(Mostly) Old Wine in a New Bottle: What is the CCP’s Overall Strategy for Solving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era?

Minxin Pei CLM Issue 87 March 2026.pdf

Download PDF • 374KB

Toward the end of 2021 China unveiled a new framing, “The party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan issue in the new era,” to summarize General Secretary Xi Jinping’s policy toward Taiwan since 2013. A close examination of statements by top Chinese leaders and senior officials responsible for the Taiwan portfolio shows that the “overall strategy,” for the most part, deviates little from the policy of Xi’s predecessors. However, the “new” components of the “overall strategy” merit serious attention because they indicate a fundamental shift in Beijing’s thinking about Washington’s role in cross-Strait relations. Convinced that the U.S. now has effectively gutted its one-China policy and become the most important source of external interference in the Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders have correspondingly raised their risk tolerance in reacting to perceived U.S. actions in support of Taiwan, as evidenced by more frequent and aggressive gray-zone tactics around Taiwan. Even though the “overall strategy” continues to emphasize the priority of domestic development over resolution of the Taiwan issue, a future crisis resulting from gray-zone coercion gone awry is nevertheless more likely than a pre-meditated naval blockade or a full invasion.

Toward the end of 2021 China unveiled a new framing, “The party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan issue in the new era,” to summarize General Secretary Xi Jinping’s policy toward Taiwan since 2013. A close examination of statements by top Chinese leaders and senior officials responsible for the Taiwan portfolio shows that the “overall strategy,” for the most part, deviates little from the policy of Xi’s predecessors. However, the “new” components of the “overall strategy” merit serious attention because they indicate a fundamental shift in Beijing’s thinking about Washington’s role in cross-Strait relations. Convinced that the U.S. now has effectively gutted its one-China policy and become the most important source of external interference in the Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders have correspondingly raised their risk tolerance in reacting to perceived U.S. actions in support of Taiwan, as evidenced by more frequent and aggressive gray-zone tactics around Taiwan. Even though the “overall strategy” continues to emphasize the priority of domestic development over resolution of the Taiwan issue, a future crisis resulting from gray-zone coercion gone awry is nevertheless more likely than a pre-meditated naval blockade or a full invasion.

Starting in late 2021, China began to use a new label—“The party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan question in the new era” (新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略) —for its Taiwan policy. This label (hereafter “overall strategy”) first appeared in a historic document, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s “Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” (中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议).[1] According to the resolution, the “overall strategy” consists of a series of “important concepts and major policies” (一系列重要理念、重大政策主张) advocated by Xi Jinping since his appointment as party chief in November 2012. In the last four years, senior Chinese officials, state media outlets, and government-affiliated scholars have spoken and written extensively on the “overall strategy.” The label initially also attracted some media attention in Taiwan.[2] In the U.S., the official unveiling of the “overall strategy” apparently has sparked new worries about China’s near-term intentions toward Taiwan and later appeared to give some credence to the widely reported remarks by then-CIA director William J. Burns that the U.S. had intelligence that Xi had ordered the Chinese military to be ready to conduct an invasion of Taiwan by 2027.[3]

Despite the growing concerns about the worsening security environment across the Taiwan Strait, China’s “overall strategy” has not received much in-depth analysis. For example, we know relatively little about the plausible motivating factors behind the introduction of this new label. Framing and discussion of the “overall strategy” in authoritative Chinese sources have yet to be scrutinized to ascertain whether the “overall strategy” differs from pre-existing policy in important respects. Similarly, the real objectives behind the “overall strategy” remain to be investigated.

This essay attempts to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge about the “overall strategy.” It first analyzes speeches and writings by senior Chinese leaders, officials in charge of Taiwan policy, and Taiwan specialists to gain a basic understanding of the broad contours of the “overall strategy,” the context in which it was unveiled, and the differences and similarities between the “overall strategy” and China’s prior Taiwan policy. The essay then focuses on two key elements of the “overall strategy”— escalation of lawfare and gray-zone tactics—to explore plausible objectives China hopes to accomplish with the “overall strategy” and implications for escalation risks in cross-Strait relations.

What is New? What is Not?

Officially defined as the culmination of Xi’s directives, speeches, and concepts on Taiwan since the party’s 18^th Congress in late 2012, the “overall strategy” cannot be found in any single official government document. This means that we can only divine the main components of the “overall strategy” by examining what senior Chinese officials and academics have said or have written about it since emergence of the phrase in late 2021.[4] The most comprehensive and authoritative statement on the “overall strategy” may be a long essay published by Liu Jieyi, then director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, in the party’s flagship ideological journal, Qiushi, in December 2022, roughly one year after first appearance of the term.[5] Stripped of its propagandistic fluff, Liu’s essay stresses several noteworthy points.

(1)   Taiwan policy must be under the centralized leadership of the party center (党中央). This underscores Xi’s central role and authority. In addition, China will firmly guide the direction and maintain the initiative in cross-Strait relations (牢牢把握两岸关系主导权和主动权).

(2)  The mainland’s development and progress is the foundation for resolution of the Taiwan issue (坚持在祖国大陆发展进步基础上解决台湾问题).

(3)  China will maintain the basic policy of “peaceful reunification and one-country two-systems” and the “one-China principle” and the “92 Consensus.”

(4)  China sees a close connection between Taiwanese independence and separatism and U.S.–China rivalry, thus necessitating a dual-track policy of “smashing the plot of ‘Taiwanese independence’” (粉碎“台独”分裂) and opposing external interference (外来干涉).

(5)  China will maintain its position of not renouncing the use of force and will keep open both options (reunification through peaceful and non-peaceful means).

To be sure, much of what Liu wrote in the essay merely reinstates pre-existing policy and positions. However, three points—two familiar and one new—deserve special attention. The first point in Liu’s article is the centrality of Xi’s leadership and authority. We can obviously interpret this point—which occupies the most prominent position in Liu’s essay—as the party’s formulaic expression of Xi’s political dominance. But a different interpretation is also reasonable. It is important to consider the timing of the unveiling of the “overall strategy” in the context of two unfavorable trends facing China in the early 2020s: the escalation of tensions with the U.S., which China saw as the primary external force seeking to frustrate its reunification project (more on this later), and the continuing entrenchment of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the island’s dominant political force, as evidenced by President Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election in January 2020. The renewed emphasis on the party center’s sole authority in the making of the Taiwan policy likely conveyed the message that Xi’s leadership should not be questioned. Even more importantly, the same message can also be read as reassurance to both the party and the Chinese public that the top leadership has effective policies to respond to these adverse developments. Thus, it is not surprising that Liu characterized “the firm grasp of the ability to guide and maintain the initiative in cross-Strait relations” (牢牢掌握两岸关系主导权主动权) as the most salient feature of the party’s Taiwan policy under Xi, implying that Beijing is firmly in control despite recent unfavorable trends. The second point made by Liu, another familiar point, underscores the party’s policy of prioritizing domestic economic development over solution of the Taiwan problem. This implies that the party will not put the cart (Taiwan) before the horse (China’s future as a superpower) and that the odds of success in accomplishing the reunification project will increase along with the rise of Chinese power. Taken together, according to Liu, the “overall strategy” does not deviate from the party’s pre-existing policy of subordinating the Taiwan issue to domestic development.

The fourth point in the list above contains a new phrase, “resolute opposition to interference by external forces” (坚决反对外部势力干涉), an obvious reference to the U.S. Placed immediately after “smashing the plot of ‘Taiwanese independence,’” this phrase signals that a critical component of the “overall strategy” is to address a new and difficult challenge—growing U.S. support for Taiwan. In his elaboration of the newly framed policy, Liu not only accuses the DPP of “willingly acting as a pawn of external forces seeking to contain China” but he also publicly points to the U.S. for “wantonly playing the ‘Taiwan card,’ hollowing out the one-China principle, raising the level of American-Taiwanese interactions, expanding arms sales to Taiwan, and plotting to obstruct progress in China’s reunification and national rejuvenation.”[6] Liu’s denunciation of the U.S. shift on its “one-China policy” (which he deliberately mischaracterizes as the “one-China principle”) is actually a brief summary of the section on the U.S. contained in China’s third White Paper on Taiwan published in August 2022.[7]

This particular White Paper on Taiwan reflects a new perspective widely shared among Chinese leaders that the context and nature of the Taiwan problem have changed qualitatively because the nature of the Sino-American relationship has changed. Prior to the onset of U.S.–China “strategic competition” (which can be dated to the unveiling of the U.S. National Security Strategy in December 2017), China saw Taiwan’s resistance as the most important obstacle to its aspirations for national reunification. After the Sino-American relationship turned fundamentally adversarial in 2020, Chinese leaders apparently concluded that the U.S. had changed its one-China policy. Instead of a biased but tolerable stance (from Beijing’s perspective) on Taiwan, America’s new Taiwan policy has flipped. As underscored by Liu’s statement above, Beijing is now convinced that the U.S. seeks to use Taiwan as an asset to contain China, and it has gutted its “one-China policy” in all but name.[8]

The U.S. Factor

Formal policy statements on Taiwan by the Chinese government merit careful examination because they seek to convey both to external and domestic audiences the top leadership’s assessment, intentions, and course of action. Any significant modification of such statements, when repeated as a formula by senior officials, signals a major shift in policy. The inclusion of “opposing interference by external forces” in the official Taiwan policy is a case in point. A careful examination of Chinese leaders’ statements and authoritative official documents on Taiwan shows that the phrase “opposing interference of external forces”—an obvious reference to the U.S.—did not appear until early 2021. Even in the “Anti-Secession Law” (2003), the text reads “resolution of the Taiwan question and realization of the reunification of the motherland is China’s internal affairs and not subject to interference by foreign forces” (解决台湾问题，实现祖国统一，是中国的内部事务，不受任何外国势力的干涉).[9] The semantic difference between “opposing” and “not subject to” is by no means minor as “opposing” implies an action-oriented posture.

To be sure, China’s perception that the U.S., as the primary external obstacle to its national reunification, is not new. Prior to the formal inclusion of “interference of external forces” in its policy statement on Taiwan, senior officials routinely referred to U.S. support for Taiwan, in particular its weapons sales and pro-Taiwan Congressional legislation, as evidence of America playing the “Taiwan card” in its intensifying strategic rivalry with China.[10] However, prior to 2021, top Chinese leaders had refrained from public statements explicitly linking China’s opposition to “Taiwan independence” in the same sentence containing opposition to interference by “external forces.”[11] When the U.S. was mentioned in the most authoritative documents on Taiwan, as in the case of the two official White Papers on Taiwan released in 1993 and 2000, it was framed as a historical factor that obstructed China’s reunification.[12] In other words, as far as Beijing’s Taiwan agenda was concerned prior to appearance of the “overall strategy” in late 2021, opposition to current U.S. interference in the Taiwan issue was accorded lesser importance than opposition to “Taiwan independence.”

The first time when “splittist activities and interference by external forces” were lumped next to each other in the same sentence in a public statement by a top Chinese leader was January 2021. At the two-day annual Taiwan Work Conference in mid-January of that year, Wang Yang, Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member responsible for the Taiwan portfolio, listed “resolutely containing splittist activities of ‘Taiwan independence’ and interference by external forces” (坚决遏制“台独”分裂活动和外部势力干涉)as a key pillar of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. This was a significant departure from Wang’s speech to the same conference in January 2020, when his statement to the conference referred to “resolutely opposing and containing all forms of splittist activities of ‘Taiwan independence.’”[13] In every Taiwan Work Conference since 2021, Wang Yang and his successor, Wang Huning, have repeated the same formulation in their keynote statements to the conference participants.[14]

It is reasonable to assume that the new formulation adopted by Wang Yang in his speech to the Taiwan Work Conference in January 2021 had been approved by the top Chinese leadership, and it indicated that the policy shift implied by the new language had occurred toward the end of 2020. Although this new formulation was not repeated by other top leaders until it was included in the party’s resolution on history in November 2021, it would become a key component of the “overall strategy” after November 2021.

This can be seen in the Premier’s annual work report to the National People’s Congress (NPC), which invariably includes a policy statement on Taiwan. In Premier Li Keqiang’s report to the NPC in March 2021, the section on Taiwan did not contain any reference to “interference by external forces.” But in Li’s work report to the NPC in March 2022, the statement on Taiwan adopts the new expanded formula and reads “(we) firmly oppose the separate conduct of “Taiwanese independence” and firmly oppose interference of external forces” (坚决反对“台独”分裂行径，坚决反对外部势力干涉).[15] In his report to the NPC in March 2023, Li repeated the same phrase, albeit in a slightly different version, in his summary of the government’s achievements in 2022, but he dropped the reference to “external forces” when listing the tasks for 2023.[16] However, the policy formulation of “resolutely opposing ‘Taiwanese independence’ and interference by external forces” reappeared in the to-do list in Premier Li Qiang’s work reports to the NPC in 2024 and 2025.[17]

A search of references to “interference by external forces” in Xi’s many speeches on Taiwan shows that, prior to the official labeling of the “overall strategy” in November 2021, Xi used “(We) will not tolerate any external interference (不容任何外来干涉) in two important speeches.[18] The first time Xi invoked the new formulation of “resolute opposition to ‘Taiwan independence,’ separatism, and interference by external forces,” according to the collection of his speeches on Taiwan compiled by the Taiwan Affairs Office, was during a call with President Joseph Biden in July 2022. Although they had previously spoken with each other on several occasions, Xi had not used the phrase in their previous calls.[19]

The inclusion of “opposing interference by external forces” in the “overall strategy” should not be treated merely as a semantic shift. As detailed above, the consistent and regular reference to this formulation in the statements by top Chinese leaders, authoritative government documents on Taiwan, and writings and press interviews with senior academics specializing on Taiwan provides unambiguous evidence that countering external interference, primarily U.S. support for Taiwan in the context of an intensifying Sino-American strategic rivalry, has become an equally important Chinese priority. For the domestic audience, the new formulation likely aims to send multiple messages. One is a warning that American interference has now greatly complicated China’s task of achieving its national reunification agenda. At the same time, the party seems eager to reassure its rank and file as well as the Chinese public that it is prepared to confront this new challenge. When read along with the first two points in the “overall strategy,” the new emphasis on “opposing external interference” seems to reinforce the main message of the “overall strategy”—in spite of the adverse developments in recent years regarding the Taiwan issue, the party has the situation under control and, more importantly, Xi’s leadership must not be second-guessed.

To the external audience, primarily the U.S., the new formulation is most likely a warning. Firmly convinced that the Trump and Biden administrations have effectively gutted the “one-China policy,” Chinese leaders hope to draw the proverbial line in the sand even at the risk of further escalation of China–U.S. tensions. Evidence for this interpretation can be found in the use of certain key words and phrases by top Chinese leaders when they refer to “external interference.” When Wang Yang, the PSC member responsible for Taiwan, gave his keynote speech at the Taiwan Work Conference in January 2022, notably the phrase “exercising the spirit of struggle” (要发扬斗争精神) was placed immediately ahead of “resolutely opposing provocations of “Taiwan independence” and interference by external forces,” indicating a higher level of resolve and risk tolerance. (In his previous speeches, this phrase was used as a stand-alone rhetorical device.)[20]

In his authoritative article published in the party’s flagship ideological journal in December 2022, Liu Jieyi, then-director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, was even more explicit. In elaborating nearly identical language used by Wang in January 2022, Liu characterized the new framing as “drawing the bottom line and the red line and demonstrating the resolve and confidence in daring to struggle and daring to win”[21] (划出底线红线，展现敢于斗争、敢于胜利的决心信心). In this context, we may gain a better understanding of why China reacted to former Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 with an unprecedented large-scale and risky military exercise that amounted to a simulated blockade of Taiwan—and carried out similar exercises almost immediately after a major act of U.S. support for Taiwan, such as President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with then House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in the U.S. in April 2023, then Vice President Lai Ching-te’s “transit visit” to the U.S. in August 2023, and the announcement of a $11 billion arms package for Taiwan in December 2025.[22]

Confirmation that Beijing is willing to take greater risks in confronting U.S. diplomatic and military actions in support of Taiwan can be found, for example, in Premier Li Keqiang’s Work Report to the NPC annual session in March 2023, barely six months after the large military exercise following the Pelosi visit to Taiwan. In summarizing the government’s achievements in “implementing the party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan question in the new era” in 2022, Li emphasized that “[the government] has carried out a major struggle against secession and interference” (坚决开展反分裂、反干涉重大斗争) in an obvious reference to the military drills and other measures taken against Taiwan and American meddling. In ranking the top ten “domestic” events in 2022, the official Xinhua News Agency put the August military exercise in third spot, even ahead of the 20^th Party Congress in late October (at which Xi received a unprecedented third term), in another indication of the political importance the Chinese leadership attached to high-profile and more confrontational tactics in dealing with perceived growing U.S. support for Taiwan.[23]

Lawfare

China’s resort to lawfare—the use of legal means such as promulgation of new laws, expansive or dubious interpretation of international law and legal precedents, and aggressive assertion of legal rights in the pursuit of strategic objectives—is not new. In the case of the Taiwan issue, passage of the “Anti-Secession Law” by the NPC in March 2005 represented a milestone as the law explicitly targets Taiwan and its deliberately short and vague provisions grant Beijing broad discretion in applying it.[24] Although lawfare was part of China’s toolkit in the execution of its Taiwan agenda prior to the advent of the “overall strategy,” lawfare has assumed increasing salience since 2021. There is no precise definition of the term “lawfare” in existing research on its application to cross-Strait relations even though analysts share similar views on the objectives China seeks to achieve with lawfare.[25] In this section, we adopt a narrow definition of lawfare in analyzing China’s use of legal means in the implementation of its “overall strategy” during the last four years.

A quick review of statements by senior Chinese officials and academics concerning the use of legal means in the furtherance of the party’s Taiwan policy indicates a greater emphasis on deploying this novel instrument during the last four years. The most widely accepted interpretation of China’s use of lawfare against Taiwan is that this reflects a more aggressive stance designed to further bolster China’s claims and squeeze Taiwan’s diplomatic space and to undermine its sovereignty and legitimacy.[26] Although this perspective is reasonable, we should not exclude the possibility that this tactic also likely reflects Beijing’s frustrations and lack of leverage in pressuring Taiwan.

Intellectually, China’s resort to lawfare reflects its growing awareness of the utility of international law as an instrument to gain diplomatic, moral, or rhetorical advantages over its adversaries. Xi Jinping directly endorsed lawfare in dealing with adversaries. “In carrying out struggle against external adversaries,” he said in a speech at a conference in August 2018, “we must raise legal weapons, occupy legal commanding heights, and dare to say no to saboteurs and disruptors” (在对外斗争中，我们要拿起法律武器，占领法治制高点，敢于向破坏者、搅局者说不). In November 2020, Xi spoke again on the importance of lawfare and called for the comprehensive use of “legislation, enforcement, and adjudication to wage struggle and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, dignity, and core interests” (综合利用立法、执法、司法等手段开展斗争，坚决维护国家主权、尊严和核心利益).[27] Since Xi became party chief in November 2012, the NPC has passed 18 new pieces of legislation and amended 39 laws related to foreign affairs and parties. Notably, the most potent laws on foreign relations, such as the “Law on Foreign Relations” (对外关系法, 2023), the “Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law” (反外国制裁法, 2021), and the “Export Control Law,” (出口管制法, 2020), were promulgated in the last five years.[28]

In the case of Taiwan, China’s intensification of lawfare since 2021 appears to follow two parallel tracks. The first track centers on invoking, reinterpreting, and even misrepresenting international agreements, such as the Potsdam Declaration and UN Resolution 2758, which expelled Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives and seated the representatives of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of China at the UN. Beijing’s renewed efforts to use UN Resolution 2758 to reinforce its claims over Taiwan apparently started in early 2024.[29] China’s claim that the UN resolution recognizes Beijing’s “one-China principle” was immediately rejected by scholars as misrepresentation.[30] Nevertheless, the Chinese government continued to press its case despite such criticism. At a high-profile press conference during the annual “two sessions” in March 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi not only insisted that the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration affirmed China’s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan but also argued that UN Resolution 2758 “completely eliminated any possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan.’”[31] In September 2025, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a formal document claiming again that UN Resolution 2758 “solemnly affirmed and fully reflected the one-China principle” (联大第2758号决议郑重确认、充分体现了一个中国原则).[32]

The second track directly targets Taiwan. In June 2024, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice issued a joint notice on prosecuting and punishing diehard “Taiwan independence” elements. The legal basis used to justify such prosecution is the “Anti-Secession Law,” “The Criminal Law,” and “The Chinese Criminal Procedure Law,” and it sets harsh penalties, including capital punishment, for the most egregious offenders.[33] In the 15 months following issuance of this notice, the Taiwan Affairs Office (which notably is not part of China’s judicial or law enforcement apparatus) designated 14 individuals in Taiwan, including prominent incumbent government officials, as “diehard Taiwan independence elements” and 12 other individuals as “accomplices.”[34] Besides this legal tactic, recent actions by China suggest that it is actively claiming legal jurisdiction over Taiwan. One such measure is the regular patrol in the waters near Kinmen that began by China’s coast guard in January 2025.[35]

Escalation of Gray-Zone Coercion

China’s intensifying gray-zone coercion against Taiwan in recent years, ranging from unprecedented large-scale military exercises simulating blockades and frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), has been widely reported and noted. The potential risks for escalation are both real and growing as each side’s redlines are unknown and the tactics become more aggressive.[36] However, no analysts so far have connected the rising frequency and aggressiveness of China’s gray-zone coercion in the Taiwan Strait to the “overall strategy” even though even a casual look at the reported incidents shows that the dramatic increase of gray-zone activities occurred after 2021, coinciding with formal designation of Xi’s Taiwan policy as the “overall strategy.”

The number of incursions by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ shows a qualitative change after 2021. In 2021, incursions by 972 aircraft were recorded. But in 2022, incursions by 1,597 aircraft were recorded. In 2023, incursions of 1,669 aircraft were recorded. In 2024, the first year of newly elected President Lai Ching-te’s term, the number of aircraft entering the ADIZ rose to 3,615. In the same period, the number of Chinese warships and coast guard ships operating in the waters close to Taiwan also rose dramatically. Prior to the military exercise China staged in response to former Speaker Pelosi’s visit in August 2022, there appeared to be no such incursions by Chinese military ships. In the four months following conclusion of the exercise, incursions by Chinese military ships averaged 117 per month. In 2023 and 2024, such incursions averaged 144 and 224 per month, respectively.[37]

In addition to dispatching military assets into the airspace and waters around Taiwan, China has also resorted to tactics previously deemed as too provocative or risky, such as suspected sabotage of Taiwan’s undersea fiber optic cables in 2023 and 2025.[38] In January 2026, a Chinese military reconnaissance drone briefly entered the airspace of Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island in the South China Sea, creating another precedent.[39]

Taken together, the seven large-scale military exercises China has staged around Taiwan since the Pelosi visit in August 2022 and the dramatic increase in incursions into airspace and waters close to Taiwan by military aircraft and ships on a routine basis have created a new and more crisis-prone security environment across the Taiwan Strait. The most widely accepted analysis tends to attribute these exercises to the Chinese response to perceived U.S. actions in support of Taiwan.[40] Although this interpretation is technically true, it misses the crucial linkage between the new formulation of “resolutely opposing external forces” in the “overall strategy” to China’s increasing risk tolerance in adopting more aggressive gray-zone tactics since 2022.

If we see the trends of gray-zone coercion since 2022 in the context of the “overall strategy,” it is reasonable to reach a slightly different but perhaps more important conclusion. As part of the “overall strategy,” which received its formal labeling in late 2021, Chinese leaders most likely authorized the PLA to develop more aggressive gray-zone tactics for future scenarios, in particular those involving a response to U.S. actions seen as crossing certain thresholds and bolstering Taiwan’s confidence, international status, and security. Since large-scale air and naval exercises are logistically and operationally complex, they require advanced planning and preparation. Rules of engagement and contingency plans to deal with potential escalation must be developed and communicated to the units involved in the exercises as well. In this light, it is unlikely that Chinese leaders decided to order the then-largest and most provocative military exercise around Taiwan just to show their displeasure about the Pelosi visit in August 2022 as a one-off gesture. Put another way, intensifying Chinese military actions in the gray zone since 2022 suggest that they are now an integral and critical component of the “overall strategy” and will be an expected consequence of major U.S. acts of support for Taiwan.

To be sure, China has previously responded strongly to perceived or suspected U.S. abandonment of its one-China policy, such as during the 1995-1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. But Chinese conduct since 2022, and for that matter in the future, should be considered qualitatively different. For one, Chinese leaders had not reached a firm conclusion that the U.S. had “hollowed out” its “one-China” policy before the free-fall of U.S.-China relations in 2020. For another, until recently China lacked the requisite military capabilities to make its resolve credible and to expand its menu of options of gray-zone coercion. The combination of Chinese leaders’ assessment of America’s new Taiwan policy (which they see as shifting to the use of Taiwan as a strategic asset against China) and the immense improvement in Chinese military capabilities implies that more frequent and more risky gray-zone tactics will be adopted in response to future actions by both the Taiwanese and American governments as prescribed by the new formula of “resolutely opposing Taiwanese independence and interference by external forces,” as stipulated in the “overall strategy.”

An obvious, albeit unstated, objective of escalating gray-zone coercion is to create a far more unstable and dangerous status quo. In the past when engagement dominated U.S.–China relations, Chinese leaders placed more value on stability in the Taiwan Strait because instability and confrontation could endanger their ties with Washington. But as Sino-American relations have turned adversarial and a stable status quo would benefit Taipei more than Beijing, the strategic calculus of Chinese leaders may likely have changed. First, they may feel that they no longer have much to lose in terms of ties with the U.S., particularly in periods when Sino-American tensions run high. (However, when Sino-American relations are largely stable, as seems to be the case since the summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in South Korea in October 2025, China has more to gain by exercising restraint and caution.) Second, the relative costs of an unstable status quo are significantly greater for Taiwan than they are for China. In other words, creating an unstable even dangerous status quo will likely impose substantial and mounting costs on Taiwan and change the calculus of its leaders, or so Chinese leaders apparently hope.

Conclusion

Xi’s “overall strategy” contains mixed messages. On the one hand, it does not constitute a fundamental deviation from his predecessors’ policy. Although China will not abandon its long-standing objective of national reunification on the basis of the “one-China” principle and “one-country, two systems,” the “overall strategy” will continue to prioritize domestic economic development over resolution of the Taiwan issue because Chinese leaders assume that expected gains in Chinese power will strengthen their hands. On the other hand, by adding “resolute opposition to inference by external forces” to the mission of opposing Taiwan independence, the “overall strategy” likely has significantly elevated the risks of Chinese overreaction to actions or rhetoric of the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Most worryingly, Beijing’s conviction that Washington has flipped its perspective on Taiwan by viewing it as a strategic tool in its open-ended rivalry with China instead of a vital element in maintaining the strategic balance of power in East Asia has led to a new policy of responding to perceived major U.S. actions in support of Taiwan with more aggressive gray-zone tactics designed both to impose costs on Taiwan and to warn the U.S. of the potential consequences of its actions. This element of the “overall strategy” has the potential of producing a dangerous spiral of tensions culminating in a confrontation reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ironically, as both China and the U.S. engage in a cycle of deterrence and counter-deterrence, an individual act initially seen by one of the three parties involved (China, Taiwan, and the U.S.) as both necessary and unlikely to escalate to a dangerous crisis may produce precisely the dreaded outcome. This risk is almost certain to outweigh that of a full-blown invasion or a blockade deliberately initiated by China before the end of 2027—and likely many years beyond.

About the Contributor

Minxin Pei, editor of China Leadership Monitor, is Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. His most recent book is The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism (2025).

Notes

[1] “中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议,” https://www.12371.cn/2021/11/16/ARTI1637053281483114.shtml .

[2] “台舆论关注“新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略”新提法,” https://www.rmzxw.com.cn/c/2022-03-27/3081575.shtml?n2m=1.

[3] “CIA chief warns against underestimating Xi's ambitions toward Taiwan,” https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/.

[4] Writings by and press interviews with senior academics specializing on Taiwan-related issues sometimes reveal useful information as such academics often attend close-door meetings where senior government officials provide more frank speeches or assessments on Taiwan.

[5] 刘结一, “坚持贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略,”《求是》,  no. 23, 2022, 

https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2022-12/01/c_1129172940.htm.

[6] 刘结一, “坚持贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略.”

[7] 国务院台湾事务办公室, “台湾问题与新时代中国统一事业,”

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202208/t20220810_10738763.html.

[8] A senior Chinese scholar who teaches at Xiamen University, gave an extended interview in December 2021 shortly after the official unveiling of the “overall strategy.” His analysis of U.S. policy on Taiwan even more explicitly echoed the perspective of the new Chinese leadership.  Since China’s top Taiwan scholars frequently participate in meetings with senior government officials, their writings almost certainly reflect official positions. 中评社, “郑剑谈台海局势现状,” https://gifts.xmu.edu.cn/info/3401/7442.htm.

[9] “反分裂国家法,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/stflgf/202206/t20220606_10699015.html .

[10] “孙亚夫在第28届海峡两岸关系学术研讨会上的致辞,” July 30, 2019, http://www.taiwan.cn/plzhx/zhjzhl/zhjlw/201907/t20190731_12188577.htm.

[11] Liu Jieyi, then director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, was the first senior official (but not a top leader) to use the phrase “坚决反对‘台独’分裂, 坚决反对外来干涉” when he spoke at a meeting commemorating the 15^th anniversary of promulgation of the “Anti-Secession Law” in May 2020.  Li Zhanshu, then a PSC member and chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, also spoke at the meeting, but he did not use the same formula, indicating that the new formulation had not become a standard expression of the party’s Taiwan policy at that time.  “刘结一：坚决遏制 ‘台独’分裂图谋 奋力推进新时代对台工作, https://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/news/202005/t20200529_12278483.htm; “反分裂国家法实施十五周年座谈会举行,” 栗战书出席并发表讲话,” https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2020-05/30/content_1989420.htm.

[12] “台湾问题与中国的统一,” (August 1993), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202206/t20220606_10699029.html; “一个中国的原则与台湾问题,” (February 2000), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202206/t20220606_10699030.html.

[13] “2020年对台工作会议在京召开 汪洋出席并讲话,” https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-01/19/c_1125482539.htm; “2021年对台工作会议在京召开 汪洋出席并讲话,”https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-01/18/c_1126996021.htm.

[14] “2022年对台工作会议在京召开 汪洋出席并讲话,” http://www.jsstb.gov.cn/toutiao/202201/t20220126_12403451.htm.

“2023年对台工作会议在京召开 王沪宁出席并讲话,” https://www.news.cn/politics/2023-05/10/c_1129603838.htm.

[15] The relevant section is “ (We) will maintain heightened vigilance against and resolutely contain splittist activities of ‘Taiwanese independence’” (高度警惕和坚决遏制’台独’分裂活动). 李克强, “政府工作报告,” https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-03/12/c_1127205339.htm; 李克强, “政府工作报告,” https://www.12371.cn/2022/03/12/ARTI1647089103970497.shtml.

[16] Li’s exact words were, “贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略，坚决开展反分裂、反干涉重大斗争,” 李克强, “政府工作报告,” http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0315/c1001-32644352.html..

[17] 李强, “政府工作报告,” https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwgkztzl/2024nzt202400102/2024qglh20240219/dlhbg20240219/zfgzbg20240226/202403/t20240312_496087.html; http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2025/n1/2025/0312/c460142-40437673.html

[18] “《告台湾同胞书》发表40周年纪念会在京隆重举行, 习近平出席纪念会并发表重要讲话,” https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-01/02/c_1123937723.htm; “习近平在纪念辛亥革命110周年大会上的讲话,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/xjpzsjstzyjh/202206/t20220606_10698879.html

[19] “习近平总书记对台工作重要论述,” https://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinping1/index.htm.

[20] The original quote is ”又要树牢底线思维，做好应对各种风险挑战的思想准备和工作准备。要发扬斗争精神，坚决遏制’台独”挑衅和外部势力干涉,’2022年对台工作会议在京召开 汪洋出席并讲话,” https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2022-01/25/c_1128299769.htm. 

[21] 刘结一, “坚持贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略.”

[22] Amrita Jash, “China’s Military Exercises Around Taiwan: Trends and Patterns,” https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/chinas-military-exercises-around-taiwan-trends-and-patterns/.  

[23] 李克强, “政府工作报告,” http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0315/c1001-32644352.html; “新华社评出2022年国内十大新闻,” 第三, 坚决粉碎“台独”分裂和外部势力干涉图谋,” https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2022-12/29/c_1129242601.htm

[24] “反分裂国家法,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/stflgf/202206/t20220606_10699015.html..

[25] Michael J. West and Aurelio Insisa, "Reunifying Taiwan with China through cross-Strait lawfare." The China Quarterly, no. 257 (2024): 186–201; Monica Glenzer, "Taiwan: Legal Status, Legitimacy, and Lawfare," Washington International Law Journal, 34 (2024): 151–182.

[26] IISS, “Lawfare: China’s Legal Initiatives Against Taiwan,” https://www.iiss.org/charting-china/2025/01/charting-china-chinas-legal-initiatives-against-taiwan/.

[27] “向破坏者、搅局者说不” https://www.qstheory.cn/laigao/ycjx/2020-12/21/c_1126887940.htm.

[28] 全国人大常委会法制工作委员会, “加强涉外立法 为涉外工作提供坚实法治保障,” https://www.qstheory.cn/20250314/cbbcde5c116a4ee99b4662df44c8459d/c.html.

[29] Nathan Attrill, “UN Resolution 2758 was never about Taiwan. Beijing just pretends it was,” https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/un-resolution-2758-was-never-about-taiwan-beijing-just-pretends-it-was/.

[30] Jacques deLisle and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Why UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 Does Not Establish Beijing’s ‘One China’ Principle: A Legal Perspective,” GMF Report (April 2024), https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/GMF_UNGA%20Res.%202758_April%202024%20Report.pdf.

[31] “王毅回答中外记者提问,” https://www.news.cn/politics/20250307/e2e99fc317cd4cf8aed29c2d56a1bfa6/c.html.

[32] “中方关于联大第2758号决议的立场文件,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202509/t20250930_11721834.shtml.

[33] “最高人民法院　最高人民检察院　公安部, 国家安全部　司法部印发《关于依法惩治“台独” 顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见》的通知,” https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrtzwj/202406/t20240621_500840.html.

[34] “国台办新闻发布厅举行例行新闻发布会,” https://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/speech/202601/t20260107_12745028.htm.

[35] 福建海警位金门附近海域依法开展常态化执法巡查, https://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bmst/202501/t20250122_12679906.htm.

[36] Raymond Kuo et. al., “Simulating Chinese Gray Zone Coercion of Taiwan: Identifying Redlines and Escalation Pathways,” RAND (June 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CFA2065-1.html.

[37] Akhil Kadidal, “Special Report: China sets new records in air-sea operations around Taiwan,” https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/china-sets-new-records-in-air-sea-operations-around-taiwan#:~:text=Key%20points,the%20ADIZ%2C%20the%20data%20show.

[38] “Taiwan suspects Chinese ships cut islands’ internet cables,” https://apnews.com/article/matsu-taiwan-internet-cables-cut-china-65f10f5f73a346fa788436366d7a7c70; “Taiwan detains Chinese-crewed ship suspected of cutting undersea cable,” https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/25/asia/taiwan-detains-ship-undersea-cable-intl-hnk.

[39] “Taiwan says Chinese drone made 'provocative' flight over South China Sea island,” https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-chinese-drone-made-provocative-flight-over-south-china-sea-island-2026-01-17/.

[40] Jash, “China’s Military Exercises Around Taiwan: Trends and Patterns.”

Photo credit: BlueHypercane761, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons