The China Leadership Monitor informs the international foreign policy community about current trends in China's leadership politics and in its foreign and domestic policies with articles written and researched by experts. Welcome to the China Leadership Monitor Expert-written, in-depth, independent research on Chinese policy, politics, and foreign relations published quarterly. Spring Issue Join our mailing list! Join I agree to the privacy policy. View. At-A-Glance Topics Ideology Elite & Party Affairs Explore this topic Other Coverage Insights Interviews: CLM conducts interviews with authors to discuss their new books and research Access Insights 1/1 Digests: Summaries of our quarterly issues to refresh you on Chinese politics Find Digests Digest: Winter 2024 Issue 82 Adam Terenyi 1 2 3 1 ... 1 2 3 ... 3 Our Issues Issue 87 March 1, 2026 Issue 86 December 1, 2025 Issue 85 September 1, 2025 Issue 84 June 1, 2025 Issue 83 March 1, 2025 Issue 82 December 1, 2024 Issue 81 September 1, 2024 Issue 80 June 1, 2024 Issue 79 March 1, 2024 Issue 78 December 1, 2023 Issue 77 September 1, 2023 Issue 76 June 1, 2023

China Leadership Monitor provides independent, timely, and in-depth research on Chinese politics. Find our most current publication here. Browse other issues and articles: All Articles Sunday, March 1, 2026 Spring 2026 Issue 87 Editor's Note The decimation of the top ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during the last two years has fueled an intense debate about the reasons behind the largest purge in the Chinese military in the post-Mao era. Despite the absence of credible evidence, many observers and journalists attribute the purge to factional strife and Xi Jinping’s insecurity. However, Joel Wuthnow’s close examination of the available evidence, primarily biographical records of the fallen PLA command Minxin Pei 49 minutes ago 4 min read Why Is Xi Still Purging His Generals? The removal of PLA senior generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in January 2026 represented the peak, if not the end, of a massive purge of the military leadership that began in mid-2023. The absence of credible information from Beijing has allowed many theories about the causes of these dismissals to circulate, which often center on factional politics or power consolidation. An examination biographical records, however, yields more support for the view that most purges are in Ideology & Elite, Party Affairs Joel Wuthnow 49 minutes ago 27 min read Occidental Fall: Assessing Chinese Views of U.S. Decline China’s leadership, state media, and foreign policy analysts consider the U.S. a declining but dangerous power. That assessment has remained durable since Michael Swaine analyzed views in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in his 2021 essay for China Leadership Monitor , though the frequency of that assessment has fluctuated. The resilience of such views in the PRC press reflects genuine assessments of U.S. internal contradictions, the Chinese Communist Party’s Leninist pre National Security & Foreign Policy Jonathan A. Czin and Allie Matthias 49 minutes ago 28 min read China’s Economic Involution: State and Business Strategies China’s economic involution, characterized by cutthroat, race-to-the-bottom competition, is a symptom rooted in its political and fiscal structure. During the recent economic downturn, the central government, local governments, and businesses entered a self-reinforcing cycle. The central growth targets and debt-reduction pressures pushed local governments to expand investment in state-favored industries, creating low-profit competition and oversupply. The declining revenues f Economy & Technology Ling Chen 50 minutes ago 24 min read (Mostly) Old Wine in a New Bottle: What is the CCP’s Overall Strategy for Solving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era? Toward the end of 2021 China unveiled a new framing, “The party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan issue in the new era,” to summarize General Secretary Xi Jinping’s policy toward Taiwan since 2013. A close examination of statements by top Chinese leaders and senior officials responsible for the Taiwan portfolio shows that the “overall strategy,” for the most part, deviates little from the policy of Xi’s predecessors. However, the “new” components of the “overall strat National Security & Foreign Policy Minxin Pei 50 minutes ago 25 min read “The Patient Labor of Assimilation”: China’s Strategies to Create a New “New Territory” With the so-called re-education camps closed, not only has media attention on Xinjiang waned but a troubling misconception seems to have taken hold: state violence targeting Uyghurs is over. In reality, the party-state’s infrastructure of repression has become more deeply entrenched in the region. Using open-source materials, especially government reports, official county-level blogs, and cadre diaries, this essay demonstrates that long prison sentences have replaced short-te Domestic Security Timothy A. Grose 50 minutes ago 26 min read CLM Insights Interview with Fiona S. Cunningham Fiona S. Cunningham. Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information-Age Weapons in International Security (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics). Princeton University Press, January 2025. 400 pages. ISBN-10: ‎0691261032; ISBN-13: ‎978-0691261034 Insights Interview In your book you advance a novel theory of “strategic substitution” that explains the decisions made by successive Chinese leaders in the post-Cold War era to modernize the military. Can you brief Insights Interviews Fiona S. Cunningham 50 minutes ago 9 min read

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We seek to inform the international foreign policy community about current trends in China's leadership politics and its foreign and domestic policies with our in-depth research and analysis from top experts. About The China Leadership Monitor (CLM) seeks to inform the international foreign policy community about current trends in China's leadership politics and in its foreign and domestic policies. Published quarterly, CLM disseminates contributions from researchers who rely on open-source materials to analyze key developments in Chinese elite politics, national security and economic policies, and social issues. We believe that independent, evidence-based, in-depth, and timely research on these issues will make valuable contributions to the international foreign policy community. CLM was launched in 2002 under the editorial leadership of Alice Miller at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. Upon Alice’s retirement in September 2018, Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College assumed CLM’s editorship. CLM also moved from the Hoover Institution to prcleader.org. CLM is funded by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. About CLM Topics Ideology Elite & Party Affairs Explore Topics National Security Foreign & Military Policy Explore Explore Domestic Security Economy Technology Explore Human Rights Explore Covid-19 Explore Photo credits (via Wikimedia Commons): Zheng Zhou, CC BY-SA 3.0 Office of the Press Secretary of the Philippines, Public domain 农业学大寨, CC BY-SA 4.0 Bruno Corpet (Quoique), CC BY-SA 3.0 Studio Incendo, CC BY 2.0 Shwangtianyuan, CC BY-SA 4.0 Licenses: ,<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0, Explore our articles Who Who Editor Minxin Pei Minxin Pei, editor of China Leadership Monitor, is Tom and Margot Pritzker '72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. He is also a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. His books include China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (2006), China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (2016); The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China (2024). Button Webmaster, Assistant Adam Terenyi

Spring 2019 Issue 59 Articles All Issues Newer Issues Archived Issues Issue 67 2026 2018 Issue 58 Previous... 2019 Issue 62 Issue 61 Issue 60 Issue 59 2024 2023 2022 2021 Issue 82 Issue 78 Issue 74 Issue 70 Issue 81 Issue 77 Issue 73 Issue 69 Issue 80 Issue 79 Issue 76 Issue 75 Issue 72 Issue 71 Issue 68 2020 Issue 66 Issue 65 Issue 64 Issue 63 2025 Issue 83 Issue 84 Issue 85 Issue 86 Issue 87 Current Issue Insights Interviews Quick Takes Topics Ideology, Elite & Party Affairs National Security & Foreign Policy Domestic Security Economy & Technology Human Rights COVID-19 Digests Miscellaneous Spring 2019 Issue 59 Abstract Beginning in late 2017, Xi Jinping found himself facing a new and daunting foreign policy challenge: The Trump Administration had adopted an openly confrontational policy towards China. This unfolded with a barrage of U.S. actions, such as naming China “a strategic competitor” and adopting successive rounds of tariffs, among other actions. This article analyzes China’s diplomatic response to the shift in U.S. policy, as reflected in China’s approach to the United States as well as to other countries. It argues that China did not adopt a confrontational strategy of its own. Rather, Beijing’s response focused on avoiding confrontation and preventing escalation with the United States, including by deferring major internal debates about the need for a new diplomatic strategy. Towards the rest of the world, Beijing took steps to stabilize its immediate Asian periphery and ties with Europe to limit its exposure to confrontation with Washington; it looked for opportunities to expand its presence and influence (especially in places where the United States had stepped back); and it invested further in ties with countries, notably Russia, that share China’s desire to constrain U.S. power. China Reacts: Assessing Beijing's Response to Trump's New China Strategy Evan S. Medeiros Explore March 1, 2019 Abstract Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, there have been major structural, legal, personnel, and policy changes to the CCP’s approach to domestic security. Xi has created new institutions, such as the Central National Security Commission and the National Supervision Commission, to improve coordination among the various agencies of the coercive apparatus and to tighten discipline and anti-corruption efforts within the party-state. The People’s Armed Police has also been restructured. Significant turnover of personnel has occurred within the domestic security agencies (including the leadership of both the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security), partly due to efforts to remove officials associated with Zhou Yongkang, former head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Meanwhile, a number of new laws on domestic security and the expansion of tech-based approaches to social control, such as grid management, represent attempts to strengthen the CCP’s ability to police contention within Chinese society. Finally, there has been a major shift in the CCP’s security strategy in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, resulting in heightened international scrutiny and attention. This article reviews these developments and their cumulative effect on domestic security in China under Xi Jinping. Domestic Security in China Under Xi Jinping Sheena Chesnut Greitens Explore March 1, 2019 Abstract How do we explain the radical shift in the Chinese Communist Party’s policies in the frontier region of Xinjiang, where more than one million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities are now interned in prison-like re-education camps? Based on a close reading of official sources, this article explores the evolution of China’s mass internment strategy and the key policy-drivers, institutions, and actors in Xinjiang policy over the last decade. It argues irrational fears of instability and dismemberment are driving the party’s unprecedented securitization and transformation strategy, with top party leaders convinced of the failure of ethnic accommodation and of the urgent need for increased inter-ethnic “blending” and “fusion.” Under Xi Jinping, Xinjiang has emerged as the party’s incubator for a more assertive and coercive form of nation-building and cultural re-engineering. The result is a surface level calm that hides deep social and psychological anxieties while at the same undermining cultural diversity and social trust. The Spectre of Insecurity: The CCP’s Mass Internment Strategy in Xinjiang James Leibold Explore March 1, 2019 Abstract Xi Jinping’s speech marking the 40th anniversary of reform and opening on December 18, 2018 recapitulates the substantial ideological and policy changes he has initiated since coming to power in late 2012. A comparison of this speech with speeches by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao on the 20th and 30th anniversary of reform and opening respectively reveals significant differences in terms of ideological rhetoric and substantive policy issues. Whereas the speeches by Jiang and Hu adhere to the basic ideological and policy guidelines established by Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping’s speech underscores his personal authority and political vision. Most significantly, Xi’s speech emphasizes the supremacy of Communist Party centralized and unified strongman rule and China’s bold and expansive role in international affairs. The uncompromising tone of his speech suggests that it is unlikely that Xi will make substantial changes to his domestic and foreign policies despite the strong headwinds both domestically and internationally. A Tale of Three Speeches: How Xi’s Speech Marking the 40th Anniversary of Reform and Opening Differs from those of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Minxin Pei Explore March 1, 2019 Abstract The ongoing trade feud with the United States, combined with an internal economic slowdown and the party’s tightening grip on the economy, presented China’s private sector with unprecedented challenges as President Xi began his second term in 2018. Beijing has responded to the frustrated private sector with promises of substantial tax cuts and an expansion of credit, together with a pledge to further deepen structural reforms and to double down on spurring indigenous innovation. What will Xi’s second term mean for the private sector? Some worry that he will further roll back the market-oriented reforms; a more hopeful scenario is that the hostile international environment and the mounting domestic pressures will counteract any anti-market trends and provide the party’s reform-leaning politicians with a rare opportunity to push forward market reforms and to create a true level playing field for the private sector. The Private Sector: Challenges and Opportunities During Xi’s Second Term Yue Hou Explore March 1, 2019 Abstract CLM Insights Interview with George Magnus China Leadership Monitor Explore March 1, 2019

Winter 2018 Issue 58 Articles All Issues Newer Issues Archived Issues Issue 67 2026 2018 Issue 58 Previous... 2019 Issue 62 Issue 61 Issue 60 Issue 59 2024 2023 2022 2021 Issue 82 Issue 78 Issue 74 Issue 70 Issue 81 Issue 77 Issue 73 Issue 69 Issue 80 Issue 79 Issue 76 Issue 75 Issue 72 Issue 71 Issue 68 2020 Issue 66 Issue 65 Issue 64 Issue 63 2025 Issue 83 Issue 84 Issue 85 Issue 86 Issue 87 Current Issue Insights Interviews Quick Takes Topics Ideology, Elite & Party Affairs National Security & Foreign Policy Domestic Security Economy & Technology Human Rights COVID-19 Digests Miscellaneous Winter 2018 Issue 58 Abstract This year Chinese leader Xi Jinping encountered the most difficult test of his leadership since assuming office in late 2012. The U.S.-China trade war (and the escalating strategic competition between the two countries in particular) have exposed China’s structural vulnerabilities and raised questions about Xi’s responsibility for the rapid deterioration in Beijing’s ties with Washington. As economic woes mounted, elite discontent with Xi’s leadership appeared to be widespread, precipitating an effort by Xi and his loyalists during the summer to bolster his authority. But whatever incipient opposition to Xi existed, it appeared to be short-lived. Xi emerged from the critical summer retreat at Beidaihe in mid- August with no obvious diminution of his authority. Since then, he has intensified efforts to strengthen his power but there are no indications that he has made fundamental adjustments to his domestic and foreign policies. Xi Jinping’s Dilemma: Back Down or Double Down? Minxin Pei Explore December 1, 2018 Abstract Xi Jinping’s concentration of power, which had already achieved remarkable success, was further endorsed and institutionalized during the October 2017 Nineteenth Party Congress and the March 2018 session of the National People’s Congress. In recent Chinese political developments, is it possible to detect elite resistance to Xi’s fast-growing power and authority? How are party-state cadres able to display such resistance? Furthermore, how does such resistance affect Xi’s power and governance? This article attempts to answer these questions by, first, looking at how Xi has promoted his concentration of power in the aftermath of the Nineteenth Party Congress; second, discussing four aspects of such elite resistance, and; third, analyzing how Xi has reacted under the new sociopolitical circumstances to elite resistance. It is argued that elite resistance does exist and recently it has been furthered by social and international factors. However, Xi has taken additional steps to strengthen his personal dictatorship over party-state elites. Such a struggle between the dictator and the bureaucrats will continue to shape the dynamics of China’s politics and policy. A Setback or Boost for Xi Jinping’s Concentration of Power? Domination versus Resistance within the CCP Elite Guoguang Wu Explore December 1, 2018 Abstract Provocative actions on both sides led to heightened tensions and a deterioration in trust between China and the United States in 2018. Chinese authoritative and non-authoritative sources have been consistent in pushing back against what is correctly viewed as a fundamental U.S. shift toward greater hostility and suspicion, although non-authoritative sources use much harsher language. At the same time, both sources call for restraint, dialogue, and cooperation in handling U.S.-China relations, and point out the apparent misalignment of the anti-China attitudes of the Trump Administration compared to the U.S. public and the rest of the world. The likely presence of moderate Chinese views toward the worsening of Sino-U.S. relations suggests the need for the Trump Administration to replace its current confrontational approach to China with a more sophisticated, balanced approach that recognizes the need for continued cooperation with Beijing. Chinese Views on the State of Sino-U.S. Relations in 2018 Michael D. Swaine Explore December 1, 2018 Abstract In recent months, scholars in China have taken advantage of the trade tensions and the fortieth anniversary of reform and opening to voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo and to advocate major economic changes. Some very established figures, either directly or indirectly, criticized China’s political system. The main participants were economists who came of age in the 1980s, who perhaps saw this as their last chance before retirement to make a major push for reform. However, the reaction has ranged from lip service to policies that introduce even more distortion to the economy. Meanwhile, it is notable that the younger generation of economists and scholars has largely stayed out of the debate, which does not bode well for internal reform pressures in the future. Cracks in China’s Statist Consensus? Victor Shih Explore December 1, 2018 Abstract Despite increasing political control under Xi Jinping’s leadership, collective action in China is not declining, though it is changing in various ways. Protests continue to be staged around issues related to the distribution of educational resources, housing, space, basic social protection, and the maintenance of market order. Compared with collective action under the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao leadership, recent collective action has a lower level of cross-sectoral support and makes fewer demands for widespread institutional reform. Other characteristics of these protests, however, are more alarming for the state, such as an increased capacity to mobilize and organize across localities and the mobilization of aggrieved groups with close ties to the regime. Although recent protests do not indicate that the regime is under threat, they do suggest some profound problems with the country’s developmental model and the need for more efficient institutional channels to allow the various social groups to negotiate their interests and address their grievances. Social Protest Under Hard Authoritarianism Ya-Wen Lei Explore December 1, 2018 Abstract CLM Insights Interview with Elizabeth Economy China Leadership Monitor Explore December 1, 2018

Summer 2019 Issue 60 Articles All Issues Newer Issues Archived Issues Issue 67 2026 2018 Issue 58 Previous... 2019 Issue 62 Issue 61 Issue 60 Issue 59 2024 2023 2022 2021 Issue 82 Issue 78 Issue 74 Issue 70 Issue 81 Issue 77 Issue 73 Issue 69 Issue 80 Issue 79 Issue 76 Issue 75 Issue 72 Issue 71 Issue 68 2020 Issue 66 Issue 65 Issue 64 Issue 63 2025 Issue 83 Issue 84 Issue 85 Issue 86 Issue 87 Current Issue Insights Interviews Quick Takes Topics Ideology, Elite & Party Affairs National Security & Foreign Policy Domestic Security Economy & Technology Human Rights COVID-19 Digests Miscellaneous Summer 2019 Issue 60 Abstract Since 2012, Xi Jinping has crafted a Taiwan policy that features two somewhat contradictory elements. On the one hand, it contains stronger measures aimed at deterring any steps toward independence, including a reduction of Taiwan’s international space, a continued military build-up, and frequent demonstrations of military force and economic coercion. On the other hand, Xi has also employed positive economic incentives, aimed largely at young people and the working class in Taiwan, to secure their support for eventual political unification with China. After the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016, Beijing doubled down on this policy that proponents believe has been validated by the results of the 2018 mid-term mayoral elections. Xi Jinping’s Taiwan Policy and Its Impact on Cross-Strait Relations Syaru Shirley Lin Explore June 1, 2019 Abstract Chinese analysts and policy makers have interpreted U.S. efforts to prevent the flow critical technologies through limits on investment, blocks on the operations of Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies in the U.S. and other markets, and new export control laws, as part of a strategy of containment designed to slow China’s rise as a science and technology power. In response, a newly emerging strategy consists of: a doubling down on indigenous innovation and developing “core technologies”; protection of supply chains; diversification of access to foreign technology; diplomatic efforts that stress the shared benefits of Chinese technology development; and continued cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. Even though both sides are likely to lose the efficiencies that came from the globalization of innovation, such a strategy may also energize American and Chinese policy makers to mobilize even greater resources for scientific competition. Seizing Core Technologies: China Responds to U.S. Technology Competition Adam Segal Explore June 1, 2019 Abstract Since assuming power in late 2012 and especially since the conclusion of the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made significant progress in implementing a systematic program to rewrite the rules of the Chinese Communist Party. These changes are designed to augment Xi’s personal authority, centralize decision-making power, tighten the party’s organizational discipline and procedures, extend CCP control over state and society, and intensify ideological indoctrination. Even though Xi has achieved indisputable success in revising and promulgating nearly all important CCP rules, it remains unclear whether such changes in the rules have been fully accepted as legitimate and binding by the CCP’s rank-and-file. Nor should we take at face value as a settled reality the assertion of Xi’s supremacy in practically every revised or newly issued CCP rule book. Rewriting the Rules of the Chinese Party-State: Xi’s Progress in Reinvigorating the CCP Minxin Pei Explore June 1, 2019 Abstract Large-scale elite upward mobility has been taking place in Xi Jinping’s China. Who has attained critical positions under Xi’s leadership? How did they achieve such career advancements? Focusing on those elites who have emerged in recent years at or above the deputy provincial and vice-ministerial levels in the power hierarchy of the narrowly defined CCP and state administrative apparatuses, this article outlines seven groups that established close connections with Xi Jinping during the various stages of his life before rising to national power; it then analyzes how sub-mainstream and non-mainstream paths of elite advancements have also worked in a marginal sense due to the so-called “cascade impact” and the “bandwagon effect.” The King’s Men and Others: Emerging Political Elites under Xi Jinping Guoguang Wu Explore June 1, 2019 Abstract Australia and New Zealand have emerged in recent years as frontlines in clashes between the West and China. In some respects, the two countries make for unlikely combatants. Both economies are heavily trade-dependent, have long looked to Asia to do business, and have enjoyed a boom in commercial ties with China over the past two decades. But both countries, to differing degrees, along with other robust democratic cultures willing to criticize undemocratic practices, have a deep ambivalence about Beijing’s growing political and security role in the region. The true test of their resolve will come when there will be a substantial economic price for challenging China. For Beijing, the two countries are valuable economic partners but, particularly in the case of Australia, troublesome politically. China Down Under: Beijng’s Gains and Setback in Australia and New Zealand Richard McGregor Explore June 1, 2019 Abstract CLM Insights Interview with Nicholas Lardy China Leadership Monitor Explore June 1, 2019

Fall 2019 Issue 61 Articles All Issues Newer Issues Archived Issues Issue 67 2026 2018 Issue 58 Previous... 2019 Issue 62 Issue 61 Issue 60 Issue 59 2024 2023 2022 2021 Issue 82 Issue 78 Issue 74 Issue 70 Issue 81 Issue 77 Issue 73 Issue 69 Issue 80 Issue 79 Issue 76 Issue 75 Issue 72 Issue 71 Issue 68 2020 Issue 66 Issue 65 Issue 64 Issue 63 2025 Issue 83 Issue 84 Issue 85 Issue 86 Issue 87 Current Issue Insights Interviews Quick Takes Topics Ideology, Elite & Party Affairs National Security & Foreign Policy Domestic Security Economy & Technology Human Rights COVID-19 Digests Miscellaneous Fall 2019 Issue 61 Abstract Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been attempting to transform the Chinese Communist Party into an ideologically committed, organizationally disciplined, and politically loyal regime. His efforts include enforcing strict discipline and curtailing the perks of officials. This attempt appears to be unpopular among the party’s rank and file and has encountered various forms of resistance. Resourceful local officials have attempted to protect their interests and resist the leadership’s efforts to strip them of the perks and benefits that until now they have taken for granted. Their passive resistance appears to be a serious obstacle to the realization of Xi’s ambitious vision. Ironically, many of Xi’s own policies, such as emphasizing ideological indoctrination and suppressing civil society, have made it more difficult to combat the subterfuge by local officials. The party’s top-down approach is unlikely to succeed in converting ideologically cynical CCP officials into true believers, while local officials have no feasible means of forcing the top leadership to change course. This political stalemate is likely to continue. Bureaucratic strategies of coping with strongman rule: How local officials survive in President Xi Jinping’s new order Minxin Pei Explore September 1, 2019 Abstract The recent resurgence of many forms of religious belief and practice in China has been met by new forms of repression and control. Basic party and state policy were established in a pair of documents promulgated in the early 1980s. The ideological foundation for the policies was Marxist secularization theory, in which religion will inevitably disappear, but its demise will take a long time and, in the meanwhile, heavy-handed attempts at repression may be counterproductive. The policies include government supervision and management of religious practices through state institutions controlled by the United Front Work Department. New regulations promulgated in 2018 maintain most of the policy instruments of the 1980s, but they have been streamlined to achieve greater efficiency and more effective supervision. The ideological framework is now mainly based on “Sinicization” rather than Marxism. Since Sinicization generally requires adaptation to an idealized version of Han Chinese culture, outsiders to this culture, such as Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and Muslims, especially Uighurs, are subject to even harsher repression than they were under the former Marxist ideology. Han Chinese Daoism and Mahayana Buddhism are faring somewhat better, although they too are still subject to restrictions by a watchful state. The Sinicization of Chinese Religions under Xi Jinping Richard Madsen Explore September 1, 2019 Abstract After becoming the leader of China in late 2012 Xi Jinping rapidly launched his signature foreign-policy campaign—the Belt and Road Initiative—to project China’s economic and geopolitical influence. Whether the BRI has improved China’s external environment, especially in its immediate periphery, will be subject to debate for years to come. However, the U.S. threat perception of China as a result of the BRI has unequivocally heightened, leading to the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017. In an era defined by U.S.-China great power strategic competition, a central theme of Xi’s foreign policy has been a recalibration and realignment of relations with Asian countries in order to effectively counter the U.S. role in Asia. As a result, China has adapted its policy to pursue a closer alignment with a like-minded Russia, to improve relations with India to prevent a potential U.S.-India alliance in Asia, to steer the souring relations with Japan toward cooperation, and to consolidate Southeast Asia as part of China’s sphere of influence. Recalibration and Adaptation: China’s Relations with her Key Neighbors during the Trump Era Yun Sun Explore September 1, 2019 Abstract China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a topic of great interest. But there is little knowledge about China’s internal voices. Dissent remains rare, yet there has been considerable pushback on BRI policy and decision making. This is because there is an array of structural problems with the BRI’s design. BRI is entirely an economic program, run by various parts of the economic bureaucracy. But it does not give bureaucrats sufficient mandate to pursue their interests within China’s internal politics. So the BRI is attractive for central SOEs and dealmakers but unattractive to local leaders who are held accountable for whatever goes wrong in their respective areas. Although overt criticism is rare, failure to carry out orders is common. China’s leaders have responded to critiques of the BRI, radically changing its official focus and policy. It has moved from a geoeconomic export policy to part of China’s toolkit in the current US trade war. But there is no indication that the structural problems will be addressed, thus limiting the BRI’s ability to achieve its goals, and as such, pushback will continue. Twists in the Belt and Road Ryan Manuel Explore September 1, 2019 Abstract CLM Insights Interview with M. Taylor Fravel China Leadership Monitor Explore September 1, 2019

Winter 2019 Issue 62 Articles All Issues Newer Issues Archived Issues Issue 67 2026 2018 Issue 58 Previous... 2019 Issue 62 Issue 61 Issue 60 Issue 59 2024 2023 2022 2021 Issue 82 Issue 78 Issue 74 Issue 70 Issue 81 Issue 77 Issue 73 Issue 69 Issue 80 Issue 79 Issue 76 Issue 75 Issue 72 Issue 71 Issue 68 2020 Issue 66 Issue 65 Issue 64 Issue 63 2025 Issue 83 Issue 84 Issue 85 Issue 86 Issue 87 Current Issue Insights Interviews Quick Takes Topics Ideology, Elite & Party Affairs National Security & Foreign Policy Domestic Security Economy & Technology Human Rights COVID-19 Digests Miscellaneous Winter 2019 Issue 62 Abstract The U.S.-China trade war has had a huge impact on the supply chains in China, accelerating their relocation that had already begun due to rising taxes, costs of labor, and other input factors. The exodus reported in the past year is only the tip of the iceberg, as more serious effects will not become apparent immediately. A major effect of the relocation on China is job losses, which may reach as many as 5 million in the coming years. Given the unlikeliness of a quick end to the trade war and the reluctance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to make structural changes, the long-term prospects for supply chains in China are not promising because not only will existing firms gradually reduce their exposure to political and economic uncertainties, but also potential newcomers are likely to avoid China. Although the CCP rolled out some policies that may help alleviate the shock, it has yet to come up with specific policies to effectively address the problem. The Relocation of Supply Chains from China and the Impact on the Chinese Economy Shaomin Li Explore December 1, 2019 Abstract A standard view of Hong Kong’s months-long anti-extradition protests is that Beijing has not resorted to a crackdown in a manner similar to that which occurred in 1989. I argue that Chinese leaders have long sought to exert comprehensive control over Hong Kong and have exploited the crisis to accelerate the erosion of “one country, two systems.” Beijing has deployed the Hong Kong police and local thugs not just to break up protests, but also to foment chaos and violence. It is also purging the civil service and the broader society. To forestall another mass movement in the future, Beijing will further attempt to create amnesia among the rebellious youth. In essence, Beijing is applying the standard tools of “stability maintenance” to Hong Kong. However, Beijing will not be able to establish iron rule over Hong Kong without destroying the territory. Beijing’s All-Out Crackdown on the Anti-Extradition Protests in Hong Kong Victoria Hui Explore December 1, 2019 Abstract While reaffirming China’s longstanding “peace and development” line and offering a more positive take on many developments in Asia, the 2019 Defense White Paper highlights many negative features of the global security environment. This suggests an unresolved internal contradiction in China’s security views and policies. Such an apparent contradiction is perhaps resolved by the Defense White Paper’s description of strategic competition as driven largely by the U.S., not by China, and out of step with deeper global trends. Indeed, the PLA under Xi Jinping is depicted as working with other countries to realize Xi’s “shared community for mankind” as it strengthens its deterrence capabilities. Yet this propaganda-laden take reinforces the suspicions of many regarding China’s “real” goals. Beijing must inject a much more pragmatic, hard-power perspective into its public security stance and engage Washington on that basis in order to realize a meaningful level of stability based on mutual accommodation. How China’s Defense Establishment Views China’s Security Environment: A Comparison between the 2019 PRC Defense White Paper and Earlier Defense White Papers Michael D. Swaine Explore December 1, 2019 Abstract The CCP under Xi Jinping’s leadership has launched the most sustained and comprehensive program of ideological indoctrination in the post-Mao era. By issuing new rules and revising old ones on ideological education in the party, propaganda work, education, and patriotic education, the party apparently seeks to use ideological indoctrination to strengthen Xi’s personal authority, demand strict political loyalty from its officials and members, tighten control in the mass media and on college campuses, and mobilize nationalistic support from the public. Although the program is being implemented through administrative measures, its reliance on coercion and material incentives belie the challenge facing the party to carry out ideological indoctrination in a highly materialistic society. This program reflects the regime’s insecurity about the erosion of its members’ ideological commitment and political loyalty. The backward- looking nature of the party’s program of ideological indoctrination is symptomatic of its poverty of ideas, even as the party struggles to project a forward-looking vision. The outcome of this program is likely to be political ritualization and feigned loyalty that are more common in a regime in decay than in a regime undergoing reinvigoration. Ideological Indoctrination Under Xi Jinping Minxin Pei Explore December 1, 2019 Abstract China is in the midst of an ambitious rectification campaign. Since 2014, Xi Jinping has launched an aggressive effort to reassert party ideological controls over art, culture, and higher education that had partially slipped during the more relaxed atmosphere of China’s post-1978 reform era. Within Chinese universities, intellectuals are facing intensified pressures for political conformity —through political education, funding pressures, and direct repression. Such efforts resemble the early stages of the campaign to re-establish party dominance over the bar and legal profession in the early 2000s. These pressures are likely to steadily worsen in the near future, with significant negative implications for intellectual life in China. Intelligentsia in the Crosshairs: Xi Jinping's Ideological Rectification of Higher Education in China Carl Minzner Explore December 1, 2019 Abstract CLM Insights Interview with Jude Blanchette China Leadership Monitor Explore December 1, 2019

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