China’s National Security: The People’s Liberation Army’s Shrinking Role in Protecting the Nation’s Core Interests

Timothy R. Heath CLM Issue 86 December 2025.pdf

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China’s elevation of “national security” to a priority has redefined the military’s role in protecting the country. With the National Security Commission assuming responsibility for managing external dangers, the role of the People’s Liberation Army has shifted to one of support. The military remains responsible for ensuring combat readiness and nuclear deterrence, but its contribution to national security consists primarily of non-war actions to augment civilian-led efforts. Despite U.S. fears about a possible conflict, Chinese authorities regard Taiwan primarily as a political, not a military, problem, and they have shown little interest in risking a war.

Paradoxically, China’s military buildup has grown robust at the same time that its role in protecting the country appears to be shrinking. To be sure, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems stronger than ever. China’s defense budget is now the second largest in the world, and the military fields an impressive arsenal of advanced warships, stealth fighters, and missiles.[1] The PLA’s extensive modernization has spurred fears that China may be ready to risk military conflict against its neighbors. Fears that China may be preparing to attack Taiwan have also spurred the United States and its allies to step up defensive preparations.[2] U.S. officials have warned that war could break out as soon as 2027, or even earlier.[3]

Yet these concerns have grown just as the Chinese authorities under President Xi Jinping have downgraded the role of the military in countering external threats. Prior to Xi’s establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC) in 2013, the military was mainly responsible for protecting the country. When China faced the peril of large-scale attack by the Soviet Union and/or the United States during the Cold War, for example, the leadership looked to the military to keep the country safe. Lin Biao, reflecting the central leadership’s views at the time, stated at the 9th Party Congress in 1969: “We must make full preparations against their [i.e., the U.S. and the Soviet Union] launching a big war at an early date.”[4] Authorities backed up such statements with action. In the 1960s, China’s military occasionally fought the Soviet and U.S. militaries either directly, as in the 1968 border clash with the Soviets, or indirectly, as in the U.S. war in Vietnam. Industries moved deep within the country to the so-called “third front” in anticipation of a large-scale war, and the party frequently mobilized the populace against enemies, both foreign and domestic.[5]

By the mid-1980s, however, Chinese leaders judged that the country no longer faced the danger of a major war.[6] However, the military remained responsible for handling external threats. Chinese leaders directed the military to prepare for the possibility of limited, localized clashes along the country’s periphery. Such clashes did not pose an existential threat such that existed during the Cold War, but they did carry the risk of escalation if they were mishandled. The military also remained responsible for deterring the remote possibility of a nuclear attack. The military thus began modernizing its outdated, poorly equipped forces, and it expanded its nuclear inventory.[7] 

Although the military was in charge of protecting the country in the 1980s and 1990s, the lack of a clear enemy greatly devalued the importance of war preparations. The PLA, like other ministries, followed the central leadership’s lead in seeking wealth through rapid economic growth. The PLA operated enterprises, smuggled goods, built infrastructure, and participated in myriad other lucrative schemes, often to the detriment of its combat readiness and morale. These business activities also fueled a ballooning corruption problem.[8] Yet the PLA could afford the degradation in its fighting prowess because, given the generally benign security environment. its services as a fighting force against foreign enemies were not really needed.

However, demand for an operationally proficient military increased in the early 2000s. As the rapidly growing country integrated into the global economy, vulnerabilities emerged. New threats arose that had virtually nothing in common with the perils of the Cold War and for which the military had no experience. Hailed as “non-traditional threats” by Chinese officials and analysts, such hazards endangered the markets and resources upon which the country’s economic growth – and CCP legitimacy – depended.[9] The introduction of digital communications also opened the country to new forms of foreign influence and subversion.[10] In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao charged the PLA with protecting China’s “development-related” interests abroad.[11] Top leaders directed the military to carry out “diversified tasks” to address such threats, even as the military continued to modernize its forces to fight potential localized, limited conflicts and to deter nuclear attacks.[12] 

Despite the military’s expanded mission portfolio, it quickly became apparent that the PLA was poorly suited to counter many of these non-traditional threats. How could the military protect China’s financial interests? Or protect supply chains? How could the military protect Chinese maritime claims without provoking a war with its neighboring countries? Given the lack of foreign bases and its strict foreign-policy rules against unilateral military intervention, the PLA could not offer much protection to citizens and assets located in other countries. To protect workers and facilities, Chinese state-owned enterprises instead heavily relied on security contractors and diplomatic help from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the military playing a limited role at best.[13] Moreover, despite the unsettled security environment, the military’s combat capabilities did not have an obvious use. As one of the richest and most powerful countries in the world, China no longer feared an attack by another country. Disputes over desolate features in the first island chain or on the arid mountaintops near India hardly seemed worth fighting for. Feuding between China and the United States and its allies intensified beginning in the early 2000s. But the two countries did not regard each other as the existential threats that they did during the Cold War. Instead, they argued over trade, technology, espionage, diplomacy, Taiwan, and other issues. Chinese leaders rejected war as a way to resolve such disputes. Instead, they advocated a “new type” of international relations to peacefully manage differences, and they emphasized crisis management and war prevention.[14] 

Recognizing the limited utility of military power in such a situation, Chinese leaders under Xi rebranded the principal threats to CCP rule in terms of “national security.” Based on such an understanding, the main dangers had little to do with conventional war and more to do with the many dangers that imperiled the country’s development. Accordingly, authorities assigned responsibility for protecting the country’s interests to a new civilian-led bureaucracy, the NSC. As Xi explained at a Politburo meeting marking the tenth anniversary of the commission, China required a “new security architecture” to “better safeguard China’s new development pattern.”[15] In addition to establishment of the NSC in 2013 and passage of the National Security Law in 2015, relevant security measures are now also included in Chinese plans. The 13th Five-Year Program introduced national security requirements as part of China’s development plan, an innovation that carried over into the 14th Five-Year Program.[16] The government modified offices, authorities, and organizations to streamline and improve policy coordination across civilian and military bureaucracies.[17] It also implemented policies to bolster security in the political, economic, information, and other domains.[18] By 2025, China’s first National Security White Paper declared security to be the “most important thing for a country.”[19]

The Military’s Role in National Security

National security has replaced national defense as the prism through which China’s leaders now view external threats. As defined by Chinese officials, national security involves the state’s ability to govern all of its national interests, including economic and social development. The National Security Law defines national security as the “relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state's power to govern, its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security.”[20] This concept prioritizes politics and economics. As the National Security White Paper states, the central leadership takes “political security as its foundation,” and “economic security as the basis.” Security “serves and promotes high-quality development.”[21] The White Paper also describes security in expansive terms, encompassing “military science and technology,” “culture and social security,” “international security,” “development and security,” “external security” and “internal security,” “traditional security” and “non-traditional security,” and “self-security” and “common security.” Involving mainly non-military threats, civilian ministries with relevant expertise are responsible for national security. By contrast, national defense involves threats to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and foreign aggression.[22] Relevant dangers include armed insurrection, attacks by rival enemies, and invasion by a rival country. Involving mainly dangers of armed conflict, the military forces are responsible for national defense. From these descriptions, it is clear why Chinese leaders believe the country today faces a far greater threat in terms of national security than it does in terms of national defense. One sign that the leadership views the nation’s threats primarily through the lens of national security rather than national defense is that it last published the White Paper on China’s National Defense in the New Era in 2019, whereas in 2025 China published its first National Security White Paper.

In bureaucratic terms, the NSC has expanded its authority into areas previously managed by the military and the foreign ministry. Formerly, the Central Military Commission (CMC) oversaw policy and actions to respond to external security threats. Its main responsibilities were to repel aggression, deter nuclear attack, and deter and win potential localized conflicts. However, as such threats have become less likely, the CMC’s responsibilities have been adjusted. It continues to administer and command the military. As previously, it still maintains its role in deterring the remote possibilities of aggression, nuclear war, and potential localized conflicts. But it is no longer the leading body for managing all external threats. Instead, the CMC supports the NSC in the handling of external threats.[23] Similarly, senior foreign-policy officials formerly helped oversee China’s response to international crises. However, the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC), created under Xi, now focuses on “top-level design, overall planning and coordination” and oversight of the execution of relevant foreign-policy tasks.[24] Analysts point out that the CFAC is mainly responsible for overseeing the nation’s “greater diplomacy” – i.e., diplomatic outreach involving non-state actors, the CCP, and non-state sectors abroad.[25] For external security threats and crises, the CFAC supports the NSC.

As a supporting bureaucracy on national security, the military thus takes its cues and instructions from the leaders and staff in the national security bureaucracy. The supporting role played by the military can be seen in how the PLA has redefined its understanding of threats, its role in national strategy, and its guidance in responding to external threats.

Threats

Senior Chinese leaders discuss the most urgent dangers in terms of national security, not national defense. In speeches about the international environment, Xi has repeatedly emphasized non-traditional threats, and he has downplayed concerns about armed conflict.[26] At the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping described threats by first listing issues of “social governance,” referring to popular discontent over corruption, inequality, and local malfeasance.[27] He then mentioned “ethnic separatists, religious extremists, and violent terrorists” as well as organized crime and natural disasters, before moving on to other perils, including pressure from the United States. Similarly, in a 2019 speech in which Xi Jinping outlined the seven most prominent “major risks” to the China Dream, he listed dangers related to “politics,” “ideology,” “the economy,” “science and technology,” “society,” “the external environment,” and “party building.”[28] Only the dangers posed by the “external environment” implied a potential military hazard. With respect to Taiwan in particular, Xi called for “safeguarding” China’s “sovereignty, security, and developmental interests.”[29] The term “safeguarding” can be translated as “maintaining” or “protecting,” thus allowing for considerable flexibility in defining success. Indeed, officials have surprisingly characterized the country’s past approach to Taiwan as successful. In 2022, for example, the minister of Foreign Affairs stated that China had “effectively safeguarded” its core interests regarding Taiwan “for the past ten years.”[30]

These and other comments by senior leaders make clear that the most urgent perils are fundamentally non-military in nature, and thus they are best handled by civilian authorities. Nevertheless, there are some threats that require military attention. In military parlance, “strategic directions” [战略方向] represent the geographic direction from which the greatest dangers arise. However, the meaning of strategic directions has changed to accommodate the leadership’s views about national security. This has occurred in three ways: 1) strategic directions are no longer only about war preparations, 2) strategic directions have proliferated, and 3) the main strategic directions mainly concern political, non-war threats.

First, strategic directions are no longer exclusively about war preparation. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy states that, unlike during the Mao era, strategic directions in the post–Cold War era are about “key tests for national power and military strength” and less about preparation for land wars.[31] However, the text acknowledges that the military must be prepared to win a war if one should arise. Other PLA writings suggest strategic directions may be as much or more about non-war tasks as they are about war preparations. A 2011 PLA dictionary broadly defines a “strategic direction” as the “direction of action for the military to carry out strategic tasks” that apply to “main” and “secondary” strategic directions.[32] This definition does not specify if combat preparations are the only or even the most important “actions.” Indeed, the PLA dictionary does not define “strategic tasks,” but it does include an entry for “diversified tasks” which consist of both war and non-war tasks. This phrasing suggests that in peacetime, war planning may not be the most important responsibility for any strategic directions. Instead, militaries may be expected to “take action” through non-war tasks to promote national security, even as they continue to enhance combat readiness for possible war situations. Reflecting this logic, a State Council website on Theater Commands explains that the commands have two responsibilities: first, to “protect national security” and second, to “prevail on the battlefield.”[33] 

The second point is that China faces many strategic directions. In the Cold War, the PLA tied “main” and “secondary” strategic directions to war threats. But with strategic directions no longer tethered exclusively to war threats, they may be more freely assigned. Each theater command appears responsible for at least one strategic direction, which would mean China faces at least five strategic directions, and possibly more depending on the tasks assigned to the PLA. The 2015 Military Strategy White Paper states that China faced “various threats and challenges in all its strategic directions and security domains.”[34] The 2019 White Paper on China’s National Defense in the New Era similarly states that the theater commands since 2012 have “carried out extensive mission-oriented training tailored to the specific needs of different strategic directions.”[35] An article by an unspecified “planning department” that appeared on the National Development and Reform Commission website stated that the 14th Five-Year Plan for national defense required that the military “accelerate preparations for military struggle in various strategic directions.”[36] Some strategic directions, such as those related to the Western theater, may not involve war threats. A 2016 article in Global Times cites an expert who explained that the “Western Theater Command may shoulder more responsibilities in counterterrorism, while the Eastern and Southern Commands will face more threats from the East and South China Seas.”[37] 

Third, the main strategic direction in peacetime primarily involves political security. Chinese writings define a “main strategic direction” [主要战略方向] as the “focal location of the most serious war threat” and the “most urgent military struggle mission within a time period.”[38] Chinese military writings since at least the 1990s suggest Taiwan is the main strategic direction. Drawing on such writings, Western analysts have characterized the “main strategic direction” in terms of war or contingency planning.[39] However, as the previous points make clear, Chinese sources recognize that a strategic direction may have a meaning during peacetime that is different from its meaning during wartime. This indicates that the main strategic direction for the military in peacetime may prioritize political security even as it implies a need to prepare for combat if war should arise. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy alludes to the importance of political dangers when it describes the main strategic direction as having a “high political level related to unification and national revival.”[40]

The priority placed on political over military threats for the main strategic direction is made even clearer by how senior leaders characterize the threat from Taiwan. Officials emphasize in particular the political problems of foreign interference, subversion, and support for “separatism” as related to Taiwan. For example, the 2025 National Security White Paper depicts Taiwan as part of a bigger problem of “Western, anti-China forces” which it claims seek to “suppress and contain China” by “grossly interfering in China’s internal affairs and causing trouble in the Taiwan Strait.”[41] Similarly, at the 20th Party Congress, Xi characterized the threat from Taiwan in primarily political terms, criticizing both “Taiwan independence” and “gross provocations of external interference in Taiwan affairs.”[42] He claimed that China had “resolutely fought against separatism and countered interference, demonstrating our resolve and ability to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to oppose ‘Taiwan independence.’” This language suggests that the primary danger arising from Taiwan stems from the menace of foreign interference and efforts to contain China as well as from the provocation of separatism. None of these sources suggest that Taiwan poses an imminent threat of war, nor do they characterize Taiwan as a problem to be solved through military attack. On the contrary, recognition that the main strategic direction may include both a proximate political danger in peacetime and a more remote danger of conflict in wartime opens the possibility for different, but complementary responses. In peacetime, political dangers pose the most pressing challenge and are best handled by civilian authorities, with the military providing support through non-war actions. Central leaders regard war as neither desirable nor necessary, but should a war occur, the military must win, and thus the military must enhance its combat readiness.

The Role of the Military in National Strategy

The central leadership’s elevation of national security has not only redefined the military’s understanding of threat but it has also redefined the military’s role in national strategy. Prior to the establishment of the NSC, authorities looked to the military to protect the nation’s “core interests,” i.e., national interests deemed most essential to the country’s survival and development. However, the NSC has displaced the CMC in terms of protecting the nation’s core interests.[43]

The NSC’s approach to protecting core interests emphasizes protecting China’s interests while managing risks. As guidance for handling all security threats, the National Security White Paper lists the basic principles that balance contrasting imperatives, such as “development and security,” “external and internal,” “risks and opportunities,” and “rights and stability.” The general approach is one of resolute protection of Chinese interests in a manner that mitigates risk and avoids unwanted conflict. The National Security White Paper states that the “central task” of national security is the “prevention and management of risk.”[44] It states that all risks should be “prevented and controlled,” but priority should be placed on “preventing and controlling those global risks that may delay or interrupt the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This requires flexibility. The White Paper calls for officials both “to dare to fight and to be good at fighting” and “to adhere to bottom-line thinking,” yet to “seek cooperation and promote win-win results in the struggle.” Officials are also expected to “resolutely defend the bottom line of no systemic risks.” The approach advocated by central leaders calls for a flexible mix of incentives and coercion to protect the nation’s interests while avoiding unwanted conflict.

The military directly supports the NSC’s approach. This point was made explicit in Xi’s formal designation of the military’s roles in national strategy, known as the “historic missions.” The new definition clarifies the military’s role to provide “strategic support” to largely civilian-led efforts to protect core interests.[45] Articles that explain the revised historic missions echo the approach outlined by central leaders regarding national security. They emphasize protecting the country’s interests while maintaining stability and managing risk. The military also maintains its traditional duties of ensuring overall deterrence and readiness to prevail should a war arise. A 2019 article states the change in mission requires the PLA to “prevent crises, resolve confrontations, and deter conflict,” presumably in peacetime, while also being able to “win wars,” presumably in wartime.[46] As an article in Military History puts it, the resolution of disputes over unification and other territories pose a “major risk” to the “historical process of national rejuvenation,” and thus they “must be correctly handled.”[47] 

Guidance in Responding to Threats

Guidance on how military power should be employed to ensure national security largely follows the previous points. The military is expected to play an active supporting role in non-war operations and tasks to protect core interests. At the same time, the military is expected to ensure combat readiness so that it can prevail in the unlikely event that war should occur.

To support the central leadership’s proximate goals, the PLA has prioritized non-war operations to address a broad range of mostly non-traditional threats. Observers have noted the wide range of coercive actions China’s armed forces have taken against its neighbors, including intimidating exercises, simulated blockades, cyber operations, and information operations.[48] Chinese military forces have also backstopped paramilitary forces in efforts to bully and coerce Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam in the maritime domains.[49] Military writings explain that such non-war operations and activities are designed to advance CCP goals. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy states, “Under the new circumstances, at the same time as our military is persistent in having the unshakeable duty of winning wars as the core, it should also focus on satisfying the nation’s multiple kinds of strategic needs and requirements during times of peace, to fulfill various categories of non-warfare military activities, to use a price lesser than war and a mode more flexible than war to obtain greater strategic benefit.”[50] The text calls such non-war missions the “main way to directly manifest the party’s political will” [emphasis added]. It explains that such actions may include cooperative as well as coercive actions. As examples of the latter, it lists “low intensity military activities against actual and potential opponents,” designed for use “under specific political backgrounds to display the existence of the military, to express security concerns, to declare the strategic bottom line, and to detect the opponent’s movements.” Even here, writings emphasize the importance of risk management and escalation control, warning that China needs to “strive to avoid overdrawing the sword and upsetting the opponent, leading to a loss of control in escalation.”[51]

Even as the military becomes involved in non-war efforts to bolster national security, it is paradoxically also expected to win in the unlikely event central leaders decide to wage war. The PLA’s efforts to improve combat readiness are widely recognized. Increases in defense spending, organizational reforms, acquisition of advanced weapons and equipment, and detailed doctrine writings have been accompanied by exhortations by senior leaders to improve the military’s combat readiness.[52] On multiple occasions Xi Jinping has demanded that the PLA be “combat ready” and develop the capacity to “fight and win wars.” But there are three points worth noting about the directive to enhance combat readiness: first, it applies to the entire military, second, it serves a number of purposes, and third, it is subordinate to the directive to carry out non-war tasks to ensure national security.

First, as with the directive to carry out non-war tasks, the injunction to improve combat readiness applies equally to all theater commands, not only to those units facing Taiwan. Experts have interpreted PLA modernization and exhortations to enhance combat readiness as evidence of preparations for war against Taiwan and the United States.[53] However, Xi has demanded that units enhance combat readiness in all theaters, including the northern theater command, which faces Russia, Korea, and Mongolia as well as the western theater command facing India and Russia.[54] 

Second, improving combat readiness serves a variety of useful purposes. For the PLA, as for most militaries, the main benefit is that it ensures that the military is operationally proficient and thus capable of competently executing any assigned missions. This includes non-war missions to bolster national security. As the 2019 White Paper on China’s National Defense in the New Era states, combat readiness is “an important assurance of an effective response to security threats and the fulfillment of tasks.”[55] A combat-ready military also provides leaders the option of waging war should the need ever arise. But there are other reasons as well. A military focused on operational proficiency is likely to be less corrupt and less involved in domestic politics. Military modernization also bolsters the nation’s prestige and enhances the appeal of the CCP. Xi Jinping has stated, for example, that China needs a “strong military” to become a “strong country.” He has explained that China is seeking a world-class military “commensurate with China’s international standing and its security and development interests.”[56] 

Third, the directive to ensure combat readiness is subordinate to the directive to carry out non-war tasks to ensure national security. The two directives are in tension and, at some level, mutually antagonistic. The directive to carry out non-war tasks to ensure national security requires that the PLA prioritize competence in non-war operations and tasks. It also requires that the military carry out extensive indoctrination to reinforce the importance of upholding CCP rule. This requires time and resources that invariably detract from efforts to ensure combat readiness. Yet given its importance for ensuring CCP rule, the military has little choice but to prioritize non-war tasks to support national security over tasks to enhance combat readiness.[57]

Conclusion

As a political military, the PLA has long grappled with the contending priorities of the party over those of a professional military. The elevation of national security and its mostly non-war dangers has aggravated such tensions. The PLA does not have an easy way to resolve the tensions between its competing priorities. It is unlikely to prioritize war preparations over those aiding national security because doing so would render the military largely irrelevant to the dangers that the party regards as the most threatening. Yet prioritizing efforts to ensure national security carries its own costs. Time and resources that could be spent on ensuring the PLA’s readiness for war must instead go to aiding civilian authorities in cooperative and coercive operations and actions against mostly non-military threats. Aware of the central leadership’s lack of interest in war preparations, the military may lose interest in such preparations, which may exacerbate its problems of corruption, low morale, and weak combat skills.[58] 

Extravagant parades, fancy hardware, and martial propaganda scarcely obscure the reality of a political military dedicated to keeping the CCP in power, even at the cost of a persistently doubtful combat readiness.[59] Too often analysts have conflated China’s repressive focus on national security with war preparation to suggest an overall increase in belligerence. But instead of being mutually reinforcing, the two imperatives of national security and war preparation are better understood as inimical. Chinese leaders understand this trade-off well, and they clearly regard national security as the priority. For this reason, they have shown no interest in risking war over Taiwan, and, accordingly, they have made virtually no preparations for a large-scale war. In the coming years, it is in the non-war domains of national security, not the popular but improbable scenarios of a major war, that the greatest challenges from China will likely arise.[60]

About the Contributor

Timothy R. Heath is Senior International Defense Researcher at RAND. Prior to joining RAND, Heath had over fifteen years of experience in the U.S. government researching and analyzing military and political topics related to China. In addition to his publications with RAND, Heath has published numerous articles and two books. Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, he has extensive experience analyzing China's national strategy, politics, ideology, and military, as well as Asian regional security developments. He has a Ph.D. in political science from George Mason University and an M.A. in Asian Studies from The George Washington University. 

Notes

[1] U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.

[2] Peter Apps, “Papering Over Strains, US and Allies Prep for Taiwan War,” Reuters, July 24, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/papering-over-strains-us-allies-prep-taiwan-war-2025-07-25/.

[3] Tara Copp and David Rising, “US Defense Secretary Warns Indo-Pacific Allies of ‘Imminent’ Threat from China,” Associated Press, May 31, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/us-hegseth-speech-china-taiwan-7a0ee0860be972f5f9eeca09926ecd85.

[4] The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), https://redlibrary.info/works/misc/lulu/the-ninth-national-congress-of-the-communist-party-of-china-documents.pdf.

[5] Covell F. Meyskens, Mao’s Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

[6] M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

[7] Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[8] James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military–Business Complex, 1978–1998 (New York: Routledge, 2001).

[9] Fu Xiaoqiang and Han Liqun, “A Study on the Impact of Trends in Non-Traditional Security on National Security” (非传统安全对国家安全的影响趋势研究), China Security Studies (国家安全研究), no. 2 (2022), https://www.cssn.cn/gjaqx/202307/P020230710550012063753.pdf.

[10] Tian Wenlin, “Why the United States Is So Eager to Instigate ‘Color Revolutions’” (美国为何热衷策动‘颜色革命’), People’s Tribune (人民论坛), no. 7 (2023), https://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2023-05/15/content_25999958.htm.

[11] Daniel M. Hartnett, “The ‘New Historic Missions’: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military Legacy,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11946.5.pdf?addFooter=false.

[12] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Xinhua, 2013), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/China-Military-Watch/2013-09/09/content_16953672.htm.

[13] Timothy R. Heath, China’s Pursuit of Overseas Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2271.html.

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Envisions China’s Diplomacy in 2024: We Will Be More Confident and Self-Reliant, More Open and Inclusive, Uphold Fairness and Justice and Promote Win-Win Cooperation,” 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202403/t20240308_11256413.html.

[15] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Urges Accelerated Efforts to Modernize National Security System, Capacity (Beijing: Xinhua, 2023), https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202305/30/content_WS6475e94fc6d03ffcca6ed801.html.

[16] Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives for 2035 (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议) (Beijing: Xinhua, 2020), https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-11/03/content_5556991.htm.

[17] Joel Wuthnow, Testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on CCP Decision-Making and the 20th Party Congress, January 27, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Joel_Wuthnow_Testimony.pdf.

[18] Katja Drinhausen and Helena Legarda, "‘Comprehensive National Security’ Unleashed: How Xi's Approach Shapes China's Policies at Home and Abroad,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2022, https://merics.org/en/report/comprehensive-national-security-unleashed-how-xis-approach-shapes-chinas-policies-home-and.

[19] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China Releases White Paper on National Security (Beijing: Xinhua, 2025), http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-05/12/content_117870467.html.

[20] National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President No. 29) (中华人民共和国国家安全法 [主席令第二十九号]), adopted July 1, 2015, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-07/01/content_2893902.htm.

[21] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China Releases White Paper on National Security.

[22] Office of National Defense Education and Talent Training, Party Committee of the Armed Forces Department, Tsinghua University (清华大学党委武装部国防教育与人才培养办公室),“Basic Knowledge of National Defense” (国防基本常识), Tsinghua University National Defense Website (清华大学国防网), https://guofang.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1017/1513.htm.

[23] Joel Wuthnow, “A New Chinese National Security Bureaucracy Emerges,” China Brief 21, no. 23 (2021), https://jamestown.org/program/early-warning-brief-a-new-chinese-national-security-bureaucracy-emerges/.

[24] “Foreign Affairs Commission Under the CPC Central Committee,” China.org.cn, January 19, 2020, http://www.china.org.cn/english/china_key_words/2020-01/19/content_75629423.html.

[25] Guoguang Wu, “Emergence of the Central Office of Foreign Affairs: From Leadership Politics to ‘Greater Diplomacy,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 69 (2021), https://www.prcleader.org/post/emergence-of-the-central-office-of-foreign-affairs-from-leadership-politics-to-greater-diplomacy.

[26] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Urges Accelerated Efforts to Modernize National Security System, Capacity; State Council of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院), “Xi Jinping Delivers an Important Speech at the Opening Session of the Seminar for Principal Provincial- and Ministerial-level Leading Cadres on Adhering to Bottom-line Thinking and Focusing on the Prevention and Resolution of Major Risks” (习近平在省部级主要领导干部坚持底线思维着力防范化解重大风险专题研讨班开班式上发表重要讲话), 2019, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-01/21/content_5359898.htm.

[27] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Xinhua, 2022), https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202210/25/content_WS6357df20c6d0a757729e1bfc.html.

[28] “Xi Urges Major Risk Prevention to Ensure Healthy Economy, Social Stability,”

Xinhua.net, January 22, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/22/c_137763248.htm.

[29] “Study Reader (26): Resolutely Safeguard National Sovereignty, Security, and Development Interests” (学习读本（26）坚决维护国家主权、安全、发展利益), China News (中新网), February 11, 2025, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2025/02-11/10366587.shtml.

[30] Zhang Guo, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Firmly Safeguarding National Dignity and Core Interests” (外交部：坚定维护国家尊严和核心利益), China Youth Daily (中国青年报), October 20, 2022, https://news.cyol.com/gb/xwzt/articles/2022-10/20/content_GWoXVc5X6.html.

[31] Military Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, Science of Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-02-08%20Chinese%20Military%20Thoughts-%20In%20their%20own%20words%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy%202013.pdf.

[32] PLA Dictionary (军语) (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2011), 55.

[33] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China Keywords – Theater Commands,” November 10, 2021, http://english.scio.gov.cn/featured/chinakeywords/2021-11/10/content_77863832.htm.

[34] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing, 2015), https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

[35] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (2019), http://www.scio.gov.cn/gxzt/dtzt/2019/xsddzggfbps/bps_21484/202209/t20220921_435341.html 

[36] National Development and Reform Commission (中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会), “High-Quality Development Plan for the Belt and Road Initiative” (高质量推进一带一路建设发展规划), December 25, 2021, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/202112/t20211225_1309729.html.

[37] Jiang Jie, “China Unveils Five New Theater Commands,” Global Times, February 2, 2016, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/966860.shtml.

[38] Military Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, Science of Strategy.

[39] David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” Asia Policy, no. 4 (2007): 67–72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24904602.

[40] Academy of Military Science, Military Strategy Department, Science of Strategy.

[41] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China Releases White Paper on National Security (Beijing: Xinhua, 2025), http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-05/12/content_117870467.html.

[42] Xi Jinping, “Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects (I),” October 16, 2022, https://www.bjreview.com/2022pdf/SY_NO_44_2022.pdf.

[43] National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President No. 29).

[44] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China Releases White Paper on National Security. 

[45] Timothy Heath, “The Historic Missions of the People’s Liberation Army under Xi Jinping: The Military’s Role in the ‘New Era,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 80 (2024), https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-historic-missions-of-the-people-s-liberation-army-under-xi-jinping-the-military-s-role-in-the. 

[46] Yan Wenhu, “Correctly Understanding the Mission and Tasks of the Military in the New Era” (正确理解新时代军队使命任务), QSTHEORY.CN, July 26, 2019, https://www.qstheory.cn/llwx/2019-07/26/c_1124800633.htm.

[47] Wang Hongwei (汪红伟) and Sun Wengang (孙文广), “Deep Understanding of the Development Logic and Basic Characteristics of the PLA’s Historical Mission” (深刻认识我军历史使命的发展逻辑及其基本特征), Military History (军事历史), no. 4 (2022): 54-59.

[48] Sam Garcia and Hollier Younger, “China Increasing Cyberattacks, Military Exercises and ‘Gray Zone’ Tactics: NSB,” Taipei Times, April 8, 2025, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/04/08/2003834838.

[49] Bonny Lin et al., Competition in the Gray Zone (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html.

[50] Academy of Military Science, Military Strategy Department, Science of Strategy.

[51] Ibid.

[52] “Xi Says Chinese Are People with Great Spirit of Struggle,” Xinhua, March 20, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/20/c_137052296.htm.

[53] John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger, “Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War,” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/xi-jinping-says-he-preparing-china-war?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20251104.

[54]“Xi Extends Spring Festival Greetings to All Servicemen,” Xinhua, January 25, 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202501/25/content_WS6794b481c6d0868f4e8ef2ad.html.

[55] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (2019).

[56] “Xinhua Headlines-Xi Focus: Reshaping China’s Armed Forces,” Xinhua, July 31, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/31/c_138273335.htm.

[57] Timothy R. Heath, The PLA’s Doubtful Combat Readiness (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025).

[58] “Xi Unleashes China’s Biggest Purge of Military Leaders Since Mao,” Bloomberg News, August 26, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2025-xi-china-military-officials-purge/?embedded-checkout=true; Dennis J. Blasko, “The Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts,” War on the Rocks, February 18, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/.

[59] Nectar Gan et al., “China Showcases Military Strength at Parade as Xi Stands Alongside Putin and Kim,” CNN, September 3, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/china-military-parade-xi-jinping-09-03-25-intl-hnk; Heath, The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness.

[60] Timothy R. Heath, Testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Is China Prepared for War, June 13, 2024, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA3300/CTA3381-1/RAND_CTA3381-1.pdf; The author would like to thank Joel Wuthnow, Taylor Fravel, and Howard Wang for their feedback and advice on this paper.

Photo credit: 中国新闻社, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons