Changes of Factional Dynamics under Xi Jinping

Guoguang Wu CLM Issue 88 June 2026.pdf

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This article proposes a revisionist framework of factionalism to explain the latest escalation in the purge of high-ranking CCP cadres and to understand the changes in leadership politics during Xi Jinping’s third term in office. Based on Aristotle’s distinction between oligarchy (ruling power resting in a small group) and tyranny (one-man rule) as two different non-democratic regime types to analyze factionalism, the article argues that this distinction affects the unfolding of factional dynamics in China today. With Xi’s one-man rule, the CCP’s factional structure, like that during Mao’s later years, has changed from parallel oligarchic factions to a factional cascade in which Xi’s faction “wins all.” But this hegemonic faction consists of, or is divided into, some sub-factions below Xi. The article analyzes the prominent features of such new factional dynamics and its implications for the distribution of power, the impact of policy, and leadership stability.

The number of purges of high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres has been escalating during Xi Jinping’s third term in office. Up to April 2026, in the first three and half years since the CCP’s 20th Central Committee assumed office in October 2022, 47 members and alternate members were penalized or placed under investigation, accounting for 12.5 percent of the total. This figure far exceeds the rate of purges, at 5.32 percent, during the first three and half years after the 18th Central Committee and the 0.8 percent rate during the same period following the 19th Central Committee,[1] thus constituting a record in terms of the number of purged Politburo members and other national leaders. Among the 24 members of the 20th Politburo, 3 (12.5 percent) members have been expelled from the Politburo or face disciplinary investigation.[2] In terms of the 18th Politburo, only one member among the 25 members was purged during the entire term, and no members of the 19th Politburo were purged. In addition, only two of the total seven members of the 20th Central Military Commission (CMC) are still active (one of whom is Xi himself) because five members (71.43 percent) have already been disciplined. Similarly, two of the five State Councilors appointed in 2023 (40 percent) were investigated in 2023 and penalized in 2024.[3]

These purges have led to a number of surprises, as they seemingly contradict the observation that Xi has been successful in concentrating power during his third term. The phenomenon also raises a general question regarding operation of the autocratic CCP regime under a one-man dictatorship rather than a so-called collective leadership. This article is an attempt to explore these issues from a revisionist perspective on factionalism that incorporates regime theory and institutionalist analysis to remedy the weaknesses in our understanding of factionalism and to understand CCP leadership politics. It will first introduce Aristotle’s distinction between oligarchy (often mis-conceptualized as “collective leadership” in contemporary scholarship on China) and tyranny (one-man rule) as two different non-democratic regime types to analyze factionalism. It then will investigate how factional dynamics have evolved from oligarchy to tyranny under Xi Jinping. Further, it will discuss some prominent features of factionalism under tyranny that differ from the oligarchic features of factionalism, including the implications for the distribution of power, the impact of policy, and leadership stability. The concluding section will summarize these arguments in connection to the escalating purges under Xi.

The Factional Conundrum and Its Institutionalist Remedy: From Oligarchy to Tyranny

Factionalism as an academic paradigm to understand CCP politics presents a political and intellectual conundrum. Despite extant achievements in this direction, some fundamental questions remain regarding the concept of “faction” per se and how it operates. In the first regard, observers disagree over how to define a faction: Does a faction refer to a group of politicians who share an ideology or an interpretation of the official ideology, or does it refer to those who have similar governance policy preferences or to  those who are connected through patron-client relationships in the pursuit of  collaborative and individual interests? Accordingly, does factional competition in CCP politics unfold around ideological divergences, policy debates, or the distribution of power and interests among differing interpersonal networks? In the latter regard, a major weakness of factionalism lies in its lack of an institutional dynamic perspective, as it often assumes that factional change only takes place during the rise and fall of certain factions, and it does not pay sufficient attention to structural and institutional changes in the factional composition, factional interactions, and factional mechanisms. According to this line of reasoning, it would seem that factional competition over time always follows a similar pattern, and changes can simply be attributed to the rise, fall, or death of the involved politicians.

In analyzing CCP politics under Xi, particularly the latest intensification of purges, the conceptual and methodological difficulties in the analysis of factionalism frequently give rise to a number of questions, such as: Does the ongoing purge of high-ranking CCP cadres imply that Xi’s power, status, and policies face challenges by Xi’s competitors? Were the officials purged under Xi challengers to his authority or his policy agenda? Or, because many of those newly purged leaders have been widely regarded as Xi’s men (or at least they joined the 20th Central Committee with Xi’s endorsement), does their fall indicate that non-Xi factions are active and powerful? Will the escalation of factional competition undermine and destabilize leadership under Xi? Is Xi’s excessive concentration of power real? If not, who exercises real power in today’s China, and how was Xi able to secure a third term? What are the policy disputes and their implications in such factional competition and personnel cleansing? Is it possible that the current leadership turmoil will lead to a redirection in Chinese leadership politics?

This article is not so ambitious to attempt to answer all of the above questions, but it will attempt to apply regime theory and institutional analysis to factionalism to explore a path that may provide some answers. For our purposes, a faction is defined as an interpersonal network centering on a powerful leader that is due to the many overlaps in the network members’ personal experiences and career paths. We refer back to Aristotle in ancient Greece, who provides a political regime typology that distinguishes between two forms of non-democratic governance, namely, oligarchy in which a small group exercises power and tyranny in which absolute power is vested in a single ruler, but with both forms serving the  interests of the rulers.[4] Based on this conceptual lens, the CCP regime can be seen as having shifted during the Xi era from the oligarchic structure of the previous leaderships to a far more centralized form of rule under tyranny. In contemporary terms—though the phrase may be somewhat misleading—this represents a transition from the “collective leadership” associated with the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras to the current high concentration of power in the hands of Xi Jinping. This change has been widely observed and recognized among China watchers, and Xi’s efforts to concentrate power through elite purges have been extensively documented and analyzed in numerous studies and publications.[5] 

This raises the question of whether such changes have affected factional politics within the CCP leadership and, if so, in what ways. Following social science institutional analysis, the answer to this question is yes. In contemporary scholarship, oligarchy and tyranny are understood as distinct institutional arrangements. Institutions, according to Douglass North’s classic definition, are the “rules of the game” that constrain people’s behavior;[6] and, according to Stephen Krasner, regimes consist of the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures guiding the actors’ behavior.[7] The transition from oligarchy—rule by a small group—to tyranny, where power is concentrated in a single individual, inevitably alters the rules governing elite politics and leadership behavior and the interpersonal relationships that underpin factionalism. This framework informs the following discussion.

From Parallel Factions to Factional Cascades: Change in Structural Dynamics

Politics under the leadership of Xi Jinping has clearly demonstrated two distinct dynamics in factional structure along with with his personal concentration of power—that is, the broader transformation from the pre-Xi oligarchic system to Xi’s personalistic rule. During Xi’s first ten years in office (2012–2022), the structure of CCP leadership politics featured Xi’s struggle to build up and empower his faction, as opposed to the previous dominant factions centered around former party chiefs Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, respectively. Among 25 members of the 18th Politburo, nine members had backgrounds in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and/or had worked as aides to Hu Jintao, and eight members (excluding Xi Jinping) had various connections to Jiang Zemin and his so-called Shanghai Gang.[8] In contrast, no one could be unequivocally identified as Xi’s own protégé at that time, although Wang Qishan and Li Zhanshu were already considered to have established working alliances with him. The factional structure of the 19th Politburo (2017–2022) featured a dramatic change in favor of Xi, as at least twelve members could be regarded as Xi’s men. Of the remaining, Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, both leaders of the CCYL faction, sat on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), and another leader, Hu Chunhua, the youngest member of the Politburo, was also part of the CCYL faction. At least seven members had Shanghai connections, two of whom (Wang Huning and Han Zheng) had newly joined the PBSC, though by now the Shanghai members seemingly have secured Xi’s trust.[9] Although the precise factional affiliations of individual members may be open to question, the broader pattern is not seriously disputed: it can be described as a structure in which relatively parallel factions were organized around different top leaders.

However, top leaders with their own interpersonal networks but no close connections with Xi Jinping virtually disappeared from the 20th Politburo and its Standing Committee. There are still top leaders with partially distinct interpersonal networks operating in parallel—for example, Li Qiang and Cai Qi[10]—but these figures are now widely regarded as key members of Xi Jinping’s broader network. In this configuration, their associated factions function less as independent or competing blocs with Xi’s network but more as extensions of a dominant Xi-centered coalition. In this sense, they should be regarded as sub-factions under the umbrella of the Xi faction. Metaphorically, unlike earlier groupings, such as the CCYL-associated network and the Shanghai-based faction of the 18th and 19th Politburos—where multiple factions coexisted in a more plural, bush-like configuration of competing clusters—the factions within the 20th Politburo are better understood as branches of a single, overarching structure, with Xi Jinping at its trunk. Or, in his first ten years in office, Xi Jinping can be viewed as an elder brother figure with his own followers in the leadership, while other senior figures—his “siblings” in this metaphor—retained independent power bases, did not recognize him as a patriarchal authority, and had their own protégés in the leadership. This reflects a factional structure closer to an oligarchy, whereby several factional leaders more or less share power. In the 20th Politburo, however, Xi has become the patriarch, and no siblings are present in the leadership; other powerful leaders, such as Li Qiang and Cai Qi, can be seen as Xi’s sons and daughters, even though they now have their own factions consisting of their sons and daughters. This factional structure both reflects and helps to sustain Xi’s concentration of authority, effectively translating it into a form of one-man rule.

Decades ago, the late China scholar Tang Tsou identified an early connection between factional politics and the emergence of increasingly concentrated power within what had previously been an oligarchic system, emphasizing the “winner-takes-all” dynamic in CCP politics. According to Tang Tsou, “[T]he basic assumption of CCP politics has been that a group or a coalition of groups can and does decisively defeat a major rival group or coalition and eliminate it.”[11] In the analysis here, the “decisive” defeat refers to the turning point in the transformation from oligarchy to tyranny. After the “decisive” defeat of the rival group or coalition, the leader of the victorious oligarchic group or coalition emerges as a “tyrant” in the sense of his becoming the dominant figure among former oligarchic peers, effectively “taking all” and consolidating power into the hands of a single individual.

Tang Tsou’s analysis is grounded in observations of CCP politics during the Cultural Revolution, and the Mao era more broadly, which also witnessed a transformation of the factional structure—from competition between Mao’s own faction and other parallel elite groupings to a situation in which, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, factional dynamics cascaded into a hierarchy of “sub-factions” that ultimately was positioned beneath Mao Zedong himself. This historical similarity offers enlightenment to understand today’s factional dynamics and its political impact under Xi. First, in essence, the emergence of a tyranny inevitably implies that the top leader’s faction has overwhelmed the previously parallel factions, and, accordingly, with one-man rule, such as that under Mao or Xi,  his (practically never her in CCP history) faction becomes a “full-house,” or an “empire” faction holding power. Second, this never means the end of factionalism, because, even as the old factions are eliminated, the mechanism of factionalism remains, and CCP political dynamics always contribute to the emergence of new factions. In the late Mao era, the new factions included those headed by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and some others, respectively; following the 20th Party Congress, new factions, headed by Li Qiang, Cai Qi, and others, respectively, immediately emerged.[12] Third, although these new factions are structurally parallel with one another and largely similar to the oligarchic factions, they are all part of the “empire faction” headed by the patriarch/tyrant. They can be more appropriately described as sub-factions, resulting in a factional structure that differs from an oligarchic configuration and that instead takes the form of cascading layers in a factional alignment. Fourth, these sub-factions are inevitably engaged in competition with one another (to be discussed in the next section). Sub-factional competition, like that during the late Mao period, will eventually lead to a new oligarchy that replaces the tyranny (we will return to this issue in the conclusion).  

The Intensification of Sub-factional Competition and Its New Features: Change in Interactive Dynamics

Whereas these sub-factions emerge to extend and consolidate Xi’s power base within the national leadership, competition among them may immediately begin with the allocation of power below Xi Jinping and extend into broader struggles over the distribution of power at lower levels, intensifying for reasons to be discussed later. However, such sub-factional competition exhibits characteristics that differ significantly from those found under an oligarchic structure.

First, such sub-factional competition usually does not point to the tyrant, or, more accurately, it does not involve, let alone present, a challenge to the top leader in terms of leading to his replacement. Under an oligarchy, factions compete with one another and the faction headed by the no. 1 leader (nominally or real) is also involved in such competition. This often means that factional competition tends to constrain and balance the power of the no. 1, and it  may often evolve into a struggle to challenge and secure the top leadership position. But under a tyranny, this factional dynamic undergoes a change, whereby power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual and factional competition typically unfolds beneath the level of the ruler, that is, among his own followers organized into sub-factions. Structurally, this reflects the establishment of one-man rule and a reconfigured factional order in which sub-factional competition no longer generates momentum directed at the position of the no. 1, at least during the early stages of such a system.

Moreover, the top leader often prefers to and intentionally arranges certain multifactional checks and balances to enhance his own effective control over the powerful subordinates. During Xi Jinping’s third term, such arrangements—marked by complex patterns of interpersonal ties and mutual factional monitoring—can be observed across all major party, state, and military institutions. Take the State Council as an example: Li Qiang, Ding Xuexiang, and He Lifeng, as well Zhang Guoqing and Liu Guozhong, all either premier or vice premier, obviously belong to different branches of the greater Xi faction, as Li Qiang began following Xi during Xi’s Zhejiang years, Ding Xuexiang’s career unfolded in Shanghai before arriving in Zhongnanhai, He Lifeng’s connection with Xi can be traced back to Xi’s Fujian experience, Zhang Guoqing was a typical military-industrial engineer prior to his political career, and Liu Guozhong early on was trained as a military-industrial engineer working in local government in Heilongjiang.[13] Each official’s connection with Xi Jinping is not mediated by others; individuals report directly to Xi rather than through intermediaries such as Li Qiang.

The above kind of arrangement is also a significant factor causing the intensification of the sub-factional competition under one-man rule. In such a context, sub-factions seeking political security and influence may attempt to obstruct or to undermine the careers of key figures in rival sub-factions, with the widespread corruption among cadres often providing ample opportunities for such maneuvers. When sufficient evidence is gathered against an individual and presented to Xi Jinping as the ultimate decision-maker, the likelihood of that person being purged or at least sidelined can be significantly higher. This may be called “muckraking with CCP characteristics,” implying that sub-factional competition, rather than legal procedures and/or investigative journalism, incentivizes the muckraking of party-government officials by their comrades. This helps to explain why so many high-ranking leaders were purged following the 20th Party Congress.

In an oligarchic setting, responses to factionally driven “muckraking” typically depend on where the targeted individual sits within the competing power bloc. If the person under attack is a protégé of Xi Jinping, Xi is expected to mobilize available institutional and informal resources to protect the person against any rival factions. Conversely, if the individual belongs to a rival faction, that faction’s leader will likely attempt a similar defense, though with varying degrees of effectiveness depending on his relative power. This logic of a factional anti-corruption struggle has changed, however, during Xi’s third term. Without a rival faction in the top leadership, it is no longer a priority for Xi to cement his own faction by providing such protection for any who is charged of corruption. Those who are under such an attack may belong to sub-factions associated with figures such as Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Chen Xi, or Peng Liyuan. In a broader sense, they can still be regarded as part of Xi Jinping’s network, but their ties to him are often indirect and mediated through the leaders of the sub-factions. Accordingly, the targeting or removal of such figures does not necessarily undermine Xi’s authority as long as he maintains effective control over the heads of the key sub-factions.

This does not necessarily imply that Xi Jinping’s sense of political security is high. He still must remain vigilant against any changes in the sub-factional dynamics. This implies that it is not in his interest for competitive sub-factions below him to be engaged in a power struggle that results in one sub-faction becoming dominant and the parallel structure of sub-factions being destroyed. The cascade factional structure would thus be undermined. The rise of a successful sub-faction may increase its capacity to evolve into a faction that would be comparable to the dominant “empire faction” of the top leader, and the head of such an emerging bloc may eventually pose a challenge to the leader’s authority and status. The latest purge of extremely powerful military generals, especially He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Zhang Youxia, might provide an example of such a case: muckraking stimulated by sub-factional competition between He Weidong/Miao Hua and Zhang Youxia seemingly explains the fall of the former, but the latter immediately became dangerous to Xi because below Xi there were no factional checks and balances over Zhang, thus leading to Zhang’s inescapable fate.  

The Tyrant’s Institutional Dilemma: How Sub-factional Competition Destabilizes His Regime

Another prominent feature of sub-factional competition under a tyranny is that it tends to involve less policy debate than factional competition under an oligarchic system. This is the case because an oligarchy and a tyranny involve different policy-making mechanisms. When power is exercised by a group, such as that in an oligarchy, members of the group may have different views on various issues concerning governance and, accordingly, they may have different policy preferences. Moreover, policy issues may become arenas of contestation and/or may be used as instruments in power struggles among the various factions. In contrast, a tyranny by definition means that government power rests in hands of one man and, by extension, this means that this one top leader determines the policy principles, and no policy ideas fundamentally different from his are allowed, let alone to dominate the policy-making process. When Aristotle observes that the tyrant is primarily concerned with his own interests rather than those of the people,[14] I interpret this outcome as stemming not merely from the ruler’s personality, but also from a power structure that suppresses substantive debate over governance and policy.

Because this shift in how policy is shaped—from oligarchic factional competition to tyrannical sub-factional competition—is often overlooked, China watchers tend to overstate the extent of internal differences in policy preferences within the Xi leadership. In this context, Li Qiang’s approach to economic governance may appear more accommodating to the private sector than Xi Jinping’s approach and may therefore be interpreted as a signal of a degree of policy divergence or even a policy constraint. At the same time, it is important to recognize that, given his responsibility for economic performance, Li Qiang is likely to be guided more by pragmatic economic considerations than by ideological rigidity. But I believe that the overall power structure, including the factional structure, is more powerful than Li’s personal inclination to influence China’s economic governance, and thus far, Li Qiang has not undertaken any significant initiatives that move beyond the framework established by Xi Jinping for governing the Chinese economy.

Li Keqiang, Li Qiang’s predecessor as China’s premier, was also unable to alter Xi Jinping’s overarching economic agenda. However, particularly during the early years of Xi’s leadership, he did articulate his own policy preferences, which were sometimes labeled “Keqiang economics” or “Likonomics.” This approach emphasized deleveraging, reducing government-led investment, and encouraging private-sector–driven growth. He also came up with  the “Li Keqiang Index” to bypass potentially inaccurate official statistics so as to accurately gauge actual economic performance.[15] The differing roles of Li Keqiang and Li Qiang as China’s premier not only suggest changes in the factional structure under Xi Jinping from his first decade to his third term but also indicate a clearer tendency during the third term to downplay visible policy divergences within the leadership.

Such downplaying, of course, does not improve Chinese policymaking or the corresponding governance performance. This creates a dilemma for Xi Jinping’s concentration of power: the absence of effective policy debate may weaken the quality of governance, yet meaningful policy discussion can easily cross the boundaries set by the top leadership and thereby come to be perceived as a challenge to authority. Because a tyranny is often ill-suited—both structurally and operationally—to sustained, serious policy deliberation (even among the elite), it may result in constraints on governance and can, in turn, generate pressures that undermine the system itself.

Therefore, sub-factional competition under one-man rule may have a spillover effect that challenges and in turn, destabilizes the top leader’s power, position, and regime in at least three respects. First, it may undermine governance and development performance. Second, a successful sub-faction may emerge as a dominant force within a given policy domain through intra-elite competition. Third, there is the potential for cooperation between a sub-faction operating under Xi Jinping and the remnants of older factions that historically were influential and completed with the leader under the prior oligarchic structure. Although such former factions are largely excluded from formal politics, as reflected in their near-absence from the 20th Politburo, they may still seek to exert influence through informal political channels.[16] 

CCP politics is a huge black box, and informal politics within CCP politics is among the darkest part of the black box. Therefore, it is difficult to know what has been occurring with respect to interactions between the old factions and the new sub-Xi factions during Xi’s third term. Punitive actions against high-ranking cadres previously linked to those older factions may offer some hints in this regard, as illustrated by the recent cases involving the former personal secretaries to Wen Jiabao and Wang Qishan as well as a relative of Guo Shengkun.[17]  

After all, the issue of power succession after Xi Jinping provides a strong incentive for factional competition. As Xi ages and his health declines, this factor is likely to encourage both sub-factions aligned with Xi and non-aligned groups to intensify their complex rivalries, with outcomes such as purges potentially further sharpening these dynamics. Under such circumstances, factional competition is likely to increasingly be oriented around the issue of succession and the identity of the next party chief, which in turn may weaken the earlier pattern of “tyrannical” sub-factional competition that is largely detached from direct challenges to the supreme leader. This dynamic has only begun to emerge during Xi’s third term, but it is likely to become increasingly important in shaping factional politics even into a potential fourth term.

Conclusion

Based on Aristotle’s classic theory that divides an autocracy into two types of regime, namely, an oligarchy in which a small group rules and a tyranny in which one man rules, this article attempts to understand CCP factional politics with a corresponding distinction between two different factional structural dynamics, namely, parallel factions and factional cascades. The former describes a situation whereby several factions coexisting in the national leadership constrain, balance, and compete with one another in the exercise of power; the latter, by contrast, refers to a structure overwhelmingly dominated by one faction. But within this faction several sub-factions may emerge that are similar to the parallel factions in the former situation. The fundamental difference between the two structures lies in regime type. An oligarchy is based on the coexistence of multiple parallel factions in personnel terms, with the leaders of these factions collectively forming the governing elite. When one faction becomes sufficiently powerful to eliminate or substantially suppress its competitors, its leader is then able to concentrate authority in his own hands, thereby transforming the system into a tyranny.

This article attempts to explain leadership politics during Xi’s third term based on changes in factional dynamics, with a particular emphasis on understanding how factionalism is unfolding during Xi’s third term—namely, how factional dynamics evolve within a single dominant faction operating under one-man rule. Contrary to the view that such a situation marks the end of factionalism, this argument holds that new factions—or more precisely, sub-factions—will inevitably emerge within the hegemonic faction, and that competition among these sub-factions will tend to intensify. Such sub-factional competition usually does not involve, let alone target, the top ruler. However, during the late Mao era, uncertainties regarding the succession of power loomed large, which significantly intensified the sub-factional competition to a level that at times exceeded the control of the top ruler. This article predicts a similar situation might emerge during the late and post-Xi periods. That such a trend has already begun to emerge during Xi’s third term helps explain the escalation in the number of purges of high-ranking cadres who previously were regarded as Xi’s men but who have different sub-factional backgrounds. In particular, the dramatic fall from power of many younger high-ranking cadres (such as those who were born in the 1970s) signals a further intensification of sub-Xi factional struggles with an eye on the post-Xi redistribution of power.[18] Such sub-factional competition and its impact on personnel, policy, and governance will destabilize leadership under Xi and the CCP regime. This is similar to what occurred during the turbulent late Mao period, even if it does not directly challenge Xi’s power and position. In this sense, the Xi regime may be seen as having passed its apex and now entering a phase of gradual decline.

About the Contributor

Guoguang Wu holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and is Senior Research Scholar at Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, Stanford University, Senior Scholar and Executive Director of the Hoover Institution’s Human Security and Prosperity Project, as well as Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at Center for China Analysis of the Asia Society Policy Institute. His research focuses on Chinese politics and comparative political economy, with current interests focusing on Chinese elite politics, politics of development and governance, transition from communism, and capitalist institutions in comparative perspective. He is the author of four books, including China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Globalization Against Democracy: A Political Economy of Capitalism After its Global Triumph (Cambridge University Press, 2017), and editor or co-editor of six English-language volumes and author or editor of twenty Chinese-language books. During the late 1980s, he worked in Beijing as a policy adviser and speechwriter for the leadership under Zhao Ziyang.

Notes

[1] The author’s database. These 47 do not include those who disappeared from public for unusually long periods of time but were not officially announced to have been penalized, investigated, or removed from office, constituting a total of about 25–30 persons.

[2] They include He Weidong, Ma Xingrui, and Zhang Youxia. See PRC Ministry of National Defense, “何卫东、苗华等9人严重违纪违法被开除党籍军籍,” http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16416031.html, posted October 17, 2025; Xinhua, “马兴瑞涉嫌严重违纪违法正接受中央纪委国家监委纪律审查和监察调查,” https://www.news.cn/legal/20260403/fada9edefb4548eaa8fab74db8f89c28/c.html, posted April 3, 2026; PRC Ministry of National Defense, “张又侠、刘振立涉嫌严重违纪违法被立案审查调查,” http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16439106.html, posted January 24, 2026; all accessed May 1, 2026.

[3] They are Li Shangfu and Qin Gang. See PRC Ministry of National Defense, “中央军委原委员、原国务委员兼国防部长李尚福受到开除党籍处分,” http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16319113.html, posted June 27, 2204; 共产党员网, “中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报,” https://www.12371.cn/2024/07/18/ARTI1721291343859528.shtml, posted July 18, 2024; both accessed May 1, 2026.

[4] Aristotle, The Politics, 1279a22–1279b10.

[5] See, for example, Susan L. Shirk, “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: The Return to Personalistic Rule,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (April 2018): 22–36; Chun Han Wong, Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China's Superpower Future (New York: Avid Reader, 2023); Yew Lun Tian, “How China's Xi Accumulated Power, and Why It Matters in a Third Term,” Reuters, October 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/how-chinas-xi-accumulated-power-why-it-matters-third-term-2022-10-10/.

[6] Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3.

[7] Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as Intervening Variable,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.

[8] To identify Xi’s men, see the attempt in Guoguang Wu, “The King’s Men and Others: Emerging Political Elites under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 60 (June 2019), https://3c8314d6-0996-4a21-9f8a-a63a59b09269.filesusr.com/ugd/10535f_da7effdfa8ad40979f17d561cb845a98.pdf.

[9] For the CCP’s 19th Politburo , see 新华网, https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/cpc19_index.htm, accessed April 22, 2026. This composition may be viewed as an “oligarchy with a predominant leader” (see Graeme Gill, Collective Leadership in Soviet Politics [London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018], chap. 2).  However, the present article adopts a simplified set of conceptual tools that may be applied to Communist leadership politics in order to make the discussion more accessible and easier to follow.

[10] Guoguang Wu, “Li Qiang versus Cai Qi in the Xi Jinping Leadership: Checks and Balances with Chinese Characteristics?” China Leadership Monitor, no. 77 (September 2023), https://www.prcleader.org/post/li-qiang-versus-cai-qi-in-the-xi-jinping-leadership-checks-and-balances-with-ccp-characteristics.

[11] Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. xvii; Tang Tsou, “Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?” The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995): 95–156.

[12] Guoguang Wu, “New Faces, New Factional Dynamics: CCP Leadership Politics Following the 20th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 74 (December 2022), https://www.prcleader.org/post/new-faces-new-factional-dynamics-ccp-leadership-politics-following-the-20th-party-congress.

[13] For an analysis of their career paths and possible factional connections, see, for example, Wu, “The King’s Men and Others”; Guoguang Wu, “Aerospace Engineers to Communist Party Leaders: The Rise of Military-Industrial Technocrats at China’s 20th Party Congress,” Asia Society Policy Institute, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/aerospace-engineers-communist-party-leaders-rise-military-industrial-technocrats-chinas-20th-party, posted February 8, 2023. 

[14] Aristotle, The Politics, 1279a22-1279b10.

[15] The index includes a customs proxy index measuring railway cargo volume, electricity consumption, and loans dispensed by banks.

[16] For the importance of informal politics in China and some analysis, see, for instance, Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui, and Peter N.S. Lee, eds., Informal Politics in East Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[17] 新华网, “水利部原党组成员、副部长田学斌接受审查调查,” https://www.news.cn/20260105/863bf48a07374de9bef262617467baee/c.html, posted January 5, 2026 (Tian is Wen Jiabao’s former secretary); 新华网, “国家金融监督管理总局党委委员、副局长周亮接受审查调查,” https://www.news.cn/legal/20260324/10e33dc7f62d402eaed6e437e8dd139f/c.html, posted March 24, 2026 (Zhou is Wang Qishan’s former secretary); 新华网, “共青团江西省委书记邱凌接受纪律审查和监察调查,” https://www.news.cn/20260428/d47e323fefb44191ac3ca46f5f548611/c.html, posted April 28, 2026 (Qiu is said to be a nephew of former Politburo member and Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun, and Guo is said to be a relative of former PBSC member Zeng Qinghong). All accessed May 1, 2026. 

[18] For some recent examples: Fei Gaoyun (born in 1971, party secretary of Hefei, provincial capital of Anhui with a massive high-technology sector), for the official announcement of the investigation into his “suspected serious violations of discipline and law,” see CCDI website, https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiaon/202605/t20260506_488951.html, accessed May 6, 2026; Li Yunze (b. 1970, China’s first minister who was born in the 1970s), for his unannounced disappearance from the official website of the National Financial Regulatory Administration, of which he had been the no.1 leader, see https://www.nfra.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/jigougaikuang/jigougaikuang.html, accessed May 6, 2026; and Zhou Liang (b. 1971), see ftn. 18.

Photo credit:  彭嘉傑, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons