Russia and China’s Grand Strategy

Elizabeth Wishnick CLM Issue 89 September 2026.pdf

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Is China poised to advance an alternative vision of the global order in partnership with Russia? After gathering momentum during the previous decade, the Sino-Russian partnership has been deepening under Xi Jinping. Since 2022, progress has been notable in military cooperation and, although Sino-Russian economic ties have long been a weak spot, they have made some progress in energy and regional relations. The full-scale war in Ukraine has highlighted China as an indispensable partner for Russia, and it has also increased Russia’s value to China, especially due to the Russian military’s ongoing experience in drone-driven battlespace. Although China and Russia are in alignment in their efforts to counter U.S. power as it comes to bear on their immediate interests, they are not in lockstep in their efforts to envisage an alternative order. Nevertheless, their parallel efforts, especially those built on deeper military cooperation, may have a significant impact on regional dynamics.

Is China working with Russia to blunt American power and build alternative mechanisms for global and regional order, as Rush Doshi argues in The Long Game?[1] In his comments to the press after Russian president Vladimir Putin’s May 2026 visit, Xi Jinping spoke of the need for “higher quality international coordination” between China and Russia.[2] This is an interesting formulation because international coordination has not been a strength of Sino-Russian relations, a partnership involving considerable flexibility within the framework of a broader geopolitical alignment.

When Xi took office in 2012, China-Russia ties already were on an upswing. The Sino-Russian partnership was in its 15th year. It had been over a decade since the two countries had signed a friendship treaty, the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, subsequently extended to 2021, and then again in five-year increments, with the next phase set to begin in February 2027. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hailed the treaty for playing “a decisive role in shaping a new model of Russian-Chinese cooperation – one that imposes no constraints on the sovereignty of either party, thereby affording it the necessary flexibility and, consequently, clear advantages over ‘classical alliances.’”[3] For his part, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi credited the treaty with forging “a new type of state-to-state and major-country relations.”[4] Although the reference to a “new type of great power relations” has been linked to China’s approach to relations with the U.S., the concept actually originated in a 2014 speech Xi Jinping gave to a Moscow think-tank, and it was initially applied to China-Russia relations, before being used as a framework for China-U.S. ties.[5]

Evolution of a “High-Quality” China-Russia Partnership

Ever since China and Russia declared their strategic partnership in 1997, the two countries have been consistent in their joint support for a multipolar world order, their insistence on non-interference in domestic affairs (of authoritarian states), opposition to “hegemonism,” and respect for the positions each one takes on territorial integrity and sovereignty. In a commentary by Chinese and Russian officials on the 30th anniversary of the partnership and the 15th anniversary of the friendship treaty, there are a few notable shifts in emphasis that are worth noting.

China and Russia highlight that their partnership provides stability in an unstable world, one that is increasingly characterized by rivalry and international tensions. At the May 2026 summit with Putin, Xi stated that their partnership was particularly relevant at a time when “the world risks returning to the law of the jungle.”[6] For Xiao Bin, deputy secretary general of the Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xi’s statements demonstrate the “profound adjustment” in China-Russia collaboration at a time of global turbulence.[7]

After the May 2026 visit by Putin to Beijing, his 25th visit, Chinese and Russian officials highlighted the importance of the two top leaders in guiding their partnership. Luo Shixiong, PRC consul general in Yekaterinburg, called the diplomacy between the two top leaders “the fundamental guarantee” of the partnership, a point the Russian foreign minister later reiterated.[8] At their latest meeting, Putin quoted a Chinese saying: “One day apart feels like three autumns,” noting that he and Xi were constantly coordinating their positions “personally.”[9] 

After the summit, Lavrov chose to highlight the equality of the partnership, terming it “equal and trusting” and a model for interstate engagement based on equality, a balance of interests, and mutual advantage,” a characterization echoed in statements by Chinese officials.[10] China’s state coverage of the visit also flagged the “high-quality development” of the relationship between the two countries.[11] This is a noteworthy turn of phrase, as it implies that we should be focusing on the overall depth of the partnership rather than on the specifics which may be wanting in certain areas.

Key Inflection Points

Considering that China and Russia have fought several border wars since the 17th century and their 1969 clashes took place when both were nuclear powers, thus raising the prospect of a dangerous escalation, their current strategic partnership has never been a foregone conclusion. Although external events have been important in solidifying their deepening ties, we can identify a series of inflection points largely connected to domestic developments in each country but also responding to the changing geopolitical environment.

Lavrov credits the 2001 Sino-Russian friendship treaty, especially Article 6 where both countries relinquish territorial claims against one another, as paving the way for agreement on the last remaining section of the Sino-Russian border that was to be demarcated in 2004 and its ratification in 2008.[12] In 2005, China and Russia held their first bilateral Peace Mission military exercises, involving a tabletop exercise in Vladivostok and a naval drill in the Yellow Sea.[13] 

The 2008 global financial crisis, which both China and Russia interpreted as a failure of Western approaches to development and economic governance, provided additional impetus for the two countries to develop new approaches and institutions. Chinese and Russian statements about the need for a multipolar order appeared to bear fruit at the inaugural meeting of BRICS in 2009, joined by South Africa a year later. Indirectly, the global financial crisis also paved the way for more substantial energy cooperation between Russia and China. Hard hit by the crisis, Russian energy companies approached China, which had recovered more swiftly, for financing for the East Siberian Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. The China Development Bank provided a $25 billion loan in exchange for annual fuel deliveries and a dedicated spur of the pipeline to China.[14]

Russia and Chinese rhetoric opposing unilateralism turned into action, as Putin followed up on his belligerent speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference by occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia after a brief war with Georgia and then taking over Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine in 2014.[15] Similarly, China has relied on historical interpretations rather than international law, and it has used coercion to defend its maritime claims in the South China Sea, especially since the 2010s. China and Russia have acquired a parallel agenda – although neither fully subscribes to the partner’s blueprint, they provide mutual support for the views they share about territorial sovereignty and integrity and the coercive tactics they employ to safeguard them.

Their deepening partnership has coincided with growing tensions over U.S. and EU trade with China and mounting anxiety about Chinese intentions in the Indo-Pacific in the late 2010s. Moreover, by 2018, China had abandoned term limits and effectively so had Russia. Despite their unlimited hold on power, Xi and Putin both feared for the fragility of their rule and each saw in in their partnership a means to shore up their respective regime security. Both have national security doctrines focusing on internal as well as external risks.[16] Wu Guoguang has argued that together they aim to reshape the global order in support of authoritarianism, both at home and abroad.[17] 

Since the full-scale war in Ukraine, which has contributed to closer ties between NATO and U.S. allies in Asia, China and Russia have been in greater alignment about the external threats they face from the U.S. and its allies. Their 2022 joint statement, issued just prior to the Russian invasion, called out the “small number of forces” in the world that were acting unilaterally, interfering in the domestic affairs of other states, and creating conflict.[18] Although this statement attracted more attention for its assertion that there were “no limits, … no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation,” a formulation since abandoned, subsequent joint statements have highlighted their greater geopolitical alignment.[19] During their 2026 summit meeting, Xi and Putin codified these views in a declaration on the “Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations,” declaring their “resolute opposition to hegemonism and unilateralism, their opposition to a return to a world where might alone rules, and their firm support for the authority and central roleof the UN in international affairs.”[20] 

Developments in Energy, Military Cooperation, and Regional Relations 

For many years, China and Russia struggled to build momentum in bilateral trade and investment, leading to a situation whereby the deepening political partnership and growing geopolitical alignment far outpaced their economic ties – what observers have referred to as “hot politics, cold economics.”[21] Today, Wu Dahui, deputy director of the Russia Institute at Tsinghua University, speaks of the 60,000 institutionalized communications channels connecting broad swaths of Chinese and Russian societies, like a network of blood vessels.[22] The energy sector was one the first major areas of successful bilateral cooperation, but even so it would take nearly a decade for China and Russia to come to terms on the East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline.[23] ESPO was finally completed in 2011, and it now sends 30 million metric tons of oil annually via a spur from Skovorodino in eastern Russia to Daqing in the Chinese northeast.

In 2007 China’s Sinopec succeeded in making its first upstream investment in the Sakhalin 3 offshore gas project with a 25 percent stake in the Venin block.[24] This was followed several years later by a series of investments in Russian Arctic gas.[25] China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired a 20 percent stake in the first Yamal LNG project in 2013, one of the PRC’s largest investments in Russia, with CNPC hailing it as a “fine example of China-Russia cooperation.” Three years later, China's Silk Road Fund purchased a 9.9 percent stake. In 2019 CNPC and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) each bought a 10 percent stake in the Yamal Arctic LNG 2 project.[26] 

It took two decades to negotiate Russia’s first gas pipeline to China, Power of Siberia, due to differences over the route and the price of gas. On May 21, 2014, three months after the Russian operation to annex Crimea, Russia and China signed a $400 billion deal to ship 38 bcm of gas from eastern Siberia to northeast China. The pipeline was fully completed in November 2024, though it began shipping gas in 2019. CNPC’s $25 billion prepayment for future gas supplies helped sweeten the deal and reduce the sting of Western sanctions.[27] Russia has been less lucky in implementing a memorandum of intent with China for a second Power of Siberia pipeline, which would transit Mongolia. Although the parties have agreed in principle and the project is mentioned in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, there have been no signs that China will be investing in the pipeline or has agreed to a gas price. The war in Iran has complicated the picture, as Russia now may be more reluctant to meet China’s price demands given the higher energy prices. Meanwhile, China has other options, including a fourth pipeline from Turkmenistan.[28]

Military cooperation has been another dynamic area in China-Russia relations, albeit not consistently. After a period of rapid expansion, Russian military sales to China peaked by 2005, but then revived after 2014.[29] By this point, China’s own defense production had advanced considerably, and it was more selective in its purchases. At the same time, despite past concerns about the potential for Chinese reverse engineering, Russia became more willing to sell some of its most advanced systems to China, leading to two major contracts, a $2 billion deal to sell Su-35 fighters to China and a $3 billion agreement to provide S-400s. Since 2015, Russia has also provided China with heavy-transport aircraft, aircraft engines, surface-to-air missiles, and air-to-air missiles. A project for joint production of heavy-lift helicopters is proceeding slowly.[30] The status of Russian assistance to China to develop an early warning system for intercontinental ballistic missile defense, announced by Putin in 2019, remains unclear.[31] According to one U.S. analysis, Russia may have assisted with the PRC’s deployment of at least three satellites for this purpose in 2022.[32]

Sino-Russian military exercises, drills, and patrols increased in geographic scope and frequency beginning in the 2010s. Bilateral formats largely have focused on the Asia-Pacific (with the exception of joint drills in the Gulf of Aden in 2009, the Mediterranean in 2012 and the Baltic Sea in 2017 and 2024).[33] These exercises involved combined naval, air, and staff command components, meaning that members of a single service from Russia and China participated together rather than demonstrating multi-service interoperability.[34] Multilateral exercises have included BRICS partners in the Persian Gulf and South Africa in displays of military diplomacy as well as SCO partners in Central Asia, largely focusing on counterterrorism.

In more recent bilateral air and naval exercises, China and Russia have exhibited greater complexity and have engaged in operations in more sensitive areas.[35] A joint strategic bomber patrol took off from Anadyr in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug in July 2024, the first time Chinese aircraft were allowed access to Russian bases. Chinese and Russian diesel submarines participated in joint exercises in 2025 and 2026.[36] The Joint Sea 2026 exercise focused on joint submarine rescue operations, strikes against enemy vessels, and air and missile defense missions, including countering maritime and aerial drones, the first instance of drone operations in China-Russia exercises.[37]

With the deterioration of Russian and Chinese relations with Japan in recent years, Sino-Russian exercises have focused on its nearby seas and airspace. The North Pacific Arctic has been another area of increased joint activity, especially after the Chinese and Russian coast guards signed a cooperation agreement in 2023.[38] In the following year, a joint patrol enabled the Chinese Coast Guard to sail into the Arctic Sea for the first time. For both China and Russia, including the North Pacific Arctic in their area of patrols and exercises is another example of their readiness to use their joint activities to signal their presence and to challenge competitors, such as the U.S. and Japan.[39]

Another astonishing sign of progress in China-Russia relations is the institution of a reciprocal program for visa-free travel in 2024, now extended to 2027. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian media were full of reporting about Chinese illegal immigration. In part, this was connected to Russian regional politics in the Russian Far East (Russians were able to vote for their governors from 1995 to 2005 and the China threat was a reliable vote-getter at the time), but the fraught history of Sino-Russian border relations also played a role. This history remains divisive and has played a role in dampening enthusiasm, on the Russian side in particular, for more extensive cross-border ties with China. Nevertheless, after decades of talks, two bridges now connect the two countries across their lengthy Amur River border. Ironically, both bridges opened during COVID-19 at a time when the Sino-Russian border remained closed.[40]

The highway bridge between Heihe and Blagoveshchensk, first discussed in 1995, finally saw completion in 2022. Freight traffic began that year, with passenger vehicles using the route as of 2025. Another agreement for a railway bridge between Tongjiang and Nizhneleninskoye was reached in 2014 and completed in 2022. Yury Trutnev, Russian presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, called the bridges a “key link” between Russia and China at a time of “new challenges from unfriendly countries.”[41] Viktor Larin, an expert on China-Russia regional relations in Vladivostok, nevertheless sees regional infrastructure as inadequate for developing regional relations. In his view, large companies and efforts by the central authorities in both countries have been the drivers of regional cooperation, not the regions themselves.[42]

Russia's Perspective: How China Became an Indispensable Partner

Prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine, China was an important strategic partner for Russia, but one of many – including the U.S., the EU, India, and Vietnam, among others.[43] By contrast, in Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, China and India topped the list of Russia’s partners within Eurasia and the EU, and the U.S. ranked at the bottom.[44] Since 2022, Russia’s options for technology imports, energy exports, and Arctic investment have narrowed considerably, and China has become a lifeline, as observed by former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk.[45]

By 2024, trade with China had doubled compared to the 2020 figures, reaching $244 billion.[46] After a 6.5 percent contraction in 2025 due to declining oil prices and Russian protectionist measures in the automotive sector, a key PRC export area, bilateral trade rebounded in the first half of 2026, increasing by 25 percent and reaching $134.5 billion.[47] China plays a key role in facilitating Russian trade by directly clearing payments in RMB and using its own payment clearing mechanisms.[48]

Russia primarily exports energy and minerals to China, and the price of oil impacts the volume of this trade.[49] China now purchases 50 percent of Russian oil, 31 percent of its pipeline gas, 23 percent of its LNG, and 37 percent of its coal. Russian observers have seen the resource orientation of Russian trade with China as a persistent problem, predating the 2022 war.[50] Unusually, in 2026, with Ukraine targeting Russian refineries, China is selling 1.3 million tons of petroleum products to Siberia and the Russian Far East, a move that Pravda has called a “clear gesture of support for Moscow.”[51] 

Its pledges of neutrality notwithstanding, China has been Russia’s top supplier for the war in Ukraine by providing a source of ready substitutes for Western goods, imports through third countries, for example through Central Asia, and for turning a blind eye to exports of sanctioned goods by Chinese firms.[52] A 2026 analysis by The Insider, an investigative reporting website, found that Chinese firms accounted for 61 percent of the exporters of sanctioned goods to Russia in 2024-25 – 4,000 out of 6,000 firms with shipments of over $10,000.[53] By comparison, many fewer firms came from countries such as Turkey (300), the UAE (120), and India (60). Chinese firms have played a key role in providing semiconductors and other dual-use technologies, drones, and machine-tools for weapons production, trucks, and gunpowder for use by the Russian military in Ukraine.

A new development in the China-Russia military relationship involves the development of cooperation in military training. According to three European intelligence agencies and documents obtained by Reuters, 200 Russian troops secretly received training in drone warfare and mine sweeping in China, according to the terms of a July 1, 2025, agreement.[54] These agencies reported that some of the trainees subsequently returned to Ukraine. Another contingent of 200 Russian troops also reportedly received training in China on radiological, biological, and chemical warfare, according to additional information obtained by Reuters.[55]

In technology cooperation beyond Ukraine, we see greater dependence by Russia on China in AI and even in space, where the Russian space program once was a leader. Since 2021, the Russian State Corporation for Space Activities, Roscosmos, and China’s State Space Administration have been collaborating in the international lunar space station, the Sino-Russian rejoinder to the U.S.-led Artemis project.[56] Chinese companies also are now providing about 24 percent of the equipment for production of the Angara 1.2 launch vehicle for Russian military satellites.[57] In AI, cooperation with China began prior to 2022, but it has since expanded as sanctions have restricted alternative partners and technologies.[58]

An agreement between BeiDou and GLONASS, signed just before the full-scale war in Ukraine, contributes to improved alignment in Chinese and Russian satellite systems, envisaging building three ground stations on each other’s territory.[59] At present, the two satellite systems remain complementary rather than achieving interoperability.[60] Nevertheless, Russia relies on China’s BeiDou to supplement its polar coverage. Since 2022, Russia increasingly has had to substitute Chinese technology for Western systems to continue Arctic energy development plans. After some delays due to sanctions (which the involved PRC firms ultimately circumvented), China provided modules for the Yamal Arctic LNG 2 project.[61] Thus far, China has not agreed to provide steering and propulsion equipment for Russian ice-class vessels due to concerns about sanctions.[62]

China’s Perspective: Why Russia Matters

China has played an outsized role in supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, but Chinese officials also see considerable geostrategic benefit in the Sino-Russian partnership. Xi Jinping commented in April 2026 that given the “complex and volatile international situation, the stability and certainty of China-Russia relations are precious.”[63] Xi often mentions that China seeks to advance “back-to-back strategic coordination with Russia.”[64] Although I have argued here previously that the two countries act in parallel rather than in coordination, what is important in this quote is the “back-to-back” part.[65] This refers to the strategic benefit China now derives from avoiding a two-front threat due to its strategic partnership with Russia.

Although the deepening Sino-Russian partnership has contributed to a downward spiral in China-EU relations, recent reporting sheds light on some of the advantages that China may be reaping from its partnership with Russia.[66] RUSI reported in September 2025 on a 2023 deal for Russia to supply weapons and equipment for an airborne battalion and to provide related training, indicating support for China’s Taiwan-related preparations.[67] Training is a key need for the PLA which has not fought a war since 1979 and has never been involved in the type of drone warfare seen in Ukraine. Based on 800 pages of documents obtained by the Black Moon hacktivist group, if true, China is leveraging the Sino-Russian partnership to receive material aid for a Taiwan contingency. Russia also has been training PLA troops in drone warfare and urban combat since 2024, as reported by The Economist.[68] 

In testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee in April 2026, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, spoke of the growing mutual support and “interconnected challenge” of the deepening ties between China and Russia, even though their objectives may not always be aligned.[69] Reporting based on documents from the Black Moon hacking highlights the overlap between Russian objectives in Ukraine and PRC planning for a Taiwan contingency. In July 2025, The Insider revealed that in 2023-24 China had purchased a Russian automated command system for secure tactical communications, and it had signed a contract for related training for PLA airborne troops.[70]

In July 2026, The Insider, Der Spiegel, and Le Monde published additional documents, also dating from 2023-24, that reveal PRC and Russian collaboration to counter Starlink and to develop advanced missile defense capabilities. These joint endeavors go well beyond their individual efforts to develop their own version of Starlink and countermeasures, such as Russia’s Volna Kupol Garant, an electronic warfare system designed to temporarily disrupt Starlink communications.[71] These documents also portray a division of labor whereby the Russian military tests Chinese drone technologies on Ukrainian battlefields, which could potentially lead to joint production in China.[72]

Igor Denisov, a senior research fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, argues that the benefits that China derives from the partnership with Russia cannot simply be tallied from the balance sheet of Sino-Russian trade and investment. He contends the strength of the partnership “lies in the extent to which their roles become indispensable to one another at times of prolonged Western pressure.”[73]

The Parameters of a Deepening Partnership

China and Russia are in alignment regarding the broad contours of the geopolitical threats they face, but not necessarily on the specific policies. This stems from their different identities and interests on various issues. Russia never signed an agreement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for example, preferring to link up with it through the Russia-led Greater Eurasian Partnership. They both see themselves as potential leaders of the Global South, but they have different ideas about what this leadership should entail. China remains skeptical about the staying power of Putin’s “Turn to the East,” given that some highly placed Russian scholars are keeping the door open to a future reengagement with the U.S. and Europe in an effort to achieve a more balanced foreign policy between East and West.[74] 

Both China and Russia see themselves as leaders, and neither wants to explicitly follow the other. Russian observers see China as “indispensable” and central, but they dispute its dominance in the partnership with Russia or with U.S.[75] Roman Lunkin, deputy director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Guancha that the major powers look to each other for mutual support, and there is no space for hegemony by any one of them.[76] Alexander Lukin, research director of the Center for China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, along similar lines argues that China, Russia, and other “civilizations” must find ways to cooperate with one another without one dominating the other.[77]

Some Chinese scholars share the credit with Russia for jointly developing a new model for international relations. Cui Heng, a Russia expert at East China Normal University, contends that “China-Russia relations stand as a distinctive model, offering a valuable reference for countries striving to break free from unipolar hegemony and to pursue independent development. …”[78] Nevertheless, other Chinese analyses put greater emphasis on China’s leadership role. Ye Tianle, an associate research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), describes the Sino-Russian partnership as mutually beneficial and based on strategic autonomy, but in the same breath he speaks of the paradigm for their relationship as “a valuable ‘Chinese solution’” for the international community.[79] 

Sun Zhuangzhi, director of the Institute of Russian, Eastern European, and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has described Xi Jinping’s depiction of the China-Russia partnership as an example of China’s global leadership in creating a new type of international relations.[80] He notes that Russian endorsement of many principles for global governance that China has developed implies some consensus, while emphasizing that it was the Chinese side that proposed many of the involved concepts. A People’s Daily editorial about the Xi-Putin summit, praised China and Russia for working together – in support of all of Xi Jinping’s initiatives (global development, global security, global civilization, and global governance) and his aim to build a community of common destiny, although Russia has not directly signed on to any one of them.[81]

Where both China and Russia seem to agree is that a partnership short of an alliance provides needed flexibility. Lavrov praised the relationship with China for “affording the necessary flexibility” and imposing few constraints.[82] Chinese scholars concur. Zhang Yao, a researcher at the Centre for RimPac and International Studies, points out that the Sino-Russian partnership has a stabilizing impact by avoiding what he terms the “hijacking effect,” i.e., the partner being dragged into the other’s conflict.[83] Wu Dahui characterizes their relationship as “self-selected strategic coordination,” which he also views as stabilizing.[84]

China can afford to be selective, some Russians argue, because Xi has not stepped up to take advantage when the U.S. has found itself in a debacle, as in the case of the Iran war today. An article by prominent Russian experts from the Higher School of Economics sees Xi s China as inward-looking, focusing on achieving resilience to achieve core interests in Taiwan and the Pacific region more broadly.[85] In their view, China sees U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran as potential disruptions to Beijing’s primary agenda, and they believe that Xi will choose carefully when and where to intervene. Observers in the West are equally skeptical. Yu Jie, senior research fellow at Chatham House, argues that China speaks “a new language of international order,” but it has yet to commit the resources to implement it.[86] Similarly, Yun Sun, director of China Studies at the Stimson Center, contends that China has not proven to be willing to fill the space left by the U.S. retreat from global leadership, despite Xi’s alternative visions for a global order.[87]

China has its own reasons to be selective in establishing the parameters for partnership. Alice Ekman, research director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), argues that China prefers more fluid networks to alliances – circles of friends (中国的“朋友圈” – Zhongguo de pengyou quan) but with Russia at the core.[88] The concept of “circles of friends” echoes Russia’s post-2022 priority on expanding ties with “friendly countries.” China relies on these networks to enlist support for Xi’s centerpiece initiatives and to build coalitions within multilateral institutions. The Friends of the Global Development Initiative is one example of such a networks that China has launched at the UN and in which Russia participates.

Conclusion

Under Xi Jinping, Sino-Russian relations have been deepening, with notable achievements in energy, military, and technological cooperation, and some progress in regional relations. Although international developments have shaped the trajectory of the partnership, parallel domestic developments – especially the indefinite rule by Xi and Putin and their ongoing concern about external and internal threats to regime security – have been the primary drivers of the partnership. The war in Ukraine has been a real turning point in their relations. For Russia, China has become a lifeline for dual-use technologies, financial settlements, and, more recently, petroleum projects. Despite the growing economic asymmetry, Russia has also become a more valuable partner for China because of Russian battlefield experience, especially with drone warfare.

Although China and Russia may not pursue identical interests in many issues, their broad alignment against Western pressure and deepening military cooperation will have far-reaching consequences.[89] We already have seen some reporting of parallel efforts by Russia and China to assist Iran, with China granting satellite access and Russia reportedly providing some military equipment and intelligence.[90] Russia also could potentially provide important indirect assistance to China during a Taiwan contingency, even if Russia does not become directly involved.

Broad alignment does not mean that China and Russia are working together to displace the U.S. or the international order, though they each have a vision for an improved order that would be more conducive to their own agendas. Chinese commentary highlights the importance of the China-Russia partnership at a time of global instability, backstopping China so that it can achieve its broader global security aspirations. Some Russian observers question the depth of China’s commitment to that goal beyond achieving its own core interests. Nevertheless, both Chinese and Russian officials welcome the flexibility of their non-alliance and neither one wants to be required to follow the other’s agenda to the letter.

About the Contributor

Elizabeth Wishnick is Senior Research Scientist in China Studies at CNA and Distinguished Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. She was a tenured professor of Political Science at Montclair State University from 2005-2024. Dr. Wishnick has dual regional expertise on China and Russia and is the author of Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (University of Washington Press, 2014, 2001). Her forthcoming book China’s Risk: Energy, Water, Food and Regional Security (Columbia University Press, 2027) addresses the security consequences of energy, water, and food risks in China for its Eurasian neighbors, a topic she explores in a Substack newsletter, China’s Resource Risks. She would like to thank Samuel Robertson for his research and editorial assistance. The views expressed here are her own and do not reflect those of CNA or its sponsors.

Notes

[1] Rush Doshi, “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order,” The Brookings Institution, August 2, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/. Also see Claus Soong, “China’s Moment to Shape a New Order,” The Diplomat, July 6, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/chinas-moment-to-shape-a-new-global-order/; Alexander Korolev, “Xi-Putin Summit Displays Transition Not Only in Global Power but in the Global Order,” East Asia Forum, July 24, 2026, https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/07/23/xi-putin-summit-displays-transition-not-only-in-global-power-but-in-the-global-order/.

[2] “President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin Meet the Press,” May 20, 2025, https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202605/t20260520_11914662.htm.

[3] Sergey Lavrov, “A Constant in an Era of Radical Change: On the 25th Anniversary of the Russian-Chinese Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation,” Kommersant, July 16, 2026, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2126964/.

[4] “Chinese FM Meets Russian Counterpart,” Xinhua, July 25, 2026, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202607/25/content_WS6a64143ac6d00ca5f9a0c6a4.html.

[5] Elizabeth Wishnick, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and East Asian Order,” Asian Perspective 42, no. 3 (2018),

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359069291_The_Sino-Russian_Partnership_and_East_Asian_Order.

[6] “Update: China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Further Extended,” Xinhua, April 20, 2026, https://english.news.cn/20260520/6a006a8528d04e328bdbfad1bfc37393/c.html.

[7] Xiao Bin, “Coordination Reflects Shifts in Relations,” China-US Focus, June 3, 2026, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/coordination-reflects-shifts-in-relations.

[8] “驻叶卡捷琳堡总领事罗世雄在俄媒体发表署名文章 ‘三十年风雨同舟，共铸新型大国关系典范 – 写在中俄战略协作伙伴关系建立三十周年之际’” June 10, 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/webzwbd_673032/wjzs/202606/t20260611_11942236.shtml. Also see Lavrov, “A Constant in an Era of Radical Change.”

[9] “Conversation with President of China Xi Jinping,” May 20, 2026, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/79783 .

[10] Lavrov, “A Constant in an Era of Radical Change.”

[11] “Xinhua Commentary: Xi-Putin Meeting Charts New Strategic Course for China-Russia Ties,” Xinhua, May 21, 2026, https://english.news.cn/20260521/da99530e91d644bb8d946bf32773d975/c.html.

[12] Lavrov, “A Constant in an Era of Radical Change.” For the full text of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, see https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag1735_57fb5eaecbea8.pdf. .

[13] Shinji Hyodo, “First Ever Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercises: Russia Moving Closer to China,” The National Institute for Defense Studies News, no. 92 (September 2005), https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2006/092.pdf.

[14] Natalya Chabarovskaya, “Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties are Deeper than Washington Thinks,” CEPA, June 16, 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks/.

[15] Pavel K. Baev, “Putin’s Journey From the Munich Speech to the Brink of War With Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 19, no. 18 (February 14, 2022), https://jamestown.org/putins-journey-from-the-munich-speech-to-the-brink-of-war-with-ukraine/ .

[16] “In Their Own Words: 2025 China's National Security in the New Era,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, May 12, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2025-09-08%202025%20China%20National%20Security%20White%20Paper%202025.pdf?ver=nA5qS3sBOYidpEoW77qhfw%3d%3d,http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001?index=4; “2021 Russian National Security Strategy,” Russia Matters, https://www.russiamatters.org/2021-russian-national-security-strategy.

[17] Guoguang Wu, “Interpreting Xi Jinping's Shifting Strategy on the Russia-Ukraine War,” Asia Society Policy Institute, October 11, 2023, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/interpreting-xi-jinpings-shifting-strategy-russia-ukraine-war.

[18] “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.

 [19] “Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики об углублении отношений всеобъемлющего партнёрства и стратегического взаимодействия, вступающих в новую эпоху” [Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening the Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Entering a New Era], March 21, 2023, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5920. By 2023 China and Russia had instead opted to adopt China’s three noes (no alliance, no confrontation, no targeting of third parties) and described their partnership as “superior” to an alliance. For a discussion of the reasoning behind this change in formulation, see Elizabeth Wishnick, “A ‘Superior Relationship’: How the Invasion of Ukraine Has Deepened the Sino-Russian Partnership,” China Leadership Monitor, Issue 76, June 1, 2023, https://www.prcleader.org/post/a-superior-relationship-how-the-invasion-of-ukraine-has-deepened-the-sino-russian-partnership.

[20] “Совместная декларация Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики о становлении многополярного мира и международных отношений нового типа” [Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations], May 20, 2026, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/6486.

[21] Yana Leksyutina, “Russia-China: Economic Ties Progress from Cold to Warm,” Valdai Club, September 27, 2019, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-china-economic-ties-progress/; “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770;

[22] Cited in Fan Chen, “Why China-Russia Ties Are ‘Better than Alliance’ and Immune to US Containment Efforts,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3352894/why-china-russia-ties-are-better-alliance-and-immune-us-containment-efforts.

[23] Igor Danchenko, Erica Downs, and Fiona Hill, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Realities of a Rising China and Implications for Russia’s Energy Ambitions,” Brookings Policy Paper, no. 22 (August 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/08_china_russia_energy_downs_hill.pdf.

[24] “Sinopec, Rosneft Deal on Sakhalin Project,” Xinhua, March 30, 2007, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-03/30/content_840389.htm.

[25] Elizabeth Wishnick, “Will Ukraine Put China’s Arctic Ambitions on Ice?” China’s Resource Risks, June 3, 2021, https://www.chinasresourcerisks.com/post/will-russia-put-china-s-arctic-ambitions-on-ice.

[26] “Yamal LNG Project Completed and Put into Operation,” CNPC, July 2018, https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/csr2014enhms/201807/771c0549950f4420ad6de3972fe27073/files/88c8e515fb734e6984ef3599ab2255c2.pdf.

[27] Elizabeth Wishnick, “The ‘Power of Siberia’: No Longer a Pipe Dream,” PONARS Eurasia, August 18, 2014, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-power-of-siberia-no-longer-a-pipe-dream/.

[28] Elizabeth Wishnick, “Power of Siberia 2: Significant Shift in Global Gas Markets or Another Pipe(line) Dream?” China’s Resource Risks, September 6, 2025, https://chinasresourcerisks.substack.com/p/power-of-siberia-2-significant-shift.

[29] Dmitry Gorenburg, Paul Schwartz, Brian Waidelich, and Elizabeth Wishnick, Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation: An Increasingly Unequal Partnership, CNA, March 1, 2023, https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/Russian-Chinese-Military-Cooperation.pdf.

[30] Alexei Zakharov, “Russia-China Defence and Security Cooperation: Intensification Amid Constraints,” ORF Middle East, May 28, 2026, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/russia-china-defence-and-security-partnership-intensification-amid-constraints/.

[31] Reuters, “Kremlin Hails Special Relationship with China amid Missile System Cooperation,” Moscow Times, October 4, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/04/putin-says-russia-helping-china-to-build-missile-attack-warning-system-a67597.

[32] Jacob Mezey, “Russian and Chinese Strategic Missile Defense: Doctrine, Capabilities, and Development,” Atlantic Council, September 10, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russian-and-chinese-strategic-missile-defense-doctrine-capabilities-and-development/.

[33] Andrew S. Bowen, “Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols,” CRS R48978, June 9, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48978.

[34] Gorenburg, et al., Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation.

[35] Bowen, “Russian Military Activities in Asia.”

[36] John C.K. Daly, “First Joint Russian–PRC Submarine Exercise Patrols Pacific,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 18, 2025, https://jamestown.org/first-joint-russian-prc-submarine-exercise-patrols-pacific/; Chen Chuanren, “China and Russia Expand Naval Cooperation with Submarine Participation,” Asia Military Review, July 22, 2026, https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2026/07/china-and-russia-expand-naval-cooperation-with-submarine-participation-foc/.

[37] “China, Russia Practice Joint Strikes on Ships and Air Defense During Naval Drills,” Ukrinform, July 12, 2025, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4143503-china-russia-practice-joint-strikes-on-ships-and-air-defense-during-naval-drills.html; “China Is Gaining Troubling Military Know-How from Russia,” The Economist, July 23, 2026, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/07/23/china-is-gaining-troubling-military-know-how-from-russia.

[38] Elizabeth Wishnick, “Sino-Russian Partnership in the North Pacific Arctic,” in The “New” Frontier: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and its Geopolitical Implications, ed. Niklas Swanström and Filip Borges Månsson, September 2025, https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SP-Arctic-Sep-2025-final.pdf.

[39] Ondrej Ditrich and Alice Ekman, “Rehearsing for War: China and Russia's Military Exercises,” EUISS, July 3, 2024, https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/rehearsing-war-china-and-russias-military-exercises.

[40] Ed Pulford, “Cautious Contact on the China-Russia Border,” The Diplomat, March 1, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/cautious-contact-on-the-china-russia-border/.

[41] “Russia Completes First Rail Bridge to China,” Moscow Times, April 27, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/27/russia-completes-first-rail-bridge-to-china-a77503.

[42] Cited in Andrei Pushkaryev, “Какие препятствия стоят на пути сотрудничества России и КНР” [What Obstacles Stand in the Way of Cooperation between Russia and China?], RG, July 23, 2026, https://rg.ru/2026/07/23/kitajskaia-gramota-dlia-regionov.html.

[43] “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” November 30, 2016, https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Foreign%20Policy%20Concept%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20%28approved%20by%20President%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20Vladimir%20Putin%20on%20November%2030%2C%202016%29%20-%20Asset%20Publisher%20-%20The%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation.pdf.

[44] “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 31, 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/.

[45] Arseniy Yatsenyuk et al., “Is the Russia-Ukraine War Winnable,” Chatham House, October 3, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/open-event/russia-ukraine-war-winnable.

[46] “China-Russia Dashboard,” MERICS, https://merics.org/en/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship.

[47] “China's 2025 Trade with Russia Posts First Decline in 5 Years,” Reuters, January 14, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-2025-trade-with-russia-posts-first-decline-5-years-2026-01-14/; Iwona Wiśniewska, “Russia Is Grappling with an Influx of Chinese-Made Cars,” OSW, August 1, 2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-08-01/russia-grappling-influx-chinese-made-cars; “Russia-China Trade Grows 25.6% in First Half of 2026,” Moscow Times, July 14, 2026, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/14/russia-china-trade-grows-256-in-first-half-of-2026-a93246.

[48] Graham Ayres and Lyndi Tsering, “China’s Facilitation of Sanctions and Export Control Evasion,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 14, 2025, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/Chinas_Facilitation_of_Sanctions_and_Export_Control_Evasion.pdf.

[49] “China/Russia,” https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/rus.

[50] Alexey Martynov, “Beijing Can No Longer Treat Moscow as a Junior Partner,” RT, May 16, 2026, https://www.rt.com/news/640052-beijing-moscow-sanctions-partnership/.

[51] “Двойная игра Пекина: Китай умудрился ударить в спину и тут же спасти Россию от беды” [Beijing’s Double Game: China Managed to Stab Russia in the Back and Immediately Save it from Disaster], Pravda, July 9, 2026, https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/2368659-china-fuel-export-russia-strategy/.

[52] Dmitry Gorenburg, Samuel Bendett, Ken Gause, Pavel Luzin (Center for European Policy Analysis), Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Paul Schwartz, and Elizabeth Wishnick, Crafting the Russian War Economy, CNA, October 2024, https://www.cna.org/reports/2024/10/Crafting-the-Russian-War-Economy.pdf.

[53] Andrey Zayakin, “The Insider Identifies 6,000 Exporters Trading With Sanctioned Russian Firms or Defense Industry Suppliers, 4,000 Of Them Based in China,” The Insider, March 11, 2026, https://theins.press/en/inv/289970.

[54] “Russians Covertly Trained by China Return to Fight in Ukraine, Sources Say,“ Reuters, May 19, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russians-covertly-trained-by-china-return-fight-ukraine-sources-say-2026-05-19/.

[55] “Russia Approved Secret China Military Training at Top Level, Sources Say,” Reuters, July 1, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-approved-secret-china-military-training-top-level-sources-say-2026-07-01/.

[56] Tahir Azad, “The Limits of the China–Russia Strategic Partnership in Military Space Cooperation,” Small Arms Journal, January 30, 2026, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/30/the-limits-of-space-cooperation/; Kevin Pollpeter, Elizabeth Barrett, Jeffrey Edmonds, Amanda Kerrigan, and Andrew Taffer, “China-Russia Space Cooperation: The Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, and Economic Implications of a Growing Relationship,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, CNA, June 2023, https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/06/China-Russia-Space-Cooperation-May-2023.pdf.

[57] “Chinese Entities Supplying Russia with Space Militarization Equipment Operate in EU and U.S. Markets, Dallas Analytics Reports,” The Insider, July 31, 2026, https://theins.press/en/news/295579; “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: The Foreign Machinery Behind Russia’s Space Militarisation,” Dallas Analytics, July 31, 2026, https://dallas-analytics.com/russia-imports-chinese-machine-tools-angara-product,ion/.

[58] Gaziza Shakhanova, “Russia-China Cooperation Amidst the War in Ukraine: From Joint Management of Security in Eurasia to AI Collaboration,” EuroHub4Sino, May 15, 2026, https://eh4s.eu/publication/russia-china-cooperation-amidst-the-war-in-ukraine-from-joint-management-of-security-in-eurasia-to-ai-collaboration#footnotes.

[59] Jack Lau, “China and Russia to Boost Satellite Navigation Systems with New Ground Stations,” South China Morning Post, September 30, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3194387/china-and-russia-boost-satellite-navigation-systems-new-ground.

[60] Johan Schalin and Sophie Arts, “Bracing for a Cold Front: Assessing Russian and Chinese Strategic Objectives and Hybrid Threat Capabilities in the Arctic,” Hybrid CoE Paper 28, January 2026, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/20260121-Hybrid-CoE-Paper-28-Bracing-for-a-cold-front-Assessing-Russian-and-Chinese-strategic-objectives-and-hybrid-threat-capabilities-in-the-Arctic-WEB.pdf.

[61] Max Meizlish, “China’s Support for Russia’s Arctic Energy Buildout Complicated by Sanctions – But Not Prevented,” FDD, July 23, 2026, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/07/23/chinas-support-for-russias-arctic-energy-buildout-complicated-by-sanctions-but-not-prevented/.

[62] “China Declines to Supply Equipment for Russian Northern Sea Route Fleet,” Kyiv Post, July 18, 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/80572.

[63] “習近平：面對變亂交織的國際形勢 中俄關系的穩定性和確定性尤為寶貴,”[ Xi Jinping: Amid an international landscape Characterized by Intertwined Turbulence and Change, the Stability and Certainty of China-Russia Relations are Particularly Valuable],

 CCTV News, April 15, 2026, http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2026/0415/c1024-40702063.html.

[64] “Update: China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Further Extended.”

[65] Elizabeth Wishnick, “The Sino-Russian Partnership: Cooperation without Coordination,”

China Leadership Monitor, Issue 83, March 2025, https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-sino-russian-partnership-cooperation-without-coordination.

[66] Andreea Brinza, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Philippe Le Corre, John Seaman, Richard Turcsányi, and Stefan Vladisavljev, EU-China Relations: De-risking or De-coupling − The Future of the EU Strategy Towards China, European Parliament, March 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754446/EXPO_STU(2024)754446_EN.pdf.

[67] Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Jack Watling, “How Russia is Helping China Prepare to Seize Taiwan,” RUSI, September 26, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-russia-helping-china-prepare-seize-taiwan.

[68] “China Is Gaining Troubling Military Know-How from Russia.”

[69] “Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture,” April 2026, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/paparo_opening_statement.pdf.

[70] “Documents Confirm Russia Is Helping China Develop a System for Managing Landing Operations – Potentially for Use in a Taiwan Invasion,” The Insider, August 14, 2025, https://theins.press/en/inv/284047.

[71] Stephen Clark, “Could China and Russia Really Destroy Starlink? Only with a Boomerang,” ArsTechnica, July 16, 2026, https://arstechnica.com/space/2026/07/could-china-and-russia-really-destroy-starlink-only-with-a-boomerang/; Efosa Udinmwen, “Russia Debuts Anti-Starlink EW System that Can Blind Terminals by Overloading 'Satellites' Receiving Antennas,'” Techradar, August 2, 2026, https://www.techradar.com/pro/russia-debuts-anti-starlink-ew-system-that-can-blind-terminals-by-overloading-satellites-receiving-antennas.

[72] Michael Weiss, Roman Dobrokhotov, and Christo Grozev, ”Shooting Starlink: The ‘No Limits’ Partnership between Russia and China Is Taking Aim at Elon Musk,” The Insider, July 9, 2026, https://theins.press/en/inv/294635.

[73] Igor Denisov, “China Is Indispensable, But Not Dominant,” The Diplomat, June 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/china-is-indispensable-but-not-dominant/.

[74] Alexander Lukin and Vladimir Lukin, “Russia’s Foreign Policy After the Ukrainian Crisis,” Washington Quarterly, December 23, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2595888.

[75] Denisov, “China Is Indispensable, But Not Dominant”; “罗曼·伦金：中国正处于世界秩序的核心位置” [Roman Lunkin: China Occupies a Central Position in the World Order], Guancha, May 24, 2026,

 https://www.guancha.cn/RomanLunkin/2026_05_24_818190_2.shtml.

[76] “罗曼·伦金：中国正处于世界秩序的核心位置.”

[77] “Alexander Lukin: ‘The Beijing Summit Showed that China Still Needs Russian Fuel,’" Moscow Foresight, June 22, 2026, https://moscowforesight.ru/publications/alexander-lukin-quotthe-beijing-summit-showed-that-china-still-needs-russian-fuelquot.

[78] Wang Qi, “China, Russia Pioneer New Major-Country Relations Model, Expert Says on Landmark Treaty's 25th Anniversary,” Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202607/1366134.shtml.

[79] “二十五载条约筑基，中俄新型大国关系何以行稳致远?” [A Treaty Foundation Spanning 25 Years: How Can the New-Type Major-Country Relationship Between China and Russia Ensure Steady and Enduring Progress?],

July 16, 2026,

http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/2026-07/16/content_118602347.html.

[80] “孙壮志：欧亚外交将成为中国领导力新增长极” [Sun Zhuangzhi: Eurasian Diplomacy Will Become a New Growth Pole for China's Leadership], Aisixiang, July 19, 2026, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/179715.html.

[81] “推动中俄新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系站得更高、走得更稳、行得更远” [Propel the China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era to Reach Greater Heights, Advance More Steadily, and Go Further],

Xinhua, May 17, 2026, https://www.news.cn/world/20260517/a6eb96ffd7344098ba55f652d1ed2e05/c.html.

[82] Lavrov, “A Constant in an Era of Radical Change.”

[83] Rui Rui, “中国是唯一无视对俄制裁的国家，因为手里有这张牌” [China is the Only Country Disregarding Sanctions against Russia, Because It Holds this Card],

Guancha, May 21, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2026_05_21_817913_1.shtml.

[84] “Why China-Russia Ties Are ‘Better Than Alliance’ and Immune to US Containment Efforts.”

[85] Vassily B. Kashin, Veronika A. Smirnova, and Alexandrova D. Yankova, “The New Great Wall: The Logic of China’s Foreign Policy Behavior,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2 (2026): 79-95, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-kashin-smirnova-yankova/.

[86] Yu Jie, “China Sets Out Its Vision for a New Global Order – But Will It Commit the Resources to Match Its Ambition?” Chatham House, June 24, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/china-sets-out-its-vision-new-global-order-will-it-commit-resources-match-its-ambition.

[87] Yun Sun, “Trump 2.0: Is China Filling the Void?” China Leadership Monitor, Issue 88 (June 2026), https://www.prcleader.org/post/trump-2-0-is-china-filling-the-void.

[88] Natalia Chabarovskaya, “Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties Are Deeper than Washington Thinks,” CEPA, June 16, 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks/.

^[89] Christopher Walker, Tamás Matura, Mathieu Boulègue, and Evgeny Roshchin, “The China-Russia Meta Threat: The Architect of Authoritarian Power,” CEPA, June 4, 2026, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-china-russia-meta-threat-the-architecture-of-authoritarian-power/.

[90] Julia Joja, “Russia’s Wartime Support for Iran,” Middle East Institute, June 3, 2026, https://mei.edu/policymemo/russias-wartime-support-for-iran/; “China-Iran Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 16, 2026, https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-fact-sheet-short-primer-relationship.

Photo credit: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Vostok-2018_military_manoeuvres_%282018-09-13%29_51.jpg?utm_source=commons.wikimedia.org&utm_campaign=index&utm_content=original