CLM Insights Interview with Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung
- Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung
- 2 hours ago
- 8 min read
Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, China's Global Strategy under Xi Jinping. Oxford University Press, 2026. 296 pp. ISBN-10 : 0197828817; ISBN-13: 978-0197828816
Insights Interview
Most analysts believe that the rapid change in the balance of power between China and the U.S. is the fundamental cause of the end of Deng’s grand strategy of “hide and bide” under Xi. You place more emphasis on Xi’s agency. Can you elaborate?
The two are not mutually exclusive. The shift in the balance of power between China and the U.S. is a structural factor that, under Hu Jintao, started to encourage China to become more confident and even more assertive. We saw China doing this after the global financial crisis of 2008 revealed the weaknesses of the U.S.-led capitalist system. But it did not amount to replacing pragmatism, inherent in the Dengist “hide and bide” approach, by a systematic alternative. Deng’s pragmatism was utilitarian and served China well, but it did not amount to a grand or global strategy; it had no vision of what China should do next. Hu could not and did not fill in the blanks when the time came either to stop “hiding” or to stop “biding.” Hu departed from this, but he did not reverse the Dengist approach.
In contrast, Xi Jinping has put forth a vision and a suite of global initiatives to guide China to fulfil his vision, called the China Dream of national rejuvenation, to be accomplished by 2050. He is leading China to forge the common destiny of humankind via what he calls the “democratization of international relations,” which makes it clear that under him China’s foreign policy is not pivoted to its relations with the U.S. Its vision is global not regional, and not merely reactive to a shift in the balance of power. It is also highly personal, based on Xi’s own thought, which raises the question of whether it can be sustained after Xi.
Applying neo-classical realism has led many colleagues to focus on the structural changes in the relative power between China and the U.S., but it does not explain why China under Xi behaves in the way it does, in particular in prioritizing its relations with the Global South. Xi’s strategy shapes China more than shifts in the balance of power.
In this book, we put forth a Sino-centric party-state realism analytical framework to provide a better understanding of what Xi’s vision is and how he intends to fulfil it, while Beijing still takes advantage of the shift in relative power between itself and Washington. We argue that the way realism affects China’s conduct as a rising superpower is conditioned by other more powerful drivers. Paying closer attention to Xi’s agency enables us to understand more precisely what drives China’s approach.
Our analytical framework lists four key drivers in China’s global strategy. They include: the underlying or constant driver that is Xi Thought, and the aspirational driver of what Beijing would like to achieve. They take precedence over the regular driver of neo-classical realism. But if any or all of them should contradict the basic requirement of the overriding driver – keeping Xi and the Communist Party in power – the latter would prevail. We believe understanding the dynamics of the four drivers provides a more accurate way to appreciate Xi’s ambitions for China, how they are intended to be achieved, and the factors that support or frustrate them. Standard variants of realism do not do that.
What are the underlying assumptions and core components of China's global strategy? How do these components complement each other?
China’s global strategy has a dual pivot. Its primary pivot is to engage the Global South, which constitutes a clear majority of the world's countries and population, to secure support for China to steadily reshape the existing international order by re-centering the UN in global politics, so that, with China taking the lead, international affairs, from security crises to global governance, are more responsive to them than they are to the minority democratic West. This is the basis for Xi’s idea of the “democratization of international relations.” With the support of the Global South, Xi seeks to forge a common destiny of humankind, implying transforming what remains of the “liberal international order” into a Sino-centric order, which is based on his understanding of the traditional Chinese concept of tianxia.
Tianxia consists of two Chinese characters, “sky” and “below,” meaning “under the sky” and it is usually rendered as “all under heaven.” As a political concept, it was applied during periods when the empire in China was united, rich, powerful, and more advanced in civilizational, technological, and organizational terms than other societies at various times over the course of two millennia. China was regarded as so superior that other countries were so overawed by it that they looked to China for guidance and inspiration, resulting in pax Sinica without China having to forcefully assert itself like a hegemon. This is the new international order toward which Xi would like to steer the existing international order. The historical reality of tianxia was of course different: Chinese empires behaved like other great empires, from the Roman to the British, and exercised hegemony by force when required.
Putting tianxia in place implies “restoring” Chinese global pre-eminence. Xi has no desire for China to replace the U.S. as the global hegemon, not least because American hegemony after 1945 also included delivering costly public services, such as policing, to the global community. Nor does he want China to assume such obligations. Being embraced as the pre-eminent power suffice for him, as it will already ensure that China’s Communist Party system cannot be challenged.
To signal the advent of Chinese global pre-eminence requires a spectacular demonstration of China’s achievements, and for this, a complementary pivot is required in Xi’s global strategy. This is for China to take Taiwan, despite the American commitment enshrined in their Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to help Taiwan defend itself against an externally imposed change of its status. Taiwan matters because geographically it is in the middle of the strategically vital First Island Chain in the Pacific Ocean, and it has only managed to remain outside of Chinese control after 1949 with U.S. protection. In Beijing’s approach to Taiwan, Xi has made a paradigm shift. Since the Korean War (1950-53), all his predecessors saw Taiwan as the unfinished business from the Chinese Civil War (1946-49) for which no one specified a meaningful timeline for completion. In contrast, while Xi retains irredentist language, he has incorporated Taiwan into his China Dream, making 2050 the deadline for taking Taiwan.
Beijing’s preferred outcome is to compel Taiwan to negotiate for “peaceful reunification” and thus remove the American raison d'etre for intervention. Other democracies, from Japan to Europe, will then have no choice but to accept the new reality. If this fails, Beijing will use force. The calculation is that success by either means will reveal U.S. inability, on its own or with its democratic allies, to counter a spectacular Chinese move that will result in control over the First Island Chain. Accomplishment of this will not only enable China to project power well into the Pacific Ocean but will also make key U.S. allies, like Japan and South Korea, ponder whether they can still rely on their respective defense treaties with the U.S. for their security.
The humbling of the U.S. over Taiwan, the frustration of which is a key American strategic priority, is meant to demonstrate not only Chinese dominance in the Western Pacific but also its global preeminence. It is supposed to mark the advent of the tianxia order.
How does China's global strategy challenge the West-led international order? Is there any room for accommodation?
In principle, China’s global strategy does not challenge the existing international order. What it does is transform the existing international order from within. The case for making such a change is that the democratic West is an elitist minority among UN members and in terms of the global population, and its dominance in the international order is therefore undemocratic and unjustifiable. By reassuring autocracies and autocrats in the Global South, as Xi’s Global Civilization Initiative does, that with China’s support and leadership, they can stop any powers or grouping of nations from imposing their (democratic) model on others, Xi gains their endorsement for his “democratization of international relations” rhetoric. China’s requests of its autocratic partners – support at the United Nations and backing for China’s claim to Taiwan – are essentially cost-free for them.
The Chinese argument is that this is not against any country or alliance system; it is about making the world better and more just. To Beijing, no reasonable country can object to such a goal, and thus it cannot be anti-West. This is helped by its default to an instrumentalist approach to international organizations and to international economic ties. However, instrumentalism has its limits. When Beijing can or is poised to assert its pre-eminence in the world, the democracies will probably perceive a major challenge.
What are the tools China uses to execute its global strategy? What are its notable successes and failures since 2013?
The centerpiece of China’s tools is the pivot to the Global South, complemented by its Belt and Road Initiative, a development and technological charm offensive. They are meant to be complemented by China’s expansion of its roles in key departments and agencies of leading international organizations, particularly at the UN. In the last two decades, China has, for example, exercised major influence over the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the Human Rights Council. They are complemented by new international organizations that China has played a leading role in establishing, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. Furthermore, China is working assiduously to transform itself from a rule-taker to a rule-maker, particularly but not limited to the high-tech industries. It also uses its industrial might and control of critical materials to persuade others that embracing Chinese leadership in global affairs is a positive, if not the less painful, way forward.
Arguably, China has not faced major setbacks in its push to establish global pre-eminence. Its assertiveness and support for autocracies have raised alarm in democracies beyond the U.S., particularly in Europe, where some countries are working with the EU to de-risk their economic ties with China because of competitiveness and security concerns. However, the fact that there has been no reversal of the progress China has made in advancing the two pivots suggests that its global strategy is working. We should be mindful that its strategy does not require others to formally take sides between China and its main competitors; it merely requires them to accept or to acknowledge Chinese pre-eminence.
Have you detected any meaningful adjustments or modifications to China's global strategy in recent years? Can you identify any conditions or factors that will make this strategy endure beyond the Xi era?
As China’s global strategy is based fundamentally on Xi Jinping Thought, it is unlikely to change in any significant way unless Xi Jinping Thought undergoes major corrections. Since this could undermine Xi’s authority, it is highly unlikely. However, there has been some fine-tuning of China’s approach. This can be seen in efforts to repair its strained ties with some U.S. allies and partners that hope to reset relations with China, notably Canada, Australia, and Vietnam. The reining in of the “wolf-warrior” diplomats, whose aggressive approach provoked backlash, also reflects this process of fine-tuning. The fact that no senior “wolf-warrior” diplomat has been punished suggests that Xi is not asking Chinese diplomats to cease being assertive; he is only asking them to assert themselves in less offensive ways.
Whether Xi Thought or its associated global strategy will survive Xi is a different matter. It will depend on where China will be when Xi finally joins Marx and Mao. If China’s economy is in a very bad place and latent discontents are serious enough to worry the leadership of the Communist Party, a carefully choregraphed side-tracking of the Xi approach, as happened with Mao at the end of the Cultural Revolution, can and probably will occur. But if China remains on course to deliver Xi’s China Dream, it is likely that the dual-pivot global strategy will be sustained.
