Local Cadres’ Inaction versus Central Control in Xi Jinping’s China
- Guoguang Wu
- 6 days ago
- 21 min read
This article analyzes how central-local relations have evolved in Xi Jinping’s China from the perspective of elite politics, focusing on local elite behavior vis-à-vis the leader’s concentration of power. It finds that local cadres have responded to Xi’s “self-revolution” of tightening party discipline, a major political measure to achieve his concentration of power, mostly with inaction in terms of performing their job duties, and their passive and defensive behavior has negatively affected Chinese local governance. It argues that such cadre inaction can be viewed as everyday resistance to Xi’s rule, including his concentration of power and his governance programs. The Xi leadership has made great efforts to overcome such resistance, primarily by dispatching various inspection teams to the localities. This countermove, however, has worsened, rather than overcome, the dilemma between central control and local enthusiasm in policy implementation, leading to what appears to be a stalemate between Xi and the vast local bureaucracy.
The leader’s concentration of power in the context of Communist China often implies a centralization of power in central-local relations, which, in theory, increases pressure and discipline over local cadres to follow the leader’s instructions and implement central policies. The degree of Xi Jinping’s concentration of power has been extremely high. How do local cadres of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) respond in terms of performing their governance responsibilities vis-à-vis Xi’s concentration of power? Do they perform better in executing central policies? Does such a concentration of power improve their ability to carry out their centrally assigned jobs?
This article focuses on the behavior of Chinese local cadres during the Xi era to explore how their behavior affects central-local political dynamics in terms of elite management and Chinese governance. It first examines the increasing inaction of local cadres in recent years to perform their jobs, and it looks at how this has affected local governance. The article then extends the discussion to explore the political meaning of such cadre inaction by viewing it as a form of everyday resistance by local bureaucrats to rule by Xi, including both his concentration of power and his governance programs. The third section investigates how the Xi leadership deals with this challenge by, in particular, dispatching various inspection teams to localities throughout the nation, and why this has exacerbated, rather than overcome, the dilemma between central control and local enthusiasm in policy implementation. How does such a tug-of-war affect politics and governance in Xi’s China, especially in terms of cadre management and central-local relations? The conclusion will briefly answer the question.
Due to the very low transparency of CCP politics, it is extremely difficult to collect systematic data regarding the job performance of party-state cadres, especially when such performance is negative due to apathy and inaction. This article relies on official CCP publications as their criticism of cadre behavior reveals the problems in cadre management and what the regime is worried about in terms of governance.
Cadre Inaction Undermining Governance Effectiveness
“Encouraging cadres to take responsibility and to do their jobs is a key and difficult issue in current organizational work” (激励干部担当作为是当前组织工作中的重点难点问题). This is a 2020 diagnosis by the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee regarding cadre behavior.[1] In fact, this has been an enduring problem throughout the Xi era, both before and after 2020.
The issue became most prominent in 2018 when Xi began his second term, when his rapid and successful concentration of power during the first term (2012–17) began to affect cadre behavior. According to Xi’s speech at the National Conference on Organizational Work, held in July 2018, “Some cadres lack the energy and spirit to do their jobs and perform with creativity; they do not take responsibility, and they do not take action; … they are afraid of making mistakes in decision-making, dare not make decisions, and shirk and procrastinate in their work.”[2] Several months later, at a Politburo collective study session on November 26, 2018, Xi criticized cadres’ “risk-averse mentality lacking a drive to confront challenges,” and he raised the issue of “mobilizing cadre enthusiasm.” He emphatically defended his harshness to “manage” cadres by saying that “It is wrong to place the blame on strict management for some cadres’ irresponsibility and inaction.”[3]
Such a highlight on cadre irresponsibility and inaction implies the seriousness of the problem, and in 2023, when starting his third term, Xi had to reiterate the issue by admitting that “among cadres there are still prominent problems of unwillingness, fear, and inability to take responsibility.” He elaborated by noting that “Some cadres prefer to do nothing and muddle through in order to avoid trouble; some take detours when encountering conflicts and difficulties, shirk their own responsibilities, and dare not take real action or tackle difficult problems; some engage in rhetoric without taking action, take stands quickly with declarations of loyalty to the leader but are slow and ineffective in execution; some do not meet the demands of their positions, have mediocre abilities, cannot shoulder their responsibilities, and do not make progress in their work; some are hesitant and timid, lacking confidence and feeling a sense of panic in the face of risks and challenges, etc.”[4]
Xi’s criticism is a good summary of the negative responses of cadres in performing their duties in Xi’s “new era.” Such behavior persists to this day. The latest sign of its continuity, despite Xi’s criticism, can be found in a series of commentaries published by Xinhua, China’s official news agency, in April 2025, which repeatedly note that “some cadres are afraid that the more they work, the more mistakes they make, and that involvement in conflicts bring them trouble, thus leading to a mentality of not daring to take responsibility and not daring to act.”[5] The series of commentaries describe those cadres as “being positive in their attitudes but negative in their actions,” that they solve problems like “moving forward on a treadmill”[6]—the gesture seems to be moving forward but no a real progress is made.
CCP publications, in their harsh criticism of such behavior, have borrowed and invented a variety of terms to refer to cadre irresponsibility and inaction, including “lying flat” (躺平), “side-lying” (侧卧), “giving up” (摆烂), “hiding from trouble” (躲事儿), and “job burnout” (职业倦怠). These terms highlight both the gravity and the persistence of the problem.
“The phenomenon of some cadres lying flat is quite prominent now,”[7] a magazine sponsored by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) warned in 2023. It is evidenced by that, accessed on May 11, 2025, Google finds 1.92 million results with “干部躺平”as the keyword. A Peking University professor of public administration, who was also party committee secretary of the faculty, found in 2022 that “lying flat” had become a “phenomenon among local cadres,” whereby “cadres have no desire and lack any motivation and enthusiasm in their daily work.” She vividly described “the main manifestations of the lying flat phenomenon” as follows: It is difficult to propel them forward, and they complain when they are being pushed; they like to dodge and avoid their job responsibilities, choosing to do easy tasks rather than difficult tasks; they lack the drive to fight for the party’s objectives, instead they merely go through the motions, feeling weary from their responsibilities and observing passively. In performing their government jobs, they simply “prefer to do nothing, become discouraged, and want to give up.”[8]
According to Xinhua, after these “lying flat” cadres were condemned and some were disciplined by the party, a new type of cadres called “side-lying” cadres emerged. “These side-lying cadres often lie down when they feel like lying down, stand up when they feel like standing up, lying down and standing up whenever they want.” In terms of carrying out their party-state duties, “they just watch the fun, act as spectators, and stand by the sidelines.”[9]
A Central Party School–affiliated newspaper found a mentality of “playing it badly” among cadres, which “may seem like a nonchalant attitude and performing their jobs in a self-defeating way in terms of facing risks and challenges.” It criticized cadres “who respond negatively to challenges, who lack competence, avoid responsibility, and deceive themselves to justify their inaction.”[10]
Cadre inaction in implementing central policy inevitably and negatively affects regime governance, especially in terms of local implementation of central policies. In general, as a People’s Daily–affiliated magazine article admits, it “has caused grassroots cadres to form a ‘middle obstacle’ in the implementation and performance of party-state policies.”[11] In particular, in some policy areas to which the Xi leadership pays significant attention but heavily relies on local performance, such as poverty alleviation and environmental protection, such cadre inaction leads to impotent governance.
Based on survey data covering 155 prefectures and cities in 29 provinces across the country, a research article finds that job burnout among grassroots cadres in poverty alleviation is “a phenomenon that deserves great attention” as the overall average level of job burnout among China’s grassroots poverty alleviation cadres (52.05) “is significantly higher than the reference value (45).”[12] The manifestations of job burnout among poverty alleviation cadres can be described as “some cadres have lost their enthusiasm for poverty alleviation, have no passion and vitality, often are irritable, fear to work, or even avoid work, and they have no mood to complete their existing tasks.”[13]
In terms of environmental protection, CCP official media have also found local cadres are “not attentive” to relevant policies despite “repeated emphasis” by the central leadership and the media have criticized local cadres for “a floating work style, not taking action when encountering problems, and being at a loss when asked about environmental protection. In concluding, the above inevitably leads to “irresponsibility, lack of understanding, and ineffective handling of problems occurring right under their noses.”[14]
Everyday Resistance as the Response of Local Bureaucrats to Xi’s Concentration of Power
Burnout by bureaucrats can be found everywhere, but it has become a prominent issue in Xi’s China in particular due to Xi’s “new era” that features his concentration of power and the policies that facilitated this centralization.
First, the political atmosphere created by such policies has added to the anxieties and insecurities among cadres to perform their duties. It is well known that Xi consolidated his authority and achieved a significant concentration of power primarily through the anti-corruption campaign—what he calls the CCP’s “self-revolution”—which has been marked by a range of punitive measures that harshly discipline party-state cadres, often in the absence of due process. Cadres have responded by “lying flat” or by other similar behavior to reduce the political risks they will encounter in performing their duties. In Chinese public opinion, this is known as a “no trouble” mentality. An essay published in October 2020 in The People’s Forum magazine, which is sponsored by the CCP Central Committee mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, states: “At present, some party members and cadres, fearing to make mistakes, take ‘no trouble’ as the highest principle in their work, creating a mentality of not daring to act or being unwilling to act”; these cadres “prefer not to seek credit and to avoid making mistakes,” meaning “avoiding their responsibilities.” Such a mentality “inevitably contributes to buck-passing, procrastination, and laziness in local governance.”[15]
Many relevant analyses in CCP publications—sometimes indirectly—offer similar diagnoses of such inaction, attributing it to passive responses to the tightening of party discipline among elites in Xi’s China. First, they explain that local cadres now believe that “it is difficult to find problems if you do nothing, there is no risk if you do nothing, and there tend to be fewer shortcomings noted in organizational assessments when one refrains from doing much thus from making significant mistakes,”[16] because “the more you do, the more mistakes you make; the less you do, the fewer mistakes you make; and if you do nothing, you make no mistakes,” and they understand that “this phenomenon leads some cadres to hesitate and shrink back, thus fostering a negative mentality of “avoiding errors rather than striving for achievements.”[17] The Central Commission of Discipline Inspection (CCDI)–affiliated journal has echoed this in a more forthright tone: “Cadres are mostly risk-averse, as they fear being held accountable for making mistakes. They believe that the more work they do, the greater the responsibilities they will bear and the higher the risks they will take.” Thus, “they think it is better that they do less.”[18]
Second, the huge pressures local cadres face to accomplish their duties have added to their job burnout; both the style of Xi’s exercise of power and his policies of governance in the “new era” are the most obvious contributors to such pressures. The CCP media are aware of this, noting “the increase in work pressures has brought about some negative effects, such as the lying flat phenomenon.”[19] A survey found that “There are widespread psychological pressures to varying degrees among local cadres, marked by ‘psychological imbalances’ and ‘psychological fatigue,’” and the “main factors affecting the mental health of local party-state cadres come from the workplace.” It is said that “Most local cadres face heavy and complex workloads and are exhausted from constant coping, as operating under excessive pressure has become the norm.” They each have numerous duties, huge responsibilities, heavy burdens, and demanding requirements, but at the same time, they face “many constraints.” Thus they “are prone to psychological problems, such as mental fatigue, psychological imbalances, or excessive depression.”[20] As examples of the major tasks local cadres face, this survey article lists epidemic prevention, stability maintenance, poverty alleviation, party building, operating “clean government,” and preparing for inspections,[21] many of which are hallmarks of Xi’s governance program, powerfully promoted by the central leadership in the process of Xi concentrating his power.
Third, the leader’s personal concentration of power often leads to capricious policymaking and inconsistent policies, thus adding to the confusion and hesitation among local cadres in terms of implementing policy. CCP publications do not dare blame their great leader, but they may indirectly say such things as: “Some policymaking is not well investigated and studied; it does not understand the real situation at the grassroots levels, and policies are one-size-fits-all and blindly issued. … It is not that grassroots cadres are unwilling to do their jobs, but that the policies do not fit the actual situation and thus the cadres are unable to do their jobs.”[22] In many cases, the local cadres simply “do not know what to do”; “they may become confused, lost, and full of worries, so they hesitate to act.”[23]
Fourth, Xi’s concentration of power has destroyed many norms that previously governed cadres’ career expectations, promotions, and advancements, thus greatly contributing to their insecurities, uncertainties, and lack of a sense of accomplishment, which lead to cadres being irresponsible and not taking action. This is an extremely sensitive political issue that is virtually untouchable for public discussion in China, but there still are hints indicating the disappointment, if not discontent, among local cadres that ultimately affects their job performance. “Every party member and cadre should be grateful for the party organization’s training, and they should fully trust the party’s personnel selection and employment system,” a party media article told its audience in 2020. When “other party cadres are promoted to more important positions” but “their own wishes are not met,” party cadres should avoid “feeling that the party organization has let them down, becoming discouraged and passive in their work, and even seeking ways to obtain compensation and comfort through corruption.” The author, a CCP party-building research director at the Institute of Marxism of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warned that if party cadres fail to overcome such a mentality, “the result will be nothing but disgrace and the destruction of their own futures.”[24]
Most importantly, with Xi’s concentration of power, the already limited atmosphere within the CCP for policy discussion, bottom-up criticism, and expression of discontent has all but disappeared.[25] Cadre behavior is what James Scott calls “everyday resistance” as “weapons of the weak.”[26] CCP cadres are not “weak” in a general sense, but they are weak in the face of their supervisors and, ultimately, the party organization and their great leader. Their everyday resistance, therefore, is often manifested in increasing bureaucratism. In an article published in April 2025, the head of the Organization Department of a provincial party committee, describes such bureaucratic “everyday resistance” as: “inaction, slow action, and false action (不作为，慢作为，假作为), treating being said as being done (把说了当做了), treating having been doing as having done well (把做了当做好了), treating a meeting to study the problem as the problem being solved (把开会研究了当问题解决了), and treating the breakdown of tasks as task completion (把任务分解了当工作完成了), etc.”[27]
The increasing number of cases of job burnout among poverty alleviation cadres exemplifies a form of soft resistance to central policies. According to the study cited earlier, job burnout among poverty alleviation cadres has been marked by a dramatic increase in disappointment, irresponsibility, and inaction on the job since 2012, and such negative attitudes among cadres can be attributed to “being restricted by the system, and forcing oneself to carry out assigned duties while harboring inner reluctance.”[28]
The Central Inspection Teams and the Tightening of Supervision over Local Cadres
The Xi Jinping leadership has been fully aware of the inaction among local cadres, as indicated by the speeches and publications cited above. The challenge, however, lies in finding effective ways to overcome it. The various measures the leadership has taken include ideological education, organizational reshuffling, administrative disciplining, and granting of career rewards, but the dispatch of inspection teams to the localities has become the most widely used, significant, and unique measure in recent years.[29]
Intra-party inspections have become prominent since the 18th Party Congress in 2012 when Xi became party chief because it was reinvented by the Xi leadership for the purpose of effectively carrying out the anti-corruption campaign, a hallmark of Xi’s politics of governance. During Xi’s first term in power (2012–17), the Politburo and its Standing Committee (PBSC) held 23 meetings to discuss inspection work; Xi delivered an “important speech” at each of the meetings “profoundly expounding on the great significance of inspection work.”[30] Central inspection teams conducted 12 rounds of inspections, inspected 277 party organizations, and conducted “return inspections” to 16 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, “achieving full coverage of the party during one term for the first time in the history of the party.”[31] In 2015, the CCP Central Committee issued the “Regulations on the Inspection Work of the Communist Party of China.”[32] With the beginning of Xi’s second term in 2017, the 19th Party Congress amended the party charter and for the first included the inspection system in the CCP’s constitutional document.[33] A Google search on May 11, 2025 of “中央巡视工作” finds 6.97 million results, partially showing the significance of central inspection work in today’s Chinese politics.
An official assessment finds that “inspection and supervision work has greatly improved comprehensive and strict governance by the party,” especially by “extending the comprehensive and strict governance of the party to the local levels.”[34] The experience of the anti-corruption campaigns inspired the Xi leadership to develop a variety of inspection teams going beyond anti-corruption to cover “all walks of life” in politics and governance,[35] and increasingly employing inspections as a way of “breaking down possible local and grassroots resistance” to central policies and “solving the difficult problems in local governance.”[36]
The regime uses different Chinese-language terms to refer to the various inspection and supervision teams, which include 巡视组, 巡察组, 巡查组, 督查组, 督导组, 督察组 etc. There are subtle differences among these terms, but the job of all the teams is quite clear: “to look down from the top, discover problems in the ‘last mile’ at the grassroots, discover corruption and unhealthy trends that harm the vital interests of the party-state, and consolidate the local foundation for party governance.”[37]
In essence, the inspection system operates with the dispatch of teams by the party-state central leadership and sub-national leaderships to subordinate organizations for the purpose of inspecting and supervising in specific politics and governance-issue areas. These inspection teams are established as special agencies directly responsible to the party organizations that dispatched them,[38] namely, the Party Center, to inspect the localities. The Xi leadership has learned from the ancient Chinese experience in inspection, whereby “the distinctive feature was that the emperor and the central supervisory authority regularly or temporarily dispatched officials to inspect local areas to achieve the functions of supervising officials, detecting illegal promotions, and combating corruption.”[39] In 2013, implying that he himself is the emperor, Xi explicitly compared his inspection groups to an “envoy on behalf of the emperor” (钦差大臣 ) and an “inspector of the eight local jurisdictions” (八府巡按), assuring the teams that “the central leadership has given the imperial sword (尚方宝剑).”[40] In 2014, Xi cheered that “now the inspection groups are a bit like the ‘inspectors of the eight local jurisdictions,’” and that “those cadres with problems are scared.”[41] To strengthen the autonomy of the inspection groups from local interests and the effectiveness of their inspections, the leaders and the members of the inspection teams are fluid rather than fixed, and “they try every means to keep the localities from detecting the ‘patterns’ in their work methods.”[42]
How have the above measures been effective in overcoming the inaction of local cadres? They might help, but the effectiveness may be limited as indicated by the ongoing presence of cadre inaction. Since then, the central leadership has continuously expanded the scope of inspection efforts and, more recently, it has introduced an innovation known as “level-up inspections” (提级巡视), whereby central inspection teams are dispatched directly to the sub-provincial localities. This measure suggests a weakening of the central leadership’s political trust in provincial party organizations to effectively urge local cadres to implement central policies.[43]
In February 2024, the Party Center once again revised its Regulations on Inspection Work by further highlighting the political nature of inspections. A major revision appears in the first substantive clause, which states: “Inspection work is political supervision by higher-level party organizations over lower-level party organizations to fulfill their party leadership functions and responsibilities. The fundamental task of such inspection work is to resolutely safeguard General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core position in the party Central Committee and the core position of the entire party, and to resolutely safeguard the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core.”[44] This revision was a further move by Xi to suppress intra-party discontent with his concentration of power and his policy programs, especially any potential discontent among local cadres. Such a tightening of political discipline over local cadres, however, repeats the vicious cycle in which the tighter political control by the central leadership is exercised, the less enthusiasm the local cadres will exhibit to implement central policies.
Conclusion
In a large-size polity like China, the local officials’ response to national policy is a key for governance and a most significant factor in shaping the political dynamics of central-local relations. This feature has been mostly neglected in analyses of Xi Jinping’s China, however, because discussions of his concentration of power often overshadow any possible observations about the mentality and behavior of local cadres. This article is a preliminary attempt to examine how the central leadership’s effective political control over local cadres has, ironically, led to passivity and inaction among the local cadres in carrying out their duties to implement central policies. A major finding is that CCP local cadres who face harsh political discipline have become irresponsive to central instructions; they choose inaction to increase their own political security, as it is easy for them to show off their loyalty to the great leader in formalistic ways, but it is not easy for the central leadership to effectively supervise their daily work to fulfill its governance roles.
The Xi leadership has developed various methods to deal with the problem, among which this article emphatically stresses the “inspection group” phenomenon. Xi has attempted to revitalize the imperial measure in Chinese dynastic politics of dispatching central inspectors to the localities to check on performance, but it still cannot escape from the dilemma of local inaction. The mobilization of central inspection groups during Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns has worked effectively to find and purge corrupt and disloyal cadres; so far it has been less effective, however, in overcoming cadre inaction in performing daily local governance functions. Inspection teams are surely a powerful tool for the central leadership to control local cadres, but the challenge is that the tightening of political control over local cadres inevitably increases their insecurity and, therefore, reduces their incentives to perform their governance duties, leading to what appears to be a stalemate between Xi and the vast local bureaucracy.
This stalemate significantly reduces Xi’s ability to complete his personal policy agenda and, over time, it will undermine the capability of the entire CCP regime to take real actions in terms of solving the problems of governance. This seems to be a major challenge to Xi and his regime, especially in the context of the economic slowdown, and it is leading to a negative social aftermath. All efforts made by the Xi leadership to overcome the challenge, however, seemingly are becoming part of a self-defeating cycle, since the leadership primarily relies on political control to manage local cadres, but the increasing political control invariably leads to political insecurities and thereafter inaction among cadres. This does not help to break the stalemate, but it may encourage local cadres to display their political loyalty as a way to mask their inaction through various formalistic and bureaucratic measures. In this tug-of-war, Xi prevails in asserting formal control, but falters in policy implementation, while local cadres appear to maintain the upper hand in navigating their difficult circumstances by muddling through.
About the Contributor
Guoguang Wu holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and is Senior Research Scholar at the Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, Stanford University, as well as Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis. His research focuses on Chinese politics and comparative political economy, with current interests on China’s elite politics, politics of development and governance, transition from communism, and capitalist institutions in comparative perspective. He is the author of four books, including China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Globalization against Democracy: A Political Economy of Capitalism After its Global Triumph (Cambridge University Press, 2017), and editor or co-editor of six English-language volumes and author or editor of twenty Chinese-language books. During the late 1980s, he worked in Beijing as a policy adviser and speechwriter for the Zhao Ziyang leadership.
Notes
[1] 中共中央组织部干部一局，“加强领导班子政治建设，推动干部担当作为,” 共产党员网， May 14, 2020, https://www.12371.cn/2020/05/14/ARTI1589423939702586.shtml, accessed April 14, 2025.
[2] 习近平, “在全国组织工作会议上的讲话,” 共产党员网, July 3, 2018, https://www.12371.cn/2018/09/17/ARTI1537150840597467.shtml, accessed April 15, 2025.
[3] 习近平, “努力造就一支忠诚干净担当的高素质干部队伍,” 新华网, November 26, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-01/15/c_1123994727.htm, accessed April 15, 2025. Also, 王子晖, “干部队伍建设, 习近平这9句话振聋发聩!” 新华网, January 24, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2019-01/24/c_1124037703.htm, accessed April 14, 2025.
[4] 习近平, “在学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想主题教育工作会议上的讲话,” 《求是》, April 3, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/30/content_5753819.htm, accessed April 14, 2025.
[5] “整治形式主义, 新华社六连评!” 新华网, June 1, 2024, http://www.news.cn/politics/20240601/338693f9c7b4481f953890d858d650b1/c.html, accessed April 14, 2025.
[6] Ibid.
[7] 陈杨、黄月，“‘躲事儿’干部面面观,”《中国纪检监察杂志》, no. 684, May 15, 2023，https://zgjjjc.ccdi.gov.cn/bqml/bqxx/202305/t20230515_264186.html, accessed April 14, 2025.
[8] 句华, “让混日子的‘躺平式’干部没市场,”《人民论坛》, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2022-04/01/content_25917755.htm, accessed April 15, 2025.
[9] 评论员 徐文秀, “谨防‘侧卧式’干部,” 新华每日电讯, October 17, 2023, http://www.news.cn/mrdx/2023-10/17/c_1310745775.htm, accessed April 15, 2025.
[10] “年轻干部不能有工作‘摆烂’心态,”《学习时报》, September 22, 2023, https://hrss.tj.gov.cn/xinwenzixun/meitijujiao/202309/t20230922_6413623.html, accessed April 14, 2025.
[11] 句华, “让混日子的‘躺平式’干部没市场”.
[12] 王亚华、舒全峰，“脱贫攻坚中的基层干部职业倦怠：现象、成因与对策,”《国家行政学院学报》, no. 3, August 27, 2018, https://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1007/5369.htm, accessed April 14, 2025.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “整治形式主义, 新华社六连评!”
[15] 王世泰，“基层治理中的干部避责心态及纠偏,”《人民论坛》，http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2020-10/11/content_2019944.htm, accessed April 14, 2025.
[16] 句华, “让混日子的‘躺平式’干部没市场.”
[17] “让想干事会干事的干部能干事干成事,”《中国纪检监察》, January 6, 2025, https://www.gdjct.gd.gov.cn/zhyw/content/post_204207.html, accessed May 7, 2025.
[18] 陈杨、黄月，“‘躲事儿’干部面面观.”
[19] 句华, “让混日子的‘躺平式’干部没市场.”
[20] 董静, “新时代基层党政干部心理健康问题研究,” 大河网, August 8, 2023, https://4g.dahe.cn/theory/202308041282454, accessed April 14, 2025.
[21] Ibid.
[22] 陈杨、黄月，“‘躲事儿’干部面面观.”
[23] 评论员 徐文秀, “谨防‘侧卧式’干部.”
[24] 戴立兴, “个别干部负面心态的表现及对策,”《人民论坛》，http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2020-07/20/content_2005476.htm, accessed April 14, 2025.
[25] For early resistance to Xi’s policies by CCP elites, see Guoguang Wu, “A Setback or Boost for Xi Jinping’s Concentration of Power? Domination versus Resistance within the CCP Elite,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 58 (December 2018), https://www.prcleader.org/_files/ugd/10535f_abd8da1b99e14b10a7039ae151b09b53.pdf, accessed May 7, 2025.
[26] James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
[27] 李东旭 (宁夏回族自治区党委常委、组织部部长)，“坚持用改革精神和严的标准锻造高素质干部队伍,”《学习时报》, January 20, 2025, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0120/c40531-40405232.html, accessed April 14, 2025.
[28] 王亚华、舒全峰，“脱贫攻坚中的基层干部职业倦怠.”
[29] An earlier essay by this author touches on this issue. See Guoguang Wu, “Has Xi Jinping Reached His Peak? Power Concentration versus Governance Capability,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 81 (September 2024), https://www.prcleader.org/post/has-xi-jinping-reached-his-peak-power-concentration-versus-governance-capability, accessed May 7, 2025, especially the section on Xi’s elaboration of the “three distinguishes.”
[30] “党的十八大以来中央巡视工作综述,” 人民网, September 29, 2017, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0929/c117092-29566664.html, accessed April 20, 2025.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “巡视组、巡察组、巡查组，督导组、督察组、督查组…究竟有啥区别？” 共产党员网，November 3, 2018, https://www.12371.cn/2018/11/02/ARTI1541115997443267.shtml, accessed April 7, 2025.
[33] “中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会对党章进行了哪些重要修改?” 共产党员网, November 30, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2022/11/30/ARTI1669808559522631.shtml, accessed April 21, 2025.
[34] “党的十八大以来中央巡视工作综述.”
[35] “巡视不止于反腐,” 新华社, October 21, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-10/21/c_1119765695.htm, accessed April 20, 2025; “巡视组、巡察组、巡查组，督导组、督察组、督查组…究竟有啥区别?”
[36] “三个关键词读懂新一轮巡视,” 《南方日报》，April 10, 2025, https://www.gdjct.gd.gov.cn/lzlt/content/post_205605.html, accessed May 7, 2025; “中央提级巡视，为什么是昆明?” 《中国新闻周刊》, April 17, 2025, https://www.inewsweek.cn/politics/2025-04-17/25043.shtml, accessed April 20, 2025.
[37] “巡视组、巡察组、巡查组，督导组、督察组、督查组…究竟有啥区别?”
[38] Ibid.
[39] 余少祥，“中国古代巡视制度考略,” 人民政协报，March 6, 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0306/c70731-26645800.html, accessed May 7, 2025.
[40] “习近平谈做好新时代巡视工作,” 中华人民共和国最高人民检察院，September 24, 2019, https://www.spp.gov.cn/dj/djxmt/201909/t20190924_432734.shtml, accessed April 20, 2025.
[41] “用好巡视这把‘利剑’”—习近平总书记这样说,” 中央纪委监察部网站, June 16, 2017, https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/zyxszt/bjzl_zyxs/201706/t20170622_101534.html, accessed April 20, 2025.
[42] “巡视组、巡察组、巡查组，督导组、督察组、督查组…究竟有啥区别？”; “王岐山如何挑选‘打虎将,’” 人民文摘, February 2015, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmwz/html/2015-02/01/content_1541438.htm, accessed April 7, 2025.
[43] “三个关键词读懂新一轮巡视”; “中央提级巡视，为什么是昆明?”
[44] “中共中央印发《中国共产党巡视工作条例》,” 中国政府网, February 21, 2024, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202402/content_6932874.htm, accessed April 7, 2025. Also, “《中国共产党巡视工作条例》修订条文对照表,” 共产党员网, February 22, 2024, https://www.12371.cn/2024/02/22/ARTI1708570430983588.shtml, accessed April 21, 2025.
Photo credit: luchangjiang~鲁昌江, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
