Chinese Views of U.S. Decline

The idea of an America in decline has become a major subject of discussion among many PRC observers. A seeming preponderance of Chinese authoritative, semi-authoritative, and non-authoritative Chinese elites believe that the distribution of global power is shifting in a direction that favors China over the West/the United States. However, what is less clear is how those many Chinese who see the U.S. as being in decline view the specific origins, nature, and extent of that decline and its implications for China. Chinese public statements on the decline offer no conclusive evidence supporting the claim that Beijing is basing its policies on the sure conviction that the U.S. is in an irreversible, structural decline benefiting China and that Beijing is therefore committed to a policy of taking advantage of this decline. A more nuanced understanding of Chinese discourse on U.S. decline and its implications for the United States is in order.

Even a cursory examination of publicly available PRC sources confirms that the idea of an America in decline has become a major subject of discussion and analysis for many Chinese observers, especially in journals (Figure 1).
 
 For some committed Chinese Marxists, the U.S. decline has been emerging for many decades, inherent in the supposed weaknesses and contradictions of the capitalist and democratic West. But for most Chinese proponents of the notion, it began with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), followed by a series of domestic and international events adversely affecting the U.S., from growing domestic political dysfunction and the chaos of the Trump administration to the American military-political failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and the gross mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic.
 
 According to many outside observers, the Chinese belief in America’s decline (and that of the West in general) — described by one observer as “Beijing’s declinist narrative”[1]— has become a fundamental axiom of the PRC government, largely explaining not only Beijing’s growing assertiveness internationally but also its deepening strategic challenge to U.S. global power and influence. Indeed, a declining U.S. (alongside China’s continued growing power and international capacity) is supposedly seen by the Chinese leadership as both allowing and necessitating a largely irreversible Chinese effort to replace America as the new global hegemon and to become the decisive shaper of a new, alternative global order.[2]
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 Obviously, such assumptions regarding Chinese views on the state of the United States and the implications for PRC policies and global peace and stability potentially have enormous implications and require close examination. this article takes a close look at what Chinese authoritative, semi-authoritative, and non-authoritative sources (in that order) say, and do not say, about American (and Western) decline, and it assesses the possible significance of such views for U.S.-China relations and global (and especially Asian) stability.[3]
 
 
 Figure 1. Frequency of journal and newspaper articles in the CNKI database mentioning “U.S.” (美国) and “decline” (衰落) in the same sentence. 2000–2021

Of course, analysis of publicly available Chinese sources on this issue cannot confirm conclusively how Chinese notions of a U.S. decline influence the kind of policy calculus that Beijing holds toward the United States and the West as well as toward its own international behavior. But it can at least offer some indication of the public contours of the discussion and views existing among Chinese intellectuals and the most important factors likely influencing the thinking of the Chinese leadership, including the possible risks of basing PRC policy on the idea of continued American decline.
 
 The remainder of this article will first examine Chinese views across the three categories of Chinese sources mentioned above and then, in the conclusion, briefly discuss the implications of these findings for Chinese and U.S. policy.
 
 Authoritative Sources
 There is little doubt that many Chinese see the GFC as an early harbinger of U.S. decline. However, at that time and for a few years afterward, authoritative sources did not raise such a view, instead stressing the oft-repeated need for “no conflict or confrontation” … “mutual respect” and … “win-win cooperation,” as part of the development of “a new model of major country relations between China and the United States.”[4]
 
 One source explicitly stated a few years after the GFC that “…China’s rise does not mean America’s decline. On the contrary, the United States can benefit from China’s progress."[5]
 
 In fact, perhaps somewhat surprisingly — given the stress that many Western authors place on the idea that PRC policy is motivated by expectation of U.S. decline — even today’s authoritative Chinese sources still do not openly and clearly state that U.S. power per se is declining.[6]
 
 Figure 2 CNKI full-text search “great changes unseen in a century” (journals)

The closest that authoritative sources come to asserting that the U.S. is in decline is in statements about the international environment experiencing “great changes unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局). This term was first mentioned by Xi Jinping in December 2017, at a work conference attended by Chinese ambassadors, and it has since been mentioned by him many times as well as by other authoritative sources.[7] In fact, the frequency of this term in Chinese sources of various types shot up only after December 2017 (Figures 2 and 3). As discussed below, many Chinese sources link this phrase to the notion of a rising East and a declining West (东升西降), thus clearly implying that Xi Jinping is also conveying that meaning (and hence the notion of a U.S. in decline) when he uses the term (Figures 4 and 5).[8]
 
 Figure 3 CNKI full-text search “great changes unseen in a century” (newspapers)

Figure 4 CNKI full-text search “A rising East and a declining West” (journals)

Figure 5 CNKI full-text search “A rising East and a declining West” (newspapers)

However, overall, we have found no open sources that contain direct quotes from Xi Jinping unambiguously using 东升西降.[9] Of course, we certainly cannot rule out that he might have used them during internal meetings.
 
 In any event, while in some cases pointing to the obvious fact that no nation’s power will continue to dominate the world indefinitely, many authoritative sources below Xi assert that U.S. power will nonetheless remain dominant for a long time into the future, a point also made by other types of sources (see below). As Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng stated as recently as July 13, 2021,

In fact, some senior PRC officials have explicitly stated that the United States is “definitely not on the decline” and “will probably remain the world’s No. 1 for a fairly long time to come.”[11]
 
 But while asserting the still-unrivaled nature of American power, many authoritative sources clearly indicate that the U.S. is weakening itself by trying to maintain its controlling, hegemonic position in the world in the face of the ever-increasing, worldwide historical trend toward multipolarity. In other words, such sources make a clear distinction between the self-induced decline of U.S. influence due to its insistence on behaving in a unipolar hegemonic manner and actual U.S. power, which remains unrivaled.[12]
 
 In support of this view, authoritative sources often observe that its futile effort to resist the emergence of a multipolar world is causing the U.S. to lose confidence, become anxious, and generate “China threats” of various kinds, thus undermining its own interests.[13] This reaction is seen as leading Washington to attempt to promote unilateralism over multilateralism and zero-sum over win-win or positive-sum strategies, and to confront China and Russia in destructive ways.[14]
 
 For many authoritative sources, such U.S. actions simply serve to create friction and conflict for Washington and to undermine its ability to effectively utilize its still-dominant power. In this sense, for some authoritative observers, America’s major challenge lies in its inability to adjust to the inexorable multipolar forces of history.[15]
 
 Moreover, although clearly associated at the time with the unilateralist policies of the Trump administration, authoritative Chinese sources seem to think that these counter-productive U.S. responses are part of a larger hegemonic viewpoint that operates independently of any specific U.S. administration.[16]
 
 Finally, although not explicitly linked to a process of American decline, authoritative sources in recent years have also pointed to signs of U.S. domestic problems in handling racial injustice, economic inequality, gun deaths, and of course the COVID-19 pandemic. In some cases, they have contrasted these U.S. failures with China’s success in advancing the livelihood and health of its citizens.[17]
 
 At the same time, Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently stated that the U.S. will “maintain its vitality” if it can address its domestic problems.[18] And as Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin succinctly put it:

 These statements at the very least suggest America’s potential (if not actual) decline relative to China. And for some authoritative observers, the depiction of China as a major threat to the U.S. is in part an effort by Washington to deflect blame from America’s domestic ills. As Yang Jiechi stated at the Anchorage meeting between senior U.S. and Chinese leaders in March 2021,
 

 The implication is that the U.S. cannot resolve its domestic problems simply by blaming and scapegoating China.
 
 Semi-authoritative Sources
  In general, semi-authoritative sources are more willing than authoritative sources to identify the U.S. as being in decline and to discuss the various aspects of that phenomenon. Some sources do not shirk from explicitly placing the decline of the United States in the larger context of the above-mentioned global shift in power between a rising East and a relatively declining West (东升西降) as well as the above-mentioned concept of “great changes unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局).[21]
 
 However, as with most authoritative sources, many semi-authoritative Chinese observers also stress that America’s decline is largely a function of its subjective attitude toward the emergence of a multipolar world. Some explicitly and in some detail point to the “hegemonic anxiety” (霸权焦虑症) of the United States in confronting growing multipolarity, and its efforts, along with those of its closest Western allies (within bodies such as the G-7) to resist that reconfiguration of global power.[22]
 
 And, as with authoritative sources, America’s arguably growing domestic problems and its inability to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic are viewed by some sources as greatly augmenting or accelerating its hegemonic anxiety.[23] In other words, again as with the authoritative sources, the relative decline of the United States is seen by several semi-authoritative sources as being due to subjective beliefs and interests that prevent the U.S. (and the West) from accepting the historical trend toward multipolarity and doing what is necessary to cope with its domestic problems.[24]
 
 In fact, one semi-authoritative source echoes the comments of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson cited above:
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 Moreover, as some authoritative sources have also suggested, such U.S. resistance and inability to confront its own problems serve to exacerbate greatly America’s relations with the outside world, as the U.S. seeks to blame and confront others for its own internal ills and pursue zero-sum solutions to common international economic, security, and other problems.[26]
 
 Semi-authoritative People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sources also apply a similar perspective in the military realm, stressing that the U.S. effort to maintain hegemony with regard to the global scope of its naval military operations in the face of shortages in resources and platforms will simply produce greater decline.[27]
 
 As one semi-authoritative PLA source stated:
 

 Non-authoritative Sources
 As is the case in virtually all other foreign policy areas, non-authoritative Chinese sources regarding American decline are the most openly blunt and critical. Beginning largely with the 2008 GFC, many, but not all, non-authoritative observers concluded that the U.S. had entered a period of marked decline.
 
 At that time, some asserted, as did many semi-authoritative sources, that America’s decline was only relative to the rise of other countries and by implication not due to any growing internal weaknesses or lack of power.[29]
 
 However, not long after the GFC, some non-authoritative observers cautioned against concluding that the U.S. had entered an irreversible period of decline.[30] Echoing authoritative and semi-authoritative sources, one observer remarked in 2012 that:
 

 Another observer even asserted, on the eve of the Trump administration taking office, that America’s power was “rapidly recovering,” and it remained as the world’s only superpower, and was “… unlikely to face substantial challenges for a certain period in the future.”[32]
 
 But overall, and especially as time passed, various types of statements about American decline have become more prevalent among non-authoritative sources, no doubt driven as much or more by Chinese interpretations of events within the U.S. than because of U.S. foreign policy per se or China’s growing power.[33]
 
 And yet, considerable variation in viewpoints remains, including individuals who still question whether the U.S. is in fact declining, or if it is declining, whether the decline is permanent, and what an impact of a declining America might be on China.
 
 Regarding statements of decline, some non-authoritative sources now openly refer to America’s “inevitable” decline (无可避免的衰落), while calling on the U.S. leadership to ensure that its decline is stable and peaceful.[34]
 
 Some observers are imaginative in their labels for what the U.S. is supposedly experiencing. While some echo semi-authoritative references to America’s “hegemonic anxiety,” another observer describes the U.S. as being gripped by “hegemonic menopause syndrome” (霸权更年期综合症), marked by “…inner anxiety, oversensitivity, and a lack of confidence.”[35]
 
 Another scholar refers to the U.S. condition as “hegemon decline syndrome” (霸权衰落综合症). Although the Trump administration was in many ways seen as amplifying this anxiety and in effect accelerating this anxiety-driven process of decline,[36] it is also linked to “…changes in the international environment,” and predicted to be “…long and nonlinear.” [37]
 
 Yet, in contrast, at least one non-authoritative observer recently linked American decline more with the Trump administration than with the U.S. as a whole, and even asserted that “…the core of U.S. power has not been seriously eroded."[38]
 
 As with semi-authoritative sources, some non-authoritative observers point to the fractured U.S. political scene and the election of the unilateralist and protectionist Donald Trump, along with the inability of the United States to effectively handle the COVID-19 pandemic, as indications of decline. Washington’s handling of the pandemic in particular is stressed by some observers as a watershed in confirming clearly that the U.S. is in decline.[39]
 

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 More recently, some also point to specific domestic events, such as the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol building or the loss of electric power in Texas, as emblematic of a broader societal problem.[41]
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 In the international arena, as with several semi-authoritative sources, many non-authoritative sources see the U.S. decline in the larger context of a rising East and a declining West.
 
 This term first appeared among non-authoritative sources in the People’s Daily in 2012. Until about 2016, it was largely limited to a discussion among these sources of relative shifts in economic power between developing and developed countries.[42]
 
 But non-authoritative scholars began to describe the term more broadly in late 2016 and early 2017, in reference to an overall shift in the power distribution among the great powers.[43]
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 The 东升西降 term is linked by many non-authoritative sources to the term now commonly used by Xi Jinping and other leaders of “great changes unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局), noted above.[44]
 

Although some Western observers regard the term “great changes unseen in a century” as simply a Chinese euphemism for American decline,[45] many Chinese define and interpret it more broadly to include not only a redistribution of the global power balance in China’s favor but also a host of other fundamental changes, such as increasing globalization and interdependence, decoupling and intensifying reliance on technological innovation, and transnational security threats, such as climate change.[46]
 
 Taking its meaning as a whole, for some non-authoritative observers, the phrase poses both opportunities and dangers for China. In the latter category, as seen with authoritative and (to a greater extent) semi-authoritative sources, many non-authoritative observers refer to the dangers supposedly resulting from an anxious, politically divided, and less confident U.S. in disrupting the global order and provoking confrontations with China and Russia as Washington attempts to strengthen domestic unity and slow or reverse its relative decline.[47]
 
 But despite all these statements, to some extent the issue of U.S. decline, and the role of the pandemic in supposedly fostering it, remain under debate within China, at least among non-authoritative observers. One overview of Chinese scholarly views states:
 

 One analyst asserts that, while “…[t]he rise of the East and the decline of the West is a broad trend…the status of a strong West and a weak East will remain unchanged for a long period in the future.”[49]
 
 In fact, a few non-authoritative observers still argue that it would be premature to assert that America is actually in permanent decline, given its strengths and resiliency. One scholar states:
 

 Another researcher even states:
 

 As with some semi-authoritative sources, a few non-authoritative observers also point to the dangers of China underestimating the strength and importance of the U.S. to the global system and responding in an excessive, zero-sum manner to any aggressive U.S. actions associated with its decline.[52]
 
 One non-authoritative source states that China needs to:
 

 Another observer (the former vice dean of China Foreign Affairs University) even argues that:
 

 Conclusion
 The preceding analysis indicates that many, but not all, Chinese observers believe that the global order is evolving in a direction that favors the East (and hence China) over the West (and hence the United States). This is most clearly indicated by the common Chinese view that the term “great changes unseen in a century,” frequently employed by Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders (as well as by both semi-authoritative and non-authoritative sources) includes the idea of a rising East and a declining West (东升西降), even though no authoritative Chinese source has used the term.
 
 However, what is less clear is how those many Chinese who see the U.S. as being in decline view the specific origins, nature, and extent of that decline and the implications for China. Many non-authoritative Chinese observers explicitly assert that the U.S., and the West in general, are in some kind of steady decline, resulting not only from China’s rising power but also, for some, from America’s supposedly growing domestic problems. Yet other Chinese sources of all types question whether the U.S. is actually in an irreversible, structural decline. Some authoritative and non-authoritative sources even reject the idea that the U.S. is in any kind of decline at all, reversible or not.
 
 Moreover, many Chinese observers view any kind of U.S. decline as likely to be very gradual in nature, possibly nonlinear, and resulting more from Washington’s misguided efforts to uphold its hegemonic global position against the general trend toward multipolarity rather than as a result of any permanent, inherent weaknesses. Some see the U.S. decline as only occurring relative to China’s rise, while others believe that the U.S. might reverse its decline. Equally notable, even though Xi Jinping asserts that the ongoing “great changes unseen in a century” (and hence presumably the U.S. decline) on balance benefit China, many Chinese observers point to various dangers for China that could result from an ongoing American decline. In fact, at least one non-authoritative observer explicitly asserts that a declining U.S. is actually not in China’s interest.
 
 Some might argue that none of these variations in Chinese views about U.S. decline matter, since Xi Jinping has publicly endorsed a term that, while not explicitly conveying the idea of such a decline, is nonetheless taken by many Chinese to include it. That might well be the case, i.e., Xi probably does believe that the U.S. is in some kind of decline. But whether he believes that such a decline is permanent or potentially reversible, structural, or attitudinal poses no or few dangers to China is less clear. In addition, the fact that many views in China exist on this issue and that a wide variety of observers are allowed to state their various views openly, at the very least suggests that there is no clear Chinese consensus on the matter and on what to do about it, as some might claim. Indeed, some Chinese refer to a “debate” on the issue.
 
 All this indicates that one should approach with caution the idea that the Chinese government is basing its policies on the sure conviction that the U.S is in an irreversible, structural decline benefiting China, and that Beijing is therefore committed irrevocably to a policy of taking advantage of this decline, perhaps with the ultimate objective of replacing the U.S. as global hegemon. There is thus far no conclusive evidence for such a notion.
 
 Hence, it would be a mistake for the U.S. government to adopt policies based on that viewpoint. Such an approach would almost certainly close off many options that might exist for moderation and mutual accommodation between the two powers, and simply reinforce the existing Sino-U.S. security competition, most likely in hostile, zero-sum ways.
 
 Instead, a more nuanced understanding of the Chinese discourse on U.S. decline and its implications for the United States is in order, one that allows for the possibility that Chinese views on this topic, including among the senior Chinese leadership, are still in some flux and hence malleable. Such an approach would permit U.S. policies designed not only to deter Beijing if it were to act with overconfidence on the basis of extreme assumptions about a U.S. decline but also reassure Beijing in positive directions if in fact the Chinese debate over U.S. decline reflects considerable insecurity and uncertainty.

About the Contributor

Michael D. Swaine, director of QI’s East Asia program, is one of the most prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies. He comes to QI from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he worked for nearly twenty years as a senior fellow specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations. Swaine served as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. Swaine has authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs, including Remaining Aligned on the Challenges Facing Taiwan (with Ryo Sahashi; 2019), Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment (with Nicholas Eberstadt et al; 2015) and many journal articles and book chapters.

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(The author is deeply indebted to Luo Shuxian for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article)

Photo credit: Tyler Merbler from USA, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons