China’s Great Power Vision Comes into Focus

Ryan Hass CLM Issue 89 September 2026.pdf

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History may record the 2020s as the period during which China’s vision for updating the international political order came into focus. Chinese leaders and experts have laid their cards on the table, arguing that the era of “hegemonic politics” needs to be replaced by a new order that redistributes power away from its concentration in liberal democracies toward a more equal distribution among states, while protecting the inviolability of sovereign states to govern their populations as they see fit. Beijing views America as declining but dangerous. Rather than confront the United States in a contest for leadership, China is content to patiently accumulate power and influence until such time as the country becomes broadly recognized as leader of a new political order. Such an outcome is possible but not preordained. A core tension is whether China will match its expansive vision with a willingness to pay the costs of leadership. Rhetoric without the backing of economic resources is an expression of ambition, not a plan for realizing it.

Beijing is confident that a lane is opening for it to revise the international order, and specifically the political order, to better suit its preferences.[1] Rather than seeking to overturn all aspects of the international order, China’s focus is on revising the political and normative foundations of the U.S.-led liberal political order while preserving features of the broader international system from which it benefits.

As the Ministry of State Security-affiliated think-tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) recently concluded, “The international order is in a transition period wherein the old order is disintegrating while the new one has yet to be established. The so-called liberal international order that underpinned the post-Cold War international system has already collapsed.”[2] For Beijing, this collapse is a symptom of America’s decline, China’s rise, and a shifting distribution of power within the international system away from liberal democracies toward developing countries that Chinese scholars like to refer to as the “global majority.” This term describes the fact that most of the global population and a rising share of economic output reside in developing countries.[3]  

American Decline

Most Chinese observers agree that America is experiencing relative decline, though the pace of decline remains a source of debate. This diagnosis has ideological roots and state backing. The notion that America’s political system contains the seeds of its own destruction is longstanding. It is informed by the Marxist lessons of dialectical materialism[4] and historical materialism[5] that all senior Chinese cadres have been taught during their ascent to the top of the Chinese Communist Party.

Judgments about America’s internal contradictions and weaknesses are prominent and mainstream. For example, in 2021 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a report describing America’s political system as “gravely ill with money politics, elite rule, political polarization, and a dysfunctional system.”[6] The report highlighted Washington’s failure to address America’s societal shortcomings, framed America’s political system as chaotic and discriminatory, and condemned American efforts to export its political system.[7] Several years later, in 2024, the State Council Information Office reported that America is afflicted with rampant gun violence, a drug epidemic, endemic racism, widespread poverty and homelessness, and widening wealth inequality.[8] Echoes of these characterizations of America’s maladies can be found regularly in official Chinese media.

Beijing sees America accelerating its own erosion of power and influence. For example, from China’s perspective, America has weakened one of its asymmetric advantages, its attractiveness to foreign students and innovators. By heightening national security considerations in its immigration policies, so the thinking goes, America has repelled talented immigrants and lowered the country’s human capital profile, thereby degrading America’s future technological competitiveness.[9] China’s leaders have also concluded that Washington has failed to design a balanced economy that provides opportunities for upward mobility.[10] Instead, American leaders have catered to an economy dominated by finance and technology, while its real economy has withered.[11] In this view, America’s hollowing out of industrial capacity for core functions such as shipbuilding and refurbishment of missile inventories represents the height of irresponsibility, leaving America in an increasingly vulnerable position.

Chinese commentators also describe America’s influence on the world stage as diminishing.[12] They see America’s military advantages narrowing, and America’s capacity to play the role of “world policeman” increasingly beyond reach.[13] They observe Washington’s global convening power eroding, leading to a reduction in America’s capacity to organize and advance international initiatives.[14] Chinese experts also judge that America’s traditional alliance relationships are attenuating.[15]

China’s Ascent

Beijing is gaining confidence that its governance system and the plans it produces are enabling relative gains in scientific and technological power. Xi’s top intelligence advisor, Minister of State Security Chen Yixin, gave voice to this confidence, writing for the newspaper of the Central Party School, “China’s development strides are ever firmer and more forceful; its economic strength, scientific and technological strength, and composite national power have leapt to new levels, and the country’s hard power, soft power, innovative capacity, appeal, and cohesion keep growing.”[16]

China’s leaders believe they are making progress in ensuring that the world depends more on China, while China depends less on the world for critical inputs for its advancement.[17] Whereas America was forced to retreat from its trade war with China in 2025 under threat of loss of access to China’s rare earths and magnets, China weathered the impact of an energy shock during the Iran war without making any major near-term policy shifts.[18] Instead, Beijing relied on its existing reserves, its diversified sources of oil supply, its expanding renewable energy capacity, and other energy sources. China’s intended message was clear – it will not be held hostage by threats to cut off its access to oil imports from the Middle East, or anything else for that matter.

Leading Chinese commentators now describe America and China as being on equal footing and entering a period of “strategic stalemate.” They ascribe this stalemate to a reduction in the power gap between both countries alongside continuing economic interdependence. In explaining the sources of the stalemate, CICIR observed, “The first major reason and feature of the new stage of the China-US strategic stalemate is the change in relative strength. During the 14^th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), China achieved steady economic growth and made significant advances in scientific and technological innovation. China also increased its capacity to safeguard national security…while the United States still had significant overall national strength, its hard and soft power have declined relative to its “unipolar era” of uncontested dominance at the beginning of the 21^st century.”[19]

Even as Beijing judges that the power gap between the United States and China is narrowing, it is not spiking the proverbial football in celebration – as part of a deliberate effort to avoid conflict with the United States as its power declines. To the contrary, Chinese references to “American decline” in official news outlets have dropped precipitously during this period. Beijing may have chosen to cool down its rhetoric on American decline to avoid triggering President Donald Trump and potentially disrupting trendlines in America’s China policy that it views favorably for its strategic goals.

Figure 1: CNKI full-text search “美国衰落” or “American decline” in all sources (newspapers, academic journals)

Rhetorical restraint notwithstanding, Beijing remains vigilant to the risk of instability or conflict during periods of major power transitions. As CICIR concluded, “Historical experience shows that conflicts or even wars have often accompanied major transitions in the international order.”[20] From Beijing’s perspective, this heightened risk increases the need for Washington and Beijing to deepen engagement and leader-level involvement to militate against a slide toward U.S.-China confrontation or conflict. China still views the United States as “its top strategic threat.”[21] In the face of this threat, China’s objectives in its America policy are “… avoiding conflict, engaging in limited cooperation, and preparing for long-term competition,” according to Renmin University’s Wang Wen.[22]

China’s Vision for the Future

China has reached a level of power that has caused its leaders to conclude they no longer need to submit to a U.S.-led international political order that fails to take account of its top priorities and concerns. Minister of State Security Chen Yixin put Beijing’s critique of the existing U.S.-led global order in sharp relief in his December 2025 assessment of the global landscape:

The international order formed after World War II is seriously mismatched with today's international balance of power, and global governance has come to a new crossroads. A certain major power uses might to wreck universal principles, zero-sum thinking to wreck win-win cooperation, and unilateralism to wreck multilateralism, repeatedly "quitting groups and tearing up agreements" and "withdrawing funds and cutting off supply," leaving global governance mired in discordant ideas, malfunctioning mechanisms, and ineffective rules. …

The tide of the times – peace, development, cooperation, and win-win outcomes – has not changed, but unilateralism and protectionism are rising, threats from hegemonism and power politics are growing, and the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation. Security camps are dividing at an accelerating pace: some countries are building exclusive "small circles," bringing the return of zero-sum games, the resurgence of bloc politics, and the reappearance of camp confrontation.[23]

Alert to risks, Beijing does not seek to confront America in a clash for supremacy or assume the burdens of unipolar leadership. Nor are China’s leaders clamoring to tear down the old order to create a new one out of whole cloth, a point Chinese Politburo member Wang Yi stressed in a February 2025 address to the United Nations Security Council.[24] Rather, Beijing is working methodically to build international support for filtering out aspects of the existing order that Beijing opposes and replacing them with concepts that better align with China’s preferences. China’s ideational appeal is to construct an updated international order that better reflects the interests and concerns of the “global majority.”

China presents its desired reforms as aiming to replace “hegemonic politics and unilateralism” (defined by Beijing as the use of national strength to bully weaker states) with the principle of sovereign equality. According to China’s Global Governance Initiative, “The essence of sovereign equality lies in the fact that the sovereignty and dignity of all countries, regardless of size, strength, or wealth, must be respected, their internal affairs must not be interfered with, they all have the right to independently choose their social system and development path, and they all have the right to participate, make decisions, and benefit equally in the global governance process.”[25] Beijing’s appeals to principle are undermined, however, by China’s persistent refusal to call out Russia’s invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, as well as China’s growing use of extra-territorial economic tools to pressure countries into compliance with China’s priorities.[26] 

As Beijing becomes more powerful in the international order, it would like greater respect for its governance and economic growth model, as well as greater deference to its territorial claims. China seeks greater acceptance of its position that cross-Strait differences are an internal matter to be resolved between Beijing and Taipei.[27] China similarly wants other countries to accept – or at least not to challenge – its territorial claims along its southern border and in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Beijing expects Washington to become more circumspect in supporting its allies and partners in the region as the military balance between the United States and China becomes more symmetrical.[28] The more Washington exercises caution to avoid triggering conflict with China, so the thinking goes, the more that other countries with lesser capabilities should follow suit.

Chinese officials also call for the abolition of security blocs, particularly among liberal democracies. This includes efforts by Western democracies to coordinate export controls and other protectionist measures, which Beijing views as antithetical to its ascent. Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping, make it a staple of public statements to rally countries to oppose the formation of “small circles” of countries.[29] 

Beijing would also like to hollow out the liberal core of the post-World War II international order. China views promotion of human rights, individual liberties, and liberal democracy as a challenge to its governance model. China has taken comfort in America’s recent retreat from promotion of individual liberties and democratic governance. Looking ahead, China would like to build broad international support for reorienting the United Nations away from investigations and advocacy for individual rights and to focus instead on removing threats to peace, limiting aggression, resolving interstate disputes through peaceful means, and other missions set forth in the UN charter.[30]

China’s Tactics for Realizing its Vision

Chinese experts and officials think often in terms of relative power and influence.[31] They are constantly in search of leverage to help strengthen China’s capacity to secure its vision and objectives on the world stage. Progress, from this vantage, is measured in terms of playing a greater role in global governance and rulemaking, securing greater freedom of action in governance and development, and relatedly, becoming less beholden to American global leadership. In service of these objectives, Chinese leaders and commentators externally present their country as working to bring about a more harmonious world that better reflects virtue and Chinese values. China seeks to represent modernity and development. Beijing has done this by drawing global awareness to its burgeoning dominance in clean energy, electric vehicles, batteries, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies. Chinese leaders have used this progress to present their country as the critical partner for supporting other countries down their own development path.

Xi made this point explicitly in his address to the 2026 World AI Conference in Shanghai. He said, “AI development should not be a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation. …We are ready to work with all parties to seize the opportunities of AI development and meet the challenges and join hands to create a brighter future for humanity.”[32] In that same speech, Xi also announced new training and capacity-building programs for the “global majority.” Xi’s message was perfectly in tune with a core theme of China’s diplomacy – China will unlock development opportunities for its partners, i.e., it pays to be China’s friend.

Beijing’s cultivated image as the key development partner for countries is challenged by the reality of China’s growing dependence on exports to fuel its economic growth. China’s surge in export volume is wiping out local industries and jobs across the developing and developed world alike.[33] Rather than working with other countries to address global economic imbalances, China is seeking to shift the debate by promoting itself as a key source of global demand for imports. Xi has announced that China will import more than $8 trillion from developing countries by 2030,[34] and Politburo member Wang Yi has repeatedly pledged that China will serve not only as the world’s factory but also the world’s market to stimulate demand from the rest of the world.[35] 

As more countries come to depend on China for their own development, China builds greater leverage to compel political accommodation to its priorities. When countries refuse to yield to Chinese requests, particularly on issues implicating China’s “core interests,” they face strong coercive pressure. China has built a robust regulatory, legal, and security toolkit to threaten and punish countries that defy their demands.[36] For example, Beijing responded to a dispute with Tokyo this year by pairing military pressure with detentions of Japanese businesspeople and restrictions of dual-use exports of rare earths, magnets, and other critical minerals.[37] 

Perhaps aware that coercive tools do not attract broad support for China’s global leadership ambitions, China’s leaders also are promoting an ideational vision for making the international political order more equitable. The primary vehicles for advancing this vision are Xi’s four global initiatives.[38] At the same time, Beijing is on guard to prevent obstacles to its continuing accumulation of power and influence. China’s principal focus for reducing external vulnerability is its campaign of self-reliance. This campaign is a centerpiece of the country’s current and previous five-year plans and a core element of Xi’s political brand.

China’s leaders recognize that America is the one country with both the means and the potential motive to seek to undermine China’s ascent. To guard against this risk, China’s leaders have implemented a suite of regulatory measures that mirror America’s export-control and investment- screening regimes. In doing so, Beijing has signaled its capacity to counterpunch any efforts by the United States to tighten economic pressure on China.[39]

At the same time, Beijing has refocused the narrative of the U.S.-China relationship around both leaders’ shared commitment to build a relationship of “constructive strategic stability.” This framing provides “process management,” in the words of Fudan University expert Wu Xinbo.[40] The aim is to manage differences so that they do not escalate to crises or conflicts.

Lastly, Beijing has stayed true to its longstanding posture of avoiding responsibility for other countries’ problems. Beijing views America’s overseas entanglements as cautionary tales, particularly America’s near-constant wars in the Middle East and Southwest Asia over the past two decades. From Beijing’s vantage, America’s military overextension and strategic distraction have been key contributors to its relative decline. Far better, from Beijing’s vantage, to build flexible partnerships around trade, investment, industrialization, and infrastructure than to take on the burden of other countries’ problems.

In sum, Beijing is employing a suite of tactics to build global support for its vision for updating the international political order. Viewed holistically, these tactics combine ideational appeal with efforts to mitigate risk as well as sharp-edged coercive tools for anyone who crosses China, particularly on issues that implicate China’s “core interests.”

Obstacles to Realization of its Vision

There is no longer ambiguity about two interlocking dynamics: first, China’s judgment that the world is transitioning from a U.S.-led international political order; and second, China’s aim to move from participant to architect of the next international political order. Beijing has consistently and clearly laid out its vision for its ideal new order.[41] The key question now is whether China has the means and the momentum to deliver on its vision.

Historically, global leaders have spent generously to realize their vision. For example, the United States embarked on reconstruction of Europe after World War II, in addition to underwriting international institutions, establishing treaty alliances, and supplying public goods such as freedom of navigation. Beijing, by contrast, has shown no inclination for major new financial pledges to support the realization of its vision.[42] As Chinese foreign policy expert Yu Jie has observed, China appears caught between ambition and restraint. It is increasingly willing to criticize America’s mismanagement of its global leadership role and to offer itself as a better alternative. But China does not appear willing to bear the costs traditionally associated with architecting a revision to the existing order.[43]

Beijing’s tightfistedness toward international organizations is reflected in its government budgets. Policy-bank lending for Belt and Road Initiative projects has significantly shrunk, causing China to move from scale to selectivity in its projects.[44] On foreign aid and international organizations, China is not stepping forward to fill the vacuum created by America’s retreat. China’s foreign aid contributions have remained relatively flat and are nowhere near the scale that would be required to replace U.S. development assistance.[45] Put simply, China’s willingness to take on more responsibilities has not risen because America has withdrawn.

With economic growth slowing and debt mounting in China, it is not clear whether Beijing will choose to allocate the resources to match its stated external ambitions. The country confronts demographic decline, rising local government debt, weak consumer demand, and a deflationary spiral in which the supply of goods far outpaces demand. Beijing thus far has sustained steady growth by exporting its excess capacity to external markets. As the societal and economic impacts from China’s wave of exports pile up around the world, however, the likelihood of countries and blocs creating protectionist walls grows. So, too, might their reluctance to support a greater leadership role for China on the world stage.

The past year has already been notable for China’s limited gains in taking advantage of America’s retreat from global leadership. Beijing arguably has strengthened its influence and presence in Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. It has lost ground to the United States in Latin America.[46] In Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, the picture is murkier. Despite Trump’s blustery recklessness and the negative public perceptions it has generated,[47] there has not been any genuine swings toward China in these regions.

Europe

Beijing believes European leaders should accept that they hold a deteriorating negotiating position with China due to Europe’s ongoing face-off with Russia over Ukraine and the widening trans-Atlantic rift with Trump. This should cause European leaders to adapt accordingly, in Beijing’s view, including by becoming more accommodating to China’s preferences on trade, Taiwan, and human rights.[48] Meanwhile, leading European industrial powers such as Germany and France have been battered by a sharp rise in Chinese imports, which is generating negative public sentiment toward China. These economic dislocations are piling up on top of European frustrations with China’s enabling role in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. These pressures could in time serve as the kindling for a future China-EU trade war.

The Middle East

From China’s perspective, America and Israel launched a war against Iran that unleashed negative repercussions across the region. China, by contrast, has presented itself as a conflict mediator and peacemaker. What may appear as benevolent diplomacy in Beijing often is seen in the region as a case of Chinese diplomatic posturing.[49] Countries in the region are not shifting toward China nor are they reducing their relationships with the United States. They do not have confidence in Beijing’s willingness to protect them or to undertake the hard work of mediating a termination to the ongoing conflict. Instead, they are reaching a clear-eyed conclusion that China is an economic enabler, not a reliable security patron that could replace the United States.[50]   

East Asia

China similarly has failed in its efforts to exploit the opportunity presented by Trump’s return to pull South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or the Philippines closer into its orbit. All four have shown a continuing desire to align with the United States. In the case of Japan and the Philippines, both countries have responded to rising bilateral tensions with China by doubling down on their relationship with the United States. They also have increased their own defense spending and strengthened strategic coordination between themselves and other democratic partners in Asia.[51] Former National Security Council official Evan Medeiros has aptly characterized China’s domestic and foreign policies as generating the very reactions from East Asia that they were designed to prevent: “thickening counter coalitions, greater security balancing (internal and external), de-risking economies, and states that are transitioning from hedging and latent alignment into more explicit balancing strategies.”[52] This regional response reflects a shortcoming in China’s capacity to attract support for its leadership vision.

Conclusion

Beijing’s normative appeal for updating the international political order rests upon an argument that power has shifted from 1945 to the present and now the voices of the “global majority” should carry more weight in setting the agenda. China’s bet is that the “global majority” will view China as its champion. This, in turn, will grant China greater influence and leadership on the world stage and greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives. Beijing’s ambition to architect an updated international political order is transparent. What remains to be seen, however, is whether China will commit resources to underwrite its ambitions and become adept at attracting international support for its vision. Absent new investments in international institutions, public goods, and partnerships with other key countries, China’s efforts to reform the international political order may wither. America’s retreat from its traditional leadership role has opened a lane for China. To fill it, though, Beijing will need to put forward resources, not only rhetoric.  

About the Contributor

Ryan Hass is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution and holds the Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brookings. He is co-host of the Beijing Brief podcast. From 2013 to 2017, Hass served on the White House National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia.

Notes

[1] For purposes of concision, throughout this paper I describe China’s desire to amend and update the “international order” to better reflect its priorities and concerns. I am primarily referring to China’s desire to update the political/development order, and specifically, China’s interest in hollowing out the liberal core of that existing order, while at the same time strengthening the sovereign inviolability of states to manage their own affairs within their borders. For fuller treatment of the eight international orders and China’s relation to them, see Iain Johnston, "China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations," International Security 44, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 9–60, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/44/2/9/12242/China-in-a-World-of-Orders-Rethinking-Compliance 

[2] Task Force of the Institute of American Studies, "The Evolving World and the Right Way to China-US Coexistence," China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), May 13, 2026, http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/en-us/Reports.html?id=27c51c1a-d49f-46e8-a3fd-80028c33d06f

[3] Guo Xiuqing, "The Global Initiative on Global Governance Leads the Reform of the Global Governance System," Contemporary World, November 3, 2025, http://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-11/03/content_118156724.shtml 

[4] Xi Jinping, "Dialectical Materialism is the Worldview and Methodology of Chinese Communists" (Speech at the 20th Group Study Session of the 18th CPC Central Political Bureau, January 23, 2015), Qiushi, https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2018-12/31/c_1123923896.htm

[5] Xi Jinping, "Upholding Historical Materialism and Continuously Opening Up New Horizons for the Development of Contemporary Chinese Marxism" (Speech at the 11th Group Study Session of the 18th CPC Central Political Bureau, December 3, 2013), Qiushi, https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-01/15/c_1125459115.htm

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "The State of Democracy in the United States," December 5, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/mgmzqk/zw/202112/t20211205_10462534.shtml

[7] Ibid

[8] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "The Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2024 (Abstract)," Xinhuanet, August 17, 2025, https://www.news.cn/world/20250817/8e767511d21c4db782a92ca7de921acf/c.html

[9] Gao Qiao, "Why Has the U.S. Halted the 'China Initiative?'" People's Daily Overseas Edition, March 17, 2022, p. 6. https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2022-03/17/content_25907761.htm

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "The True Facts of the Deteriorating Polarization Between the Rich and the Poor in the United States," February 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202302/t20230224_11030966.shtml

[11] Xi Jinping, "Make the Real Economy Stronger, Better, and Bigger," Xinhuanet, https://www.news.cn/20260515/5fb692a4fb284dda9efa63259ae44fdf/c.html

[12] Chen Yixin, "Comprehensively Building an Impregnable Fortress of National Security," Study Times, December 8, 2025, p. 1, https://www.theorychina.org.cn/c/2025-12-08/1537514.shtml

[13] Zhou Bo, "Mentioned the 'Six-Character Mantra' 4 Times and Didn't Say a Single Word About Taiwan: What Signal is the US Sending?" Observer Network, June 1, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/ZhouBo3/2026_06_01_818991.shtml

[14] Wu Xinbo, "250 Years Since Founding: The Waning of U.S. Global Leadership," China News Service, July 3, 2026, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2026/07-03/10652477.shtml

[15] Qi Haixia, "Hedging and Its Risks Under US-China Competition," Studies in International Politics, no. 2 (2024), https://www.sis.pku.edu.cn/docs/2024-05/20240524163905149647.pdf

[16] Chen Yixin, "Comprehensively Building an Impregnable Fortress of National Security," Study Times, December 8, 2025, p. 1, https://www.theorychina.org.cn/c/2025-12-08/1537514.shtml

[17] Xi Jinping, "Several Major Issues in the National Medium- and Long-term Economic and Social Development Strategy," Qiushi, October 31, 2020, https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-10/31/c_1126680390.htm 

[18] China was able to withstand the energy shock from the Iran war with limited disruption to its economic performance due to a combination of factors, including large petroleum reserves, energy supply diversification, and world-leading electrification, which reduced demand for oil.

[19] Task Force of the Institute of American Studies, "The Evolving World and the Right Way to China-US Coexistence," China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), May 13, 2026, http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/en-us/Reports.html?id=27c51c1a-d49f-46e8-a3fd-80028c33d06f

[20] Ibid

[21] Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, "Dialogue is Better than Confrontation: How Beijing Wants to Shape the Global Order," Global Asia 21, no. 2 (2026), https://globalasia.org/v21no2/focus/dialogue-is-better-than-confrontation-how-beijing-wants-to-shape-the-global-order_yan-xuetongsun-xuefeng

[22] Wang Wen and Lu Donghong, "Constructive Strategic Stable Relations Between China and the United States: Historical Evolution, Core Connotation, and Future Trends," Theoretical Construction, no. 3 (2026), http://rdcy.ruc.edu.cn/grzl/28117a7813e744c6ae92b60e1dcb12ef.htm

[23] Chen Yixin, “Comprehensively Building an Impregnable Fortress of National Security,” Study Times, December 8, 2025, p. 1, https://www.theorychina.org.cn/c/2025-12-08/1537514.shtml

[24] Wang Yi, "Practicing True Multilateralism and Building a Just and Equitable Global Governance System" (Remarks at the UN Security Council High-Level Meeting, UN Headquarters, February 18, 2025), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202502/t20250219_11558555.html

[25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Concept Document of the Global Governance Initiative," September 1, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202509/t20250901_11699909.shtml

[26] Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David O. Shullman, "Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia's War on Ukraine," Marshall Papers, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine

[27] See, for example, Xiao Qian, “The One-China Principle is the Prevailing International Consensus, and the Most Fundamental Truth regarding the Taiwan Question,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, https://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshd/202601/t20260122_11841226.htm 

[28] Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, “‘Dialogue is Better than Confrontation’: How Beijing Wants to Shape the Global Order,” Global Asia, June 2026, https://globalasia.org/v21no2/focus/dialogue-is-better-than-confrontation-how-beijing-wants-to-shape-the-global-order_yan-xuetongsun-xuefeng

[29] Xi Jinping, "Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Jointly Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind," State Council of the People's Republic of China, June 28, 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/28/content_WS667e6d1dc6d0868f4e8e8a82.html

[30] China traditionally blocks UN Security Council resolutions targeting autocratic regimes, often in coordination with Russia. See, for example, Emma Farge, “China and Russia Repeatedly Tried to Defund UN Human Rights Work, Report Says,” Reuters, October 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-russia-repeatedly-tried-defund-un-human-rights-work-report-says-2025-10-21/ 

[31] Ezra Klein, “What Americans Need to Understand about China,” New York Times, July 14, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/14/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-kevin-rudd.html 

[32] Xi Jinping, “Joining Hands to Build a Just and Equitable System for Global AI Governance, Keynote Address by Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China,” State Council Information Office, July 17, 2026 http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2026-07/18/content_118605932.html

[33] Enrico Fardella and Sergey Radchenko, “China is Sabotaging the World that Enabled its Rise,” Foreign Affairs, July 15, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-sabotaging-world-enables-its-rise 

[34] Xi Jinping, “Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Conference Marking 70th Anniversary of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” State Council Information Office, June 28, 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/28/content_WS667e6d1dc6d0868f4e8e8a82.html

[35] “Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” March 8, 2026, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202603/t20260308_11870805.html

[36] See Evan S. Medeiros and Andrew Polk, “China's New Economic Weapons,” The Washington Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2025): 99–123, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2480513 

[37] Lily Kuo, Pei-Lin Wu, and Kiuko Notoya, “China’s Latest Pressure Tactics are Tightening the Screws on Japan,” New York Times, June 30, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/30/world/asia/china-japan-rare-earths-patrols.html 

[38] The Global Development Initiative aspires to support the material advancement of other countries; the Global Security Initiative intends to safeguard a non-conflictual environment; the Global Civilizational Initiative seeks to build consensus on respecting different historical and cultural traditions; and the Global Governance Initiative supplies guarantees regarding the continued centrality of the United Nations and equitable distribution of decision-making authority among states, regardless of national power. See Ma Jingjing, “Readers’ Reflections: China’s Four Global Initiatives Establish a Platform for Equal Dialogue between Countries: Norov,” Global Times, January 5, 2026, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352342.shtml

[39] Evan S. Medeiros and Andrew Polk, “China's New Economic Weapons,” The Washington Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2025): 99–123, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2480513 

[40] Wu Xinbo, “Wu Xinbo on Why Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy May Be Driving China’s Rise,” South China Morning Post, July 6, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3359456/wu-xinbo-why-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-may-be-driving-chinas-rise

[41] See, for example, “More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions,” State Council Information Office, June 2026, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202606/17/content_WS6a326192c6d00ca5f9a0bab7.html

[42] Yu Jie, “China Sets Out its Vision for a New Global Order – But Will It Commit the Resources to Match its Ambition?” Chatham House, June 24, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/china-sets-out-its-vision-new-global-order-will-it-commit-resources-match-its-ambition?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[43] Ibid. 

[44] See Boston University’s “China Overseas Development Finance Database,” https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/ 

[45] Yun Sun, “Trump 2.0: Is China Filling the Void?” Chinese Leadership Monitor, June 2026, https://www.prcleader.org/post/trump-2-0-is-china-filling-the-void#_ftn71

[46] Huang Renwei, “The Adjustment of US Global Strategy and its Influence on China,” Economic Herald, February 5, 2026.

[47] Jonathan Schulman et al., “People in Many Countries Now View China More Positively than the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, July 15, 2026, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/15/people-in-many-countries-now-view-china-more-positively-than-the-u-s/

[48] Zhu Zhengyu, “How to Understand the Current Global ‘Multipolarity’ through the 2025 Munich Security Conference?” Fudan Development Institute, July 13, 2026, https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn/f9/ea/c21253a719338/page.htm

[49] 中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅就中国外交政策和对外关系回答中外记者提问_中华人民共和国外交部, March 8, 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/202603/t20260308_11870706.shtml

[50] Mohammed Alsudairi, Andrea Ghiselli, and Aaron Glasserman, “The Gulf’s China Problem” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/gulfs-china-problem  

[51] John Lee, “How Asia Learned to Live with ‘America First,’” Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-asia-learned-live-america-first?utm_campaign=tw&utm_content=&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter

[52] Evan Medeiros, “China: A New Strategy for a New Era,” Strategic Asia 2026, forthcoming

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