategy, initially laid out in the CC’s proposal for the 14^th FYP and further refined in the proposal for the 15^th FYP, is the right one for a dangerous world.[4]

A Darker Assessment of the External Environment

To reiterate the party’s justification for a security-centered development strategy, the proposal for the 15^th FYP paints a darker picture of the external environment facing China in 2025 than in 2020. For example, in spite of the trade war with the U.S. and the rapid deterioration in Sino-American ties in 2020, the proposal for the 14^th FYP maintained that “peace and development remain the primary theme of [our] era” (和平与发展仍然是时代主题)  – a stock phrase repeated in all previous party FYP proposals. In describing the current external environment, such an upbeat characterization is dropped in the proposal for the 15^th FYP.  The proposal for the 14^th FYP stated “economic globalization is encountering counter-currents; the world has entered a period of turbulent change; unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemonism pose threats to peace and development in the world” (经济全球化遭遇逆流，世界进入动荡变革期，单边主义、保护主义、霸权主义对世界和平与发展构成威胁).[5]  However, from the party’s perspective the threats facing China today have escalated:  “Change and chaos in the world are interwoven, turbulence has intensified, and geopolitical conflict occurs more easily and frequently” (世界变乱交织、动荡加剧, 地缘冲突易发多发).[6] In addition, “unilateralism and protectionism have reared their heads, the threats of hegemonism [China’s thinly veiled reference to the U.S.] and power politics have increased, the international economic and trade order has encountered severe challenges, the global economy lacks momentum for growth, and competition among the major countries has become more complex and intense (单边主义、保护主义抬头，霸权主义和强权政治威胁上升, 国际经济贸易秩序遇到严峻挑战，世界经济增长动能不足；大国博弈更加复杂激烈).[7]

To confront this increasingly grim external environment, the proposal calls for stronger confidence in an eventual victory and greater courage and skill in waging a struggle and facing the severe and dangerous crises (增强必胜信心… 敢于斗争、善于斗争，勇于面对风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪的重大考验).[8]  Such rhetoric is both more alarmist as well as more militant than the proposal for the 14^th FYP, which merely called for “promoting the spirit of struggle and establishing bottom-line thinking” (发扬斗争精神，树立底线思维).[9]  However, despite the growing external threats and challenges, the proposal for the 15^th FYP reiterates prioritization of domestic economic development, a strategic principle the party has followed since the end of the Maoist era.  If anything, the proposal for the 15^th FYP places even greater emphasis on this priority. While the proposal for the 14^th FYP described this priority as “doing our own [domestic] things well” (办好自己的事), the proposal for the 15^th FYP frames it as “concentrating our capabilities on doing our own things well” (集中力量办好自己的事).[10] 

Few should be surprised by the darker tone of the proposal for the 15^th FYP. The world in 2025 is far more dangerous and uncertain than it was in 2020. In China’s case, rivalry with the U.S., its primary geopolitical adversary, has intensified and broadened in the intervening period to such an extent that Chinese leaders have concluded, as have their American counterparts, that tensions, distrust, and hostility will define the China-U.S. relationship for decades to come. With China entering this era of great power rivalry as the weaker player relative to the U.S., its leaders must have realized that they will have better odds of closing the gap in capabilities with the U.S. by prioritizing domestic economic and technological developments. Even though the party unveiled its new development strategy of “dual circulation” and technological self-sufficiency in October 2020, the escalation of U.S. export controls and the trade war since then must have reinforced China’s leaders’ conviction that only an all-out effort to address its most serious vulnerabilities, such as dependence on Western technologies and markets, will enable them to regain the strategic initiative in competing with the U.S.

Even Greater Emphasis on Security

If we count the frequency of the appearance of the phrase “national security” (国家安全) as a crude measure of the party’s priorities, the difference between the CC proposal for the 13^th FYP and that for the 14^th FYP is dramatic (seven vs. fifteen). The number of appearances of this phrase increased only marginally in the proposal for the 15^th FYP (to seventeen). However, a closer comparison of the two proposals (for the 14^th and 15^th FYPs) shows that national security receives an even greater emphasis in the proposal for the 15^th FYP. The first two sections (Sections 49 and 50) of Part 13 of the proposal for the 15^th FYP contain new tasks and objectives not mentioned in the proposal for the previous FYP. In Section 49, the most notable addition appears to be a list of tasks, or goals, specifically designated to protect China’s overseas interests and to counter Western sanctions. In the period of 2026–2030, according to the proposal, China will further improve external-facing national security mechanisms, build a system to safeguard overseas security interests, and intensify the struggle against sanctions, intervention, and “long-arm jurisdiction” (完善涉外国家安全机制，构建海外安全保障体系，加强反制裁、反干预、反“长臂管辖”斗争).[11]  These additions likely reflect Chinese leaders’ growing awareness of the need to develop policies and mechanisms to counter the West’s use economic sanctions in pursuance of its security interests, as fully demonstrated after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In Section 50 of the proposal, the party sets new national security objectives for the 15^th FYP. Topping the list are “safeguarding the security of strategic transit routes, promoting the construction of the depth of national security [apparently referring to less-populated interior areas that are less vulnerable than the coastal regions], reserving capacity in key industrial sectors, and intensifying the building of capacities in new national security domains, such as data, artificial intelligence, biology, ecology, nuclear, space, the deep sea, the polar region, and low earth orbits (维护战略通道安全，推进国家战略腹地建设和关键产业备份。加强网络、数据、人工智能、生物、生态、核、太空、深海、极地、低空等新兴领域国家安全能力建设).[12]   Designation of these new security objectives likely reflects one of the lessons Chinese leaders have learned from the war in Ukraine, namely, the vital need to protect critical infrastructure and key industries in the case of a potential military conflict.

In Part 14, which deals specifically with military modernization, the proposal for the 15^th FYP not only adds one new section (Section 55) but also articulates new tasks and objectives not contained in the previous proposal. Formulation of the policy to build up nuclear deterrence remains essentially unchanged. The proposal for the 14^th FYP called for expanding strategic capabilities (壮大战略力量). In the proposal for the 15^th FYP, “deterrent” is added to the same phrase (壮大战略威慑力量). This likely reveals that, although the decision to build up China’s nuclear arsenal was made in about 2020, the party will continue with the current course and maintain the same pace. But the proposal sets more ambitious objectives for acquiring advanced capabilities at scale in new domains. Unmanned intelligent combat systems as well as capabilities to counter them will be another priority. The overall objective is to develop a new war-fighting system enhanced with [artificial] intelligence (构建智能化军事体系).[13]

Section 55 of the proposal merits special mention not because it is new but because it seems to imply that China must integrate its military and the apparatus of the local state to better position itself in the event of a major conflict. The overall goal laid out in this section is the strengthening and improving of China’s “integrated strategic system and its capabilities” (一体化国家战略体系和能力). Specific steps will require deepening reforms to improve coordination between the military and local governments. The new phrase of “interfacing between the military and local governments” (军地对接) may mean more institutionalized channels of interaction and coordination in the development of national security capabilities. Another notable objective in this section is the interchangeability of military and civilian standards (军民标准通用化), which seems to imply that civilian and military goods and equipment will use the same technical standards. To prepare for a future conflict, the proposal calls for the strengthening of a strategic early warning system for national defense, accelerated development of the capacity for national mobilization, intensification of the building of reserve capabilities, and the construction of modern naval and air defense along China’s coast (加强国防战略预制。加快国防动员能力建设，加强后备力量建设，加强现代边海空防建设).[14]  If implemented effectively, these steps will better position China for a protracted attritional conflict – another key lesson Beijing has likely learned from the war in Ukraine.

Section 59 of the proposal, which addresses the Taiwan issue, adopts a tougher stance. In the proposal for the 14^th FYP, the same section called for “high vigilance against and resolute containment of separatist activities for ‘Taiwanese independence’” (高度警惕和坚决遏制“台独”分裂活动). This relatively restrained formulation has been replaced in the proposal for the 15^th FYP with more bellicose phrases. The task for the coming five years is to “resolutely strike at separatist forces for ‘Taiwanese independence,’ oppose interference by external forces, and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” (坚决打击“台独”分裂势力，反对外部势力干涉，维护台海和平稳定). Intriguingly, the standard formulation of “maintaining the one-China principle and the ’92 consensuses” is dropped in the proposal for the 15^th FYP, and it is replaced by the new formulation of “deepening implementation of the party’s overall strategy of resolving the Taiwan question in the new era” (深入贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略).[15]  The disappearance of the “one-China principle and the ’92 consensuses” may make some wonder whether there is any change in Beijing’s Taiwan policy.  But a closer look at perhaps the most authoritative explanation of the party’s “overall strategy,” provided by the then-director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council in December 2022, shows that the “one-China principle and the ’92 consensuses” remain an integral part of this strategy. If there is any policy shift on Taiwan in the proposal for the 15^th FYP, the shift is toward a less-compromising stance.[16]

Key Economic Objectives

In terms of its key economic objectives, the proposal for the 15^th FYP can be treated as an update of the 14^th FYP to reflect the party’s new priorities. Perhaps the most eye-catching difference between the two proposals is the slight change in the order in which the key economic objectives are arranged. In the proposal for the 14^th FYP, acquisition of indigenous capabilities for innovation and technological self-sufficiency was listed as the top economic priority, above the goal of “acceleration of development of modern industrial production systems” (加快发展现代产业体系). In the proposal for the 15^th FYP, the positions of these two goals are flipped: the goal of “building modern industrial production systems and consolidating and expanding the foundations of the real economy” is above that of “acceleration of high-level scientific and technological self-sufficiency, and self-strengthening” (加快高水平科技自立自强). A further surprise, especially for those assuming that the party is focused completely on high-tech self-reliance, is that task number one in building “modern industrial production systems” is actually the upgrading of traditional low-tech industries in which China is already globally competitive, such as mining, metallurgy, chemicals, light industry, textiles, machinery, ship-building, and construction. According to the proposal, China seeks to entrench and improve its competitiveness (and market share) in these sectors globally.[17]  The emphasis placed on traditional industries likely reflects the party’s concern that China risks losing its edge in these sectors before it can become a competitive player in more high-tech sectors. If China successfully increases its competitiveness in these sectors and gains more market share, tensions with its trading partners are bound to increase. But in the eyes of Chinese leaders, this risk apparently is less consequential than the hollowing-out of China’s industrial base.

Despite taking second place, scientific and technological development remains a high priority for the party. The most notable changes in the objectives set for the next FYP include declaration of an all-out effort to conquer technological chokepoints. According to the proposal, China will perfect its “new-type whole-of-nation system” of resource mobilization (完善新型举国体制) and “undertake extraordinary measures” (采取超常规措施) to achieve decisive breakthroughs in core technologies in the entire supply chains of semi-conductor manufacturing, machine tools, high-end instruments, advanced materials, and biotech (全链条推动集成电路、工业母机、高端仪器、基础软件、先进材料、生物制造等重点领域关键核心技术攻关取得决定性突破).[18]  We will have to wait until the release of the 15^th FYP to learn the specifics of the “extraordinary measures” that China will adopt.  What is clear is that the party will double down on its quest for scientific and technological self-sufficiency.

Artificial intelligence (AI) was mentioned only once in the section on science and technology in the proposal for the 14^th FYP. In contrast, the proposal for the 15^th FYP devotes nearly an entire section to introduce China’s AI strategy. Besides spelling out its overall objectives, such as accelerating innovation in AI research, achieving breakthroughs in AI theory and core technologies, and strengthening a “highly efficient” supply of computing power, models, and data, the proposal calls for comprehensive implementation of the AI+ action plan (which promotes the application of AI in everyday economic activities). The ultimate goal is to gain a commanding advantage in the application of AI in industrial production and to endow all sectors with this general-purpose technology.[19]  Although the framing of its AI strategy represents existing policy, the emphasis on AI in the proposal is a political signal that the party will stay the course in spite of U.S. export controls and advances by American tech giants in the sector.

The concept of “dual circulation” featured prominently in the party’s proposal for the 14^th FYP, occupying two sections in Part V.[20]  But the emphasis of the proposal for the 15^th FYP is not on this fancy phrase. Instead, the party singles out specific policies to address the weakest point in the Chinese economy: anemic consumption. Although the proposal for the 14^th FYP also called for policies to promote consumption, it contained fewer specifics. By comparison, the proposal for the 15th FYP lists more concrete measures to stimulate consumption. Most notably, the party promises specific subsidies to incentivize consumption (the Chinese government has implemented, for example, a program to subsidize the replacement of old household appliances). Fiscal policy will also pivot to higher spending on public services and social protection. “Unreasonable” regulatory restrictions on housing and vehicle ownership will be removed.

Given the party’s poor record in raising domestic consumption despite its repeated pledges to do so, we must treat these measures with skepticism. The most specific measures included in the proposal for the 15^th FYP are likely to have no more than a marginal impact on household consumption. Several major reforms will be required to raise household consumption meaningfully. One is a radical restructuring of the fiscal system to increase the revenue of local governments. Another is for the central government to assume greater responsibility for funding social safety nets. A third is to channel local government spending away from wasteful activities (such as building unneeded infrastructure and operating unprofitable state-owned enterprises) toward social spending. Because the proposal does not mention any of these reforms, it is doubtful that the 15^th FYP will include them.

Dual circulation apparently has lost its luster for good reason. Chinese leaders have long viewed the colossal size of the domestic market as a structural advantage. But a super-sized market will function poorly and remain fragmented if it lacks the underlying institutions, such as rule of law and effective regulations. This reality now confronts Chinese leaders. The proposal for the 15^th FYP admits that the party’s efforts to establish “great domestic circulation” (国内大循环) has encountered bottlenecks and obstacles (卡点堵点). But the solutions articulated in the proposal do not seem to break any new ground. Radical institutional reforms, such as improving protection of property rights, reducing barriers to entry, “normalizing local government behavior in promoting the economy” (规范地方政府经济促进行为), dismantling local protectionism, and “comprehensively rectifying ‘involutionary’ competition” (综合整治“内卷式”竞争) do not seem likely unless the party forgoes some of its power over the legal system and makes it difficult for local governments to access the credit market for funding wasteful investments.[21]

Challenges Ahead

Ever since the party pivoted to a security-centered development strategy at the end of 2020, the Chinese government has struggled to maintain the right balance between security and development. Judging by China’s achievements in technological self-sufficiency during the last five years, it seems reasonable to conclude that it has made more progress in strengthening security than it has in reviving its economic momentum. To the extent that progress toward economic security in general, and technological self-sufficiency in particular, will be impossible to sustain without a robust economy at the macro level, the party is well advised to place greater emphasis on regaining China’s economic momentum through much-needed and long-promised structural and institutional reforms. Otherwise, continuing to prioritize security is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. Indeed, as two veteran analysts of China recently warned, China’s obsession with technological self-sufficiency is a drag on its broad economy.[22]  Simple math shows that China is unlikely to grow at 4.5 percent per annum in the period covered by 15^th FYP unless it can replace the contribution of exports to growth with domestic demand. As exports in recent years have contributed 30 percent of GDP growth, China has managed to fulfill its growth target of about 5 percent. A former senior official in the Central Finance Commission has estimated that meeting the growth target of 4.5 percent in the coming five years will require 7 trillion yuan (about US$1 trillion) in additional aggregate annual demand (or 35 trillion yuan over five years).[23]  The only realistic way of creating new demand equivalent to the current size of the German economy by 2030 is to rely on domestic consumption because the potential for China to increase its exports (nearly $3.6 trillion in 2024) in the coming five years will be limited.[24]  But the challenge of reviving China’s growth momentum will be more difficult than the challenge of mitigating its vulnerabilities in critical technologies.  Progress in the latter can be accelerated through brute force, such as China’s financial resources and human talent. Lifting the Chinese economy from its post-pandemic doldrums will require the kind of complex and difficult structural and institutional reforms the party has long promised but has failed to deliver. The party’s proposal for the 15^th FYP attempts to project the leadership’s optimism for the future. For a Chinese public that needs more than reassuring rhetoric, the proposal simply does not contain enough substance to be truly credible. One can only hope that the actual 15^th FYP will do better.

About the Contributor

Minxin Pei, editor of China Leadership Monitor, is Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. His books include China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (2006), China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (2016), The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China (2024), and The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism (2025).

Notes

[1] “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要,”

https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm; “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议,” https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-11/03/content_5556991.htm.

[2] Minxin Pei, “Beijing’s New Economic Strategy from the Resolution of the CCP Central Committee’s 5th Plenum,” China Leadership Monitor, Issue 66 (December 1, 2021), https://www.prcleader.org/post/beijing-s-new-economic-strategy-from-the-resolution-of-the-ccp-central-committee-s-5th-plenum.

[3] 习近平，“关于中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年计划的建议的说明,” https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202510/content_7046048.htm.

[4] Jonathan Czin, “Plotting the Course to Xi’s Fourth Term: Preparations, Predictions, and Possibilities,” China Leadership Monitor, Issue 85, September 1, 2025, https://www.prcleader.org/post/plotting-the-course-to-xi-s-fourth-term-preparations-predictions-and-possibilities.

[5] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议,” https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-11/03/content_5556991.htm.

[6] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议,” https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202510/content_7046050.htm.

[7] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[8] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[9] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议.”

[10] “共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议”; “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[11] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[12] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[13] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[14] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[15] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议.” “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[16] 刘结一, “坚持贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略,” 《求是》, December 1, 2022,  https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2022-12/01/c_1129172940.htm.

[17] In Section 7, Part III, the proposal lays out the following goals: “优化提升传统产业。推动重点产业提质升级，巩固提升矿业、冶金、化工、轻工、纺织、机械、船舶、建筑等产业在全球产业分工中的地位和竞争力.”

[18] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[19] In Section 11, Part IV, China’s AI strategy is characterized as: “加快人工智能等数智技术创新，突破基础理论和核心技术，强化算力、算法、数据等高效供给。全面实施“人工智能+”行动，以人工智能引领科研范式变革，加强人工智能同产业发展、文化建设、民生保障、社会治理相结合，抢占人工智能产业应用制高点，全方位赋能千行百业.”

[20] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议.”

[21] “中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议.”

[22] Scott Kennedy and Scott Rozelle, “China’s Tech Obsession is Weighing Down its Economy,” FP, October 10, 2025.

[23] “杨伟民：形成消费拉动模式，提高农业转移人口市民化率是关键,”

https://topics.caixin.com/2025-11-14/102383058.html.

[24] Export data obtained from WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/world_trade_statistics_e.htm.

Photo credit: 中华人民共和国国务院, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons