Elizabeth Wishnick
Jun 5, 202315 min
Updated: Aug 3, 2023
Relations between China and Russia have deepened since 2022, although each country is now more careful in messaging, especially to foreign audiences, about their partnership. The priority of Russia for China comes at the expense of its previous partnership with Ukraine and Chinese economic interests there. China now aspires to take on a role in any future peace process for Ukraine, but Xi and Putin, by and large, speak with one voice on what they call “the Ukrainian crisis.” The deepening partnership is reflected in their synergy in the information space, their ongoing cooperation in technology and defense, and energy and agriculture deals. Despite these trends, their partnership is also one of interdependence, whereby Beijing is willing to accept costs to derive perceived benefits. Even as Russia becomes more economically dependent on China, Xi’s ability to restrain or even influence Putin’s thinking remains untested.
At a time when many world leaders have reassessed their views of both Russia and Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping is doubling down on his support for Russia and his “dear friend” Vladimir. This should have been a bellwether year for Sino-Russian relations, yet the tumultuous events resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine actually have changed the partnership very little as it continues to deepen.
One challenge to understanding the current phase of the Sino-Russian partnership is that Chinese officials downplay its significance with European audiences but highlight its consistency for Chinese and Russian audiences. In Brussels we saw PRC Ambassador to the EU Fu Cong telling The Financial Times that China and Russia “are not in a military alliance, and we may not see eye to eye on all issues with Russia.”[1] This contrasts with PRC Ambassador Li Zhanhui’s earlier comments to Russia’s TASS News Agency about “the even more brilliant results” the Sino-Russian partnership will bring and their deepening “back-to-back cooperation,” referring to the strategic benefits of avoiding a two-front war.[2] To a Chinese audience, Li Zhanhui has emphasized how the partnership supports PRC priorities, such as building a community of common destiny and developing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). “The more turbulent the world is, the more China-Russia relations should move forward steadily,” he has asserted.[3]
At the March 20–22 summit, Xi and Putin used new language to describe their partnership. They dropped the “no limits” formulation that caused such consternation and confusion in the West. The PRC Foreign Ministry had used that phrase in the February 4, 2022, Sino-Russian joint statement to convey that an alliance was not necessary since the partnership had an unbounded future.[4] Twenty days later, Russia invaded Ukraine, leading outside observers to conclude that China will go along with whatever Putin decides to do.
PRC and Russian officials now claim that their partnership is “superior” to Cold War alliances (but they reject any portrayal of their relationship as a military alliance). The March 21, 2023, joint statement restates China’s “three noes” [no alliance, no confrontation, no directing against third parties] that has characterized China’s foreign policy since the Deng Xiaoping era. The joint statement also emphasizes that the partnership has a solid foundation, it is rooted in the domestic interests of both countries, and the external environment is not the main driver. This is a position that key PRC Russia experts have long advocated.[5] There were still echoes of the “no limits” formulation in Xi’s remarks to the Russian media, however, when he revealed that he and Putin had “agreed that Sino-Russian ties have gone far beyond bilateral relations ...”[6]
Pro-Russian Neutrality in Russia’s War on Ukraine
Without considering the priority Beijing places on the Sino-Russian partnership, it is difficult to understand China’s apparent about-face on Ukraine. Nearly ten years ago, on December 5, 2013, China and Ukraine signed an agreement establishing a strategic partnership and highlighting that “firm mutual support on issues concerning national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity is an important part of the strategic partnership between the two countries.”[7] The joint declaration also called attention to Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons and China’s pledge to provide “security guarantees to Ukraine” in the case of any nuclear aggression against it.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, China was Ukraine’s top trade partner, and Beijing saw Ukraine as a key transit point for BRI trade with Europe and a source of agricultural imports. Beijing had an interest in developing Ukrainian ports, and China’s agribusiness giant COFCO International had invested $50 million in Mariupol (now largely destroyed and under Russian occupation) for a transshipment facility. Chinese companies also saw opportunity in Ukraine’s energy sector and they had purchased Ukrainian military equipment, including the Varyag aircraft carrier, China’s first, and now refurbished as the Liaoning.[8]
Despite the 2013 agreement and a record of economic and military cooperation with Ukraine, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine China has staked out a type of “pro-Russian neutrality.” China claims to be impartial and it aspires to play a diplomatic role, but in his long-awaited phone conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, 2023, Xi did not even mention Russia, nor did he refer to the conflict as a war. Not surprisingly, in Xi’s conversation with Zelensky, there was no discussion of the need for Russia to withdraw its troops, though Xi did express support for Ukraine’s sovereignty.[9] The timing of the call—on the anniversary of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident—highlights China’s concerns about threats to Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhiya nuclear power plant and Russian use of nuclear threats more broadly during the war, an issue about which Xi has been most vocal in expressing concern.
China’s Position on Ukraine
The February 23, 2023 PRC Foreign Ministry’s position paper on Ukraine mentions Russia in the specific context of the need for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, the desirability of exchanges of POWs, and the continuation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated by Russia, Turkey, and the UN, to export Ukrainian grain.[10] For fourteen months, world leaders have been urging China to help end the war, and even U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken left open the possibility of working with China on an eventual peace settlement—if the Chinese government accepts Russia as the aggressor and agrees to play a role in ensuring a durable peace, not one that serves as a respite for a second Russian war on Ukraine.[11]
These are big “ifs,” especially in light of the comments by PRC Ambassador to France Lu Shaye on French television that questioned publicly the sovereignty of the former Soviet states under international law.[12] Thereafter the PRC Foreign Ministry claimed these were the ambassador’s personal views and not the country’s official position,[13] but they still cast a shadow over Xi’s statements to Zelensky and raised more questions about China’s views of post–Cold War territorial settlements.
When, right after the Xi-Zelensky call, China supported an April 26, 2023 UN General Assembly resolution on the Council of Europe that mentions Russian aggression in Ukraine and Georgia there was hope that China was changing its position more substantially.[14] Russian media immediately sought to downplay such a prospect.[15] Chinese diplomats ultimately clarified that there had been no change in the PRC position. Although China initially had abstained from the paragraph that notes Russian aggression, it ultimately voted for the resolution as a whole.[16]
For the most part, Beijing has been successful in asserting message control on Russia and Ukraine. Since the beginning of the war, the Chinese government has restricted critical commentary on the war and on China-Russia relations, despite a few prominent dissonant voices. One highly placed commentator predicted that China will become more isolated internationally as a result of its position on Ukraine.[17] A year later, once China was positioning itself as a potential peace broker, the same expert argued that Beijing’s peace plan has “no realistic foundation” as developments on the battlefield will be the most decisive.[18] PRC scholars and retired officials who have spoken out against the war more typically focus their criticism on Russian policies rather than on Chinese positions.[19]
Despite such dissonant voices, the dominant view among PRC elites remains optimistic about Russia’s ability to maintain its positions in Ukraine and about the staying power of the Sino-Russian partnership.[20] This belief stems from continued confidence in Russia’s ability to prevail on the battlefield in a war of attrition and an assessment of waning U.S. and EU military support for Ukraine.[21] A wargame by the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences concludes that the war will likely result in a stalemate by the summer, a time when U.S. support for the Ukrainian military may run into political headwinds, thus providing an opportunity for a PRC-led peace initiative.[22]
Synergy in the Information Space and a High-Tech Partnership
Despite claims of neutrality, PRC media echo Russian talking points on the war. This includes repeating spurious claims the Russian Ministry of Defense has made about U.S. biolabs in Ukraine, a point that recalls earlier Sino-Russian propaganda falsely accusing a U.S. military lab in Fort Detrick, Maryland, of being the source of the COVID-19 pandemic.[23] China and Russia are the only two countries that refused to sign off on a joint statement condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine at the February 2023 summit of G20 finance ministers in India.[24]
Following a trend that began with the COVID-19 pandemic, China and Russia continue to develop synergy in the information space. In addition to their collaboration in propaganda, Russian and Chinese officials have long had a shared interest in promoting what they call “internet sovereignty” to prevent any organization of domestic interests and to share any information that could threaten their respective regimes. In 2015 they signed a bilateral agreement on information security, and they have since promoted similar multilateral initiatives at the United Nations and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Documents that Systema (RFE/RL’s Investigative Unit) obtained show how the Cyberspace Administration of China and Russia’s internet regulator, Roskomnadzor, have been sharing best practices on blocking VPNs and implementing internet censorship for at least five years in their efforts to contain Western influence and to prevent it from fueling anti-regime protests. Cooperation has involved exchanges of technical experts and high-level talks.[25]
In recent years, China and Russia have made cooperation in the tech sector a top priority, especially in AI, robotics, space, biotechnology, and telecommunications.[26] The emphasis on sales of energy resources in economic relations with China has long rankled Russia, which chafes at being perceived of as a resource appendage of its neighbor. However, technology is an area where the two countries pool their different strengths (Russia’s basic research and China’s industrial applications) and compensate for difficulties obtaining Western technologies.[27] In AI, for example, China is a leader in developing the technology, but Russia has the experience in applying it to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Syria.[28]
Sino-Russian cooperation in satellite technology, first initiated in 2014, is moving forward. Russia’s GLONASS and China’s BeiDou are working to improve the technical compatibility of their systems, potentially paving the way to promote joint use in third markets.[29] In September 2022, Russia and China agreed to deploy three GLONASS stations in China (Urumqi, Changchun, and Shanghai) and three BeiDou system stations in Russia (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Obninsk, and Irkutsk) to achieve more reliable navigation.[30]
After the U.S. Department of Commerce placed Huawei on its Entity List in 2019, the PRC telecom giant turned to Russia for wide-ranging cooperation.[31] Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Huawei and its Russian counterparts had developed partnerships in cloud computing and security, video surveillance and facial recognition, equipment testing, and tech education.[32] Despite some reporting by Russian media that Huawei was scaling back some of its Russia-based operations in 2022, it appears that the company has merely reorganized its distribution networks in Russia, and Huawei products continue to be available.[33]
Prior to 2022, the Russian government had sought to balance its deepening tech ties with China with its desire for “internet sovereignty,” and it tried to avoid undue dependence on Chinese telecommunications technologies.[34] This strategy has proved to be untenable in light of the international sanctions on Russia since 2022. In April 2023 Bloomberg published a leaked assessment by the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media that shows mounting concern in the Russian government about the country’s growing dependence on Chinese companies, such as Huawei, and the potential resultant security risks. This assessment reportedly was shared with the Russian Armed Forces and Security Council, which urged caution in reliance on Chinese technology to avoid complete dependence.[35] The Bloomberg article resonates widely in the Russian media, and many outlets have republished the article verbatim.[36] Russia’s Kaspersky Lab had already reported a growing number of cases of Chinese hacking of Russian firms, including in the defense sector, as Sino-Russian technology collaboration deepened prior to 2022.[37] Russian intelligence services have been increasingly uneasy about the scope of Chinese intelligence-gathering in Russia, even publicizing cases of Russians being apprehended for spying for China.[38]
Deepening Military Cooperation
U.S. and allied leaders have been concerned about potential PRC military assistance for Russia’s war in Ukraine and they have warned Beijing repeatedly against crossing this line. Leaked U.S. intelligence documents reveal that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service claims that China’s Central Military Commission has agreed to sell weapons to Russia incrementally but it has wanted to keep it secret.[39] However, other leaked documents show China ignoring a request for aid from Russia’s Wagner Group in early 2023.[40]
China has angrily denied that it has sent or would send lethal aid to Russia—a military spokesperson called such allegations “sinister” and “pure fabrication.”[41] As a Global Times editorial puts it, “China is not obliged to repeatedly ‘prove its innocence’ on this issue.”[42] For the most part, this appears to be true, though some Chinese dual-use technologies have been found on Ukrainian battlefields and sanctions have been imposed on a small number of Chinese companies.[43] Nevertheless, U.S. officials have been sounding out the G-7 allies about imposing sanctions on China in the event it provides more substantial direct military aid to Russia.[44] Analysts warn that even non-lethal aid, such as semi-conductors and trucks, can contribute to the Russian war effort.[45]
Sino-Russian military cooperation has continued and even deepened since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, belying Beijing’s claim of impartiality in the conflict. Newly appointed PRC defense minister Li Shangfu chose Russia as the destination for his first foreign visit and he has hailed Putin’s contribution to world peace.[46] He identified three areas for future military cooperation with Russia, including sharing combat experience and intelligence, and participating in joint military exercises and patrols. Putin, who met with PRC Defense Minister Li, made a point of emphasizing that Sino-Russian military cooperation was occurring globally, but he highlighted the Pacific theater, as if to emphasize Russia’s potential military contribution to PRC security interests.[47]
Increased Economic Cooperation
Is China backstopping the Russian economy? To be sure, Sino-Russian trade has increased in the past year—the total volume in 2022 reached $190 billion, a 34 percent increase over the 2021 figures. In 2022, Chinese imports from Russia nearly doubled, reflecting increased energy purchases, and PRC exports to Russia increased by 17.8 percent. Even though Russia accounts only for 3 percent of China’s trade, the closer Sino-Russian economic ties are much more meaningful for Russia. Prior to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, China accounted for just 10 percent of its total trade, but it reached 18 percent by the end of 2021.[48] Although the Russian government stopped publishing foreign trade statistics in the spring of 2022, some Western analysts estimate that as much as 40 percent of Russian imports now come from China, placing China in second place after North Korea in terms of dependence on the Chinese economy.[49]
China has benefited from increased oil and gas imports from Russia. It now receives 25 percent of its oil, 23 percent of its coal, 10 percent of its LNG, and 25 percent of its pipeline gas from Russia. But China is still far from replacing the EU as a destination for Russian gas, as China only accounts for 15 percent of Russia’s pipeline gas exports and 20 percent of its LNG exports. Because the oil embargo imposed on Russia did not begin until December 5, 2022, energy experts Erica Downs and Tatiana Mitrova caution that Russian dependence on the Chinese market is likely to grow—in 2022 China had already accounted for 35 percent of Russian oil exports.[50]
According to a Finnish analyst, China has been receiving 16–17 percent discounts on Russian oil purchases,[51] and even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia was China’s cheapest supplier of pipeline gas.[52] Although a deal for a Power of Siberia 2 pipeline (from eastern Siberia across Mongolia to China) that Putin had been touting as largely completed was not signed at the March 2023 Sino-Russian summit, it is likely that, if concluded, China will insist on steep discounts there as well. One analysis shows that in 2014 Gazprom accepted the lowest price from China for Russian pipeline gas.[53] Even with the inducement of a low price, China may not be tempted to sign on to a second gas pipeline, however, preferring to obtain additional gas from Turkmenistan so as to avoid excessive dependence on Russian supplies.
Although nuclear energy accounts for only 5 percent of China’s energy mix, cooperation with Russia in the nuclear field has been an important component of the Chinese leadership’s plans to expand nuclear power significantly by 2050.[54] A June 6, 2018, Sino-Russian agreement outlines a long-term basis for their joint efforts in nuclear energy. Russia pledged to build four VVER1200 nuclear reactors in Tianwan and Xudabao in China at a cost of $3.62 billion and to assist with additional projects exceeding another $15 billion for China’s fast reactor CFR-699 pilot project as well as with RITEG (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator) for its space program.[55]
After the March 2023 summit, Russian and Chinese nuclear energy officials agreed to collaborate in the production of highly enriched uranium fuel and the handling of spent fuel.[56] U.S. officials are concerned about Russia providing China with enriched uranium, which, with further processing, might be used to assist Beijing in expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal.[57] China aspires to be self-sufficient in fuel production, and a recent study assesses China’s current dependence on the Russian nuclear industry as relatively low.[58] Russia is now the world leader in nuclear energy, but China is catching up fast and it now competes with Russia globally for project construction.[59]
Although energy products account for two-thirds of Sino-Russian trade, agriculture is another area that both sides hope to develop. In 2022 China benefited from increased Russian exports of food, which grew by 44 percent in terms of value and 36 percent by volume. China is now the top importer of rapeseed oil, poultry, beef, soybeans, oats, and flax seeds from Russia. Exports of Russian fish also jumped 46 percent by volume and 68 percent by value. The surge in food imports from Russia in part reflects the removal of Chinese COVID restrictions.[60] Chinese officials are optimistic about agricultural cooperation with Russia, claiming that the PRC is ready to triple its imports of Russian soybeans over the next two years. Because Russia already sends nearly 90 percent of its soybeans to China and the availability of additional land for their cultivation is questionable, a major expansion of their soybean trade may not be feasible. China is now willing to import wheat and barley from all over Russia, removing the rest of the phytosanitary barriers that had been in place since 1997 due to a pathogen in the country.[61] However, Chinese companies are cautious about increasing their investments in Russian agriculture due to the threat of counter-sanctions and the volatility of the ruble.[62]
Interestingly, China is the top beneficiary of the Black Sea Grain Initiative that Russia has been threatening to scrap. According to Ukrainian statistics, China has received one-third of the 26 million tons of grain and corn transported along the Black Sea corridor since July 2022. In fact, 2022 proved to be a peak year for agricultural trade between Ukraine and China, though at steeply discounted prices.[63] A few days before a deal was reached by the United Nations and Turkey, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi put forward an initiative on global food security,[64] a theme that is also emphasized in China’s February 23, 2023 position paper on Ukraine.[65] Although China is the single largest recipient of Black Sea grain, some 55 percent goes to the developing countries.[66]
Sino-Russian Interdependence
Given the growing importance of the Chinese market for the Russian economy, some experts foresee Russia inevitably becoming China’s vassal, a viewpoint that Putin has rejected angrily and PRC officials also have refuted.[67] Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin, argues that Russia is becoming more dependent on China than it ever was on Europe. Putin is willing to pay this price to prosecute Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Gabuev warns that in the future China may demand payback, for example, by curtailing Russian military cooperation with India or Vietnam. [68]
Weak states, such as North Korea for example, however dependent, still have considerable agency. Despite its dependence on China for 90 percent of its trade, Chinese leaders have had little success in reining in North Korea’s provocative nuclear policies. Russia is not North Korea—Russia has considerable energy resources and military and other technologies that other states want to buy, and despite the sanctions, Russia has maintained relationships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. In the Arctic, where Russia finds itself increasingly isolated, Russian officials continue to engage with a range of partners, despite some recent overtures to China regarding investments.[69]
Interdependence is a more accurate description of the Sino-Russian partnership as China needs Russian energy, assistance with its civilian nuclear program, support in the UN, military cooperation, and the appearance (if not the reality as of yet) of joint action in the Indo-Pacific. Despite uncertainties and foreign policy costs to China of a deepening partnership with Russia due to its ongoing war in Ukraine, this association brings substantial geostrategic and economic benefits to Beijing. Ivan Zuenko, a China expert at the Moscow State International Relations Institute (MGIMO), emphasizes that “For China, Russia is needed not as a weak, unstable state, of which there are so many on our continent, but as a strong predictable foreign policy partner and a reliable supplier of strategic resources.”[70]
This explains Beijing’s sudden motivation, after sitting on the sidelines for a year, to engage in diplomacy in Ukraine. The best scenario for China is a diplomatically acceptable status quo that enables China to pursue its interests in Europe as well as in Russia, while preserving the Russian state as a great power. In Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s May 17, 2023, meeting with Li Hui, PRC special envoy to Ukraine, the Ukrainian government clearly rejected any “freezing” of the conflict or any loss of territory to Russia.[71] Ukrainian officials further told Li Hui that Ukraine’s own peace proposal should be the basis of any negotiated settlement,[72] demonstrating that Xi’s plan remains a non-starter in Kyiv. While some in the international community bank on China reining in Russian aggression, how much influence China actually has over Russia—even in its economically weakened and internationally restricted position remains to be seen, as well as the results of Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive.
About the Contributor
Elizabeth Wishnick is Senior Research Scientist in CNA’s China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division, on leave from her position as Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University. She is also Senior Research Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University. The views expressed here are strictly her own. For more on her work, see www.chinasresourcerisks.com and https://elizabethwishnick.academia.edu/.
She would like to thank Samuel Robertson for his research and editing assistance.
Photo credit:
Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons