From Purge to Control: A Recent Pivot in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Crackdown
A striking anomaly marks Xi Jinping’s never-ending anti-corruption campaign. Twelve years after its launch, the number of party members and officials punished for violating CCP discipline has more than doubled. In addition to raising questions about the effectiveness of Xi’s approach to fighting corruption since a successful campaign should have already reduced the level of corruption and the number of officials disciplined, this anomaly may also be the result of a shift from purge to control in the emphasis of Xi’s anti-corruption drive. As evidenced by three successive revisions of the party’s discipline code within an 8-year period, the party under Xi’s rule has greatly expanded the range of actions it deems to be in violation of political and organizational discipline. An examination of the new rules shows that most of these new rules are vaguely worded, perhaps deliberately so, in order to give the party greater discretion in disciplining its members. Analysis of sample cases involving disciplined senior and mid-level officials in 2023–24 indicates that these revisions have indeed given the party new instruments to control its officials, with about 10–25 percent of the disciplined officials accused of violating the newly established rules.
Since he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012, Xi Jinping has pursued the toughest and longest anti-corruption campaign in party history. Judging by the large number of party officials disciplined and prosecuted during the last twelve years, it seems reasonable to believe that this unrelenting crackdown on malfeasance within the party should have already achieved its desired goal of reducing corruption. At the very least, the number of party members and officials investigated, disciplined, and punished should have declined, not risen, if this datum is treated as a proxy of the scope of corruption inside the party. Additionally, although it is reasonable to suspect that purging rivals might have motivated Xi to launch the campaign during his first term as a means to consolidate power, weaponizing anti-corruption investigations against rivals seems to make less sense in more recent years as most known threats to Xi, such as former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, former director of the Central Committee General Office Ling Jihua, and many other senior officials as well as their highly placed loyalists in the party, the government, and the military, had already been expelled from the party and sent to prison. In all likelihood, the most recent officials disciplined and punished for various misdeeds have no connections with Xi’s rivals. Many of them actually received promotions after Xi’s rise to power.
However, the total number of party members and officials disciplined for various violations of discipline has steadily increased, rather than declined, in recent years (Table 1). The most surprising rise in the number of disciplined party members and officials occurred in 2024. In the first nine months of the year, the party punished 889,000 members and officials, averaging 296,000 per quarter. On an annualized basis, this would mean that 1.185 million party members and officials were disciplined in 2024, nearly twice the number of those disciplined in 2023 (Table 1).
There are several mutually compatible explanations for the steady increase in the number of disciplined party members and officials. The popular joke that an anti-corruption campaign only makes corruption worse (越反越腐) reflects the difficulties a one-party regime faces in trying to cleanse its ranks. First, Xi’s anti-corruption drive has not led to fundamental institutional reforms that would curb corruption by reducing the state’s role in the economy and increasing transparency. In fact, Xi has done the opposite by pursuing a more statist economic policy and increasing secrecy. Second, international experience suggests that corruption can be more effectively contained in a society with more press freedoms, a civil society, and an independent judiciary.[1] But the measures adopted by the party to suppress civil society, stifle freedom of expression, and assert political control over the legal system are counterproductive in terms of fighting corruption. Third, officials promoted under Xi’s rule may be even more greedy and reckless due to their belief that loyalty to Xi and his supporters would make them untouchable (Admiral Miao Hua, former director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission and a longtime follower of Xi who was placed under investigation last year, is a prime example). Fourth, the incurable insecurity and paranoia of a strongman ruler like Xi may also be a factor. No number of purges can make him feel more secure as he rightly fears that the anti-corruption crackdown has increased, rather than reduced, the threats to his power because the victims of his purges and their supporters have strong motives to seek revenge. Even if this threat can be addressed by an expansion of the crackdown to neutralize second-tier or third-tier potential threats in the party, a strongman whose authority is largely built on fear must constantly reinforce deterrence against potential threats through frequent purges. The “incurable insecurity” thesis seems to make more sense in 2024 as Xi seeks to intensify the rule of fear to deter or to suppress inner-party discontent fueled by a protracted economic slump since mid-2022.
Although these explanations may answer the puzzle of why the rising or the persistently large number of individuals punished for party violations, one hitherto underexplored explanation is that the observed trend may be an indicator and consequence of a shift in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. After achieving his initial objective of neutralizing the most lethal “insider threats,” Xi may be seeking to use the party’s disciplinary cudgel to impose tighter political control and make the party more compliant in implementing his agenda. The main instrument at his disposal is the CCP Code on Penalties Against Disciplinary Violations (中国共产党纪律处分条例). On paper, the significant expansion of political violations as the result of the three revisions of the “code” under Xi (2015, 2018, and 2023) seems to have given Xi new tools to enforce political and ideological conformity. The 50-percent increase in the number of disciplined party members and officials following the 2015 revision is likely due to the expansion of punishable violations of political and organizational discipline. The near-doubling of the number of disgraced members and officials in 2024 from the previous year may also be the result of the revision of the code in 2023.
This essay first analyzes official data on the numbers and ranks of party members and officials disciplined for violations of party discipline and the penalties they received since Xi came to power in 2012. It then examines the expansion of violations of political and organizational discipline in the three revisions of the party’s discipline code. It ends with an analysis of a sample of corruption cases involving senior officials (those supervised by the party’s Central Organization Department) and mid-level officials (those supervised by provincial party organizational departments) to gauge the effects of the three revisions on the party’s ability to exert tighter control over its members.
Trends in the CCP Anti-Corruption Crackdown
Data on the number of individuals disciplined for violations of party discipline since 2013 show a significant increase during Xi’s 12-year rule even though the rate of the increase has been uneven (Table 1). The most rapid increase occurred between 2013 and 2018, when the number of disciplined individuals rose from 182,000 to 621,000. This number plateaued between 2018 and 2023, averaging 606,000 individuals per year. The record (889,000 disciplined within nine months) was reached in 2024. As discussed earlier, while we can attribute the rapid increase in the number disciplined party members during the first six years of Xi’s rule to his need to purge his rivals and their supporters, the persistently high numbers in the six years thereafter are likely the result of the factors we briefly listed earlier (ineffective policies, political insecurity, and newly created violations). Data in Table 1 also reveal an interesting pattern. The share of officials disciplined was relatively constant (around 37 percent) between 2016 and 2018, but it began a steady decline starting in 2019. By 2024, the share of mid-level and lower-level officials fell to slightly under 22 percent. This dramatic drop indicates that the anti-corruption crackdown is now mainly targeting ordinary party members, not officials. One possible explanation for this trend is that since the party’s 19th Congress in 2018, mid-level and lower-level officials have been increasingly connected with Xi’s loyalists through patronage or personal networks, thus making them less vulnerable.
Table 1. Numbers of party members and officials who have been disciplined since 2013
Year | Total number of members and officials disciplined | Township-level officials and below (% of total) | County-level officials (% of total) | Ting-Ju level officials | Provincial-Ministerial– level officials (2) |
2013 | 182,000 | NA | 6,400 (1) |
| 31 |
2014 | 232,000 | NA | NA | NA | 68 |
2015 | 336,000 | NA |
|
| 90 |
2016 | 415,000 | 137,000 (33.0%) | 18,000 (4.3%) | 2,700 | 76 |
2017 | 527,000 | 175,000 (33.2%) | 21,000 (3.98%) | 3,300 | 58 |
2018 | 621,000 | 202,000 (32.5%) | 26,000 (4.19%) | 3,500 | 51 |
2019 | 587,000 | 183,000 (31.2%) | 24,000 (4.09%) | 4,000 | 41 |
2020 | 604,000 | 182,000 (30.1%) | 22,000 (3.64%) | 2,859 | 27 |
2021 | 627,000 | 185,000 (29.5%) | 25,000 (3.99%) | 3,024 | 36 |
2022 | 592,000 | 157,000 (26.5%) | 21,000 (3.55%) | 2,450 | 53 |
2023 | 610,000 | 167,000 (27.3%) | 24,000 (3.93%) | 3,144 | 49 |
2024 (3) | 889,000 | 158,000 (17.8%) | 35,000 (3.94%) | 4,348 | 73 |
Source: Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC)
Notes:
(1) Including ting-ju–level officials.
(2) Provincial-Ministerial–level officials and “Centrally Supervised” (中管) officials disciplined or placed under investigation.
(3) From January to September.
The data in Table 2 show the types of penalties received by disciplined members and officials. In 2017, the party instituted a new four-category system (四种形态) for disciplining its members. Violators in the first category are required to make self-criticisms or to explain their conduct, but they penalties (such as warnings or minor demotions). Those in the third category receive more severe penalties (such as probation and major demotions). Only those in the fourth category are criminally prosecuted (invariably after expulsion from the party).[2]
Based on the data in Table 2, it is clear that an overwhelming percentage (around 80 percent) of disciplined CCP members and officials received light penalties (second category) and a small share (around 10–13 percent between 2017 and 2023) received heavier penalties. Although the percentage of party members and officials criminally prosecuted doubled from 2014 to 2023, this still represents a small share of the total.
Two pieces of data in Table 2 are worth noting. First, 516,000 CCP members and officials were criminally prosecuted between 2017 and 2024, underscoring Xi’s tough stance on corruption but also implying that hundreds or thousands of former CCP members are now serving prison time. Second, despite a huge rise in the number of disciplined individuals in 2024, a lower proportion of those disciplined were criminally prosecuted. It is perhaps too early to tell whether 2024 is a blip or the beginning of a new trend.
Table 2. Disposition of disciplined party members and officials
Year | Total (1) | Second Category (% of total) | Third Category | Fourth Category: Criminally prosecuted |
2013 | 182,000 | NA | NA | NA |
2014 | 232,000 | NA | NA | 12,000 (5.2%) |
2015 | 336,000 | NA | NA | 14,000 (4.2%) |
2016 | 415,000 | NA | NA | NA |
2017 | 530,000 | 412,000 (77.7%) | 70,000 (13.2%) | 48,000 (9.1%) |
2018 | 632,000 | 495,000 (78.3%) | 82,000 (12.9%) | 55,000 (8.7%) |
2019 | 603,000 | 463,000 (76.8%) | 72,000 (11.9%) | 68,000 (11.3%) |
2020 | 624,000 | 485,000 (77.7%) | 71,000 (11.3%) | 68,000 (10.9%) |
2021 | 638,000 | 494,000 (77.4%) | 70,000 (11.0%) | 74,000 (11.6%) |
2022 | 606,000 | 478,000 (78.9%) | 64,000 (10.6%) | 64,000 (10.6%) |
2023 | 622,000 | 492,000 (79.0%) | 64,000 (10.3%) | 66,000 (10.9%) |
2024 (3) | 901,000 | 756,000 (83.9%) | 72,000 (8.0%) | 73,000 (8.1%) |
Source: CDIC
Notes:
(1) The total number of disciplined members and officials since 2017 is derived by adding the number of all those who received some form of punishment. This number differs slightly from the number provided in CDIC press releases.
Revision of the Party’s Disciplinary Code
The party approved an interim (试行) disciplinary code in 1997 during the Jiang Zemin era. This interim code was revised and elevated to the status of a formal (正式) code in 2003 under Hu Jintao. In October 2015, roughly three years after Xi assumed power, the party approved a significant revision of the code. The changes in the articles dealing with political and organizational offenses are especially noteworthy because they dramatically broaden the scope of potential violations while at the same time they reduce or streamline other categories of offenses. Even more significantly but also intriguingly, after 2015 the party revised the disciplinary code two additional times (once in 2018 and again in 2023) to further tighten the leadership’s control of party members’ political conduct. Unlike Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both of whom seemed to be content with just one iteration of the disciplinary code, Xi Jinping apparently has sought to rely on a revised disciplinary code to strengthen his grip on power. In this section, we focus on the two sections in the party’s discipline code that deal with violations of “political” and “organizational” discipline because the articles in these two sections spell out those offenses that the party leadership considers to be threats to its authority and its ability to enforce political loyalty.
Table 3 provides a rough comparison of the code revised in 2003 under Hu Jintao and the three subsequent revised versions of the code under Xi. If we count the number of articles and Chinese characters in the section that specifies penalties for violations of political discipline (对违反政治纪律行为的处分), it is evident that the three revisions during Xi’s rule have significantly expanded both the number of articles and their content. Compared with the 2003 version, the 2015 revision adds three articles and about 1,000 additional Chinese characters. The 2018 version has eight more articles and about 150 more Chinese characters than the 2015 version. The winner in terms of the number of articles and characters is the 2023 version, which consists of 28 articles and 4,179 characters. If we compare the Hu version (2003) with Xi’s latest version (2023), the section on political discipline has roughly doubled both in terms of the number of articles and the number of Chinese characters. Xi’s revisions of the section on organizational discipline (对违反组织纪律行为的处分) are less extensive. The 2015 revision increased the number of articles from twelve to seventeen and added Chinese characters, but the two subsequent revisions made only modest changes.
Table 3: Comparison of the four versions of the CCP discipline code
|
| 2003 | 2015 | 2018 | 2023 |
Political Discipline | Number of Articles | 15 | 18 | 26 | 28 |
Number of Characters | 1973 | 2995 | 3145 | 4179 | |
Organizational Discipline | Number of Articles | 12 | 17 | 15 | 17 |
Number of Characters | 1237 | 2135 | 2101 | 2461 | |
Integrity and Other Violations | Number of Articles | 103 | 50 | 54 | 61 |
Number of Characters | 16138 | 6478 | 7374 | 8676 |
If we assume that Xi’s anti-corruption crackdown was intended to curb financial or economic misdeeds, such as bribe-taking, abuse of official perks, and misuse of public office, his approved revisions should toughen those provisions against such acts based on more extensive and detailed articles. However, a comparison of the four versions shows that, instead of strengthening the provisions against violations of party rules on financial or economic activities, Xi’s revisions, especially the first revision in 2015, drastically shorten the sections on penalties against violations of these rules. In the 2003 version, these sections consist of 103 articles and more than 16,000 characters. Xi’s first revision (2015) cuts the number of articles by half and the number of Chinese characters by about 10,000. The second revision added four articles and 900 characters. Even with additional articles and characters, the third revision (2023) contains still far fewer provisions than the 2003 version.
A close reading of the three revisions under Xi shows that the biggest change has been the expansion in the scope of political and organizational violations. In other words, these revisions have made many acts, including poorly defined ones, violations of party political and organizational discipline subject to punishment (up to expulsion). The most likely motivations behind these revisions include deterrence against criticisms of the top leadership, against formation of personal networks, and passive resistance to party policies. In the space below we provide some illustrative examples.
Tightening Controls on Party Members’ Speech, Access to Information, and Personal Freedoms
One of the most striking changes in the 2015 revision is the addition to two clauses in Article 46 that are obviously intended to stifle inner-party criticisms of the top leadership and its policies. These two new provisions establish penalties against “recklessly criticizing the party’s major policies and undermining the party’s centralized unity” and “smearing the image of the party and the state or denigrating and falsely defaming party and state leaders.[3] One clause in Article 53 prohibits “making decisions or speaking publicly without authorization on major policy issues that should be the purview of the party center.” (擅自对应当由中央决定的重大政策问题作出决定和对外发表主张的).[4] Further restrictions on party members’ speech were added in the 2018 revision. Article 44 makes punishable “failure to adhere to the party center on major issues of principle, as manifested in actual speech and conduct or harmful consequences” (在重大原则问题上不同党中央保持一致且有实际言论、行为或者造成不良后果的). Article 52 spells out punishment for “fabricating, spreading, and disseminating political rumors that sabotage party unity.” Party members who “engage in egregious political conduct, anonymous slander, malicious false accusations, or fabrication of other rumors” are subject to penalties up to expulsion.[5] In the 2023 revision, Article 52 penalizes party members who “privately read and listen to banned publications, documents, pictures, and recordings published on the internet.”[6] Article 66 in the 2015 revision requires that party members disclose accurate information related to their personal movements or whereabouts (个人去向).[7] Article 91 in the 2023 revision punishes party members who without approval change their itineraries on authorized private overseas trips or exceed the authorized length of
their (private) trips.[8]
Restrictions on Forming Factions, Joining Unauthorized Groups, Seeking Political Influence, or Running Personal Fiefdoms
The three new revisions also add vague restrictions on party members’ activities that might result in the formation of factions, cliques, and networks. Article 52 in the 2015 revision penalizes party members for forming small groups, cultivating personal networks, boosting personal political influence, and acquiring political capital.[9] Article 68 prohibits party members and officials from organizing or joining hometown associations, alumni associations, and veterans groups in violation of the relevant rules. In Article 72, party members are not allowed to seek votes or assist others’ election efforts or to engage in election-related activities that have not been authorized by the party.[10] Article 50 of the 2018 revision punishes party officials who run personal fiefdoms and refuse to implement the policies of the party center or who carry out different policies behind the back of the party center.[11] The 2018 revision (Article 76) also prohibits any officials from building their own power bases by appointing or promoting their loyalists and from engaging in acts that may further their personal political careers (by lobbying superiors or promising future promotions to supporters).[12] “Seeking political patrons” (政治攀附) was made a violation in the 2023 revision (Article 54).[13]
Facilitating Anti-corruption Investigations
One of the most important provisions in the 2015 revision is Article 57 which, by specifying a long list of activities of “resisting investigation,” gives the party enormous leverage over potential targets and forces them to cooperate. According to this provision, “resisting investigation” includes “fabrication of confessions in collusion with others; falsifying, destroying, removing, and concealing evidence; preventing others from providing incriminating evidence and materials; protecting others involved in the same case; providing false information to the party or covering up the facts.”[14] Article 67 penalizes failure to disclose accurate information related to personal matters in violation of relevant rules or failure to provide factual responses to the party inquiries. The 2018 revision added one more punishable offense: interference with the party’s anti-corruption inspections or failure to implement measures required by the inspection teams.[15] Article 80 in the 2023 revision penalizes party members who refuse to testify or who willfully provide false testimony (against others) during investigations.[16]
Laxity in Implementing Party Policies and Disloyalty
The revised disciplinary code holds party officials accountable for perceived laxity in implementing party policies and displaying signs of disloyalty. The 2015 revision (Article 61) imposes penalties on party members and cadres if they allow “violations of political discipline” or “erroneous thought and conduct” for the sake of “unprincipled harmony.”[17] Failure to report to or to seek instructions from the party on major issues according to relevant rules (不按照有关规定或者工作要求，向组织请示报告重大问题、重要事项) is a punishable offense as well (Article 66).[18] Article 50 of the 2018 revision singles out passive resistance or failure to implement party policies fully and resolutely.[19] Article 51 adds a new political offense: disloyalty to the party. Party members who are deemed disloyal, dishonest, and duplicitous are subject to expulsion.[20]
Unusual Provisions
The 2018 and 2023 revisions seem to mark a significant escalation in political control because they contain new, unusual, broad, and vague provisions that can be applied at the full discretion of the party. Article 49 of the 2018 revision punishes party members for “causing a deterioration of the political ecology (政治生态) in the (party member’s) region, department, or unit,”[21] or for befriending “political fraudsters” (结交政治骗子) or being taken advantage of by “political fraudsters,” (被政治骗子利用). To deter local officials from pursuing short-term policies to burnish their administrative records, Article 57 punishes officials who “have erroneous perspectives on administrative performance records, violate the values of new developments, deviate from the requirements of high-quality development, and cause the party, the state, and the people significant losses.”[22] The article increases penalties on officials responsible for constructing costly but useless “image projects” and “performance record projects.”[23]
Although it is clear that, with each revision, the party, in particular Xi, has acquired additional tools to control its members and officials, it is less clear whether the new mechanisms of control – the expansion of potential political violations – have been effective in practice. A brief analysis of the revisions shows that one new provision – penalizing those resisting investigations – has likely given the party a specific and powerful instrument of control. New provisions deterring criticisms of party leadership and prohibiting the formation of factions and personal networks have likely led to party members behaving more cautiously. In other words, party members still voice criticisms of policies and continue to acquire power through personal networks, except that they now take greater care to conceal their views and activities. Overly broad and vague provisions likely are not only difficult to enforce but also have the perverse effect of encouraging risk-aversion and inducing bureaucratic paralysis.
Analysis of Sample Cases
In order to understand the effects of the revisions of the party’s discipline code on Xi’s unending anti-corruption drive, we examine two samples of cases the party’s CDIC and provincial discipline inspection committees investigated and concluded between 2023 and early 2025.[24] The first sample consists of 118 cases involving so-called “centrally supervised” officials (usually ministerial- or provincial-level officials supervised by the CCP Central Organization Department) whose investigations were concluded and whose punishments were announced between 2023 and January 2025. The second sample consists of 112 cases involving mid-level officials (ting-ju–level officials, equivalent to director-general–level officials in the West) who are supervised by the CCP provincial organization departments).
Of the 118 senior officials punished for alleged corruption, 36 (30 percent) were accused of “resisting investigation” and 31 violated the rule prohibiting concealing important personal information from the party. Only a very small number of officials was accused of the new political violations added in the three revisions under Xi’s rule. For example, four were charged with “reading or possessing banned publications,” four had violated the rule against “forming cliques,” two were accused of “failing to comply with the policy of the party center,” and two had violated the rule against “recklessly criticizing the party center” (妄议中央). This suggests that the most potent instruments the party has at its disposal to discipline high-level officials are procedural or technical, not substantive, violations. For example, the party’s definitions of “resisting investigation” and “failure to disclosure personal matters” are extremely broad and can be easily applied to the targets of investigations. At the same time, punishing officials for newly established political violations is more difficult. Substantive acts, such as reading and possessing banned publications, may be easy to conceal. Given the lack of trust among top officials, few may take the risk of voicing criticisms of the party center among people whom they do not know well. Offenses such as “failure to comply with the policy of the party center” or “forming cliques” may be too vague to be operationally useful to investigators.
Of the 112 mid-level officials who were punished for various violations in 2023 and 2024, 86 (77 percent) were accused of “resisting investigation” and 62 (55 percent) were charged with withholding information or making false statements to the party. These two data points confirm that most officials are caught for procedural or technical violations, not substantive political violations. One possible explanation why mid-level officials are twice as likely to “resist investigation” or to “withhold information or make false statements” is that senior officials tend to be more cooperative with investigators in the hopes of gaining leniency (as the party tends to punish higher-level officials more severely). Another possibility is that mid-level officials simply have greater confidence in their ability to thwart investigations and conceal information from the party.
Mid-level officials may be more likely to run afoul of the newly created political and organizational discipline. Nine (8 percent) were accused of having “erroneous concepts about their performance records (政绩观错位) or of building image projects (形象工程)”. This should not be surprising because spending public funds on dubious projects to boost their performance record helps local officials advance their personal political careers. Eight (7 percent) engaged in “seeking political patrons” (政治攀附) or “befriending political fraudsters” (结交政治骗子). Again, this finding is not surprising because local officials have a competitive edge in climbing the bureaucratic ladder if they can secure patrons. In some cases, they rely on (often fraudulent) power brokers to establish connections with senior officials. However, only a very small number of mid-level officials were punished for violating the other new political or organizational rules. Four were accused of “undermining the political ecology” (破坏政治生态), three were accused of failing to fully implement government policies (打折扣，变通), three were charged with the forming of cliques (团团伙伙), and three were caught reading or possessing banned publications.
However vaguely defined, we should not underestimate the effects of these newly added political violations on bolstering the party’s capacity to control its members and officials. To be sure, violations such as “resisting investigation” and “withholding information” may lead to troubles for 30 percent of senior officials and about two-thirds of mid-level officials (most officials are involved in the two violations simultaneously). But other violations of political and organizational discipline can also make a significant portion of party members and officials targets of disciplinary actions. Based on our small sample, it seems that during the 2023–24 period, probably around 10 percent of senior officials violated the newly created political and organizational discipline and perhaps as many as 25 percent of mid-level officials were involved in such violations.
One potential caveat about interpreting these two relatively small samples is that they include only the most serious cases involving officials who received the harshest penalties (expulsion from the party and criminal prosecution). The vast majority of party members and officials disciplined by the party received far less severe penalties (warnings or demotions). As the penalty of expulsion is used only in cases involving egregious circumstances (情节严重), it is likely that a much larger number of mid-level or low-level officials has been punished for violating the political and organizational discipline instituted by the three revisions under Xi. But because the party only discloses details of violations in cases involving senior or mid-level officials, it is difficult to produce an accurate estimate of the impact of the recent revisions on lower-level officials and average party members. The rough estimates we reach in this analysis most likely understate the extent of the violations of the newly created political and organizational discipline inside the CCP as well as the number of individuals disciplined for such violations.
Conclusion
Xi’s apparent pivot from purge to control has its costs. Obviously, by prioritizing measures to enforce political loyalty over real reforms to fight corruption, Xi’s anti-corruption drive is unlikely to be successful. Indeed, as indicated by the dramatic increase in the number of party members and officials disciplined since 2013, Xi’s campaign may be failing more than it is succeeding. At the same time, by imposing many new but also highly vague political and organizational restrictions, Xi may have acquired new tools to control the party, but this has likely worsened the climate of fear among Chinese officials, resulting in extreme risk aversion, paralysis, or passive resistance. As noted by Patricia Thornton, my colleague and fellow contributor to China Leadership Monitor, Xi risks “governing the people to death.”[25]
Xi apparently was aware of the potential downside of his efforts to tighten control over the party when his first revision of the code of discipline went into effect in January 2016. To mitigate fears among party officials, Xi tried to reassure them that they should not be afraid to make honest mistakes in implementing party policies. The formula he proposed, known as the “Three Differentiations” (三个区分开来) does not punish officials who make mistakes due to their lack of experience, the absence of clear restrictions by superiors, and unintentional missteps taken to promote development.[26] This formulation was written into the “Resolution on Further Comprehensively Deepening Reform and Promoting Chinese-style Modernization,” which was approved by the Third Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee in late July 2024.[27] In his speech to the Third Plenum, Xi reiterated the formulation in the context of addressing the problem of misconduct and paralysis among Chinese officials.[28]
However, Xi has apparently vacillated between maintaining a hard line on corruption (i.e., political control) and reassuring those party officials who are paralyzed by fear. In his speech to the annual meeting of the CDIC in early January 2025, Xi used tough rhetoric to underscore the need to persist in the struggle against corruption while he omitted his formulation of the “three differentiations.”[29] At least for now, it seems that Xi remains fully committed to his pivot to control despite its mounting costs.
About the Contributor
Minxin Pei, editor of China Leadership Monitor, is Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. He is also non-resident senior fellow of the U.S. German Marshall Fund. His books include China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (2006), China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (2016), The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China (2024), and The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism (2025).
Notes
[1] Research by the World Bank shows that countries with greater civil liberties are more effective in fighting corruption. Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant H. Pritchett, "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects," The World Bank Economic Review 11, no. 2 (1997): 219–242.
[2] “准确运用“四种形态,” https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/jgsz/gjjwzsfbjjz/zyzsfbjjzgdtp/202412/t20241204_510649.html.
[3] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订), https://news.12371.cn/2015/10/22/ARTI1445481865237534.shtml.
[4] Ibid.
[5] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订), https://www.12371.cn/2018/08/27/ARTI1535321642505383.shtml.
[6] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2023年新旧对照版), https://www.12371.cn/2023/12/28/ARTI1703720568111279.shtml.
[7] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订）.
[8] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2023年新旧对照版).
[9] “在党内搞团团伙伙、结党营私、拉帮结派、培植私人势力或者通过搞利益交换、为自己营造声势等活动捞取政治资本.” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订).
[10] “民主推荐、民主测评、组织考察和党内选举中搞拉票、助选等非组织活动的；违背组织原则搞非组织活动，组织、怂恿、诱使他人投票、表决.” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订).
[11] “党员领导干部在本人主政的地方或者分管的部门自行其是，搞山头主义，拒不执行党中央确定的大政方针，甚至背着党中央另搞一套.” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订).
[12] “有任人唯亲、排斥异己、封官许愿、说情干预、跑官要官、突击提拔或者调整干部,”中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订).
[13] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2023年新旧对照版).
[14] “串供或者伪造、销毁、转移、隐匿证据的；阻止他人揭发检举、提供证据材料的；包庇同案人员的；向组织提供虚假情况，掩盖事实的,” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订).
[15] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订).
[16] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2023年新旧对照版).
[17] “对违反政治纪律和政治规矩等错误思想和行为放任不管，搞无原则一团和气，” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订).
[18] 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2015年修订).
[19] “落实党中央决策部署不坚决，打折扣、搞变通,” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订).
[20] “对党不忠诚不老实，表里不一，阳奉阴违，欺上瞒下，搞两面派，做两面人,” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订).
[21] “导致本地区、本部门、本单位政治生态恶化的,” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2018年修订).
[22] “政绩观错位，违背新发展理念，背离高质量发展要求，给党，国家和人民利益造成较大损失),” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2023年新旧对照版).
[23] “搞劳民伤财的 ‘形象工程;’,‘政绩工’的，从重或加重处分,” 中国共产党纪律处分条例（2023年新旧对照版).
[24] 新华网，廉政资讯，http://www.news.cn/legal/ffu/lzzx/index.html.
[25] Patricia Thornton, “‘ Lying Flat-ism’: Is the Party Under Xi ‘Governing People to Death’?” China Leadership Monitor 80 (2024), https://www.prcleader.org/post/lying-flat-ism-is-the-party-under-xi-governing-people-to-death.
[26] “学习《决定》每日问答 | 如何理解落实‘三个区分开来,’激励干部开拓进取、干事创业,” https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202411/content_6987534.htm.
[27] 中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革 推进中国式现代化的决定（2024年7月18日中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过),
https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202407/content_6963770.htm.
[28] “习近平关于《中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化的决定》的说明,”
https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202408/content_6968537.htm.
[29] “习近平在二十届中央纪委四次全会上发表重要讲话强调: 坚持用改革精神和严的标准管党治党 坚决打好反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战总体战,” 新华社, January 6, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202501/content_6996540.htm.
Photo credit: N509FZ, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
