The Dictator’s Dilemma toward the 21st Party Congress: Elite Reshuffling and Power Restructuring

Guoguang Wu CLM Issue 86 December 2025.pdf

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The 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which will convene in late 2027, will continue the Xi Jinping leadership as he enters his fourth term as supreme leader. When Xi secured his third term as party leader at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he effectively abolished the term limits that had been in place since the 1990s, so it is unrealistic to expect that he will not seek a fourth term at the forthcoming Party Congress. Regardless of widespread rumors in recent years that he will be forced to resign, such a scenario is highly unlikely because there currently seems to be no serious challenge to his leadership. But his regime has encountered a number of problems in elite management, as powerfully demonstrated by the recent high tide of purges of incumbent Central Committee members and high-ranking PLA generals. This article uses the concept of the “dictator’s dilemma” to explain these recent purges and personnel shifts. Seen through such a lens, the article provides a preview of the reshuffling of elite personnel that will take place around the time of the next congress. The article considers the potential escalation of factional rivalry, the process of cadre evaluation, the unfolding timeline for preparations ahead of the next Party Congress, and the likely composition of the 21st Central Committee.

The CCP’s National Party Congress, which has convened quinquennially since 1982, nominally is the Party’s highest decision-making body, providing a ceremonial venue for reorganizing national party leadership, including the Central Committee, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), and, ultimately, the Politburo and its Standing Committee. It is also the sole legitimate organization to formulate the party platform and the party charter.[1] Although Xi has restored some Maoist political norms, there are no indications that he intends to break with this practice.[2]

Xi secured his third term as party chief at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, which abolished the term limits that were established in the 1990s. It is unrealistic to expect that Xi will not seek a fourth term at the forthcoming 21st Party Congress. Despite widespread rumors to the contrary, there appear to be no serious challenges to his leadership. Nevertheless, Xi will face significant obstacles in organizing the next Central Committee. What difficulties will he encounter, and how can we explain them? Do they signal a weakening of Xi’s control over the party elite? What will his strategy be for overcoming these obstacles? What might the structure of the next Central Committee look like? Will there be a generational shift in the composition of Central Committee members or even that of the top leadership? Is it possible that a leadership transition will occur at the 21st Party Congress?

This article provides a preview of the elite reshuffling that will take place around the time of the 21st Party Congress by attempting to answer the above questions. It focuses on personnel issues based on the dictator’s dilemma framework whereby the leader’s power and vulnerability are linked. This analysis examines why the dictator’s authority, exercised beyond and against established norms, is creating challenges for Xi in terms of managing senior party elites. It reviews the timeline of personnel preparations for the Party Congress as well as why Xi’s personal involvement in the preparations for the 20th Party Congress failed to secure unity among his loyalists. Drawing on this review, the article then offers a preliminary assessment of the likely composition of the 21st Central Committee and the top leadership.

The Dictator’s Dilemma: Why Does the Defying of Norms Complicate Elite Management?

Xi’s triumph at the 20th Party Congress was substantial, as evidenced in the following three ways: he extended his rule beyond the customary two terms; he sidelined potential rivals while reorganizing the central leadership to favor loyalists; and he redefined the party’s political agenda, shifting the emphasis from economic development to regime and state security. Yet, in the three years following the Congress, political developments have exposed the flaws of this supposed triumph in a key aspect of autocratic governance: securing unwavering loyalty among his followers. This is particularly evident in Xi’s ongoing purges of Central Committee members.

Among the 376 members and alternate members of the October 2022 20th Central Committee, official sources confirm that 30 had been purged by October 2025,[3] accounting for 8 percent of the total membership—much higher than the 4.8 percent of the 18th Central Committee members who had been purged during its first three years (even though Xi’s first five years as top leader [2012–2017], during the 18th Central Committee, were marked by a wave of purges).[4] Among the victims of the latest purge, 14 persons (or 46.7 percent) were generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Xi’s major power base. In addition, 30 members did not participate in the latest 4th Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, held in late October 2025, including 21 PLA generals (representing 70 percent). Even assuming that not all those not present are likely to be purged, a rough total of the number of members of the incumbent Central Committee who are likely to be purged will easily reach 50 by the eve of the 21st Party Congress—many more than the 38 who had been purged during the 18th Central Committee. In fact, the 18th Central Committee had been organized prior to Xi becoming party chief (so it is likely that not all delegates were necessarily Xi loyalists). In contrast, as will be discussed in the next section, the 20th Central Committee members were all carefully selected under Xi’s extremely close supervision. These simple statistics are indicative of the political troubles that Xi has encountered in managing upper-tier cadres.

Cadre corruption powerfully explains the recent purges, at least in the official announcements, even though the real reasons for the purges may have been political—including factional rivalries at both levels of Xi versus somebody, if there is still somebody who is powerful enough to challenge Xi, and among the emerging factions below Xi.[5] In an announcement made on the eve of the 4th Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, nine of the highest-ranking generals (eight of whom were members of the Central Committee), including two members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), were purged, accused of “having lost their party spirit, faith, and loyalty,” of “having seriously betrayed the trust of the Party Central Committee and the CMC,  and of having seriously undermined the principle of the party commanding the gun and the system of  CMC chairman responsibility.”[6] Simply put, they were purged because they were not politically loyal.

Were they disloyal to Xi? If so, why—or why were they at least perceived as being disloyal—even though Xi is widely assumed to have selected them for the 20th Central Committee and even for the Politburo, thus granting them substantial authority, including significant power within the PLA? Various interpretations have been offered in an attempt to answer these questions. I have put forth a “Stalinist logic” to explain Xi’s ongoing purges even after he supposedly had already consolidated his power. I will also propose an additional interpretation, one that is compatible with and complementary to the Stalinist logic but shifts the focus to the politics of power reorganization during the Party Congress itself. This perspective is framed as a dictator’s dilemma, rooted in the inherent tensions between power and norms.

Xi achieved a political triumph in consolidating power by violating CCP political norms established in the decades prior to 2012. These include, primarily, the elimination of term limits for state president (since 1992 always held concurrently with the position of party chief), by amending the PRC constitution in 2018, and by relaxing the age limits for the retirement of high-ranking cadres. The former legitimized Xi’s extended stay in power, while the latter affected the political careers of numerous high-ranking cadres, especially Central Committee members, as will be discussed below.

The 16th Party Congress in 2002 marked the beginning of the “seven up, eight down” (qishang baxia) norm for managing the retirement of top national leaders. Under this practice, officials aged 67 or younger at the time of a Party Congress could remain in or be promoted to the Politburo or to other senior party-state positions, while those aged 68 or older were expected to retire. This led to some complicated, hierarchically structured norms for the retirement of sub-national cadres. Under this system, full-provincial and ministerial leaders followed a “two up, three down” rule: those aged 62 could remain in office but must retire during an office term when reaching age 65, while those aged 63 were expected to retire during regular reshufflings. For deputy-provincial, deputy-ministerial, and all lower-level cadres, a “seven up, eight down” rule applied: age 57 to stay, age 58 to retire during a regular reshuffling, and age 60 to retire even mid-term.[7] These norms also determined a cadre’s eligibility for entry into a new Central Committee since full members of the Central Committee are usually leaders at the full-provincial level (or its equivalent) and above.

These conventions, intended to manage generational change and to limit tenure, were notably abandoned by Xi Jinping. At the 20th Party Congress, Zhang Youxia and Wang Yi remained on the Politburo, at ages 72 and 69, respectively, as well as Xi himself, at age 69, who remained in office. Among the full members of the Central Committee, nine were already age 63 in 2022 but they still retained their seats on the 20th Central Committee. In contrast, at least six full members of the 19th Central Committee who were born in the 1960s lost their seats on the 20th Central Committee, and some top leaders born in 1955 or later (age 67 or younger), including Politburo Standing Committee members Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, were forced to retire. It is obvious that the retirement age limits were manipulated to retain and promote Xi loyalists.

In the context of CCP politics, pre-Xi norms for governing elites helped to establish rules for career development and to reduce the intensity of intra-elite conflicts. The breakdown of such norms, therefore, has rendered the career expectations of cadres uncertain and has increased the intensity of competition. For upper-echelon cadres, especially those eligible to be members of the Central Committee, much depends on securing the favor of the supreme leader. The downside is inevitable: if a high-ranking cadre fails to achieve the career advancement he/she expects at a Party Congress, his discontent will be directed at no one other than the supreme leader. The Party Congress is an occasion for the upper echelon cadres to actualize their long-expected career promotions, but the gains of some come at the expense of the losses of others. Xi’s powerful domination of the redistribution of power at the 20th Party Congress awarded many followers, but it was impossible that he could satisfy everyone’s expectations. This helps explain why the purges intensified even further after the 20th Party Congress.

Two areas have become major battlegrounds for purges following the 20th Party Congress: the military and foreign affairs. As noted above, Zhang Youxia, as the No. 1 professional soldier and Wang Yi, as the No. 1 diplomat, both remained in power in their respective areas beyond the retirement age.[8] This inevitably obstructed and curtailed career advancement for many other high-ranking cadres. It would be contrary to common sense if these cadres would not have been displeased. Their discontent may not have directly pointed to Xi in the current political atmosphere, but the ultimate source of their discontent should be clear: It was Xi’s personal power that generated a situation whereby these cadres were dissatisfied. Such discontent can easily be interpreted as being disloyal to Xi, especially when factional competition below Xi is intensifying and rivals are deliberately exploiting “unhealthy” sentiments. Ultimately, Xi was forced to confront this problem, prompting the subsequent purges; he was cornered by his own power that was being exercised beyond and against established norms.

Personnel Preparations for the Party Congress: How Are Candidates for the Central Committee Assessed?

In retrospect, Xi paid extraordinary attention to the selection of the members of the 20th Central Committee. According to an official CCP report, he started to “comprehensively make personnel preparations for the 20th Party Congress and the ‘two committees’ as early as the end of 2020.”[9] The “two committees” here refer to the Central Committee and the CCDI, and such “personnel preparations” included selection of over 2,300 delegates to the 20th Party Congress and several hundred candidates for the “two committees.” In March 2021, Xi chaired meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Politburo that decided to set up the Leadership Group on Cadre Assessments (LGCA) for the 20th Party Congress, with Xi serving as group head. Over the entire process of preparing for the 20th Party Congress, Xi presided over numerous meetings of the Standing Committee, the Politburo, and the LGCA. Official information reveals that during this period of nearly two years, the Leadership Group held 13 meetings and organized 5 training sessions and symposia. Additionally, Xi attended three meetings of subnational CCP leaders of the localities, central party-state agencies, and the military, and on numerous occasions he listened to reports on personnel preparations for the “two committees.”

During this period, Xi consistently emphasized: “When selecting and appointing personnel, the most important consideration is political standards.” He put forward a series of important requirements, including adhering to the correct political direction, upholding and strengthening the party’s overall leadership, and strictly controlling the political integrity of all candidates. He emphasized that political standards must take precedence for appointments to the two committees and that the evaluation of the candidates’ political qualities must be thorough, avoiding any superficiality or formalism.

Following Xi’s instructions, the Central Committee in July 2021 dispatched 45 assessment teams in three batches to the subnational localities, central party-state organizations, and central enterprises to conduct assessments, covering 31 provincial units and 124 central party-state agencies and enterprises. The CMC also dispatched eight assessment teams to inspect 25 PLA units. These teams worked “in strict accordance with the steps and methods stipulated by the Central Committee” (i.e., Xi Jinping) to engage in “conversations and investigations, and to make recommendations.” Each team that was sent to the subnational localities interviewed an average of more than 1,400 people, and the teams sent to central party-state organs interviewed a total of nearly 10,000 people. During each step in the work of the teams, including proposing lists of participants at meetings, determining lists of assessment subjects, and recommending the selection of candidates for the “two committees,” each team was to report to the LGCA for approval. The LGCA held five meetings to hear the reports of each team, and the Politburo Standing Committee convened a total of six meetings for the same purpose.

Such a lengthy personnel selection process, and Xi’s intensive involvement in cadre evaluations, did not resolve the dictator’s dilemma; instead, as discussed in the previous section, it deepened it. In preparing for the forthcoming 21st Party Congress, there is no indication that Xi’s leadership will alter the fundamental principles, methods, or processes used during the preparations for 20th Party Congress,[10] though there may be some minor technical adjustments. Based on retrospective knowledge, a tentative timetable for the next two years leading to the opening of the 21st Party Congress in 2027 might be as follows:

-       by the end of 2025, the preparation process will formally begin;

-       in spring 2026, following the two sessions (meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), the Leadership Group for Cadre Assessments will be set up with Xi as its head;

-       in early summer 2026, the Politburo Standing Committee and then the full Politburo will review and approve the document that stipulates the principles of personnel preparations for the selection of delegates to the 21st Party Congress and for candidates for members on the two committees;

-       in mid-summer 2026, the LGCA will review and approve a document stipulating the concrete guidelines for assessments of the candidates to be delegates to the 21st Party Congress and the members of the two committees, which will detail the allocation plan for nominations, the assessment methods and procedures, and organizational implementation;[11]

-       in summer 2026, assessment teams will be dispatched to conduct wide and intensive assessments of candidates who might become delegates to the Party Congress and members of the two committees;

-       starting from fall 2026, a reshuffling of provincial party committees will unfold, with nationwide completion in all 31 provinces and the equivalent by the summer of 2027.

-       also during the year from summer 2026 to summer 2027, the LGCA, the Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee will convene a series of meetings to discuss personnel preparations for the 21st Party Congress and to make decisions regarding the candidates;

-       in September 2027, the LGCA, the Standing Committee, and the Politburo will propose candidates as delegates for the 21st Party Congress as well candidates as members of the two committees; at this point, the candidates will be formally considered as “preliminary candidates”;

-       on the eve of the Party Congress, a plenum of the 20th Central Committee will formally endorse all the preparations, including the lists of preliminary candidates to the two committees;

-       in fall 2027 the 21st Party Congress will formally convene. On its last day, it will carry out three “elections” to appoint the full members and, then, the alternate members of the Central Committee, as well as the members of the CCDI;

-       immediately following the close of the Party Congress, the new Central Committee will convene its first plenum, and the top leaders (of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, the Central Secretariat, and the CMC, as well as the party chief) will be appointed.

This timeline will constitute the internal rhythm of CCP politics during the next two years, significantly shaping the political dynamics behind the subnational leadership reshuffling, the sub-Xi factional competition, the anti-corruption campaigns and the purges of high-ranking cadres, propaganda and policy initiatives, social stability efforts, and even the performance of the Chinese stock markets. It is certain that Xi will personally closely and tightly supervise and control the entire process, thereby intensifying the dictator’s dilemma in managing CCP upper-tier elites.

Reorganization of the Next Central Committee: Will a Generational Change and Power Succession Occur?

Beginning roughly with the reshuffling of the provincial party committees in the fall of 2026, candidates for the next Central Committee will gradually emerge and assume positions designated for entry into the new Central Committee. These include all provincial party secretaries and governors as full Central Committee members, as well as some third-ranking provincial leaders, heads of key organizations, party secretaries of major cities, and provincial standing committee members from ethnic minority groups as alternate Central Committee members.

The age thresholds for members and alternate members, respectively, of the Central Committee will be intentionally blurred to allow for Xi to have greater space to maneuver. This will be further complicated by China’s recent policy of gradually raising the statutory retirement age for the general population to address the pressures of an aging society. By around 2040, the statutory retirement age for men will have risen from age 60 to age 63, for white-collar women (cadre positions) from age 55 to age 58, and for blue-collar women (ordinary workers) from age 50 to age 55. But the increase will be incremental: starting from January 1, 2025, the legal retirement age for those whose legal retirement age was age 60 will be delayed by one month every four months, gradually delaying to age 63.[12] These rules have already been applied, albeit roughly rather than precisely, to the provincial party secretaries and governors who retired in 2025.[13] It signals a trend toward raising the age ceiling for cadre retirement and promotion, but it also renders the age norms for promotion and retirement of governing cadres even more ambiguous.

Based on relevant statistics, I speculate that the average age of members of the 21st Central Committee will correspond to those born in 1964 (63 years old in 2027) or later, although the age limit may be slightly relaxed to include those born in late 1963. Exceptions allowing members older than age 63—or even age 64—are likely. For alternate members, the age threshold will generally be five years younger, at age 58 or age 59.

If 1964 serves as the birth-year threshold for full members of the 21st Central Committee, roughly 65 to 70 incumbent members—comprising 45 members who were born in 1964 or later, plus about 20 older individuals who either hold national leadership positions or are age exceptions—will continue on  the next Central Committee, representing just over 30 percent of the total.[14] Among the incumbent alternate members, 23 persons have already assumed positions that qualify them to become full members of the 21st Central Committee (though one may be disqualified due to the age limit), and probably 20 others will be promoted to such positions around the time of the 21st Party Congress. This implies that about 45 alternate members of the 20th Central Committee will become full members of the 21st Central Committee in 2027, constituting roughly 22 percent of the new Central Committee. In addition, 3 to 5 incumbent CCDI members will be qualified to become full members of the 21st Central Committee. Thus, more than 90 full members (roughly 45 percent) will likely be new to the 21st Central Committee.[15]

These calculated statistics indicate a profound generational change in the composition of the  Central Committee at the 21st Party Congress, although it is unrealistic to expect a dramatic decline in the average age of full Central Committee members. It is estimated that the forthcoming reshuffling of provincial leaders will significantly increase the number of those in the cohort who were born in the 1970s from the current 30 percent to more than 60 percent.[16] Accordingly, the most successful members of this generation are likely to join the 21st Central Committee, potentially raising their generational share to around 40 percent, with 10–15 percent serving as full members.[17] Considering that those born in the 1970s accounted for 8 percent of the 20th Central Committee, and with no full members, the extent of generational change will be noteworthy.

A top-level power succession is unlikely, however, as Xi is highly likely to pursue a fourth term. Will he designate a successor at the 21st Party Congress? This question is difficult to answer at this early stage. Nature’s challenges to Xi will loom large, as he will be 74 years old in 2027. While the state of his health remains opaque, there are some signs of decline. It appears that Xi may be attempting to step back from some party-state responsibilities, delegating certain duties to his lieutenants, such as Premier Li Qiang. For example, during his third term Xi reduced his international travel. He took 13 foreign trips in the first three years following the 20th Party Congress (October 2022 to October 2025), as opposed to 11 such trips during the first two years following the 19th Party Congress (thereafter such travel was impossible due to the Covid-19 crisis) and 17 such trips during the first three years following the 18th Party Congress. In addition, Xi’s early international trips each often lasted for more than 10 days, registering a total 115 days abroad during the 2012–2015 period. But during the 2022–2025 period, his international trip never exceeded 6 days, and the total number of days abroad declined to 59.[18]

Therefore, it will not be surprising if Xi delegates more power to younger leaders during the next two years, and this may possibly become institutionalized at the 21st Party Congress. It is politically naïve, however, to expect that Xi will hand over the position of party chief to someone like Li Qiang or even a younger, potential heir. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping solved the problem by creating a two-line structure. For instance, Mao, from 1956 onward, retained the positions of both party chairman and CMC chairman for himself, while delegating many responsibilities to other Politburo Standing Committee members, and Deng, in the 1980s, remained CMC chairman while Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang handled day-to-day governance of the party-state. Xi may follow a pattern similar to Mao, yet he is likely fully aware of the political difficulties that such a structure of power rendered to Mao and Deng. In any case, the top-level power succession issue remains an institutional pitfall inherent in the CCP political system, posing a significant challenge to Xi and his regime at the 21st Party Congress.

Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party will convene its 21st National Congress in late 2027, during which time Xi Jinping is expected to begin his fourth term as China’s supreme leader, thus continuing to serve as party leader. But the Congress will also be a major occasion to reshuffle the members of the Central Committee and the top leadership. Generational changes are likely, and cadres born during the 1964–1974 decade will constitute the mainstream of the new Central Committee and the CCDI. Some arrangements for a top-level power succession may begin to emerge, but it is still too early to draw any meaningful conclusions.

The next two years leading up to the 21st Party Congress will be a politically sensitive and intense period for the CCP regime, particularly regarding the career mobility of high-ranking cadres and accordingly rousing and disturbing their expectations, achievements, and disappointments. A climate of widespread anxiety will likely prevail among party cadres, affecting even the party chief. As analyzed in this article, the dictator’s dilemma will continue to intensify, trapping Xi between the challenges of consolidating control over party elites and the insecurities arising from perceived inequities in the internal distribution of power among his followers. Purges of incumbents will continue alongside promotion of new faces, and this cycle will repeat itself until the 21st Party Congress convenes, though the Congress itself will not bring it to any definitive conclusion.

Even though this article focuses on personnel issues, the policy ramifications of this dilemma will be profound. Parallel with cadre appointments and promotions not based on institutional norms, any policy direction that will take place in economic development and governance will be less predictable, and elite engagement in implementing such policies is likely to be tentative and superficial. The next wave of elite reshuffling will continue to prioritize the candidates’ technocratic qualifications and governance performance. However, political constraints will remain fundamental, overwhelming, and effective in ensuring that these “red engineers” are aligned with the dictator. In this sense, a generational change in the next Central Committee will not signify a substantial redirection for China but rather a continuation—and potentially a strengthening—of the Xi Jinping era.

About the Contributor

Guoguang Wu holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and is Senior Research Scholar at the Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, Stanford University, Senior Scholar and Executive Director of the Hoover Institution’s Human Security and Prosperity Project, as well as Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Center for China Analysis of the Asia Society Policy Institute. His research focuses on Chinese politics and comparative political economy, with current interests focusing on Chinese elite politics, the politics of development and governance, transition from communism, and capitalist institutions in comparative perspective. He is the author of four books, including China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Globalization Against Democracy: A Political Economy of Capitalism After its Global Triumph (Cambridge University Press, 2017), and editor or co-editor of six English-language volumes and author or editor of twenty Chinese-language books. During the late 1980s, he worked in Beijing as a policy adviser and speechwriter for the Zhao Ziyang leadership.

Notes

[1] Guoguang Wu, China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[2] The Party Congress convened irregularly during the Mao era (1935–1976), meeting only four times during 41 years even though the respective versions of the party charter stipulated that it should meet every year (1935–1945), every three years (1945–1956), or every five years (1956–1976).

[3] This is based on various official CCP sources of information. The total includes one individual who reportedly committed suicide under pressure from an anti-corruption investigation.

[4] Author’s calculations according to official CCP sources. As an aside, only 2.13 percent of the members of the 19th Central Committee were purged during its first three years.

[5] Guoguang Wu, “New Faces, New Factional Dynamics: CCP Leadership Politics Following the 20th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 74 (December 2022), at  https://www.prcleader.org/post/new-faces-new-factional-dynamics-ccp-leadership-politics-following-the-20th-party-congress, accessed November 12, 2025.

[6] Editorial, “坚定不移把军队反腐败斗争进行到底,” PLA Daily, Xinhuawang, October 18, 2025, at http://www.news.cn/politics/20251018/1ff7e53ee17144aba63d6f88b026d9d9/c.html, accessed October 18, 2025.

[7] The CCP has never publicly announced these norms; they are summarized here by the author based on decades of observation of CCP personnel politics. More complex rules also exist, but space does not permit a detailed discussion.

[8] For biographical information on Zhang Youxia, see http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-03/12/c_1129280464.htm and for biographical information on Wang Yi, see   http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-07/25/c_1129280427.htm, both accessed November 12, 2025.

[9] For information on personnel preparations for the 20th Party Congress, see 新华社, “高举伟大旗帜, 谱写崭新篇章: 新一届中共中央委员会和中共中央纪律检查委员会诞生记,” October 22, 2022, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/22/content_5720942.htm, accessed October 20, 2025.

[10] The 19th Party Congress adopted a similar practice in terms of personnel preparations, also under Xi’s close supervision. See 新华网, “肩负历史重任, 开创复兴伟业: 新一届中共中央委员会和中共中央纪律检查委员会诞生记,” October 24, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/24/c_1121850995.htm, accessed October 20, 2025.

[11] See Ft 10.

[12] “全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于实施渐进式延迟法定退休年龄的决定,” 

中国政府网, September 13, 2024, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202409/content_6974294.htm, accessed October 16, 2025. Other policy details of the incremental adjustments are not discussed here as they are irrelevant to cadres’ retirement.

[13] Recent cases include those of Sun Shaocheng and Hao Peng, both of whom were born in July 1960 and retired (as party secretary of Inner Mongolia and of Liaoning, respectively) in September 2025. See “内蒙古、辽宁2省区党委主要负责同志职务调整,” Renmin ribao, October 1, 2025, p. 3. A different case concerns Gong Zheng, mayor of Shanghai, who was born in March 1960 but who had not yet retired as of this writing in October 2025.

[14] The calculations in this section are generally based on the initial lists of the 20th Central Committee, appointed in 2022, since the comparison is between two Central Committees five years apart (2022 and 2027). Those members who were purged are, of course, not considered as continuing into the new term.

[15] The percentages calculated here are similar to those of the composition of the 20th Central Committee in 2022, at which time 69 (33.66 percent) had been full members of the 19th Central Committee, 44 (21.46 percent) had been alternate members of the 19th Central Committee, and 92 (44.88 percent) were new members. Like the 19th Central Committee, the 20th Central Committee is composed of 205 full members and 171 alternate members. This author sees no reason for predicting any substantial change in the number of seats at the 21st Central Committee.

[16] Author’s calculations.

[17] Guoguang Wu, “How Will the Next Generation of Chinese Leaders Reconcile Effective Governance and Party Loyalty?” Center for China Analysis, China in 2026 (Asia Society Policy Institute, forthcoming, December 2025).

[18] Author’s calculations based on various official sources regarding Xi’s foreign visits.

Photo credit: Dong Fang, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons